Fairfax 2024

[Munger_Disciple]

11 hours ago, Dinar said:

I am aware of utility regulations.  My point is that utility's earnings are overstated, and free cash flow is below net income since maintenance cap ex exceeds depreciation.  Sure, you usually (not always) get rate increases to pay for increased cap ex, but again, your earnings are overstated.  

 

I am no expert on energy business but return on capital (all things accounted for) seems to be a much better metric than GAAP earnings to evaluate the business. 

Edited August 20, 2024 by Munger_Disciple

[Viking]

I did a small edit to my long post from Sunday. I thought it would be useful to include more details for the Fairfax portion of the post. The edited portion is below. 

 

It is timely because I am updating my earnings forecast for Fairfax for 2024 and 2025 (small changes).

 

As I work though my earnings update, one item keeps jumping out to me - and that is the excess of fair value over carrying value for Fairfax's non-insurance associate and consolidated holdings. Something that is not even included in my earnings update. 

 

What is the problem?

 

Over the first 6 months the excess of FV over CV had increased by more than $500 million = +$20/share pre-tax. The total is $1.5 billion = $68/share (pre-tax).

 

When I think about 'normalized' earnings for Fairfax I include the excess of FV over CV - it is value that is being built by Fairfax over time. And as we have learned with Fairfax over the years, they will find a way to monetize this value (so that it is reflected in EPS and BVPS).   

 

When we look at published earnings forecasts for Fairfax (2024, 2025, 2026, 2027 etc) we need to remember that an important component is NOT BEING INCLUDED. As a result, EPS understates the economic value that is being created each year. Probably by about $10/share. And this gap will likely widen in future years.

 

Why will it widen?

 

1.) Fairfax has a large and growing amount allocated to equity investments.

2.) The share count is materially shrinking each year.

3.) The quality (in terms of earnings power) of this collection of holdings has never been better in Fairfax's history - significant value is now being created/compounded each year by this collection of holdings and a large piece of this value creation is not being captured in EPS or BVPS. 

 

Large investment gains are coming in the future

 

In the coming years, Fairfax will be monetizing the excess of FV to CV. And the investment gains will likely be higher when they do - because the intrinsic value of many of these holdings is higher than the FV. This is really hard for most investors to understand - it's like the 'spoon bending mind scene' in the Matrix movie.

 

When they happen, these large investment gains will be incremental to current EPS estimates. They will catch analysts and investors by surprise. EVEN THOUGH WE KNOW THEY ARE COMING.

 

This is one good example of how investors are underestimating future earnings for Fairfax. And estimates of future earnings determines the value of a stock. So investors continue to undervalue Fairfax's stock today - probably significantly. 

 

Of course Fairfax 'gets it.' and that is why they are being so aggressive with stock buybacks - even at a small premium to book value.  

 

Stelco is a good current example. 

• At June 30, 2024, Stelco had a FV = $351.8 million and a CV = $277.9 million; excess of FV over CV  = $73.9 million. 
• On July 15, Stelco was sold to Cleveland Cliffs for about $668 million. Fairfax will book an investment gain of about $390 million.
• The actual investment gain ($390m) is significantly more than the excess of FV over CV at June 30, 2024 ($73.9m).

With a CV = $277.9, Stelco was being significantly undervalued on Fairfax's balance sheet at June 30, 2024. Now that the sale has been announced, the $390 million gain will now get included in EPS and BVPS. And everyone is shocked and/or surprised... who could have know that something like this was going to happen? 

 

The 'investment gains' spring at Fairfax is getting coiled ever tighter. Lots more of these 'suprises' are coming in the future... We just don't know the timing or the details. Most investors though will continue to pretend they don't exist. This approach will simply give some investors a big advantage when it comes to understanding Fairfax (future earnings) and assessing its current valuation.

 

Sale of Stelco Holdings Inc. (From Fairfax's Q2-2024 earning report)

On July 15, 2024 Cleveland-Cliffs Inc. ("Cliffs") entered into a definitive agreement with Stelco to acquire all outstanding common shares of Stelco for consideration of Cdn$70.00 per share (consisting of Cdn$60.00 cash and Cdn$10.00 in Cliffs common stock). Closing of the transaction is subject to shareholder and regulatory approvals, and satisfaction of other customary closing conditions, and is expected to be in the fourth quarter of 2024. The company's current estimated pre-tax gain on sale of its holdings of approximately 13 million common shares of Stelco is approximately Cdn$531 ($390), calculated as the excess of consideration of approximately Cdn$910 ($668 or $51 per common share) over the carrying value of the investment in associate at June 30, 2024 of approximately Cdn$379 ($277.9).

