Fairfax stock positions

[Crip1]

1 hour ago, 73 Reds said:

Show of hands:  Who here would not accept 17% annualized growth for the next 40 years?  Anyone?

My arm shot up so fast that that I tore my rotator cuff.

 

-Crip

[gfp]

1 minute ago, Crip1 said:

My arm shot up so fast that that I tore my rotator cuff.

 

-Crip

Crips a big baller, they need at least 19% or they don’t get out of bed in the morning. Me, I would accept that 17% for 40 years because I have more modest aspirations 

[Crip1]

2 minutes ago, gfp said:

Crips a big baller, they need at least 19% or they don’t get out of bed in the morning. Me, I would accept that 17% for 40 years because I have more modest aspirations 

To be clear, my comment was tongue-in-cheek!

[TwoCitiesCapital]

I think this Fairfax bad/Fairfax good debate isn't clear cut - nor do I believe that major changes have occurred.

 

Largely, I believe that Fairfax's investment style just happens to be in vogue at this time. 

 

Fairfax still makes large macro calls - a la their bond portfolio and duration calls. Fairfax still invests in small cap turnarounds. Is just the booming liquidity and economy post-2021 has been more supportive of those efforts than 2015-2020.

 

In 2015 we had a large corporate earnings recession that ravaged energy and commodity companies (though you wouldn't know it from large cap indexes).

 

2016 - 2019 you had a rate hiking cycle culminating in the breaking of over right funding rates. The lows of the 2018 drawdown for small caps took them back to the levels they had traded at in 2015. 

 

In 2019 we had an industrial recession which culminated in COVID hitting in 2020. 

 

Energy/commodity cost suffered during this period. Most things not denominated in USD suffered in this period. Small caps massively underperformed large caps. What's does Fairfax tend to own? Small caps, intl, and industrial names. 

 

What is working for them now? Small caps, intl, and industrial names. 

 

 

[Hoodlum]

Strathcona lost out in its bid for MEG.  that would mean Fairfax would soon see a $10/share dividend from Waterous. 
 

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-cenovus-energy-acquiring-meg-energy/

[Hamburg Investor]

22 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

 

Eurobank was a bad investment in 2014. And a good one in the next years

 

But today we see Eurobank was a great investment (while not the very first investment into it... ;-), but Mr. Market didn't like it until 2021 or so. 

 

@Viking Yes, it’s always good to learn and discuss - and reading your input here at cobf is one of the best examples I could imagine - thank you! 

 

I think, you read over, that I agree on the 2014 investment in Eurobank being a bad investment. 
 

You write „Fairfax didn’t exit Eurobank - Fairfax decided back in 2019 that it was one of the keepers.“ snd that that was a good decision.

 

I agree, that that was a good decision, but it even was a good decision to buy Eurobank in 2015. At least, the returns are good over that decade until today.

 

Maybe we disagree on how we value investments as good or bad.
 

My thinking is, that Prems buying decision in 2015 was a good one. To me it seems a relatively natural view to look at it like this

- Prem bought Eurobank end of 2015 at a fraction of book value. Classical value investment.

- But it could have been a value trap. But it clearly wasn’t

- I don‘t see Eurobank being overvalued today, so looking at the overall returns, seeing the progress my resumee is: That was a good decision. Prem was right in his estimate, that this investment in 2015 was cheap and not a value trap. That to me shows his ability. He is not right all the time (see the Eurobank investment before..), but often enough (if you’re right in 51 percent of all decisions, you’re better than average - Prem clearly is way better than that)

- the overall outcome of the buy decisions (excludibg the first one) brought a positive outcome. And management of Eurobank delivered; so better than written before here by me, it not only was a value investment, but Eurobank tirns out to be a compounding machine. Prem nailed it

- Until 2021 the investment not really performed well as you say and I agree. But for me the reason was Mr. Market. He was so sure, that greek investements would be bad ones forever and interest rates would stay low forever. He wasn’t anticipating crisis (covid, russia going war with ukraine) and inflation popping up and interest following. 

