Fairfax Africa

[Xerxes]

Xerxes is going to give you folks some real news that is interesting but wont be moving the needle.

 

Former President Barack Obama minority owner in NBA's Africa business (cnbc.com) 

 

"Nigeria-based industrial group Yinka Folawiyo Group and Helios Fairfax Partners Corporation, an investment holding company that trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “HFPC,” are investors in NBA Africa, alongside former NBA players Luol Deng and Joakim Noah are also investors. In addition, NBA commissioner Adam Silver and NBA Chief Operating Officer Mark Tatum have board seats."

[Parsad]

On 7/27/2021 at 4:28 PM, Xerxes said:

Xerxes is going to give you folks some real news that is interesting but wont be moving the needle.

 

Former President Barack Obama minority owner in NBA's Africa business (cnbc.com) 

 

"Nigeria-based industrial group Yinka Folawiyo Group and Helios Fairfax Partners Corporation, an investment holding company that trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “HFPC,” are investors in NBA Africa, alongside former NBA players Luol Deng and Joakim Noah are also investors. In addition, NBA commissioner Adam Silver and NBA Chief Operating Officer Mark Tatum have board seats."

 

  

 

    

[sdev]

Anyone have any color on what the fundraising outlook looks like for Helios?

 

They mentioned on the AGM that EM fundraising is tough - and I presume Africa is one step tougher (as Brazil, India, etc - seem to be raising loads of money). They also indicated that they are looking at raising a RE fund and have "interesting" things going on with respect to capital markets activities.

 

I think if they do actually have the clout to raise an equal or larger PE fund + start a successful RE fund, and continue following through with good returns, this could be a great price for the business. But if it's just a balance sheet (vs an alt asset manager) it's much less interesting.

[sdev]

As an aside I tried to get in touch with IR but no response.

[petec]

Depends on your time horizon. I suspect the long term outlook for high-performing managers is good. 

[wondering]

A bit of a promotion video, but it does highlight some of the companies Helios is invested in

 

 

[Xerxes]

Thanks for posting. I really like the work that they are doing and the impact that they are having. Compare that some guy sitting in NYC flipping options and stocks like burgers. That said, this is not only long term, it is very long term, before any major investor gets excited about the stock. Market value is at about 60% of its BV. The difference between this entity and FIH is that, for this one the current Helios operator have an incentive to close gap. (or rather more incentive than say FIH, not to say that FIH does not have an incentive)

 

At September 30, 2021 common shareholders' equity was $593.6 million, or book value per share of $5.44 with 109,107,606 shares outstanding, compared to $599.7 million, or book value per share of $5.50 with 109,118,253 shares outstanding, at December 31, 2020, a decrease of 1.1%.

[jfan]

I thought on a Sunday afternoon to glance through their most recent quarterly report. Here are some observations (no specific order).

 

First of, all I can say is what a disaster. Almost all of FAH's legacy investments have been impaired.

1) PGR2 Loan --> written down to zero

2) Atlas Mara 11% convertible bonds --> written down to zero

3) CIG common shares --> written down to zero

 

The following looks ominous:

1) Atlas Mara Facility --> according their their "Models" --> expected recovery estimate 40.7% (down from 71.3%). One saving grace is that the sales of Atlas Mara Botswana to Access Bank subsequent to Sept 30, 2021 allowed them to recover $11,325 out of the original $39,507 loan. The other saving grace is that Helios negotiated a guarantee from Fairfax to cover this mess before merging ("Atlas Mara Facility Guarantee").

 

The following if you believe them:

1) Atlas Mara 7.5% Bonds --> estimated recovery 99.5%

2) Secured Philafrica Facility (with AGH's pledge of its Philafrica equity interest) --> expected recovery 100% but currently not being paid because it is subordinate to other 3rd party debt

3) CIG Loan (with Conlog equity pledged) has expected recovery of 100% with an "orderly" sales process of Conlog.

