Russia-Ukrainian War

[Xerxes]

Thanks @Pelagic

I will check it out.

 

For clarificaiton, what I meant (or should have added but neglected) was that:   everything that moves and/or fixed could be considered a target. But that is where the process starts.

 

The very strict process that you speak of were not there to protect poor Vietnamese rice farmers, while Westmoreland, McNamara and Lyndon B. Johnson waged their noble war. They were there because the Johnson administration suffered from "recency bias" of U.S. recent experience in the Korean War, where getting close to the Yalu river triggered a PLA invasion of 300,000 men under the guise of "volunteers". On Thanksgiving no less.

 

Another example, that comes to mind, during the Korean War communist supply line through Manchuria were also considered as a target. There were talks of dropping several dozen atomic bombs in Manchuria, to distrupt the flow of arms that contributed to American deaths. Not sure if this plan contributed to MacArthur's final downfall, but in any case it was not pursued as the risks did not meet the "hurdle rate". Is that a good thing or a bad thing ?  Had the plan went through, the Red block would have received a severe blow in its infancy, at a cost of millions Chinese, but the "casual" use of nukes would have become acceptable and normal.

 

I would even say, Russia today can consider targets within Poland or Baltic Sea that are directly impacting the outcome of war that is critical to its perceived national security. Those targets have a very high "hurdle rate" to it, making it almost impossible to achieve any valuable output for the very tangible risk of triggering Article (whatever the # is).

 

 

 

 

[John Hjorth]

4 hours ago, Xerxes said:

... I would even say, Russia today can consider targets within Poland or Baltic Sea that are directly impacting the outcome of war that is critical to its perceived national security. Those targets have a very high "hurdle rate" to it, making it almost impossible to achieve any valuable output for the very tangible risk of triggering Article (whatever the # is).

 

Let him try, I would say.

 

Perhaps this thing would come much faster to an end, if he did.

 

Personally I think you as a Canadian citizen are greatly underestimating the sentiment in Northern Europe about this here.

 

It's not a "... very high "hurdle rate" ...", here, it's simply considered a suicidal action for his part trying. The crap will simply be beat of him, if he tries.

[Viking]

I think China is an important player in the war. China’s support of Russia is already accelerating the West’s move away from China. I am not sure China wants the West to accelerate its pivot even further as it would have more severe economic consequences for China. The chip sanctions were a shot across the bow.

 

If Russia escalates the war into other European/NATO states then China will likely experience collateral damage. US and European hawks will have a field day. And it could be severe for China. 2023 is shaping up to be another very crazy/interesting year. The geopolitical world is shifting. And in a big way. 
 

The iron curtain coming down in 1989 was a big deal for global economies and financial markets. China joining the WTO in 2001 was also a big deal. Both developments ushered in decades of global prosperity. As 2022 draws to a close we now know BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT that those days are gone for good. A thing of the past.
 

Russia and China have decided it is time for a new global regime. They have decided the global world order needs to be disrupted and at its very core (taking a page from Clayton Christensen’s book The Innovator’s Dilemma). Russia and China feel they have leverage over the West and the time is right to exercise that leverage. Long live authoritarianism. The split of the world into two blocks (authoritarian vs Western democracies) will be equally as impactful and will play out over decades.

Edited December 20, 2022 by Viking

[Xerxes]

54 minutes ago, Viking said:

I think China is an important player in the war. China’s support of Russia is already accelerating the West’s move away from China. I am not sure China wants the West to accelerate its pivot even further as it would have more severe economic consequences for China. The chip sanctions were a shot across the bow.

 

If Russia escalates the war into other European/NATO states then China will likely experience collateral damage. US and European hawks will have a field day. And it could be severe for China. 2023 is shaping up to be another very crazy/interesting year. The geopolitical world is shifting. And in a big way. 
 

The iron curtain coming down in 1989 was a big deal for global economies and financial markets. China joining the WTO in 2001 was also a big deal. Both developments ushered in decades of global prosperity.
 