I am pretty sure, that without that crisis (or another inflation bearing crisis in the meantime) kicking in, we wouldn‘t look at such a clear turning point like we have with 2020/2021, when looking at Prems performance. He was right, that interest rate wouldn’t stay low forever. But it wasn‘t clear to him or anyone, that things would turn so rapidly. But when it happend Prem anticipated and took his chance brilliantly. 
 

 

 

Edited August 22, 2025 by Hamburg Investor

[Viking]

2 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

@Viking Yes, it’s always good to learn and discuss - and reading your input here at cobf is one of the best examples I could imagine - thank you! 

 

I think, you read over, that I agree on the 2014 investment in Eurobank being a bad investment. 
 

You write „Fairfax didn’t exit Eurobank - Fairfax decided back in 2019 that it was one of the keepers.“ snd that that was a good decision.

 

I agree, that that was a good decision, but it even was a good decision to buy Eurobank in 2015. At least, the returns are good over that decade until today.

 

Maybe we disagree on how we value investments as good or bad.
 

My thinking is, that Prems buying decision in 2015 was a good one. To me it seems a relatively natural view to look at it like this

- Prem bought Eurobank end of 2015 at a fraction of book value. Classical value investment.

- But it could have been a value trap. But it clearly wasn’t

- I don‘t see Eurobank being overvalued today, so looking at the overall returns, seeing the progress my resumee is: That was a good decision. Prem was right in his estimate, that this investment in 2015 was cheap and not a value trap. That to me shows his ability. He is not right all the time (see the Eurobank investment before..), but often enough (if you’re right in 51 percent of all decisions, you’re better than average - Prem clearly is way better than that)

- the overall outcome of the buy decisions (excludibg the first one) brought a positive outcome. And management of Eurobank delivered; so better than written before here by me, it not only was a value investment, but Eurobank tirns out to be a compounding machine. Prem nailed it

- Until 2021 the investment not really performed well as you say and I agree. But for me the reason was Mr. Market. He was so sure, that greek investements would be bad ones forever and interest rates would stay low forever. He wasn’t anticipating crisis (covid, russia going war with ukraine) and inflation popping up and interest following. 

I am pretty sure, that without that crisis (or another inflation bearing crisis in the meantime) kicking in, we wouldn‘t look at such a clear turning point like we have with 2020/2021, when looking at Prems performance. He was right, that interest rate wouldn’t stay low forever. But it wasn‘t clear to him or anyone, that things would turn so rapidly. But when it happend Prem anticipated and took his chance brilliantly. 

@Hamburg Investor, I don’t disagree with anything you say above. I like to construct mental models to help me understand Fairfax especially from an historical perspective. My mental models are flexible. I really appreciate the opportunity to debate ideas. So thank you. 
 

You bring up another point that is a big strength of Fairfax: how committed they are to their larger investments. They want them to work out. And Fairfax has been very creative in finding solutions to help put the struggling holdings in a position to succeed. 
 

When I managed sales teams at both Kraft and Saputo in my previous life I told them my job was to solve their problems. What was stopping them from being sucessful? Tell me. I would solve it. So they could do their part and deliver oustanding sales results. Of course I had to walk the talk - and solve legit issues (which I think I did for the most part). Good sales people loved that approach. Bad sales people hated it - they had no where to hide.

I think Fairfax has been taking a similar approach with their associate/consolidated equity holdings. Especially back in the 2018/2019/2020 time period. Back then there were lots of problems:

- EXCO Resources - recapitalization as a private company. 

- AGT Food and Ingredients - take private. Terrible business model for a public company. Much better as a private holding.

- Eurobank - merge with Grivalia Properties (recapitalization).

