Russia-Ukrainian War - Political

[Luke]

Rheinmetall up 10% this morning trading now at 66x earnings selling tanks, drones whatever at 50% gross margin  

 

Welcome to the beautiful new world where we will soon invest trillions of euros as a united europe into tanks that will likely stand still in warehouses and not be used just for "deterrence". 

 

Why shouldnt you go long if you think that is what should and is going to happen?

[james22]

2 hours ago, skanjete said:

Europe will become independent in terms of security, rendering NATO obsolete.

 

Good luck with that.

 

Are you going to raise taxes or cut social programs?

 

2 hours ago, skanjete said:

US influence over Europe will drastically decline.

 

What influence has our defense bought us?

 

Certainly not gratitude.

 

2 hours ago, skanjete said:

The US will no longer be able to count on European allies in a potential conflict with China.

 

Count on? For what?

[Sweet]

8 minutes ago, james22 said:

 

What influence has our defense bought us?

 

Certainly not gratitude.

You’re joking right?  Europe largely does what America says.

 

You’ve heard of the Suez crisis right? 
 

Since Suez, Europe has nearly always consulted America on foreign policy, or did what America asked of it on foreign policy.

 

 

Edited 16 hours ago by Sweet

[Sweet]

2 hours ago, skanjete said:

• Europe will become independent in terms of security, rendering NATO obsolete.
• US influence over Europe will drastically decline.
• The US will no longer be able to count on European allies in a potential conflict with China.
• US global influence will weaken regardless, as it has proven to be an unreliable partner. Countries balancing between Chinese and Western influence—such as resource-rich African nations—are more likely to lean toward China than the US

For the most part this is what I think could happen to.

 

Not sure Europe would have been ready to go to war with China though.

 

It would be kind of ironic that Trump, who wants to assert America abroad by acting tough, is actually undermining American influence abroad.

[james22]

9 minutes ago, Sweet said:

You’re joking right?  Europe largely does what America says.

 

You’ve heard of the Suez crisis right? 
 

Since Suez, Europe has nearly always consulted America on foreign policy, or did what America asked of it on foreign policy.

 

Yeah, our bad.

 

 

[Luke]

I opened a thread - rheinmetall where we can profit from this conflict going on and on. Maybe then I will finally enjoy watching all these meetings where nobody wants diplomacy, bashes Trump for trying to get a ceasefire and demands more and more weapons against the attacker russia. Maybe just buy rheinmetall calls and get rich of of it? 

Edited 16 hours ago by Luke

[Sweet]

5 minutes ago, james22 said:

 

Yeah, our bad.

 

 

Lol, their empires were always going to go fade.  The Suez crisis was more about control of the canal which was seen as vital to the economies of Western Europe.  It’s ironic that Trump is / was talking about taking the Panama Canal back, about 70 years ago it was America that prevented Europe from controlling the Suez.  
 

Edited 16 hours ago by Sweet

[Luke]

Okay, i am now profiting of this war and very long EU weapon producer. Trump is bad! Ukraine needs more weapons, we need to buy way more weapons!

[Spekulatius]

2 hours ago, skanjete said:

 

Correct! On Friday, NATO effectively ceased to exist. It became clear that the US does not keep its promises, meaning Europe can no longer rely on the US to fulfill its NATO obligations—regardless of who is president. If the EU can muster enough unity and set aside internal disagreements for the sake of common security, it could form a unified army. The statements made on Sunday after the London summit reflect this intent.

This will be a painful process for Europe's welfare states, requiring a serious shift in priorities. However, if they succeed (within a decade?), the geopolitical landscape will change significantly:

1. Europe will become independent in terms of security, rendering NATO obsolete.
2. US influence over Europe will drastically decline.
3. The US will no longer be able to count on European allies in a potential conflict with China.
4. US global influence will weaken regardless, as it has proven to be an unreliable partner. Countries balancing between Chinese and Western influence—such as resource-rich African nations—are more likely to lean toward China than the US.

I can think of a few reasons why Trump is throwing Ukraine under the bus—perhaps to pull Russia away from China's sphere of influence or to secure Russian support for his own territorial ambitions. But in the long run, he is isolating the US, which will prove catastrophic for its global influence and position.

I believe this is a correct take. I could have written this myself.