Russia and China have decided it is time for a new global regime. They feel they have leverage over the West and the time is right to exercise that leverage. Long live authoritarianism. The split of the world into two blocks (authoritarian vs Western democracies) will be equally as impactful and will play out over decades.

 

 

If one is looking for long term historical arc, the one that is provided by Niall Ferguson is the most intersting one. Where he describes an era of globalization, where potential rival and powers traded with each other, an era that went on 40 or so years. 

 

Then, it is explained that this is not the 1990s to 2020s. But rather the 30-40 years inbetween the Franco-Prussian War leading to the First World War. After the 1914-18 war, the globalization was largely dead and wont be resurrected back till the fall of Berlin Wall. 

 

 

Edited December 20, 2022 by Xerxes

[Xerxes]

1 hour ago, John Hjorth said:

 

Let him try, I would say.

 

Perhaps this thing would come much faster to an end, if he did.

 

Personally I think you as a Canadian citizen are greatly underestimating the sentiment in Northern Europe about this here.

 

It's not a "... very high "hurdle rate" ...", here, it's simply considered a suicidal action for his part trying. The crap will simply be beat of him, if he tries.

 

Hi John,

 

I am completely unsure of how things will shape up in 2023, so perhaps undestimating and overestimating many many things at the sametime. The one thing that I know for sure, a war does not follow trends. It can have multiples reversion to the mean (politically, militarilly, economically etc.), everytime one side goes to one extreme. Only overwhelming interia may keep it on the trend.

 

And that it can easilly outlive the original sponser and take a life of its own.

 

Everyone knows about Vietnam War, how many folks know that U.S. got involved first to help the French fighting the Viet Minh, which actually could be called the first Vietnam War. And there was a third Vietnam War as well, when the PLA crossed the border and tried to "punish" Hanoi, but failed miserably. The same Chinese PLA that the American feared would jump in the war to help the communist.

 

Three Vietnam wars in south east Asia that far far outlive the initial reason why it started, and not many people would care to remember.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------

Unrelated, there was a recent interview on The Economist with the c-in-c of Ukrainian military. Some interesting parts below, but I highly recommend to read what the top soldier in Ukraine has to say.

 

An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine’s armed forces | The Economist

 

But they are working on another task in parallel, they are doing everything possible not to let us regroup and strike ourselves. This is why you are seeing battles along the 1,500km frontline. In some places more intense, in some places less intense, but they are constraining our troops in order not to allow us to regroup. The fact that they are fighting hard now is very bad, of course. But it is not a solution to the strategic problem. It simply wears down the armed forces of Ukraine.

 

That’s why, just as during the second world war, I have no doubt about it, it is most likely that somewhere beyond the Urals, they are preparing new resources. They are 100% being prepared.

 

Ammunition is being prepared, not very good stuff, but still. It won’t be the same resources as it could have been in two years of ceasefire. It will not be like that. It will be lousy, and combat potential will be very, very low, even if he enlists a million more people in the army to throw bodies, like Zhukov [a senior Soviet commander during the second world war] did, it will not bring the desired result anyway.

 

..............

 

Our second strategic task is to get ready for this war which can happen in February. To be able to wage a war with fresh forces and reserves. Our troops are all tied up in battles now, they are bleeding. They are bleeding and are being held together solely by courage, heroism and the ability of their commanders to keep the situation under control.

 

The second, very important strategic task for us is to create reserves and prepare for the war, which may take place in February, at best in March, and at worst at the end of January. It may start not in Donbas, but in the direction of Kyiv, in the direction of Belarus, I do not rule out the southern direction as well.

 

 

Have the Russian forces adapted to himars [American-made multiple rocket launchers]?

 

VZ: Yes. They’ve gone to a distance the himars can’t reach. And we haven’t got anything longer-range.

 

 

TE: What do you make of Russia’s mobilisation?

