Fairfax 2025

[djokovic1]

On 2/19/2025 at 6:30 PM, Viking said:

 

@djokovic1, nice analysis. Another thing to keep in mind is book value at a traditional insurance company will capture the value of the investment portfolio pretty accurately. Because most insurance companies are 90% bonds/fixed income and these are pretty easy to value. 

 

Fairfax has a big equity portfolio. Over the past 5 years, excess of fair value over carrying value for associate and consolidated companies has increased in value by about $2 billion (from a negative number to a big positive number today). My guess is none of this significant value creation is captured in Fairfax's L5Y ROE of 17.3% that you posted above.

 

And there is even more. The 'fair value' for holdings like BIAL also look materially low. My guess is there are other examples (like what is phantom holding AGT Food Ingredients worth these days?).

 

Bottom line, Fairfax's performance over the past 5 years has been much better than people realize. 'Best in class' is not an exaggeration.  

 

Thanks @Viking and completely agreed. That’s why I expect 15-20 % EPS compounding and not just 15% over the next few years.

[SafetyinNumbers]

13 hours ago, This2ShallPass said:

Both these methods give the same IV ($56-58B). Much higher than the $33B market cap. Do you believe Fairfax is still that undervalued? 

Yes, I do. I wouldn’t have been buying up to last week and have 49% of my net assets in it if I didn’t think so. As I tried to explain in the substack, I use a 10% hurdle rate which means there are an abundance of opportunities in the current market that meet my hurdle.
 

What makes FFH special enough to demand half my capital is twofold. To start, the hurdle rate seems likely to be exceeded over the next 5 years by a wide margin. I consider the chances average ROE exceeds 15% over that period to be 90%+ so the odds of exceeding 10% are even higher. I think the odds of 25% are higher than 10% by a wide margin. 
 

As a probabilistic investor, that’s a very special set up on fundamentals alone but on top of that the odds for multiple expansion seem very high and are open ended. There is lots of support for the multiple to expand including index add potential, potentially 10 years averaging >15% ROE (4 down, 6 to go) which leads to holders less likely to sell, 7m shares already repurchased or under TRS leaving less supply. 
 

I think people selling this week are playing a relative return game and not an absolute return game with a reasonable hurdle. I think the latter is most of the shareholder base but there will always be marginal holders. The less marginal shares available though means the higher the share price will go when passive and Canadian active PMs have to buy without regard for value. 
 

 

 

[This2ShallPass]

10 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

To start, the hurdle rate seems likely to be exceeded over the next 5 years by a wide margin. I consider the chances average ROE exceeds 15% over that period to be 90%+ so the odds of exceeding 10% are even higher. I think the odds of 25% are higher than 10% by a wide margin. 

I don't share the same level of confidence that Fairfax is 40% undervalued, but I really hope you're right.

 

What else needs to go right to get to the 25% ROE scenario? Even in these hard market years we could only get to 15%. Do you see them significantly increasing interest income (maybe w corporate spreads widening)?

[SafetyinNumbers]

7 hours ago, This2ShallPass said:

I don't share the same level of confidence that Fairfax is 40% undervalued, but I really hope you're right.

 

What else needs to go right to get to the 25% ROE scenario? Even in these hard market years we could only get to 15%. Do you see them significantly increasing interest income (maybe w corporate spreads widening)?

It’s in the substack I linked above. The short story is that expectations for underwriting, the equity portfolio, insurance gains like Ki and optionality of the fixed income portfolio are too low. We don’t know exactly where the gains will come from or how big they will be but given the 3:1 investment:equity leverage, it doesn’t take that much to get over a 20% ROE especially. 
 

Your comment “only get to 15%” ROE in the hard market years is misleading because it’s been better than 15% for the past 4 years. Also, the substack explains how conservative reserving delays some of the profit of a hard market until years later while the float growth is enjoyed contemporaneously. 
 

Edited February 21 by SafetyinNumbers

[Viking]

How Does Fairfax’s Valuation Compare to Other P/C Insurance Co’s

 

There are lots of methods an investor can use to value a company and its share price. In this post, we are going to use a method called ‘relative valuation.’ We are going to compare Fairfax to other P/C insurance peers to see what we can learn. How have they performed? How are they being valued today? When compared to some of the best P/C insurance companies in North America.

 

Which companies are we going to include?