In any case, the US focus on China will be complicated by the fact that Japan and Australia need to consider their alliance with the USA as well. Their options are more limited than the EU states. I think Japan needs to get their own nukes quickly.

[Luke]

2 minutes ago, Spekulatius said:

I believe this is a correct take. I could have written this myself.

In any case, the US focus on China will be complicated by the fact that Japan and Australia need to consider their alliance with the USA as well. Their options are more limited than the EU states. I think Japan needs to get their own nukes quickly.

Nukes are not the only thing that matters, it helps to create enough of a MAD situation so there is no nuclear war. You still need to be able to win a ground war which demands hundreds if not trillions of investments in ground war weaponry.

[John Hjorth]

12 hours ago, LC said:

@Parsad Is there a way to ignore specific topics? After multiple pages of menswear discussion I've had enough

 

 @LC,

 

We had such a thingy available on the former software platform, unfortunately not on the current. 

[Gregmal]

1 hour ago, Sweet said:

England was in control of Ireland (a sliver of old England) much longer than Russia controlled Ukraine.  The Ukrainians too regard themselves as Russian just like the Irish regard themselves as a type of English.

 

And of course Putin would consider Ukrainian democracy, free markets and a desire to live like free like the Americans a provocation.  What a despicable way to live.  How dare the Ukrainians - I mean old Russians.

 

That’s great but those are issues for those countries, not ours, and certainly not my tax dollars. 
 

People and media screaming “evil dictator” within the framework of an “us vs them” storyline won’t sway me on that either. Plenty of our “allies” are characters of similar ilk as “the bad guys” they just get the media scrub with the fancy paint job and wax coating and everyone gets in line behind them in the crusade to save the world.

[John Hjorth]

3 hours ago, Luke said:

And surely John enjoys reading because you wouldnt keep posting if it wouldnt be interesting!

 

Luca [ @Luke ],

 

On a more serious note, I personally at least try to read this topic with an open mind, and try not to go too much over board. There is a lot to learn from it about American, Canadian and European policies, opinions, sentiments and cultures.

 

Certainly much better than reading any news outlet about it.

 

All while I can't help being a Dane, and thereby European, with my own biases.

[Spekulatius]

34 minutes ago, Luke said:

Nukes are not the only thing that matters, it helps to create enough of a MAD situation so there is no nuclear war. You still need to be able to win a ground war which demands hundreds if not trillions of investments in ground war weaponry.

This is correct. Nukes are foremost a political weapon but you need to have them if the counterpart has to negate blackmail attempts which undoubtedly occur (see Putin and Ukraine war).

 

Of course conventional defense is the most important cornerstone of defense  and there is the gray area of tactical nukes . You really need them all to match a counterparty (flexible response NATO doctrine)

[Luke]

1 minute ago, Spekulatius said:

This is correct. Nukes are foremost a political weapon but you need to have them if the counterpart has to negate blackmail attempts which undoubtedly occur (see Putin and Ukraine war).

 

Of course conventional defense is the most important cornerstone of defense  and there is the gray area of tactical nukes . You really need them all to match a counterparty (flexible response NATO doctrine)

Yeah agree. You know guys, after having really tried a lot also in private with family and friends to defend a diplomatic more into trump/orban leaning solution for this conflict, i realize that 80-90% of the public in europe fully supports this war to continue at ukraines will without making any accomodations.

 

Even the greens in germany want a military to gdp budget of 3.5%, maybe more.

 

Does NTM 45 PE for a rheinmetall look expensive to whats coming to europe in terms of defense investments? I dont think so. If the left in germany also support further defense investments then we are really in for a treat regarding investments in weapons. A treat that will last a long time.

[Sweet]

1 hour ago, Gregmal said:

That’s great but those are issues for those countries, not ours, and certainly not my tax dollars. 
 

People and media screaming “evil dictator” within the framework of an “us vs them” storyline won’t sway me on that either. Plenty of our “allies” are characters of similar ilk as “the bad guys” they just get the media scrub with the fancy paint job and wax coating and everyone gets in line behind them in the crusade to save the world.

Sure, but just say that it’s their problem and not ours.  It’s makes a lot more sense than regurgitating Putin’s talking points.