 

============

Below is the edited piece from my post on Sunday.

 

Here is the link to the complete post: 

• https://thecobf.com/forum/topic/20517-fairfax-2024/page/75/#comment-575416

 

What does all of this have to do with Fairfax?

 

Fairfax has a significant portion of its equity portfolio in equities (about 30%). Over the past 5 years, Fairfax has been shifting from mark to market type holdings to associate/consolidated holdings. The proposed Sleep Country acquisition is the latest example of this trend. A gap between the fair value and the carrying value of these holdings has been growing in recent years. It is sizeable today – at June 30, 2024, the excess of FV over CV was $1.5 billion, or $68/effective share (pre-tax). Importantly, the excess of FV over CV has increased by $508 million over the first 6 months of 2024. This value creation is not captured in EPS or BVPS.

 

And there is likely a sizeable gap between intrinsic value and fair value, as we recently learned with the sale of Stelco (it was sold for much more than ‘fair value.’

 

What did Fairfax have to say on the matter in their Q2, 2024 earnings report?

 

Excess (deficiency) of fair value over adjusted carrying value 

 

"The table below presents the pre-tax excess (deficiency) of fair value over adjusted carrying value of investments in non-insurance associates and market traded consolidated non-insurance subsidiaries the company considers to be portfolio investments. Those amounts, while not included in the calculation of book value per basic share, are regularly reviewed by management as an indicator of investment performance. The aggregate pre-tax excess of fair value over adjusted carrying value of these investments at June 30, 2024 was $1,514.5 (December 31, 2023 - $1,006.0)."

 

 

Stock buybacks

 

Fairfax has also been very aggressive with stock buybacks in recent years. And they have picked up the pace so far in 2024. 

 

"During the first six months of 2024 the company purchased for cancellation 854,031 subordinate voting shares (2023 – 179,744) principally under its normal course issuer bids at a cost of $938.1 (2023 - $114.9), of which $726.5 (2023 - $70.4) was charged to retained earnings." Fairfax Q2-2024 Report

 

This year Fairfax has been buying back stock at an average price of $1,098/share. At Q2-2024, book value was $979.63. Fairfax is buying back a meaningful amount of stock at a price that is higher than book value. This will likely continue moving forward.

 

Why are they doing this? Fairfax understands its book value is understated. 

 

Edited August 20, 2024 by Viking

[StubbleJumper]

41 minutes ago, Viking said:

When I think about 'normalized' earnings for Fairfax I include the excess of FV over CV - it is value that is being built by Fairfax over time. And as we have learned with Fairfax over the years, they will find a way to monetize this value (so that it is reflected in EPS and BVPS).   

 

This is effectively just one element

of the broader Capital Gains item.  We know that capital gains will be a large element of our long-term return from FFH, but the magnitude and timing are devilishly difficult to forecast.  Whether that's the capital gain from something like Stelco or from the Pet Insurance division doesn't really matter, but it's definitely important that the fully owned or partially owned businesses become more valuable over time

 

44 minutes ago, Viking said:

Why are they doing this? Fairfax understands its book value is understated. 

 

 

The book value is what it is.  Jen Allen seems solid, so I would say that book value is neither overstated nor understated.  A more precise way to state it would be that FFH understands that, in reality, the shares are worth more than book value.  The question for an investor is how much more than BV are FFH shares worth?  A repurchase at 1.1x adjusted BV is probably beneficial to continuing shareholders because the intrinsic value of the shares is probably considerably higher than 1.1x.  The real trick for FFH is to ensure that it doesn't continue repurchases if its shares end up rising above intrinsic value.  Maybe that will be a problem for 2025 or 2026?  We can always dream!