 

The following had a small impairments

1) GroCapital Holding Ltd's 9.6% ownership of Access Bank (where the majority 90.4% interest was bought by a publicly listed Nigerian bank validating its value.

2) Nova Pioneer Bonds and Warrants were converted to Ascendant Learning Ltd equity (HFP now owns 56.3% of Ascendant) --> small impairment of the original bonds ($9 million --> small?)

 

HFP has 3% unsecured debentures from FFH totaling $100,000,000. This gets adjusted downward if the reference legacy investments of AGH, Philafrica common, Philafrica facility, and PGR2 loan is lower than $102,600,000.  (as above, the PGR2 loan was written off). <-- this is the "HFP redemption derivative"

 

82.3% of their cash and investments are Level 3 fair value disclosures.

 

The big turnaround investment is in TopCo LP Class B LP Interest. This is the management fee portion of Helio Holding Groups of some of its investment operations. These are their assumptions:

- 52.2% pre-tax profit margin, FCF growth of 4.5%, with discount rate of 21.7%.

- the current AUM is $2.3 Billion (down from $3.6 billion because Helios Fund I is closing). The 8 year CAGR of AUM is expected to be 18.7%. So they are aiming for ~ $10 billion in future AUM.

 

The other portion is in TopCo LP Class A LP interest. This is the carried interest portion.

- They've tightened their target exit multiples of invested capital to 2.5-2.6x from 2.1 - 2.6x.

 

There is some description of Helio Fund investments. Major themes include:

1) fuel distribution

2) electronic payment processing

3) telecom

4) financial services

5) agricultural distribution

6) consumer goods

7) insurance 

 

Helios fund IV has 3 investments (consumer good, insurance, and electronic payment processor).

 

Reflecting on this, my past decision making was poor. FAH was an abject failure. HFP on the other hand has a much better chance. At least, I don't think it will go to zero. Just have to figure out, when to incur my losses. That being said, if I was looking at it today, might be worth a small position (aka lotto ticket) for African exposure. Alternatively, could just invest with Helios Investment Partners instead.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[matthew2129]

38 minutes ago, jfan said:

I thought on a Sunday afternoon to glance through their most recent quarterly report. Here are some observations (no specific order).

 

First of, all I can say is what a disaster. Almost all of FAH's legacy investments have been impaired.

1) PGR2 Loan --> written down to zero

2) Atlas Mara 11% convertible bonds --> written down to zero

3) CIG common shares --> written down to zero

 

The following looks ominous:

1) Atlas Mara Facility --> according their their "Models" --> expected recovery estimate 40.7% (down from 71.3%). One saving grace is that the sales of Atlas Mara Botswana to Access Bank subsequent to Sept 30, 2021 allowed them to recover $11,325 out of the original $39,507 loan. The other saving grace is that Helios negotiated a guarantee from Fairfax to cover this mess before merging ("Atlas Mara Facility Guarantee").

 

The following if you believe them:

1) Atlas Mara 7.5% Bonds --> estimated recovery 99.5%

2) Secured Philafrica Facility (with AGH's pledge of its Philafrica equity interest) --> expected recovery 100% but currently not being paid because it is subordinate to other 3rd party debt

3) CIG Loan (with Conlog equity pledged) has expected recovery of 100% with an "orderly" sales process of Conlog.

 

The following had a small impairments

1) GroCapital Holding Ltd's 9.6% ownership of Access Bank (where the majority 90.4% interest was bought by a publicly listed Nigerian bank validating its value.

2) Nova Pioneer Bonds and Warrants were converted to Ascendant Learning Ltd equity (HFP now owns 56.3% of Ascendant) --> small impairment of the original bonds ($9 million --> small?)

 

HFP has 3% unsecured debentures from FFH totaling $100,000,000. This gets adjusted downward if the reference legacy investments of AGH, Philafrica common, Philafrica facility, and PGR2 loan is lower than $102,600,000.  (as above, the PGR2 loan was written off). <-- this is the "HFP redemption derivative"

 

82.3% of their cash and investments are Level 3 fair value disclosures.