- Farmers Edge - spac IPO. Didn’t work out. Ended in bankruptcy.
- Boat Rocker - spac IPO. Didn’t work out. Just folded in to Blue Ant (a stronger company). 
- Recipe - take private. Allow it to digest a decade of acquisitions (extremely difficult to do as a public company). Just folded in Keg Royalties Income Fund.

Fairfax took the same approach with well run equity holdings.

- IIFL - split into 3 companies (Finance, Wealth and Securities) and a 4th (5paisa) was spun off. 

- Quess - just split into three companies.
 

There are more examples. Bottom line, this approach helps their equity holdings deliver better results over time. 

 

Edited August 23, 2025 by Viking

[villainx]

56 minutes ago, Viking said:

Fairfax has been very creative in finding solutions to help put the struggling holdings in a position to succeed. 

 

Hmm... sounds like the making of a short report, Fairfax creative engineering.

 

[Parsad]

The bigger issue long-term is going to be replacing Brian and his abilities.  Fairfax will always have a large bond portfolio because of its insurance business.  Finding someone as gifted as Brian may be a 1 in 1,000,000 problem. 

 

There is the new young guy that people say is doing great, but Brian made certain calls over his career that were just extraordinary.  He is arguably one of the greatest fixed income managers in market history, especially over the duration of his career and the market beating results he has given Fairfax.  He didn't just beat his peers, he killed them...over decades!

 

This is where the young guys like Wade and Lawrence will influence the equity side to provide more steady, consistent results rather than as lumpy as we've been used to.  But their smoother earnings on the equity side may be tempered by lesser results on the overall bond portfolio.  

 

Nonetheless, Fairfax only needs a 4% return on the entire portfolio to hit its 15% ROE target.  Combine that with a well-run insurance business, they should be able to hit their past return of 17% annualized.  Cheers!

[treasurehunt]

3 hours ago, Parsad said:

Nonetheless, Fairfax only needs a 4% return on the entire portfolio to hit its 15% ROE target.  Combine that with a well-run insurance business, they should be able to hit their past return of 17% annualized.  Cheers!

 

How do you come up with 4%? The investment portfolio is about 3 times equity ($70B vs $25B or so). Even assuming zero expenses, a 4% return on the investment portfolio is only a 12% ROE. And realistically, you have deductions for interest on debt, corporate overhead, non-controlling interests, run-off and taxes. Non-controlling interests and run-off may not be relevant in the near future, but the rest are here to stay. I estimate that the investment portfolio will have to return better than 6% for Fairfax to hit the 15% ROE target. What am I missing?

[Marco Van Basten]

1 minute ago, treasurehunt said:

 

How do you come up with 4%? The investment portfolio is about 3 times equity ($70B vs $25B or so). Even assuming zero expenses, a 4% return on the investment portfolio is only a 12% ROE. And realistically, you have deductions for interest on debt, corporate overhead, non-controlling interests, run-off and taxes. Non-controlling interests and run-off may not be relevant in the near future, but the rest are here to stay. I estimate that the investment portfolio will have to return better than 6% for Fairfax to hit the 15% ROE target. What am I missing?

Underwriting profits?

[treasurehunt]

40 minutes ago, Marco Van Basten said:

Underwriting profits?

 

Yes, good point. Even adding in a reasonable estimate for that, 4% is too low for 15% ROE, I think. Net earned premiums are around $25B I believe, so a combined ratio of 96 would add 4% to pre-tax ROE or 3% post-tax. But my estimate that the portfolio needs to return 6%+ is too high. Thanks.

[SafetyinNumbers]

1 hour ago, treasurehunt said:

 

Yes, good point. Even adding in a reasonable estimate for that, 4% is too low for 15% ROE, I think. Net earned premiums are around $25B I believe, so a combined ratio of 96 would add 4% to pre-tax ROE or 3% post-tax. But my estimate that the portfolio needs to return 6%+ is too high. Thanks.