 

 

SJ

[Viking]

2 hours ago, StubbleJumper said:

 

This is effectively just one element of the broader Capital Gains item.  We know that capital gains will be a large element of our long-term return from FFH, but the magnitude and timing are devilishly difficult to forecast.  Whether that's the capital gain from something like Stelco or from the Pet Insurance division doesn't really matter, but it's definitely important that the fully owned or partially owned businesses become more valuable over time

 

 

The book value is what it is.  Jen Allen seems solid, so I would say that book value is neither overstated nor understated.  A more precise way to state it would be that FFH understands that, in reality, the shares are worth more than book value.  The question for an investor is how much more than BV are FFH shares worth?  A repurchase at 1.1x adjusted BV is probably beneficial to continuing shareholders because the intrinsic value of the shares is probably considerably higher than 1.1x.  The real trick for FFH is to ensure that it doesn't continue repurchases if its shares end up rising above intrinsic value.  Maybe that will be a problem for 2025 or 2026?  We can always dream!

 

SJ

 

I think investment gains are 'devilishly' difficult to forecast over any one or two year span. However, I think it gets easier as you build an estimate over a longer time frame (like 3 or 4 years).  

 

If you go back 10 years, it is pretty easy to calculate an average for 'investment gains.' It could be separated into large 'one-time' gains and more 'normal' mark to market changes.

 

But Fairfax's investment portfolio is much, much larger today than 10 years ago. The size of the equity portfolio is also much larger. And the quality of the equity portfolio (in term of earnings power) is also much better. So my guess is the size of 'investment gains' coming from the equity portfolio in the coming years will be much larger than what it has been in the past.

 

In the past, it was crazy the significant value that Fairfax was able to surface with very timely asset sales from the insurance bucket of holdings: First Capital, ICICI Lombard, Riverstone Europe, pet insurance and Ambridge. None of the significant gains from each of those sales were built into earnings models before they happened. This does not include significant asset sales that have happened in the investment portfolio. I think this is instructive.

Asset sales are a great example of just how different Fairfax and Berkshire Hathaway execute their business models. Fairfax has realized significant value over the years from asset sales (and it has also been a significant source of cash for the company).

 

The beauty of Fairfax's active management/value investing model is they simply take what Mr. Market is giving them at the time. Insurance one day. Equities another day. Fixed income another day. Sometimes the value creation is rapidly growing the P/C insurance business in a hard market. Other times it is buying an asset at a low valuation (insurance or investments). Other times it is selling an asset at a premium valuation (insurance or investments). it is a little bizarre how some investors think Fairfax’s opportunity set is going to suddenly disappear in the coming years (or that they are suddenly going to get incredibly stupid).

Edited August 20, 2024 by Viking

[73 Reds]

28 minutes ago, Viking said:

 

I think investment gains are 'devilishly' difficult to forecast over any one or two year span. However, I think it gets easier as you build an estimate over a longer time frame (like 3 or 4 years).  

 

If you go back 10 years, it is pretty easy to calculate an average for 'investment gains.' It could be separated into large 'one-time' gains and more 'normal' mark to market changes.

 

But Fairfax's investment portfolio is much, much larger today than 10 years ago. The size of the equity portfolio is also much larger. And the quality of the equity portfolio (in term of earnings power) is also much better. So my guess is the size of 'investment gains' coming from the equity portfolio in the coming years will be much larger than what it has been in the past.

 

In the past, it was crazy the significant value that Fairfax was able to surface with very timely asset sales from the insurance bucket of holdings: First Capital, ICICI Lombard, Riverstone Europe, pet insurance and Ambridge. 

 

The beauty of Fairfax's active management/value investing model is they simply take what Mr. Market is giving them at the time. Asset sales are a great example of how Fairfax and Berkshire Hathaway are very different animals. Fairfax has realized significant value over the years from asset sales (and it has also been a significant source of cash for the company).

Viking, do you or anyone here know what the most significant catastrophic insurance event was that affected Fairfax and what it cost & when it occurred?  Also, do we know the maximum dollar liability the company may be on the hook for now for any single event? 

[Viking]

1 hour ago, 73 Reds said:

Viking, do you or anyone here know what the most significant catastrophic insurance event was that affected Fairfax and what it cost & when it occurred?  Also, do we know the maximum dollar liability the company may be on the hook for now for any single event? 

@73 Reds sorry, i have not spent any time on what you ask. What i do know is they have been actively reducing their exposure to the catastrophe part of the business in recent years (primarily at Brit i think). I know other board members have posted on this topic in the past so hopefully they will chime in with their thoughts.