 

VZ: Russian mobilisation has worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not fight. They will. A tsar tells them to go to war, and they go to war. I’ve studied the history of the two Chechen wars—it was the same. They may not be that well equipped, but they still present a problem for us. We estimate that they have a reserve of 1.2m-1.5m people… The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops. I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv.

 

[UK]

6 hours ago, John Hjorth said:

 

Let him try, I would say.

 

Perhaps this thing would come much faster to an end, if he did.

 

Personally I think you as a Canadian citizen are greatly underestimating the sentiment in Northern Europe about this here.

 

It's not a "... very high "hurdle rate" ...", here, it's simply considered a suicidal action for his part trying. The crap will simply be beat of him, if he tries.

 

John, thanks for your comment. Yes, looking one or two years out, as soon as new Himars, F35s and other stuff will arrive (which will be very plenty) and Sweden with Finland join NATO (foregone conclusion) I am too starting to become optimistic on the ability of the region to stand on its own, even against Russia.

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-12-18/ukraine-conflict-brings-finland-s-troops-and-tanks-in-from-the-cold-war

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/12/16/lithuania-signs-495-million-deal-to-buy-himars-atacms/

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-30/poland-will-double-military-spending-as-war-in-ukraine-rages?leadSource=uverify wall

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-expected-buy-skorean-rocket-launchers-after-tank-howitzer-sales-2022-10-19/

 

 

 

 

Edited December 20, 2022 by UK

[Spekulatius]

10 hours ago, UK said:

 

John, thanks for your comment. Yes, looking one or two years out, as soon as new Himars, F35s and other stuff will arrive (which will be very plenty) and Sweden with Finland join NATO (foregone conclusion) I am too starting to become optimistic on the ability of the region to stand on its own, even against Russia.

 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-12-18/ukraine-conflict-brings-finland-s-troops-and-tanks-in-from-the-cold-war

https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/12/16/lithuania-signs-495-million-deal-to-buy-himars-atacms/

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-30/poland-will-double-military-spending-as-war-in-ukraine-rages?leadSource=uverify wall

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-expected-buy-skorean-rocket-launchers-after-tank-howitzer-sales-2022-10-19/

 

 

 

 

Dont forget Japan doubling military spending as well, since their neighborhood good signficiantly more dangerous (North Korea, Russia, China etc).

 

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pacifist-japan-unveils-unprecedented-320-bln-military-build-up-2022-12-16/

 

FWIW, i don't think Ukraine will ever get F35 fighters. most likely the Swedish Gripen fighters would be much better (I think) - cheaper, easier to maintain and can start from short airfields.

 

Ukraine will also get loner range weapons than Himars , it's just a matter of time.

 

[UK]

14 minutes ago, Spekulatius said:

FWIW, i don't think Ukraine will ever get F35 fighters. most likely the Swedish Gripen fighters would be much better (I think) - cheaper, easier to maintain and can start from short airfields.

 

I agree. I was talking about Finland re F35 (they will receive 64) and Baltics re Himars. There will be 20 Himars in Baltics in two years including long range capabilities. It is more than currently are deployed in Ukraine. Finland already owns some 20+ larger versions. And Poland is in the league of its own: 

 

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/06/07/poland-himars-us/

 

 

[shhughes1116]

4 hours ago, Spekulatius said:

FWIW, i don't think Ukraine will ever get F35 fighters. most likely the Swedish Gripen fighters would be much better (I think) - cheaper, easier to maintain and can start from short airfields.

 

Ukraine will also get loner range weapons than Himars , it's just a matter of time.

 

I think it is a toss-up between Gripens and F-16s.  The Gripens were designed to operate in austere conditions by conscripted support staff, similar to the current conditions in Ukraine.  But there is a large bolus of F-16s about to be retired in the US, and sending these to Ukraine would enable sourcing munitions from a larger group of countries that operate the f-16.  Both planes are vulnerable to shorad.