 

Below is the list of the seven P/C insurers we will compare (listed in alphabetical order):

• Berkshire Hathaway: historically, the gold standard; now more of a conglomerate than P/C insurer. We include it for fun.
• Chubb: Large, traditional insurer; international in scope.
• Fairfax Financial: An up-and-comer; about 30% of investments are in equities; international in scope.
• Intact Financial: Largest P/C insurer in Canada; expanding globally.
• Markel: ‘Baby Berk’; US focus
• Travelers: Large, traditional insurer; US focus. Part of DJIA.
• WR Berkley: Traditional insurer; US focus

To state the obvious, all P/C insurance companies have unique business models.  As a result, we will keep our analysis very high level. Buffett suggests 5 years is a good time frame to use to measure/evaluate the performance of a company - so that is what we will use.

 

The post has been updated to include 2024 actuals for Berkshire Hathaway.

—————

 

“In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.” Warren Buffett

 

The most important metric used by investors and analysts to assess the performance of a P/C insurance company is change in book value. Yes, it has its flaws. However, it is a good place to start.

 

5-Year Change in Book Value

 

We are going to look at the change in book value from December 31, 2019 to December 31, 2024. We have sorted the results in the table below from the best to the worst performers.

 

So, which company has increased BVPS the most?

 

Fairfax Financial.

 

Fairfax has grown book value by 118% over the past 5 years, a CAGR of 16.8%. Wow!

 

The second surprise is the size of Fairfax’s outperformance - it is much higher than #2 Berkshire Hathaway and way, way higher (+10% per year) than #6 Chubb and #7 Travelers. I think it is safe to say that Fairfax’s performance has trounced that of its peer group. That is pretty impressive. There are a lot of many quality P/C insurance companies on this list.

 

Were you expecting that? I bet you weren’t expecting that.

 

 

Looking at accounting results is only the start

 

An added wrinkle

 

The investment portfolio of most P/C insurance companies contain mostly bonds. These are easy to value. As  result the value of the investment portfolio captured in book value for most P/C insurance companies is pretty accurate.

 

Fairfax owns lots of equities (about 30% of the total investment portfolio). And over the past 5 years, the ‘excess of fair value over carrying value’ for associate and consolidated companies has increased and sits at $1.48 billion pre-tax ($68/share) at December 31, 2024. This is economic business value that has been created by Fairfax over the past 5 years that has not been captured in its accounting (book) value. When we include this additional value creation, Fairfax’s outperformance versus peers is even better than what we see looking only at the change in BVPS.

 

In recent years Buffett has soured on using book value to measure the performance of Berkshire Hathaway (it is now a conglomerate). His new preferred measure for Berkshire Hathaway? The change in the stock price over time.

 

So let’s now compare the performance of the same group of insurance companies using this measure.

 

Some of our companies pay a dividend. So to be fair, we are going to look at total shareholder return (total increase in share price + dividend paid).

 

5-Year Total Shareholder Return

 

We are going to look at the total shareholder return for the 5-year period from December 31, 2019 to December 31, 2024. Once again, we have sorted the results in the table below from the best to the worst performers.

 

So, which company has seen the biggest increase in their share price?

 

Fairfax Financial. It has delivered a total return of 208% = CAGR of 25.2%

 

That is an outstanding level of performance - especially over a 5 year time frame.

 

A second surprise is the size of Fairfax’s outperformance compared to peers… it has been much better - more than 10% more per year than the #2 WR Berkley and more than 15% higher than #7 Markel. Wow!

 

Markel has been the clear laggard of the group, with a CAGR of 8.6%. The remaining 5 companies all have a very respectable CAGR in the mid to low teens, which is good. The P/C insurance sector has been a pretty good place to invest over the past 5 years.

 

 

Let’s move from measures of past performance. Let’s now look at some measures of valuation and how our 7 companies compare.

 

Let’s start by comparing the stock price with the all important measure of book value.

 

Price to Book Value (P/BV)

 

We are going to use the share price for each company today (Feb 19, 2025). And their book value at December 31, 2024. This will give us a trailing P/BV multiple. We have sorted the results in the table below from the company with the highest multiple (most expensive) to the lowest (cheapest).

 

Does anything in the chart below jump out?

 

Fairfax’s valuation is the cheapest. And compared to the most expensive companies (Intact Financial and WR Berkley), Fairfax’s valuation is much, much cheaper.

 

Fairfax’s valuation is even cheaper than it looks - when we include ‘excess of FV over CV for associate and consolidated holdings’ (we discussed that earlier in this post so we won’t repeat it here).

