Russia-Ukrainian War

[Spekulatius]

Interesting channel about what happened with Eagle S.

 

Apparently this vessel was dragging its anchor about a couple of other cables and pipelines before one snapped. There is also spy / surveillance equipment on this ship.

 

This ship from the Russian shadow fleet is blacklisted by Port inspections, has likely no insurance, registered in the UAE and likely not see worthy any more. Finnland can board ships and apprehend them if they are a safety risk within a certain zone.

 

Edited yesterday at 04:24 PM by Spekulatius

[John Hjorth]

Bloomberg - Markets, Commodities [December 27^th 2024] : European Gas Faces a Raft of Challenges With Transit Deal Ending.

 

Subheaders :

 

Stockpiles are falling swiftly, volatility likely to persist

EU will increasingly have to compete with Asia for LNG cargoes.

 

 

-And then, today :

 

Bloomberg - Politics [December 28^th 2024] : Ukraine-Russia Gas Transit Deal At Critical Moment of Truth

 

Subheaders :

 

A deal allowing Russian gas to transit to EU ends on Dec. 31

Slovakia is stepping up pressure for flows to continue.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

Please tell me, aren't there any grown-up and responsible persons in the room here? Only politicians with no real skin in the game [only their respective populations have that], certainly no business persons, not even politicians with a business mindset? -It's just 'head-shaking' ...

[Spekulatius]

I think Austria (not in NATO), Slovakia and Hungary still have been using Russian gas until know. This should have stopped a long time ago as it helps financing the war on Ukraine’s for Russia.

[d29]

And Gazprom will stop deliveries to Moldova starting Jan 1st.

 

This will throw their own separatist region Transnistria intro disarray as they were highly dependend on it for both heating and to subsidize their highly inefficient steel industry.

 

Just in time to wreak havoc in the Moldovan parliamentary elections in spring as well.

[John Hjorth]

35 minutes ago, d29 said:

And Gazprom will stop deliveries to Moldova starting Jan 1st.

 

This will throw their own separatist region Transnistria intro disarray as they were highly dependend on it for both heating and to subsidize their highly inefficient steel industry.

 

Just in time to wreak havoc in the Moldovan parliamentary elections in spring as well.

 

Thank you, @d29,

 

Yeah, that, too.

 

Reuters [December 28^th 2024] : Russia says it will stop gas exports to Moldova from Jan 1

 

It reads like it's an accounting quarrel between Gazprom AR accounting department and Moldovian utility AP accounting department. Somebody - bookkeepers and bean counters - should really be at work here in the Hollidays exchanging papers and notes about account reconsiliations, and get to an agreement, or they should be fired with immediate effect coming Wednesday morning, if not solved and cleared at that time! A diff of USD 700.4 million! 

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

I found this map of the European gas pipeline network yesterday - now try to look at how many gas pipelines go through Ukraine and Belarus into Europe! :

 

entsog.eu [January 11^th 2024, updated February 20^th 2024] : System Capacity Map 2024 [Retrieved December 29^th 2024].

[Spekulatius]

5 hours ago, John Hjorth said:

 

Thank you, @d29,

 

Yeah, that, too.

 

Reuters [December 28^th 2024] : Russia says it will stop gas exports to Moldova from Jan 1

 

It reads like it's an accounting quarrel between Gazprom AR accounting department and Moldovian utility AP accounting department. Somebody - bookkeepers and bean counters - should really be at work here in the Hollidays exchanging papers and notes about account reconsiliations, and get to an agreement, or they should be fired with immediate effect coming Wednesday morning, if not solved and cleared at that time! A diff of USD 700.4 million! 

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

I found this map of the European gas pipeline network yesterday - now try to look at how many gas pipelines go through Ukraine and Belarus into Europe! :

 

entsog.eu [January 11^th 2024, updated February 20^th 2024] : System Capacity Map 2024 [Retrieved December 29^th 2024].

Do you really think this is about an accounting issue?

[John Hjorth]

1 hour ago, Spekulatius said:

Do you really think this is about an accounting issue?

 

The respective accounting departments may triangulate and pinpoint differencies, and present them to the respective managements at debtor and creditor. Then Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller [<- he has started to look like something dragged in by the cat recently, btw.] and Moldova utility CEO must solve and settle this.

 

It is a business issue.

 

I woulden't be surprised at all by seeing this escalate in the beginning of January, because of interference by politicians.

 

If somebody makes it a political issue, and thereby 'infect' and stall the solution process, it wont be solved in a satisfactory way for the Moldovan population, timely. Hostage taking has become general modus operandi in all this mess.

 

Lets see, soon.

Edited 27 minutes ago by John Hjorth

[d29]

Russia is willing to self destroy their own separatist region in Moldova in exchange for some unrest and favorable outcome in the spring parliamentary elections there.

 

https://www.facebook.com/marius.ghincea/posts/pfbid029tC5XbGpYDEiYDKT7vVzhRdfZZKNNvZBhDA9SqydYg4NvWc5y7VQPS89vSS3uezCl?ref=embed_post

 

Transalation here:

 

Quote

The Moldovan authorities in Chisinau are currently facing a situation that presents a set of opportunities, but also many risks for the stability and integrity of the Moldovan constitutional order.