 

I disagree with your point about getting longer-range weapons than HIMARs.  To make this happen, the US or NATO would have to give Ukraine tomahawk missiles, or storm shadow missiles.  Even if the tomahawk is a fairly old weapon, I don’t think we are likely to give Ukraine a 1000+ mile range weapon, and certainly not newer cruise missiles.  
 

The quickest way to end the war in Ukraine would be to hand over the soon-to-be-retired bolus or f-16s and ~250 M1A1s sitting in the boneyards.  Hell, give them the M-60s from the Gulf War also - they worked quite well for the Marines in the first gulf war.  We don’t need the old M-60s and we have more than enough old M1A1s sitting in storage for future conversion to M1A2 if needed.  This equipment helps Ukraine fight, and limits the impact of western weapons to the occupied areas of Ukraine.  

[UK]

https://edition.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/12/22/zelensky-us-congress-speech-full-sot-vpx.cnn

[ANP301191]

Maybe I have missed something, but I do remember western intelligence agencies talking about how the war would cripple Putin's ability to control the oligarchs/crush the Russian economy and eventually force him from power etc.? Havent heard that line of thought in a while. In fact, I do remember reading that some of the oligarchs who spoke out against Putin have had some pretty harsh reprisals.

 

All this goes to say, no matter what armaments the west gives to Ukraine, if Putin remains in power, there always remains a chance of further escalation (more mass mobilizations, utlization of nuclear weapons, etc.). So by all means, lets give the Ukrainians planes and guns and missiles, this ends in a political settlement or a nuclear war. In my opinion, there is no path for Ukraine to simply expel the invading forces and end the war, it only ends when Putin decides he's had enough or he's won.

[formthirteen]

1 hour ago, ANP301191 said:

In my opinion, there is no path for Ukraine to simply expel the invading forces and end the war, it only ends when Putin decides he's had enough or he's won.

 

Who knows, it might become a forever war:

 

 

The plot summary is interesting and prescient because history rhymes:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Forever_War

[Xerxes]

Tucker never fails 

 

 

[LC]

 

[Dinar]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-is-rushing-arms-to-ukraine-but-running-out-of-ammo-11671707775?mod=hp_lead_pos6

 

Western European and somewhat US incompetence is stunning 

[Xerxes]

Long, but good

i have read the first 2/5

 

How Putin’s War in Ukraine Became a Catastrophe for Russia - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

[Spekulatius]

22 hours ago, Dinar said:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-is-rushing-arms-to-ukraine-but-running-out-of-ammo-11671707775?mod=hp_lead_pos6

 

Western European and somewhat US incompetence is stunning 

LOL, Germany alone will buy ammo for 20B Euro and is building new plants. US is building capacity as well. Russia will run out of conscripts before NATO and Ukraine runs out of ammo.

[formthirteen]

12 hours ago, Xerxes said:

Long, but good

i have read the first 2/5

 

How Putin’s War in Ukraine Became a Catastrophe for Russia - The New York Times (nytimes.com)

 

Thanks. That was good.

 

By the way, I heard it's not yet too late to buy Christmas gifts:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/17/ukraine-russia-bombs-slogans-fundraising/

 

Quote

After a donation is collected, a Ukrainian soldier scrawls the requested message on the munition and takes a picture of it. The picture is then sent to the donor.

…

The group recently branded a Buk surface-to-air missile with the message “Not for use on Malaysian Airlines”

…

“I’ve already donated $3,000,” said Colin Smith, a director at an e-commerce company in Dallas who has dedicated artillery shells to friends and relatives for birthdays, anniversaries and a job promotion.

Smith first discovered Sign My Rocket on a Reddit page earlier this year. He recently gave his wife a picture of an artillery shell for their anniversary, inscribed with their initials and wedding year: “C & Y. Est. 2021.”

“She loved it,” he said, “though she’s now kind of tired of me telling her about the war.”