 

 

 

Let’s look at another valuation measure and see what it tells us.

 

Yes, P/E is frowned upon as an measure to use when analyzing P/C insurance companies. But it can be useful as a tool to compare companies in the same industry. And that is what we are doing here.

 

Price to Earnings Ratio (PE)

 

We are going to use the share price for each company today (Feb 19, 2025). And their reported earnings per share for 2024. This will give us a trailing P/E ratio. We have sorted the results in the table below from the company with the highest ratio (most expensive) to the lowest (cheapest).

 

Does anything in the chart below jump out?

 

Fairfax’s valuation is the cheapest. Again. And compared to the most expensive companies (Intact Financial and WR Berkley), Fairfax’s valuation is much, much cheaper.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

5-Year Performance

 

When looking at a large group of high quality P/C insurance companies, Fairfax has delivered the best performance over the past 5 years - both in terms of increase in BVPS and total shareholder return (share price + dividends).

 

The second key take-away is Fairfax’s outperformance of peers - across both measures - has been significant. It has been much, much better.

 

What this demonstrates is the outstanding job that Fairfax has done of building per share value for shareholders over the past 5 years. It has a high quality P/C insurance business. Its investment management business is once again performing at a very high level. And the execution from its senior management team has been best-in-class.

 

Current Valuation

 

When looking at the same large group of high quality P/C insurance companies, Fairfax’s share price today is trading at the cheapest valuation across both P/BV multiple and PE ratio measures.

 

The second key take-away is how much more cheaper Fairfax than many peers - the gap is very large.

 

What does this mean?

 

An investor today is able to buy the top performing P/C insurance company - with among the best future prospects - at the cheapest valuation.

 

Does that make any sense? No, of course not.

 

"The way of the successful investor is normally to do nothing -- not until you see money lying there, somewhere over in the corner, and all that is left for you to do is go over and pick it up." Jim Rogers

 

—————

 

What is really going on with Fairfax today?

 

Investors have apparently forgotten the incredible power of the P/C insurance (float) model.

 

Buffett leveraged the P/C insurance (float) model to deliver staggeringly high returns for Berkshire Hathaway shareholders. But even more impressive was how long he was able to sustain that performance - it went on for decades.

 

Yes, Fairfax has had 5 very good years. But they are still a small company. It looks to me like they are just getting started.

 

(Hint: There are many ways to use the P/C insurance (float) model to drive incredible returns for shareholders over the long term. Shelby Davis. Henry Singleton/Teledyne. Larry Tisch/Loews. And yes, Warren Buffett/Berkshire Hathaway. The really important point is they all did it in very different ways. Today Fairfax is providing us with the next iteration of how to capitalize on this very powerful model to drive enormous value for shareholders over the long term. Lots of investors just don’t see it yet. And that succinctly explains how the top performer can trade at the cheapest valuation.)

 

Still not sure what to do?

 

If so, you might want to read my last long-form post (it is the sister post to the one above):

 

Is Fairfax ‘the big fish that got away?’ Musings on mistakes that investors keep making.

• https://thecobf.com/forum/topic/21117-fairfax-2025/page/16/#findComment-601681

 

 

Edited February 22 by Viking

[glider3834]

https://www.insuranceinsider.com/article/2eg0na21680fl76l67xmw/behind-the-headlines-mark-allan-on-making-ki-like-a-marketplace-in-its-independent-era

 

the last 6 min were interesting on two points

1. reasons why third party capacity carriers are joining Ki digital follow platform 

2. R&D exp component to Ki's combined ratio that is more capex in nature - which potentially means they could have more of a cost advantage over other Lloyds underwriters than it appears now, as they are currently in an investment phase

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited February 21 by glider3834

[SafetyinNumbers]

50 minutes ago, glider3834 said:

https://www.insuranceinsider.com/article/2eg0na21680fl76l67xmw/behind-the-headlines-mark-allan-on-making-ki-like-a-marketplace-in-its-independent-era

 

the last 6 min were interesting on two points

1. reasons why third party capacity carriers are joining Ki digital follow platform 

2. R&D exp component to Ki's combined ratio that is more capex in nature - which potentially means they could have more of a cost advantage over other Lloyds underwriters than it appears now, as they are currently in an investment phase

 

 

 

 

 

 

Thanks for sharing. I plan to listen this weekend. 
 

I’m curious what you and others on the board think Ki is worth?