—————

Here is an exchange during the Q&A from Fairfax’s Annual Meeting this year:

 

Unknown Shareholder
…my question is for Mr. Clarke, if he can answer. As a layman investor, I believe that, if a hurricane 5 catastrophic event happens to direct hit to Miami City, that might be a $500 billion event. I wonder if you agree with me. And Fairfax cost will be 1%. That's what I believe as a layman investor. And if this even happens twice in a row in 2 years, how Fairfax can see their balance sheet...

V. Watsa
So before Peter answers. That's exactly right. We look at stuff like that. And if it happens, how are we going to survive that? So the big [ plus ] on these events is their limits, right? And so we really focus on the worst case events, from mainly Odyssey and Allied, but Peter? Peter does all the modeling and looking at it all the time. Peter?

Peter Clarke
Sure. Yes, no, as Prem said, we're focused on our catastrophe exposure, of course. And it starts with our insurance operations. The #1 thing is they have to manage their risk appetite within their capital base, but on top of that, we do a lot of work at the Fairfax level aggregating the exposures. And we really look at PMLs. So this is your probable maximum losses. And over the last 3 or 4 years, from our premium growth, we've benefited greatly from the diversification we now have within that 30 billion of premium that we write. And we can really absorb -- we can absorb significant catastrophes and still show an underwriting profit. Like the last couple of years -- this past year, cat losses were marginally down, so we had a fairly good year, but the year before that, we had probably -- I think we had 1.3 billion of losses, and over 1 billion the year before, and still posted underwriting profit. So as our premium base got bigger, we have more margin in the business for catastrophe losses, but our exposure has stayed relatively flat. So we do look at it.

 

Northeast wind is one of our largest exposures. Southeast hurricane wind again is another one, so we're all -- we're on top of that. We look at it all the time and starts with our companies, yes. We have a team at the head office that we look at it. And of course, he's all into the details as well, so...

V. Watsa
That's the one risk that can destroy our company, so we are all focused on it all the time. You mentioned Miami. Of course, Houston, California earthquake, right, those are all big item, but one that you worry about -- there's a windstorm coming along, what he was saying, northeast wind. It's coming along the coast and hitting New York, rarely happened. It's happened once or maybe twice. Coming along -- it doesn't come into the -- it doesn't come inland, comes along and then comes into New York, which would be the -- we think, the worst one, and -- but we look at all of that all the time. So your question is a good one. That's something you have to do. You have to survive, stuff like that.

Edited August 20, 2024 by Viking

[Maverick47]

26 minutes ago, Viking said:

Peter Clarke
Sure. Yes, no, as Prem said, we're focused on our catastrophe exposure, of course. And it starts with our insurance operations. The #1 thing is they have to manage their risk appetite within their capital base, but on top of that, we do a lot of work at the Fairfax level aggregating the exposures. And we really look at PMLs. So this is your probable maximum losses. And over the last 3 or 4 years, from our premium growth, we've benefited greatly from the diversification we now have within that 30 billion of premium that we write. And we can really absorb -- we can absorb significant catastrophes and still show an underwriting profit. Like the last couple of years -- this past year, cat losses were marginally down, so we had a fairly good year, but the year before that, we had probably -- I think we had 1.3 billion of losses, and over 1 billion the year before, and still posted underwriting profit. So as our premium base got bigger, we have more margin in the business for catastrophe losses, but our exposure has stayed relatively flat. So we do look at it.

 

Northeast wind is one of our largest exposures. Southeast hurricane wind again is another one, so we're all -- we're on top of that. We look at it all the time and starts with our companies, yes. We have a team at the head office that we look at it. And of course, he's all into the details as well, so...

This is pretty typical of the cat risks faced by all reinsurers.  The US tends to have the largest concentration of insured property exposures, and all the primary carriers exposed to that are interested in purchasing property cat reinsurance.  While the frequency and severity of potential hurricanes hitting concentrated areas of Florida like Miami are of concern, the larger cat risk for the US tends to be Northeastern hurricane.  These exposures are modeled, so that the impact of sample hurricanes hitting the current insured properties are estimated. One historical hurricane in 1938 hit Long Island and continued to cause significant damage inland.  However, the density of insured dwellings in the area it hit was nowhere near as much as it is today.  So a repeat of that exact hurricane would cost quite a bit more than a category 5 hurricane hitting Miami.  Odyssey and Allied World and other of Fairfax’s reinsurers are careful to manage the property cat risk they write in aggregate.

[Santayana]

Gloria was $900M in 1985.  I wonder what that would be now.