 

Edited December 24, 2022 by formthirteen

[Xerxes]

I am personally against this type of fundraising. It is one thing for soldiers to write messages on payloads/shells (they are doing the fighting after all) than turn the practice into some sort of commercial enterprise. 
 

unrelated, I thought that this was rather entertaining. 
 

https://ca.yahoo.com/news/bomb-squad-called-er-88-085637481.html

[no_free_lunch]

14 hours ago, Spekulatius said:

LOL, Germany alone will buy ammo for 20B Euro and is building new plants. US is building capacity as well. Russia will run out of conscripts before NATO and Ukraine runs out of ammo.

 

I agree.  I suspect there is half truths to these articles, it's really to shock the western public so they are more receptive and understanding to the defense production requirements.  Yes, we will have to build more defense capacity for a more conventional war.  Note that they have been saying this type of thing for somewhere around 6 months and yet Ukraine keeps getting supplied.

 

From an economic perspective, this further ties in with in-shoring of production.  I would prefer we could spend our energies on something other than defense but then we won't have a "we" if we can't fight.

Edited December 24, 2022 by no_free_lunch

[no_free_lunch]

On 12/22/2022 at 1:50 AM, ANP301191 said:

Maybe I have missed something, but I do remember western intelligence agencies talking about how the war would cripple Putin's ability to control the oligarchs/crush the Russian economy and eventually force him from power etc.? Havent heard that line of thought in a while. In fact, I do remember reading that some of the oligarchs who spoke out against Putin have had some pretty harsh reprisals.

 

All this goes to say, no matter what armaments the west gives to Ukraine, if Putin remains in power, there always remains a chance of further escalation (more mass mobilizations, utlization of nuclear weapons, etc.). So by all means, lets give the Ukrainians planes and guns and missiles, this ends in a political settlement or a nuclear war. In my opinion, there is no path for Ukraine to simply expel the invading forces and end the war, it only ends when Putin decides he's had enough or he's won.

 

At some point, Russia may run out of suckers and it can lead to revolution.  It's one thing to talk ra ra let's go get the nazi's but how many Russian's really believe that?  It doesn't seem like people are rushing to volunteer given conscription and prison soldiers.   The communist revolution in 1917 was caused by the first world war casualities, that was a big part, you could have something similar happen here.  This is not an existential crisis and people know that as is evidenced by the lack of support.  It ends when the russian population says enough.

 

For sure though the western media is far too optimistic and paints Russia as weaker than it is.  I do not understand why, who does it benefit if it's not true?  Maybe it's so that the general public can feel they are closer to victory than reality.

[Xerxes]

Some of the Western media depiction of the war has been cartoonish at best. Not the facts but how they are depicted. I dont know how many YouTube vidoes have been poping out with armchair generals making sweeping "walk in the park" declaration. Like momentum-driven investors, some of these folks are trend-followers. Take a snapshot of say event in Aug, project forward, and declare the Zelensky will be at Moscow' gate by Christmas [sarcasim]

 

I would recommend folks to check out the few articles on The Economist which interviewed the president of Ukraine, along with its top general as well as the commander of the ground forces. They certainly do not see it as a walk in the park. To a certain degree, the upbeat optimistic Western narrative has been good for Ukraine in the first half of the war. That said, I think the Ukrainian leadership would prefer for folks to see it as it is, an uphill struggle where they need all the help they can get. Not a scene off a Rambo movie.

 

EXAMPLE:

 

Fact:                       Russian conscript are nowhere near the level of training Ukraine forces have and are getting. 