 

The big turnaround investment is in TopCo LP Class B LP Interest. This is the management fee portion of Helio Holding Groups of some of its investment operations. These are their assumptions:

- 52.2% pre-tax profit margin, FCF growth of 4.5%, with discount rate of 21.7%.

- the current AUM is $2.3 Billion (down from $3.6 billion because Helios Fund I is closing). The 8 year CAGR of AUM is expected to be 18.7%. So they are aiming for ~ $10 billion in future AUM.

 

The other portion is in TopCo LP Class A LP interest. This is the carried interest portion.

- They've tightened their target exit multiples of invested capital to 2.5-2.6x from 2.1 - 2.6x.

 

There is some description of Helio Fund investments. Major themes include:

1) fuel distribution

2) electronic payment processing

3) telecom

4) financial services

5) agricultural distribution

6) consumer goods

7) insurance 

 

Helios fund IV has 3 investments (consumer good, insurance, and electronic payment processor).

 

Reflecting on this, my past decision making was poor. FAH was an abject failure. HFP on the other hand has a much better chance. At least, I don't think it will go to zero. Just have to figure out, when to incur my losses. That being said, if I was looking at it today, might be worth a small position (aka lotto ticket) for African exposure. Alternatively, could just invest with Helios Investment Partners instead.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Good summary. Personally, I'm amazed the discount to BV isn't even greater here given the discounts at FFH and Fairfax India, and this illiquid junk isn't even marginable in margin account since its a micro cap

[Viking]

4 hours ago, jfan said:

I thought on a Sunday afternoon to glance through their most recent quarterly report. Here are some observations (no specific order).

 

First of, all I can say is what a disaster. Almost all of FAH's legacy investments have been impaired.

1) PGR2 Loan --> written down to zero

2) Atlas Mara 11% convertible bonds --> written down to zero

3) CIG common shares --> written down to zero

 

The following looks ominous:

1) Atlas Mara Facility --> according their their "Models" --> expected recovery estimate 40.7% (down from 71.3%). One saving grace is that the sales of Atlas Mara Botswana to Access Bank subsequent to Sept 30, 2021 allowed them to recover $11,325 out of the original $39,507 loan. The other saving grace is that Helios negotiated a guarantee from Fairfax to cover this mess before merging ("Atlas Mara Facility Guarantee").

 

The following if you believe them:

1) Atlas Mara 7.5% Bonds --> estimated recovery 99.5%

2) Secured Philafrica Facility (with AGH's pledge of its Philafrica equity interest) --> expected recovery 100% but currently not being paid because it is subordinate to other 3rd party debt

3) CIG Loan (with Conlog equity pledged) has expected recovery of 100% with an "orderly" sales process of Conlog.

 

The following had a small impairments

1) GroCapital Holding Ltd's 9.6% ownership of Access Bank (where the majority 90.4% interest was bought by a publicly listed Nigerian bank validating its value.

2) Nova Pioneer Bonds and Warrants were converted to Ascendant Learning Ltd equity (HFP now owns 56.3% of Ascendant) --> small impairment of the original bonds ($9 million --> small?)

 

HFP has 3% unsecured debentures from FFH totaling $100,000,000. This gets adjusted downward if the reference legacy investments of AGH, Philafrica common, Philafrica facility, and PGR2 loan is lower than $102,600,000.  (as above, the PGR2 loan was written off). <-- this is the "HFP redemption derivative"

 

82.3% of their cash and investments are Level 3 fair value disclosures.

 

The big turnaround investment is in TopCo LP Class B LP Interest. This is the management fee portion of Helio Holding Groups of some of its investment operations. These are their assumptions:

- 52.2% pre-tax profit margin, FCF growth of 4.5%, with discount rate of 21.7%.