[Gregmal]

6 minutes ago, Sweet said:

Sure, but just say that it’s their problem and not ours.  It’s makes a lot more sense than regurgitating Putin’s talking points.

Nah. Put China or Russia in Mexico or Canada and spread their influence toward the borders and see how quickly our “talking points” change. In fact, it’s already happened in decades past with outside influences getting a little too close. The “talking points” really just depend upon what media soufflé ones fed. 

[Sweet]

14 minutes ago, Gregmal said:

Nah. Put China or Russia in Mexico or Canada and spread their influence toward the borders and see how quickly our “talking points” change. In fact, it’s already happened in decades past with outside influences getting a little too close. The “talking points” really just depend upon what media soufflé ones fed. 

Yes and no.  
 

Cuba - not exactly an ally of America, not the same outcome as Ukraine.  
 

Canada, and Mexico, part of a sliver of old America as justification for annexation?  Doubtful.

 

Get what you are saying of course, talking points change, but it’s not the same.  You’re implicitly suggesting all else is equal when it’s not.  
 

America has been a much friendlier neighbour than Russia over the past 150 odd years.  American values are much preferred than Russian or Chinese for that matter.  Their systems and beliefs are very different.

 

Comparable yes, the same no, and the differences matter hugely.

[Xerxes]

 

oh Jesus.
Elon is reading books. 

 

[james22]

 

[Gregmal]

It’s a question that most Westerners are not intellectually capable of answering. Some are just naive, some are intentionally dishonest, and most I think are what I’d call benevolently dishonest. Their brains hardwired by years and even decades of propaganda. Everything is framed through black and white, good vs evil, us vs themisms. They’re just hardwired to simplify everything down to (insert them) as bad, evil, dictator, imperialist, etc. Then they take us/our side and immediately default to good/insert the storyline. It’s too hard to think, let alone utter anything contrary to the he narrative that has already painted such a stark picture as the puppets fear the noose waiting for them if they don’t go with the program.

 

My favorite example is here. Most evil /dictator/imperialist Putin rhetoric almost immediately jumps to “insert most pro-Western narrative” around Crimea. Most common being it was “seized”, as Russia “invaded a sovereign nation”….well, imagine only telling the Palestinian story starting in November 2023? Oh wow how dishonest and misleading that would be! But some have their agendas, others just don’t know any better. 
 

Really what occurred, is for years/decades, Russia and Putin made very clear their lines in the sand with Ukraine/NATO/western meddling. What’s always conveniently left out of the Crimea story is how the US government and politicians consistently meddled in Ukraine, eventually prompting a coup, and helping overthrow a democratically elected government! Whoops! So, with that backdrop, one could argue that at some point Russia is forced to “put their foot down/stand up to the aggressor”. But hey, don’t take my word for it! The same people brainlessly taking “our side” like a bunch of fans on a Liverpool fan club message board, will claim out of the other side of their mouth, that the US needs to “take action” or “send a clear message” quite often! Whether it be with Ukraine or Taiwan, etc. Yes! No one else is able to draw their line in the sand, or use national security as a defense, only us, because WE are good and THEY are evil! 
 

So yea, that’s why this thread sucks. It’s the same rooting and fanboying and prescribed narratives and not a whole lot of anything useless or balanced. 

Edited 7 hours ago by Gregmal

[formthirteen]

1 hour ago, Xerxes said:

Elon is reading books. 

 

Elon seems to be listening to audiobooks.

[Gregmal]

Like it’s cray how few are even like “why is the United States involved with Ukraine/Taiwan in the first place?”. And even then, those that can ask that, how many get snared in the “because if we don’t stop them, they’ll take over the world!” propaganda. 

[Ulti]

Article in foreign affairs from the Ukrainian viewpoint on how not to em the war… seems like the UK’s are taking their past 2014 histwith Russia into account 

 

 

TETIANA KYSELOVA is an Associate Professor at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Director of the Mediation and Dialogue Research Center in Ukraine.