Western Media:    LOLOLOL they dont even have proper gear, LOL the have antiquidated guns LOL

Ukrainian/NATO:           

 

Volodymyr Zelensky and his generals explain why the war hangs in the balance | The Economist 

 

The third challenge is the most serious. Russia’s mobilisation effort has been widely disparaged, with countless stories of inadequate kit and disgruntled conscripts. Ukraine’s general staff and its Western partners are more wary. “We all know that the quality is poor and that they lack equipment,” says Kusti Salm of Estonia’s defence ministry. “But the fact that they can mobilise so fast is an early-warning dilemma for Ukraine and ultimately for nato.” Schemes run by Britain and the European Union can train around 30,000 Ukrainian troops in 18 months, he says. Russia has been able to conjure up five times as many new soldiers in a fraction of the time.

 

“Russian mobilisation has worked,” says General Zaluzhny. “A tsar tells them to go to war, and they go to war.” General Syrsky agrees: “The enemy shouldn’t be discounted. They are not weak…and they have very great potential in terms of manpower.” He gives the example of how Russian recruits, equipped only with small arms, successfully slowed down Ukrainian attacks in Kreminna and Svatove in Luhansk province—though the autumn mud helped. Mobilisation has also allowed Russia to rotate its forces on and off the front lines more frequently, he says, allowing them to rest and recuperate. “In this regard, they have an advantage.”

 

 

[UK]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-russia-ukraine-war-advisers-11671815184?mod=hp_lead_pos7

 

Russian troops were losing the battle for Lyman, a small city in eastern Ukraine, in late September when a call came in for the commanding officer on the front line, over an encrypted line from Moscow. It was Vladimir Putin, ordering them not to retreat. The president seemed to have limited understanding of the reality of the situation, according to current and former U.S. and European officials and a former senior Russian intelligence officer briefed on the exchange. His poorly equipped front-line troops were being encircled by a Ukrainian advance backed by artillery provided by the West. Mr. Putin rebuffed his own generals’ commands and told the troops to hold firm, they said. The Ukrainian ambushes continued, and on Oct. 1, Russian soldiers hastily withdrew, leaving behind dozens of dead bodies and supplies of artillery to restock Ukraine’s weapons caches.

 

Through the summer, delegations of military experts and arms manufacturers emerged from presidential meetings questioning whether Mr. Putin understood the reality on the battleground, according to people familiar with the situation. And while Mr. Putin has since then gone to lengths to get a clearer picture of the war, they say, the president remains surrounded by an administration that caters to his conviction that Russia will succeed, despite the mounting human and economic sacrifices. “The people around Putin protect themselves,” said Ekaterina Vinokurova, a member of his handpicked human-rights council until Mr. Putin removed her in November. “They have this deep belief that they shouldn’t upset the president.” The resulting mistakes have shaped Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine—from the initial days, when Mr. Putin thought his soldiers would be met with flowers, to recent humiliating withdrawals in the northeast and south. Over time, Mr. Putin, who has never served in the military, has become so wary of his own command structure that he has issued orders directly to the front line.

 

For months, a trickle of Russian officials, pro-government journalists and analysts tried to bring word in person to their president about how his invasion was floundering, according to people familiar with the matter. When one longtime pollster reached out to Mr. Putin’s office about a survey showing lower-than-expected public support soon after the invasion, his office responded, using Mr. Putin’s first name and his patronymic middle name, “Vladimir Vladimirovich doesn’t need to be upset right now,” according to a person familiar with the exchange. In July, as American-supplied, satellite-guided Himars rockets began to strike Russian army logistics depots, Mr. Putin summoned about 30 business leaders from defense companies to his Novo-Ogaryovo residence outside Moscow, according to people familiar with the meeting. After three days of quarantine and three PCR tests, the executives sat at the end of a long wooden table, listening as Mr. Putin described a war effort he considered a success. Ukrainians were only motivated to fight, he told them, because their army was shooting deserters, according to the people. Then Mr. Putin turned to Chief of General Staff for the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov, who said Russian weapons were successfully hitting their targets and the invasion was going according to plan. The arms makers left the meeting with a sense that Mr. Putin lacked a clear picture of the conflict, the people said.