I like this table to show the ROE decomposition. I think a 96 combined is way too conservative. More likely to be under 94 than 96 over the next 5 years, in my opinion as reserve releases ramp and they benefit from scale. Also, net premiums are closer to $28b and growing. 
 

[treasurehunt]

3 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

I like this table to show the ROE decomposition. I think a 96 combined is way too conservative. More likely to be under 94 than 96 over the next 5 years, in my opinion as reserve releases ramp and they benefit from scale. Also, net premiums are closer to $28b and growing. 
 

 

That's an excellent template. A 4% investment yield leads to a 12.5% operating ROE according to this table. That is a lot closer to 15% than I would have guessed. It remains to be seen whether 93% is a good estimate for the long-term combined ratio.

 

[dartmonkey]

4 hours ago, treasurehunt said:

That's an excellent template. A 4% investment yield leads to a 12.5% operating ROE according to this table. That is a lot closer to 15% than I would have guessed. It remains to be seen whether 93% is a good estimate for the long-term combined ratio.

Seconded. Safety has posted this table before but I hadn’t appreciated how elegant it was. It clears up nicely the question about how much it is reasonable to estimate that underwriting contributes to ROE, and how much of a drag there is likely to be from overhead, financing, tax, and preferred shares (7.9% total, by my calculation.)

 

Maybe there’s a companion table that breaks down how they come up with a pre-tax investment yield of 7.0%? At year end 2024 they had a bond portfolio of $46.8b earning 5.2% pre-tax, and a $17.5b stock portfolio, along with some cash, for a total investment portfolio of $67.4b. Assuming the cash is earning nothing, that would mean that to get to 7.0% pre-tax from investments (close to the long-term average of 7.7%), we would need $4.72b, with $46.8*0.052 = $2.43b of that coming from the bond portfolio, and the rest, $2.27b, coming from the equity portfolio. That would mean the equity portfolio would have to return $2.27/$17.5=13.0%. If they hit that mark, they would get an overall post-tax ROE of 18.8%, like in Safety’s chart. 

 

To hit their 15% ROE target, at a tax rate of 24.4%, they would need a pre-tax ROE of 15%/(1-.244)=19.8%, instead of the current 25.2% pre-tax, 5.4% lower. That would mean that if underwriting, interest and expenses, and bond returns stayed the same, equity investments would only need to return 14.4%, and given the 2.8x leverage, that means we would only need 5.1% from equity investments. This seems almost impossible to miss, given the investments like Eurobank 6x earnings, so a yield of about 16-17% at year end, obviously a bit lower yield now) or Poseidon (carried at $1.9b, which was 7x 2024 earnings according to the annual report.) And this is without considering the possibility that Fairfax gets even better returns by selling opportunistically, like they have done recently with Stelco or the bond portfolio. 

[Viking]

What type of return do people think Fairfax is currently earning in its investment portfolio? And what type of return do people think they can earn in an average year (I call this a normalized rate of return)?

 

Return = % of average total investment portfolio value (beginning of year total investments plus end of year total investments divided by two).

 

Of course, one of the key questions is what type of 'return' are you calculating?

• Accounting return (i.e. only including items captured in reported results?)
• Intrinsic value return (i.e. accounting items plus non-accounting items? The obvious non-accounting item is excess of FV over CV. But there are other non-accounting items that could be included.

What other important assumptions are you including?

 

Compared to a traditional P/C instance company, Fairfax is levered much more to investment results than insurance results. Getting the total return from investments estimate right is the critical input to value the company. 

 

Edited August 24, 2025 by Viking

[Viking]

2 hours ago, Viking said:

What type of return do people think Fairfax is currently earning in its investment portfolio? And what type of return do people think they can earn in an average year (I call this a normalized rate of return)?

 

Return = % of average total investment portfolio value (beginning of year total investments plus end of year total investments divided by two).

 

Of course, one of the key questions is what type of 'return' are you calculating?