Gazprom has informed MoldovaGaz that it will suspend gas supplies to the Transnistrian region starting January 1, 2025. This decision comes in the context of the Ukrainian authorities' refusal to allow the continuation of Russian gas transit from the beginning of next year, when the existing transit contract expires, and the failure (intentional?) by Gazprom to reserve transport capacity on the trans-Balkan route for January.

In Moldova's energy architecture, this Russian gas played an important role in the production of cheap electricity at the Cuciurgan thermoelectric power plant, controlled by the Tiraspol regime.

In other words, Gazprom supplied gas to MoldovaGaz, a subsidiary of Gazprom, which then passed it on to the Transnistrian regime, which used much of it to produce electricity, which was then sold to the government in Chisinau.

For Transnistria, Russian gas is an essential economic binder. It is used to cover the region's electricity needs, district heating, energy for energy-intensive industries (on which the profits of the Sheriff conglomerate depend) and brings in a large part of the separatist regime's budget revenues. In fact, the Tiraspol regime's budget is already suffering from the reduction in industrial activity, largely kept alive by Romania.

Returning to Moldova, the cessation of Russian gas supplies via the Ukrainian route brings with it a series of opportunities, but also risks of destabilization.

***

There are three main opportunities that I see from this whole story:

Chisinau can use this moment to further redefine the economic and political parameters of the relationship with Tiraspol.

In recent years, Moldova has taken concrete steps to extend constitutional and administrative order to the left bank of the Dniester River. This includes requiring Transnistrian companies to register with the Moldovan Trade Register if they want to export to the EU, where over 80% of the region's exports go, and eliminating exemptions from paying taxes and duties.

The elimination of the Ukrainian route for the supply of Russian gas, used to generate electricity at the Cuciurgan thermoelectric power plant, increases the leverage available to Chisinau in its relationship with Tiraspol.

At this moment, Tiraspol is almost completely a prisoner of the authorities in Chisinau, who can economically suffocate the Transnistrian regime.

Stopping the Ukrainian route for Russian gas also represents an opportunity to further increase Moldova's energy and economic resilience.

The increased dependence on electricity produced at Cuciurgan is a vulnerability for Moldova's energy security. The current situation offers a window of opportunity for resource diversification and a readjustment of energy cost expectations.

Together with help from Romania, both through the provision of subsidized energy from Cernavoda and through a potential unification of energy markets, Cuciurgan may become just one option among others. A good option for cheap energy, but still only one of many available. And this further reduces the room for maneuver of the Tiraspol regime in favor of Chisinau.

The cessation, even temporarily, of energy production at Cuciurgan allows for an even faster anchoring of Moldova in the Romanian energy system. As we know, the Romanian state has already assumed that energy production (from all sources) must ensure both domestic needs and all Moldova's needs. A crisis like this can lead to an amplification of Moldova's energy integration into the Romanian energy system.

This anchoring can play an important role in guaranteeing Moldova's pro-European economic and (hopefully) political orientation, regardless of who comes to power in Chisinau.

***

The suspension of Russian gas supplies via the Ukrainian route also comes with a significant set of risks for Moldova's internal stability:

Without cheap Russian gas, the Cuciurgan power plant and the energy-consuming industries on the left bank of the Dniester will enter a deep crisis, which may have a destabilizing effect, in socio-economic and political terms, also on the right bank of the Dniester.

Without cheap Russian gas, Transnistria's economy will suffocate, and this will force the Tiraspol regime to choose between three complementary options: increasing the degree of internal repression, escalating tensions with Moldova to distract attention from the economic crisis, or abandoning secessionist ambitions.

Given the already fragile economic and political situation on the right bank of the Dniester, the destabilization of Transnistria is unacceptable for Chisinau. Especially since crucial parliamentary elections for the future of Moldova are coming up, where pro-Russian forces have a credible chance of obtaining a majority.

A deep crisis in Transnistria, even without an escalation of tensions between Tiraspol and Chisinau, will lead to a serious humanitarian crisis. We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people who will be left without heat in the middle of winter, without jobs in an energy-hungry industry left without resources.

This has the potential to produce waves of internal refugees, putting pressure on public finances in Chisinau and economically destabilizing Moldova in an election year. Such a situation will require international humanitarian aid.

A sudden collapse of the Tiraspol regime would put Chisinau in an unprecedented situation, in which it would have to assume administrative and political responsibility for an additional 300,000+ people on the left bank of the Dniester. Given that the state already has limited capacity, it is unclear how Moldova could take on the burden of paying pensions, salaries, and establishing Moldovan administrative institutions in Transnistria.

The fundamental political risk would be that a potential sudden collapse of Transnistria would bring back under the Moldovan constitutional order over 200,000+ voters with explicit pro-Russian preferences. Given the difference between the votes obtained by Maia Sandu and Alexandr Stoianoglo in the presidential elections, it is possible that these new voters could ensure the victory of a pro-Russian majority in Chisinau.

In short, the suspension of Russian gas supplies to Transnistria brings both opportunities and risks for Moldova. It remains to be seen how well the Moldovan government can manage this explosive mix.

All reactions:

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[John Hjorth]

Police of Finland [December 29^th 2024] : National Bureau of Investigation continues investigation into cable rupture.

 

Quote

... – With the underwater operations, we have been able to identify the dragging track at the seabed from the beginning to the end. The track is dozens of kilometres in length. ...

 

'We're sorry, we were unaware of that we were dragging our anchor behind us.' Honestly, it's the joke of the year!  

Edited 1 minute ago by John Hjorth