 

Since March, when Mr. Putin’s invasion began to clearly falter, Western leaders have been puzzled by how a leader so singularly occupied with the status of Ukraine and the restoration of Russia’s military greatness managed to so badly underrate Ukraine’s strength and misread his own. Some of Mr. Putin’s allies concede that information reaching the president was flawed and attribute military failures to poor planning by government officials. Konstantin Zatulin, a senior lawmaker from the ruling United Russia party who supports the war, said in an interview that the president “proceeded from an incomplete understanding of the situation and in some ways not fully correct.” The war planners, he said, “clearly underestimated the strength of the enemy and overestimated their own.” Mr. Putin needed only days to roll through more than a fifth of Georgia in 2008, and weeks to take Ukraine’s peninsula of Crimea in 2014—an operation that his defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, and Mr. Gerasimov, along with Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence agency and others, had advised against. The SVR declined to comment. The Russian president came to see the Crimea operation as a personal triumph. His inner circle gradually shrank down to his most hawkish advisers, who assured Mr. Putin Russian forces would seize Kyiv within days. “He probably forgot that when he was a KGB operative he was lying to his boss,” said Indrek Kannik, a former head of analysis for Estonian foreign intelligence.

 

From inside Ukraine, a Kremlin-connected businessman was telling Mr. Putin what he wanted to hear. Viktor Medvedchuk, a Russia-funded politician, had made Mr. Putin godfather to his daughter Darya. For years, Mr. Medvedchuk had a dedicated line to reach the president—a phone with a Russian number and a secure calling app the Ukrainians called Kremlyovka, in reference to the Kremlin, according to Yuriy Lutsenko, the former head of the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office, which had tapped the phones of people linked to the Kremlin in an investigation into the 2014 downing of a Malaysian airplane above Ukraine. Mr. Medvedchuk assured Mr. Putin that Ukrainians saw themselves as Russian, and would welcome the invading soldiers with flowers, said two people close to the Kremlin. Mr. Medvedchuk, who had been arrested in Ukraine and then released to Russia as part of a prisoner swap in September, couldn’t be reached for comment. Meanwhile, the FSB was tweaking polling data to convince Mr. Putin that Ukrainians would welcome Russian soldiers, according to Ukrainian Security Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov and a person close to the Kremlin. Other opinion surveys appeared to be entirely fabricated, said Mr. Danilov.

 

War planning fell to the FSB more than the military, according to the former Russian intelligence officer and a person close to the defense ministry. The ministry kept normal working hours in the weeks leading up to the invasion, with little sense of the urgency.
Mr. Putin’s spokesman, Mr. Peskov; his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov ; chief of staff, Anton Vaino; and Mr. Kirienko, the domestic policy chief, weren’t aware of the plans, according to people familiar with the matter. Fifteen days into the war, after his quick strike on Kyiv failed, Mr. Putin scowled in a gold-embroidered armchair as his defense minister briefed him over a video link in a televised meeting. “Vladimir Vladimirovich, everything is going to plan,” said Mr. Shoigu. “We report this to you every day.”

 

Edited December 25, 2022 by UK

[UK]

I realise than not everyone here speaks russian, but for those, who can understand, very entertaining interview with former insider: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=isg4wArJJ28

 

[John Hjorth]

@UK,

 

I respectfully towards you and your right to privacy take the freedom to ask about your nationallity, mother tongue and location. I will naturally respect your refusal to provide this information, if you do so.

 

My own similar information is as follows: I'm a Dane, my mother tongue is Danish, and I'm located in  the city Odense, in the central part of Denmark.

 

I'm asking because the basis of your posts and their backdrop are important to me for my understanding of your posts.

 

This whole calamity / sh*tshow is quite close to me from a geographical perspective, as a Danish citizen. I consider Denmark at risk if this event escalates and gets somehow out of control.

 

Thank you in advance for your time and your posts in this topic.

Edited December 25, 2022 by John Hjorth