• Accounting return (i.e. only including items captured in reported results?)
• Intrinsic value return (i.e. accounting items plus non-accounting items? The obvious non-accounting item is excess of FV over CV. But there are other non-accounting items that could be included.

What other important assumptions are you including?

 

Compared to a traditional P/C instance company, Fairfax is levered much more to investment results than insurance results. Getting the total return from investments estimate right is the critical input to value the company. 

 

 

And here is a bonus question to the one I asked above: Are Fairfax's investment results volatile? I look forward to hearing other posters thoughts...

Edited August 24, 2025 by Viking

[dartmonkey]

18 hours ago, Viking said:

What type of return do people think Fairfax is currently earning in its investment portfolio? And what type of return do people think they can earn in an average year (I call this a normalized rate of return)?

 

Return = % of average total investment portfolio value (beginning of year total investments plus end of year total investments divided by two).

 

Of course, one of the key questions is what type of 'return' are you calculating?

• Accounting return (i.e. only including items captured in reported results?)
• Intrinsic value return (i.e. accounting items plus non-accounting items? The obvious non-accounting item is excess of FV over CV. But there are other non-accounting items that could be included.

 

This is an excellent question, and a good follow-up to the discussion about ROE from last week. In the table that SafetyinNumbers posted, RBC Capital Markets said the return was 7.0%, with 2.8x leverage, implying a 19.9% contribution to ROE, in addition to underwriting gains (7.8%) but before overhead, financing drag, tax and preferred dividends, bringing the total of what they call operating ROE back down to 18.8% for 2024. This of course does not include the occasional realized gain or loss from opportunistic sales, which historically has provided additional return.

 

But what is in that 7.0%? Given the end of 2024 breakdown of $17.5b in equity investments and $46.8b in the bond portfolio, plus a bit of cash and 'other', for a total investment portfolio of $67.4b, we have an equation where we can solve for the return of the equity investments, since we know the overall number (7.0%) and we also have the number Fairfax has reported (in the 2024 AR) for the bond portfolio (5.2%). That means we can calculated that the equity portfolio must have returned 13%, but as Viking asks, what type of return is that? Is it the reported earnings, using the unrealized gains in the mark to market portfolio, plus the dividends from associated investments, ignoring retained earnings until the investment is sold? I think the answer is yes, which would mean that any increase in fair value (FV) over carrying value (CV) is not in that earnings number. 

 

In addition, for some of their investments, one could legitimately ask whether 'fair value' is really fair. Eurobank is the best example - it is now trading at 7x earnings, but one might argue that it is really worth more than that, given its positioning, the strength of the Greek economy, the boost to earnings that will come as they integrate the Cyprus bank into their operations, etc. So hopefully there is an additional layer of true value (TV?) accumulating on top of FV, itself well above CV.

[Viking]

2 hours ago, dartmonkey said:

This is an excellent question, and a good follow-up to the discussion about ROE from last week. In the table that SafetyinNumbers posted, RBC Capital Markets said the return was 7.0%, with 2.8x leverage, implying a 19.9% contribution to ROE, in addition to underwriting gains (7.8%) but before overhead, financing drag, tax and preferred dividends, bringing the total of what they call operating ROE back down to 18.8% for 2024. This of course does not include the occasional realized gain or loss from opportunistic sales, which historically has provided additional return.

 

But what is in that 7.0%? Given the end of 2024 breakdown of $17.5b in equity investments and $46.8b in the bond portfolio, plus a bit of cash and 'other', for a total investment portfolio of $67.4b, we have an equation where we can solve for the return of the equity investments, since we know the overall number (7.0%) and we also have the number Fairfax has reported (in the 2024 AR) for the bond portfolio (5.2%). That means we can calculated that the equity portfolio must have returned 13%, but as Viking asks, what type of return is that? Is it the reported earnings, using the unrealized gains in the mark to market portfolio, plus the dividends from associated investments, ignoring retained earnings until the investment is sold? I think the answer is yes, which would mean that any increase in fair value (FV) over carrying value (CV) is not in that earnings number. 