[nwoodman]

Just on Ki, some clever posters above posited that Ki might well be another serious home run, but yet flagged, we might be surprised at our fractional share, given Britt trained the model.  I have some thoughts in the note attached, and I agree with both points of view.  This will likely be a 40-50% CAGR over 6 years, and we got to do it with a Gorilla. Not sure how you even handicap a successful Blackstone partnership.  Thanks, @SafetyinNumbers, for all the links you put in your Substack; my notes are far too lazy for that, hence notes.  Currently, 3.5 GWPS premium is my baseline, but +/- 20% is down to the vagaries of the market.  Great business, but what value have they created by working this through + being a partner that delivers for Blackstone? 

 

 

    

   

Ki Insurance Overview.pdf

 

Edited February 22 by nwoodman

[Hoodlum]

2 hours ago, nwoodman said:

Just on Ki, some clever posters above posited that Ki might well be another serious home run, but yet flagged, we might be surprised at our fractional share, given Britt trained the model.  I have some thoughts in the note attached, and I agree with both points of view.  This will likely be a 40-50% CAGR over 6 years, and we got to do it with a Gorilla. Not sure how you even handicap a successful Blackstone partnership.  Thanks, @SafetyinNumbers, for all the links you put in your Substack; my notes are far too lazy for that, hence notes.  Currently, 3.5 GWPS premium is my baseline, but +/- 20% is down to the vagaries of the market.  Great business, but what value have they created by working this through + being a partner that delivers for Blackstone? 

 

 

    

   

Ki Insurance Overview.pdf 1.17 MB · 12 downloads

 

 

Thanks @nwoodman for this detailed review of Ki Insurance.  For some reason I though I had read that Fairfax owned 40% of Ki Insurance, instead of the 20% ownership.  I will need to lower my expectations on any Book impact once we do see an IPO for this.

[SafetyinNumbers]

51 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

 

Thanks @nwoodman for this detailed review of Ki Insurance.  For some reason I though I had read that Fairfax owned 40% of Ki Insurance, instead of the 20% ownership.  I will need to lower my expectations on any Book impact once we do see an IPO for this.

Its 40% if you exclude the Class C preferred. The Class C get paid off with proceeds from the IPO at the IPO price so the higher the valuation the closer to 40% vs 20% they will own. 

[Hoodlum]

14 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

Its 40% if you exclude the Class C preferred. The Class C get paid off with proceeds from the IPO at the IPO price so the higher the valuation the closer to 40% vs 20% they will own. 

 

Ahh.  That makes sense.  So there will be some benefit for Fairfax to wait for the most opportune time to do the IPO.  Does Fairfax have the final say on the IPO timing, based on their 50.6% Voting share?

 

Edited February 22 by Hoodlum

[SafetyinNumbers]

1 hour ago, Hoodlum said:

 

Ahh.  That makes sense.  So there will be some benefit for Fairfax to wait for the most opportune time to do the IPO.  Does Fairfax have the final say on the IPO timing, based on their 50.6% Voting share?

 

i assume like most things that Fairfax does with partners that management and Blackstone will be part of a consensus decision. I assume they all want a good price. I don’t know if they have a need for more primary capital outside of paying off the C’s or if this marketplace approach means they are more capital light than other P&Cs.

[glider3834]

23 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

Thanks for sharing. I plan to listen this weekend. 
 

I’m curious what you and others on the board think Ki is worth?

@SafetyinNumbers I don't have a number in mind as such but just to frame my thought process on  - I guess there are two aspects to Ki's profitability

1. returns from Ki's Syndicate 1618 & 

2. also from start of 2024, remuneration arrangements with 3P capacity providers/carriers - is it fee/commission based or profitability based or some combination of both?

 

They have to deliver an attractive return profile to these 3P capacity providers, so my impression is they are not in a hurry to add more carriers to their platform because they are focused on profitability in underwriting, cost efficiency & optimising their algo. 

 

Whats interesting is if you look at the other smart follow only syndicates they appear to be mostly smart trackers, rather than fully algorithmic risk underwriters, like Ki, & Ki at this stage is also the only digital follow syndicate in Lloyds that is offering capacity from multiple carriers. While Ki operate in a competitive space they have a head start.