[Maverick47]

Sandy was a hurricane in 2012, but when it hit the Northeast it had weakened to Tropical Storm strength.  A  number of the northeastern states had coastal home insurance customers with hurricane deductibles of 1 to 5% of the replacement value of their homes.  Insurance commissioners determined that the wind speed at landfall was less than hurricane  strength, so did not allow the higher hurricane deductibles to apply.  That probably helped contributed to the losses of about $93 billion.

Since hurricane deductibles were not triggered, the industry tends to refer to the event as Superstorm Sandy.

 

A category 3 or greater hurricane hitting the right portion of the Northeastern US could cause insured losses many times that of Sandy.

 

[StubbleJumper]

4 hours ago, 73 Reds said:

Viking, do you or anyone here know what the most significant catastrophic insurance event was that affected Fairfax and what it cost & when it occurred?  Also, do we know the maximum dollar liability the company may be on the hook for now for any single event? 

 

I'm guessing 9/11 or KRW.

 

Edit: after looking up the impact of 9/11 it was 10.3 cat points on the CR and KRW was 13.9 cat points on the CR.  As a point of reference, all catastrophes during 2023 were a combined 4 cat points on the CR.

 

@Maverick47 Sandy was 4.5 cat points.  But interestingly, the same table in the AR shows the Japan earthquake (the one that affected the nuclear plant at Fukashima) in 2011 was 8.8 cat points, which surprises me even though I probably read that AR a dozen times a dozen years ago.

 

 

SJ

Edited August 21, 2024 by StubbleJumper

[TwoCitiesCapital]

2 hours ago, Maverick47 said:

Sandy was a hurricane in 2012, but when it hit the Northeast it had weakened to Tropical Storm strength.  A  number of the northeastern states had coastal home insurance customers with hurricane deductibles of 1 to 5% of the replacement value of their homes.  Insurance commissioners determined that the wind speed at landfall was less than hurricane  strength, so did not allow the higher hurricane deductibles to apply.  That probably helped contributed to the losses of about $93 billion.

Since hurricane deductibles were not triggered, the industry tends to refer to the event as Superstorm Sandy.

 

A category 3 or greater hurricane hitting the right portion of the Northeastern US could cause insured losses many times that of Sandy.

 

 

I was in NYC for Sandy. Everything South of 14th Street was a disaster for weeks. The financial district ran off emergency generators on 18-wheelers for months after the storm. 

 

The subways flooded and was months to 1-2 years before certain lines where back to normal schedules (like the NJ Path). 

 

A real hurricane would mess up the area bigly....

[Munger_Disciple]

19 minutes ago, TwoCitiesCapital said:

 

I was in NYC for Sandy. Everything South of 14th Street was a disaster for weeks. The financial district ran off emergency generators on 18-wheelers for months after the storm. 

 

The subways flooded and was months to 1-2 years before certain lines where back to normal schedules (like the NJ Path). 

 

A real hurricane would mess up the area bigly....

 

What do people think the hit to book of Fairfax under a serious catastrophic event causing a total damage of something of the order of $300 billion?

[73 Reds]

11 hours ago, StubbleJumper said:

 

I'm guessing 9/11 or KRW.

 

Edit: after looking up the impact of 9/11 it was 10.3 cat points on the CR and KRW was 13.9 cat points on the CR.  As a point of reference, all catastrophes during 2023 were a combined 4 cat points on the CR.

 

@Maverick47 Sandy was 4.5 cat points.  But interestingly, the same table in the AR shows the Japan earthquake (the one that affected the nuclear plant at Fukashima) in 2011 was 8.8 cat points, which surprises me even though I probably read that AR a dozen times a dozen years ago.

 

 

SJ

It would be interesting and probably scary at the same time to see a current schedule of all insured catastrophic events and the max liability for each.

[SafetyinNumbers]

10 hours ago, Munger_Disciple said:

 

What do people think the hit to book of Fairfax under a serious catastrophic event causing a total damage of something of the order of $300 billion?

3-3.75b based on 1-1.25%. Fairfax might breakeven in a year like that. 

[StubbleJumper]

23 minutes ago, 73 Reds said:

It would be interesting and probably scary at the same time to see a current schedule of all insured catastrophic events and the max liability for each.

 

 

I'm sure that there's an internal table or schedule with the max impact of specific existential events, but I doubt very much that shareholders would ever get to see that!