 

In addition, for some of their investments, one could legitimately ask whether 'fair value' is really fair. Eurobank is the best example - it is now trading at 7x earnings, but one might argue that it is really worth more than that, given its positioning, the strength of the Greek economy, the boost to earnings that will come as they integrate the Cyprus bank into their operations, etc. So hopefully there is an additional layer of true value (TV?) accumulating on top of FV, itself well above CV.

@dartmonkey, good point. When investors calculate the total return of Fairfax’s investment portfolio are they calculating the accounting or the economic return? They are very different numbers. 
 

And when investors look at the volatility of the returns from Fairfax’s investment portfolio why is 1-year the time frame used? Is this the right timeframe for an investor to use? (A 1-year timeframe makes sense for a speculator to use.) What is interesting is using a 2-year timeframe (which is still incredibly short term) the volatility of Fairfax’s total investment returns largely disappears. 
 

Things that make you go ‘hymmm…’

Edited August 25, 2025 by Viking

[Viking]

Estimate of change in MV of Fairfax’s equity portfolio in QTD-Q3, 2025 (to Aug 22)

 

A warning. When looking at Fairfax’s equity holdings, what matters to investors is the underlying business performance achieved by the holdings over time. Not the quarterly change in market value. 

 

Short term (quarterly) changes in market value will be volatile. As a result, short term (quarterly) changes in market value should be viewed with an appropriate amount of scepticism by investors.

 

So why track quarterly changes?

 

Because it is interesting. And it can provide some insight into one of Fairfax’s large income streams - investment gains (losses) - prior to the release of quarterly earnings. 

 

Importantly, over time (like a couple of years), the change in the market value of Fairfax’s equity holdings should roughly match the change in their intrinsic business value.

 

-----------

 

From June 30 to August 22, 2025 (QTD-Q3), Fairfax’s equity portfolio (the holdings that I track) has increased in market value by about $879 million (pre-tax), or 3.5%. 

• In Q1-2025, the increase in market value was $785 million (pre-tax), or 3.5%. 
• In Q2-2025, the increase in market value was $1.96 billion (pre-tax), or 8.5%. 

This puts the total YTD-2025 increase in Fairfax equity portfolio at about $3.6 billion, or 16%, or $154 per diluted FFH share (pre-tax). Please note, my tracker does not capture the value creation of some of Fairfax’s private holdings. This means my numbers are understated.  

 

To state the obvious, Fairfax’s equity holdings have performed exceptionally well over the first 8 months of 2025. 

 

The equity portfolio had a total value of about $26.4 billion at August 22, 2025. 

 

Included in our estimates are details from Fairfax’s Q2-2025 interim earnings report and 13F report. 

 

 

Notes: 

• The FFH-TRS position is included in the mark to market bucket and at its notional value (this position has a market value of $3.1 billion). Convertible bonds, warrants and debentures are also included in the mark to market bucket.
• Digit: My tracker does not include Digit, Fairfax’s publicly traded P/C insurance company in India. Part of Fairfax’s ownership position in Digit is market to market. Digit’s shares were up a small amount QTD-Q3.
• Currency: US$ weakness has been a tailwind for Fairfax in 2025. Where the benefit shows up in reported results is a little complicated (net income or OCI). 

The ‘tracker portfolio’ is not an exact match to Fairfax’s actual holdings. It is useful only as a tool to understand the rough change in value of Fairfax’s equity portfolio (and not the precise change).

 

Split of holdings by accounting treatment

 

About 48% of Fairfax’s equity holdings are mark to market - and will fluctuate each quarter with changes in equity markets. The other 52% are Associates and Consolidated holdings. 

 

 

Split of total gains by accounting treatment

 

The total change is an increase of about $879 million = $37/diluted share (pre-tax)

The mark to market change is an increase of about $159 million = $6.72/ diluted share. 