 

'Smart follow underwriting includes algorithmic and augmented underwriting for follow business, but also ‘tracker’ underwriters such as Beazley’s Smart Tracker syndicate or Nephila Syndicate 2358. Smart trackers follow specific leads in particular%20lines of business systematically on a portfolio basis, rather than using a machine learning algorithm to judge individual risks like Ki.' https://www.slipcase.com/view/insurer-in-full-how-smart-follow-and-algorithmic-underwriting-are-changing-the-london-market/3

 

When you think about it, the more premium that is written on the Ki marketplace, the more overhead cost per $ of premium should fall - so I would think that bringing in more 3P capacity allows them to lower the expense ratio on all business written. 3P capacity allows them to scale the platform, provide more choice/options to brokers using their platform, without having to use their own capital via Ki's own syndicate as well. Also as they scale the platform & the algo ingests more data you would assume or hope the risk selection of the algo improves over time.

 

So I have different questions - what will the fee/commission stream part of Ki digital services with 3P capacity providers look like? what sort of EBITDA margins can they generate? how low can they get their expense ratio/combined - particularly as they start to monetise their R&D/investment spend over next few years? how much 3P capacity premium can they place over their platform? 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited February 22 by glider3834

[Viking]

Gang, I love all the detailed analysis on Ki. My takeaway is Ki is another (significantly?) undervalued asset sitting on Fairfax’s balance sheet today. Importantly, it is poised to compound at a high rate in the coming years. 
 

We now have a number of different examples of significant value that is being created at Fairfax that is not showing up in accounting results (EPS and BVPS):

• Excess of fair value over carrying value for associate and non-insurance consolidated companies ($1.48 billion = $68/share pre-tax). 
• BIAL - my guess is its current intrinsic value is much higher than its carrying value.
• Ki - the latest example, as discussed in the most recent posts in this thread. 

My guess is there are more examples. Fairfax’s carrying value for Poseidon has not changed much in recent years - at the same time the size of the company has increased dramatically. Grivalia Hospitality is another interesting investment. AGT Food Ingredients is a phantom holding.
 

Bottom line, Fairfax had largely cleaned up its equity portfolio. And that higher quality portfolio has been compounding in value for years now. Some holdings, like Eurobank, we can see. There are lots of holdings at Fairfax where we dan’t see the value that has been building - it is like a spring that is quietly being coiled tighter and tighter…

 

The value that has been created (and will be created in the coming years) will show up over time in accounting results (EPS and BVPS) - via ‘surprise’ investment gains. 

Edited February 22 by Viking

[nwoodman]

10 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

Its 40% if you exclude the Class C preferred. The Class C get paid off with proceeds from the IPO at the IPO price so the higher the valuation the closer to 40% vs 20% they will own. 

True, it also depends on the dilution of shares issued to the public. My quick read is that you need 25% in public hands to meet LSE listing requirements. In the numbers above I have assumed that Blackstone retains all their B shares and only sells the shares issued to cover what’s owing on the C’s.  They may choose to sell some of those into the IPO.  So lots of assumptions, IPO price, timing, dilution etc  but I think you can conclude it will be a decent bump to book value at some point.  

 

In pulling together the notes, it did strike me that this is getting long in the tooth for a Blackstone investment (5-7 years on average), so I wouldn’t be surprised if they run it for a year or so under its own structure with an IPO 2026/2027.  This is consistent with the view you had in your Substack article.

Edited February 23 by nwoodman

[SafetyinNumbers]

3 hours ago, nwoodman said:

True, it also depends on the dilution of shares issued to the public. My quick read is that you need 25% in public hands to meet LSE listing requirements. In the numbers above I have assumed that Blackstone retains all their B shares and only sells the shares issued to cover what’s owing on the C’s.  They may choose to sell some of those into the IPO.  So lots of assumptions, IPO price, timing, dilution etc  but I think you can conclude it will be a decent bump to book value at some point.  

 

In pulling together the notes, it did strike me that this is getting long in the tooth for a Blackstone investment (5-7 years on average), so I wouldn’t be surprised if they run it for a year or so under its own structure with an IPO 2026/2027.  This is consistent with the view you had in your Substack article.

Thanks @glider3834 @nwoodman

 

There aren’t a lot of exciting things going on the LSE lately so I can see how a business with these characteristics which are very much appreciated by the market could have outsized valuation. The initial IPO could have a meaningful boost to ROE but the business itself might be a fast growing company that screens well and keeps an outsized valuation like Digit so the benefit goes on for years via FV over CV at least. 
 

I don’t think Digit has raised Fairfax’s profile much but Ki might because it’s London-based. Europeans are used to buying Canadian stocks. Perhaps, a Ki IPO could convince a few European investors to take a look at Fairfax and recognize its long term potential.