YUNA POTOMKINA is a Ukrainian lawyer and mediator. She served as Adviser to the First Deputy Head of the Ukrainian negotiation delegation at the Trilateral

On February 18, Russian and U.S. officials met in Saudi Arabia to begin talks to end the war in Ukraine—the first such high-level dialogue to take place since the 2022 full-scale invasion, but one without Ukrainian representatives. Ahead of the talks, U.S. President Donald Trump made concessions to Russian President Vladimir Putin and has since told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he was “gambling with World War III.” Accommodating Russian narratives and positions could turn out to be a provocative yet smart move to bring Putin to the table—but only if Trump sets high standards and demands once negotiations begin.

So far, Trump’s steps toward negotiations have too strongly resembled the Minsk process that began after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014. Negotiated by the so-called Normandy Four—the heads of state from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine—the process produced two sets of agreements, Minsk I in 2014 and Minsk II in 2015, both of which set out terms for a cease-fire and outlined steps toward a political resolution in the Donbas. These weak agreements were never properly implemented, and as Putin launched his 2022 invasion, he voided them outright.

The political and strategic context has changed dramatically since 2014. But the Minsk process’s bitter lessons remain more relevant than ever. Unfortunately, the new U.S.-led negotiations appear to replicate specific weaknesses from the Minsk process, such as excluding major parties to the conflict and rushing toward an undefined cease-fire with little enforcement and security guarantees. Like the current negotiations, the Minsk agreements sacrificed the complicated yet achievable prospect of durable peace for short-term diplomatic gains. If Trump truly wants to be the figure who brings the fighting between Russia and Ukraine to an end, he should not repeat Minsk’s mistakes.

IMPOSED DEALS

By seeking an agreement in principle and postponing work on the details, in the mid-2010s the Kremlin set a trap that destroyed the Minsk agreements—a trick it appears to want to redo now. The Minsk process was not meant to proceed in two parts. The process was initiated by the Normandy Four through the Trilateral Contact Group, which included representatives from Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). But Minsk I, signed on September 5, 2014, failed to stop Russian advances. After months of continued fighting and a devastating Ukrainian military defeat at Debaltseve, a second agreement, Minsk II, was negotiated and signed on February 12, 2015.

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Although the Normandy Four were meant to provide an inclusive format, Ukrainian interests were de facto eliminated from the Minsk negotiations because the country’s military and civilian apparatuses were in very weak positions—and because both Russia’s and Kyiv’s allies exerted intense pressure to rush to a quick deal. The signing of both Minsk agreements followed major Ukrainian military defeats in which Kyiv lost important territories around Ilovaisk and Debaltseve and suffered significant casualties.

As a result, Ukrainians perceived the Minsk agreements as imposed on them, and many rejected them outright. For example, in 2019, Ukrainian civil society activists, opposition politicians, and war veterans launched a social movement called “No to Capitulation!” which mobilized mass protests against political concessions to Russia under the Minsk framework. In a poll conducted by the Rating Group and released in mid-February 2022, 63 percent of Ukrainians agreed with the statement that the “[Minsk] accords should be revised, and the new ones signed,” and only 11 percent agreed that Ukraine should fulfill all of the Minsk process’s demands. In part, Ukrainians never accepted the Minsk process as legitimate because Kyiv agreed to untenable compromises.

TROJAN HORSE

The Minsk agreements also recommended that Russian troops leave occupied parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but only if local elections were held and if occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk were granted “special status” in Ukraine, with the potential right to control their own police forces and to appoint judges and prosecutors—a privilege no other Ukrainian regions had at the time. Russia touted this provision as a step toward a federal model for Ukraine. But although such an increase in regional autonomy could be interpreted as democratic, democracy under occupation does not work. Such an arrangement would have given Russia a Trojan horse to undermine Ukraine’s pro-Western course from within.

Although the parties agreed to elections in Donetsk and Luhansk during the Minsk I negotiations, they disputed the timing. In November 2014, the republics, still occupied by Russian forces, conducted local elections unilaterally, claiming that such elections had to occur before troops could leave. But Ukraine, the OSCE, and Western partners viewed these elections as illegitimate and not in compliance with Minsk I, arguing that the troops were supposed to leave before elections took place, and that elections should occur under OSCE supervision. But the territories continued to be occupied by Russian-controlled forces, despite Russia’s claim that it had no troops there, and in 2018, they again held similarly noncompliant elections.