 

But, it is somewhat sobering to look at current Net Earned Premiums and then multiply that number by the 13.9% hit from the Katrina, Rita, Wilma hurricanes, or the 8.8% hit from that Japan earthquake.  I understand that the company says it's less exposed to hurricane risk on the east coast now than it was for KRW, but those events would still be a big number!

 

 

SJ

[Hoodlum]

This is where increasing Cash/short term securities from the current $2.5B to $3.5B would help.  With the current $2.5B and the above scenarios, Fairfax would need to pull additional dividends from their subs to cover these adverse events.

Edited August 21, 2024 by Hoodlum

[gfp]

7 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

This is where increasing Cash/short term securities from the current $2.5B to $3.5B would help.  With the current $2.5B and the above scenarios, Fairfax would need to pull additional dividends from their subs to cover these adverse events.

 

Are you talking about holding company cash?  That isn't where claims are paid from.  There are plenty of invested assets, cash and otherwise, in the insurance subs and that is where claims are paid from.

[StubbleJumper]

4 minutes ago, gfp said:

 

Are you talking about holding company cash?  That isn't where claims are paid from.  There are plenty of invested assets, cash and otherwise, in the insurance subs and that is where claims are paid from.

 

Agreed.  The value of the holdco cash and the ability to tap into the revolver is that the holdco can quickly inject cash into a sub if that sub had mismanaged its exposures so badly that it had a capital shortfall.  But, we have to trust that the subs are carefully managing their exposure and will not have a capital shortfall to begin with.  The other value of that holdco cash balance is that large cats like 9/11 or KRW tend to trigger a hard market the next year, so it's nice if the holdco is able to add capital to a sub that might want to write a pile more business the year following the cat.

 

 

SJ

[Cigarbutt]

39 minutes ago, StubbleJumper said:

I'm sure that there's an internal table or schedule with the max impact of specific existential events, but I doubt very much that shareholders would ever get to see that!

...

SJ

The closest one can see from the outside that would look like that internal table is the following:

which can be found in the "ESG" report, with the next actualized version including 2023 likely coming to their website sometimes this fall.

Opinion: Catastrophe exposure is what it is but FFH has become less exposed to the risk/reward.

[Munger_Disciple]

Thanks @SafetyinNumbers, @StubbleJumper and @Cigarbutt for your perspectives on the loss estimates. 

[MMM20]

On 8/7/2024 at 7:09 PM, MMM20 said:

We are talking about a 10% ish drawdown. This happens like twice a year. If this is causing you pain and suffering, you’re probably too big in Fairfax.
 

I thought Charlie was talking about the ~50% portfolio drawdown that we’ll all go through at some point. 

 

 

Where are the posts about the extreme volatility of the past two weeks?

 

Edited August 21, 2024 by MMM20

[Santayana]

Those 10% pullbacks are such gifts.

[Munger_Disciple]

6 hours ago, StubbleJumper said:

 

 

I'm sure that there's an internal table or schedule with the max impact of specific existential events, but I doubt very much that shareholders would ever get to see that!

 

But, it is somewhat sobering to look at current Net Earned Premiums and then multiply that number by the 13.9% hit from the Katrina, Rita, Wilma hurricanes, or the 8.8% hit from that Japan earthquake.  I understand that the company says it's less exposed to hurricane risk on the east coast now than it was for KRW, but those events would still be a big number!

 

 

SJ

 

Annualizing the first six month net premiums for 2024, we get $26 Billion in net annual premiums. So that gives us roughly $3.6 Billion loss for a Katrina type CAT event which is roughly in line with the numbers suggested by @SafetyinNumbers. It equates to roughly 12%-13% after tax earnings hit to book. 

[SafetyinNumbers]

4 hours ago, Munger_Disciple said:

 

Annualizing the first six month net premiums for 2024, we get $26 Billion in net annual premiums. So that gives us roughly $3.6 Billion loss for a Katrina type CAT event which is roughly in line with the numbers suggested by @SafetyinNumbers. It equates to roughly 12%-13% after tax earnings hit to book. 

They probably still make money that year.

[StubbleJumper]

1 hour ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

They probably still make money that year.

 

Edit: Just ignore my comment, I'm mathematically challenged tonight!

 

 

SJ

Edited August 22, 2024 by StubbleJumper