[MMM20]

https://brklyninvestor.com/2025/02/24/brk-2024-annual-report-and-stuff/
 

By the way, in the MKL discussion, someone mentioned Fairfax. Yes, Fairfax has done really well in the past few years after a 'disastrous' run. The biggest mistake was hedging their equity exposure and losing out during a huge rally (tried to time the market!). The deflation trade was a big distraction, but didn't really cost them all that much economically. I just read through the annual reports over the past three years, and it is amazing what they've achieved, growing in the insurance business. India, actually, looks more interesting than anything else. I do own both Fairfax and Fairfax India. Fairfax India looks really interesting but the biggest flaw / problem for BRK-heads like us is that Fairfax will get 20% of any profits (above 5%), so they price their investment management like a hedge fund. Obviously, something like that will make it hard for the stock to trade up to intrinsic value. 

Anyway, here is the updated table including Fairfax. I used the adjusted stock price of FRFHF for simplicity:

Watsa still says he will never invest in technology (what was Blackberry?). This is the sort of dogma that I think can be unhelpful. I can understand not wanting to invest in, say, semiconductors, which is a very capital intensive, cyclical business. But as we keep talking about here, as more and more industries become tech-driven, move online etc., how can you ignore it? Go back 100+ years, and imagine you avoid anything related to the industrial revolution and the technology of the day? But OK, this is all personal preference, and surely, there are people out there doing well with no tech exposure at all.

[villainx]

1 hour ago, MMM20 said:

Watsa still says he will never invest in technology (what was Blackberry?). This is the sort of dogma that I think can be unhelpful.

 

I'm kinda wondering what "technology" entails, or what it means to Buffet, Watsa and others.  Is most of the Mag7 really "technology" technology?  Is lots of stuff in Berkshire and Fairfax as "technology" as most other technology companies: like Digit, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, etc.  Technology impacts are pretty much every facet of their investment and companies.

 

And I'm looking at my own portfolio, I kinda feel I'm underweight "technology" technology.

 

Anyway, this response kinda sounds like an ode to Brooklyn Investor.

[Hektor]

I doubt WEB and Prem are averse to "technology" per se. I feel they keep away because of the rapid disruption this sector has.

[Intelligent_Investor]

I think they refer to technology as the new disruptive stuff like all the AI hype not stuff like Apple, Alphabet etc. 

[Xerxes]

2 hours ago, Hektor said:

I doubt WEB and Prem are averse to "technology" per se. I feel they keep away because of the rapid disruption this sector has.

Even the Bangalore airport has technology it. Tons of it. 
 

I think the “I am averse to technology” is from the bygone era of 2000s and 2010s, where the divide was much clearer. (I.e buying refinery vs Facebook)

[hardcorevalue]

He seeded digit to a billion dollar plus valuation. 

 

That's all the proof you need that he can do tech. 

[Hektor]

1 hour ago, Xerxes said:

Even the Bangalore airport has technology it. Tons of it. 

True. However, BIAL is not a technology provider. That airport is going nowhere. It is probably a predictable business - 10/20/50 years from now it will be doing what it is doing today. Probably more efficiently and at a larger scale. Also, it will likely not have any competitor for another 10-15 years. And, even when a competitor arrives, it is not likely to disrupt BIAL.

 

Compared to technology providers that has to constantly fend off competitors all the time.

[MMM20]

22 minutes ago, hardcorevalue said:

He seeded digit to a billion dollar plus valuation. 

 

That's all the proof you need that he can do tech. 

Exactly. I posted I comment along those lines on the Brooklyn Investor blog post. He’s thoughtful but didn’t seem aware of Digit - that speaks to the misconceptions still out there that explain why FFH is still cheap!
 

Edited February 25 by MMM20

[SafetyinNumbers]

1 hour ago, MMM20 said:

Exactly. I posted I comment along those lines on the Brooklyn Investor blog post. He’s thoughtful but didn’t seem aware of Digit - that speaks to the misconceptions still out there that explain why FFH is still cheap!
 

It was interesting that he said he just read the last three letters. It makes me wonder when he became a shareholder of FFH and FIH and how meaningful the position is. 

 

1 hour ago, MMM20 said:

  1 hour ago, hardcorevalue said:

He seeded digit to a billion dollar plus valuation. 

 

That's all the proof you need that he can do tech. 

Ki too is AI fintech insurer. $100m investment is likely worth billions on IPO.