Today, Russia also seeks to use negotiations to meddle in Ukraine’s internal affairs, demanding that Ukraine conduct hasty presidential elections (which would likely fall short of democratic standards), return privileges to the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and restore the prominence of the Russian language. This time around, Ukraine’s leaders, civil society groups, and citizens have been quicker to recognize and reject such tactics. But if the terms of a cease-fire are again decided by Moscow and other actors—in this case, Washington—without adequate Ukrainian participation from the start, Kyiv will not be able to safeguard its interests or convince Ukrainians of the deal’s legitimacy, dooming its implementation. In a survey the Rating Group conducted in March 2024, more than half of Ukrainian respondents agreed that if they disputed the terms of a possible peace treaty they would “join a peaceful protest”; seven percent said they would join an “armed protest.”

FAILED IMPLEMENTATION

Because no cease-fire will satisfy Ukraine’s or Russia’s interests completely, any agreement will need strict third-party oversight and enforcement both during the deal’s negotiation and after its signing. Enforcement provisions were fundamentally deficient in the Minsk agreements. Neither text once referred to guarantors or any consequences for violating the agreement.

Instead, there were two attempts to implement the Minsk agreements, but both mechanisms were poorly constructed. The first entrusted the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission—a body established in March 2014, before the military conflict really escalated, and later incorporated into the Minsk agreements—with monitoring cease-fire violations and verifying that both sides had withdrawn heavy weapons from the frontline. But it did not attribute blame to any party for the violations it witnessed to any party, let alone restore compliance or apply penalties.

As the conflict continued to escalate, the parties attempted to engage more directly and quickly than through intermediaries from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission. In September 2014, Russia and Ukraine established the Joint Center for Control and Coordination, an entity staffed by both Russian and Ukrainian military officers but which lacked any formal founding document. The idea was to allow witnesses to access both sides of the front to better monitor any cease-fire violations. But that body also lacked sanctioning mechanisms, and any capabilities it had to enforce the agreements were kneecapped in 2017 when Russia withdrew its representatives and replaced them with emissaries from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk, again deflecting its own responsibility for the conflict by fronting its proxy actors. With no enforcement or even oversight, Russia could then repeatedly violate the agreements without any immediate repercussions.

The Minsk agreements’ implementation was also impeded by ambiguity about who the signatory parties were and which of them had which obligations. Russia manipulated its role and presented itself as a mediator between Ukraine and the proxy republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. Ultimately, everyone who ought to have been held accountable to the agreements was left with little clarity about whether the agreements were legally binding. Neither the Ukrainian nor Russian presidents signed Minsk I or II. And neither Ukraine’s nor Russia’s parliament ratified either agreement. (A UN Security Council Resolution did call on the parties to implement Minsk II in a 2015 resolution, but this appeal had little effect.) These defects could not be remedied by any consequent efforts; there were at least eight documents all together—including protocols, memoranda, addenda, and decisions by the Trilateral Contact Group—and all contributed to the agreements’ failure.

U.S., Saudi, and Russian diplomats, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, February 2025Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

Making each sentence of an agreement, even if it is merely a cease-fire, as detailed and carefully worded as possible—spelling out obligations and creating specific deadlines and technical specifications for monitoring and accountability—strengthens accords against manipulation. Any agreement to end the war in Ukraine must more clearly provide for a much more robust enforcement mechanism, too. First, any settlement should include security measures that, in the case of a violation, would be invoked rapidly and independently. Russia will be particularly interested in minimizing security guarantees for Ukraine, and so such guarantees would preferably be agreed on by Ukraine and its allies prior to negotiations with Russia. A cease-fire or peace agreement must also then integrate a monitoring, verification, and accountability mechanism that can objectively and quickly identify cease-fire violations, unambiguously attribute the fault to one of the parties, and most important, restore compliance—if necessary, by imposing sanctions for violations. Given the present lack of trust among the parties, a joint military peacekeeping mission, whose members all negotiating parties agree to, could be a way forward.

Technical solutions for enforcing a cease-fire will also need to account for the nature of modern warfare. The frontline in Ukraine currently stretches over 3,000 kilometers, with intense fighting taking place across approximately 970 kilometers. This is at least ten times the size of the front during the Minsk negotiations. Any notion that such a large conflict zone—expanded further by the use of drones, precision-guided missiles, and electronic warfare systems—can be controlled without robust enforcement is an illusion.