 

 

What were the big movers in the equity portfolio in Q2, 2025?

 

Eurobank continues its excptional run in 2025 (and the past 5 years). Other strong performers QTD were Metlen, CIB, Orla and Cleveland-Cliffs. The biggest laggard was FFH-TRS. 

 

 

Excess of fair value over carrying value

 

The excess of FV over CV for non-insurance associate and consolidated holdings is about $3.1 billion or $133/diluted share (pre-tax). It was $1.5 billion at December 31, 2024. It is up significantly in 2015 (about 100%).

 

The 'excess of FV to CV’ has been materially increasing in recent years. This is economic value that has been created by Fairfax that is not captured in accounting value (earnings or book value) – it is one good example of how annual EPS and book value is understated at Fairfax. (Note, the carrying value we use in our tracker for associate and consolidated holdings is from June 30, 2025 so our number will likely be a little high).

 

Excess of FV over CV = $3.1 billion = $133/diluted share (pre-tax)

• Associates        = $2.3 billion
• Consolidated    = $0.8 billion

Equity Tracker Spreadsheet explained:

 

We have separated holdings by accounting treatment: 

• Mark to market
• Associates – equity accounted 
• Consolidated
• Other Holdings – total return swaps and warrants/debentures

The value of each holding is calculated by multiplying the share price by the number of shares. All holdings are tracked in US$, so the values of non-US holdings have been adjusted for currency.

 

This spreadsheet contains errors. It also contains some information that is dated (like the carrying value for associate and consolidated holdings). Please keep this in mind. The spreadsheet is updated as new information becomes available.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited August 25, 2025 by Viking

[Hoodlum]

Thanks @Viking for the detailed breakdown of the equity portfolio so far.   I didn't see it mentioned, but did you account of the sale of Praktiker in Q3.  This looks like a ~$100M gain.

[Viking]

45 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

Thanks @Viking for the detailed breakdown of the equity portfolio so far.   I didn't see it mentioned, but did you account of the sale of Praktiker in Q3.  This looks like a ~$100M gain.

@Hoodlum, good catch. No, I have not included the gain from the sale of Praktiker. That should result in a nice realized gain in Q3. 

[Hoodlum]

45 minutes ago, Viking said:

@Hoodlum, good catch. No, I have not included the gain from the sale of Praktiker. That should result in a nice realized gain in Q3. 

One transaction that can sometimes get missed when looking at equity value increases, are large onetime dividend payouts such as was done with Stelco.   We will likely see another large onetime dividend payout from Waterous (Strathcona) this year that represents >25% of current equity value.  

[Viking]

2 hours ago, Hoodlum said:

One transaction that can sometimes get missed when looking at equity value increases, are large onetime dividend payouts such as was done with Stelco.   We will likely see another large onetime dividend payout from Waterous (Strathcona) this year that represents >25% of current equity value.  

An untold story for Fairfax is how much cash the various investments are spitting out today. Some are visible. Others are not. Fixed income is yielding 5.1%. And the equities are now a significant source of cash for Fairfax. Examples: selldown of the Eurobank position in Q1. Dividend from Eurobank in Q2. Quarterly dividend payments from Poseidon. Etc. In 2024, examples were the initiation of the dividend from Eurobank. Poseidon payments. The significant one time dividend payment from Digit in Q4 (as part of their IPO). There are lots more… these are just some quick examples that came to mind. 
 

Of course, asset sales are another significant source of cash each year. 
 

The investment portfolio has now become a significant source of cash for Fairfax. This is a new/emerging story. With ‘old Fairfax’ fixed income was generating much less cash for Fairfax. And equities were uses of a significant amount of cash. The swing is very large. 

Edited August 25, 2025 by Viking

[glider3834]

https://www.marketscreener.com/news/metlen-energy-set-for-ftse-100-replacing-taylor-wimpey-ftse-russell-ce7c50d9dc88f12d