Finally, Europe will also need to play a large role—and a more disciplined and responsible one than it did in the mid-2010s. During the Minsk negotiations, France and Germany were mediators that brokered the hasty agreements and presided over the Trilateral Contact Group working groups that followed. They did resist recognizing the proxy republics that Russia established in Donetsk and Luhansk, but they erred badly, along with Ukraine, in allowing the proxy republics to sign the agreements, creating no clear obligations for Russia.

Today, most European countries seem to have grasped the extent to which Ukraine’s security interests are also Europe’s. The permissive attitude that marred the Minsk negotiations must be avoided—and unfortunately, both Russia and the United States have moved to exclude the very European countries that learned Minsk’s bitter lessons from current talks. Europe needs a seat at the negotiating table; a unified position on the provision of security, military, and economic support to Ukraine; and alignment with Ukraine’s negotiation strategy.

LOOKING TO THE LONG TERM

Trump has set a time frame for reaching a cease-fire deal in Ukraine of days to months. At the same time, he has made no demands of Putin, and Russia continues to pressure Ukraine on the battlefield and attack civilian infrastructure throughout the country. Rushing an agreement is exactly the wrong approach, because it will allow Russia to manipulate negotiations. Even if Trump imagines that a temporary agreement can later be expanded on, he cannot move so quickly. The war’s frontlines must first be stabilized so that ongoing fighting does not muddy the talks. Then, avoiding Minsk’s devastating ambiguity and enforcement defects will take time. It will require substantial preparation and coordination by parties, including Russia, Ukraine, and Europe, as well as the United States.

The Minsk negotiation process did facilitate a temporary de-escalation of hostilities. But ultimately, it undermined the search for a long-term solution, set the stage for a more devastating conflict, and tarnished the legacy of all involved with it. A resolution that applies Minsk’s lessons will be essential to safeguarding U.S. interests, as well as Trump’s 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[cubsfan]

31 minutes ago, Gregmal said:

It’s a question that most Westerners are not intellectually capable of answering. Some are just naive, some are intentionally dishonest, and most I think are what I’d call benevolently dishonest. Their brains hardwired by years and even decades of propaganda. Everything is framed through black and white, good vs evil, us vs themisms. They’re just hardwired to simplify everything down to (insert them) as bad, evil, dictator, imperialist, etc. Then they take us/our side and immediately default to good/insert the storyline. It’s too hard to think, let alone utter anything contrary to the he narrative that has already painted such a stark picture as the puppets fear the noose waiting for them if they don’t go with the program.

 

My favorite example is here. Most evil /dictator/imperialist Putin rhetoric almost immediately jumps to “insert most pro-Western narrative” around Crimea. Most common being it was “seized”, as Russia “invaded a sovereign nation”….well, imagine only telling the Palestinian story starting in November 2023? Oh wow how dishonest and misleading that would be! But some have their agendas, others just don’t know any better. 
 

Really what occurred, is for years/decades, Russia and Putin made very clear their lines in the sand with Ukraine/NATO/western meddling. What’s always conveniently left out of the Crimea story is how the US government and politicians consistently meddled in Ukraine, eventually prompting a coup, and helping overthrow a democratically elected government! Whoops! So, with that backdrop, one could argue that at some point Russia is forced to “put their foot down/stand up to the aggressor”. But hey, don’t take my word for it! The same people brainlessly taking “our side” like a bunch of fans on a Liverpool fan club message board, will claim out of the other side of their mouth, that the US needs to “take action” or “send a clear message” quite often! Whether it be with Ukraine or Taiwan, etc. Yes! No one else is able to draw their line in the sand, or use national security as a defense, only us, because WE are good and THEY are evil! 
 

So yea, that’s why this thread sucks. It’s the same rooting and fanboying and prescribed narratives and not a whole lot of anything useless or balanced. 

 

Put me down as a confused Westerner 3 years ago. I was all for Ukraine Nato membership and taking it to Russia on the offensive. A couple key posters changed my mind. Because you are right, the media narrative painted was totally dishonest, and I was too stupid to realize the complexity of the roots of the conflict. It's not black & white - and we don't belong there.

 

The USA has no business being in Ukraine - we can't get out fast enough.

Edited 6 hours ago by cubsfan