- the current AUM is $2.3 Billion (down from $3.6 billion because Helios Fund I is closing). The 8 year CAGR of AUM is expected to be 18.7%. So they are aiming for ~ $10 billion in future AUM.

 

The other portion is in TopCo LP Class A LP interest. This is the carried interest portion.

- They've tightened their target exit multiples of invested capital to 2.5-2.6x from 2.1 - 2.6x.

 

There is some description of Helio Fund investments. Major themes include:

1) fuel distribution

2) electronic payment processing

3) telecom

4) financial services

5) agricultural distribution

6) consumer goods

7) insurance 

 

Helios fund IV has 3 investments (consumer good, insurance, and electronic payment processor).

 

Reflecting on this, my past decision making was poor. FAH was an abject failure. HFP on the other hand has a much better chance. At least, I don't think it will go to zero. Just have to figure out, when to incur my losses. That being said, if I was looking at it today, might be worth a small position (aka lotto ticket) for African exposure. Alternatively, could just invest with Helios Investment Partners instead.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

@jfan great summary. Fairfax Africa / Helios Fairfax provides a great example of the transformation that has been underway for years at Fairfax from ‘old Fairfax’ to ‘new Fairfax’. 
 

Old Fairfax: Fairfax Africa. They took what they were doing in India (where they have a proven competitive advantage) and thought they could copy it to Africa (where they had no proven competitive advantage). Prem has said that this was Paul Rivette’s idea and he was responsible for managing it. And boy what a catastrophe. Paul is no longer with Fairfax (retired, i think  ). Bad decision after bad decision year after year. 

One of Fairfax’s strengths (at least in recent years) is recognizing mistakes/problems. And then finding a creative solution. 

 

New Fairfax: the solution was the sale/merger of Fairfax Africa into Helios creating Helios Fairfax Africa. Helios Fairfax is now managed by Helios (please correct me if i am wrong). It will take Helios many years to right the ship. They have a very good track record and we will see what they can do in the coming years. 
 

The other important piece is Helios Fairfax is now a VERY small investment for Fairfax with a market value of US$130 million or so… (based on where shares are trading today)… it is less than 1% of their equity portfolio. Perhaps there will be another write down coming; so be it (bad past decisions have consequences). So it is now a lottery ticket type investment with a 5 to 10 year time horizon. If Helios works their magic it might bloom and Fairfax makes good money many years down the road. Or it goes to zero. 
 

Bottom line, we can all move on from the debacle that was Fairfax Africa. A very welcome development for Fairfax shareholders. 

Edited November 22, 2021 by Viking

[TwoCitiesCapital]

2 hours ago, StubbleJumper said:

It will be interesting to see what FFH has done with its cash and fixed income portfolio.  My sense is that they'll be waiting for rates to rise a bit more before making meaningful changes to duration, but there will at least be some slightly better return opportunities for the short-term investments.  At this point, perhaps two-year treasuries are the compromise position that delivers some yield while allowing the long treasuries to return to sane prices.  Even reinvesting $5b into the 2-yr at current rates would probably bump interest income by $25m/yr or so.  It still doesn't take you to the 3%+ that you'd like to see, but every bit helps....

 

 

SJ

 

We will see. Two year yields are up substantially off their lows, but the long end basically is only up slightly from where it was at before the Omicron scare. 

 

Would be nice to see them roll some maturities at higher rates to pick up a slight boost in interest income, but ultimately won't be much impact to the bottom line. 

 

I honestly think it'll be a few years before we can hope for anything appreciable out of fixed income. If they weren't adding 10-years at 3.25% in 2018, I can't understand why they'd add at anything below that level now with inflation where it's at. 

Edited January 10, 2022 by TwoCitiesCapital

[wondering]

https://www.heliosinvestment.com/uploads/files/HFP-Helios-Fairfax-Partners-2021-Annual-Report-Mar-22-2022.pdf

 

2021 Financial statements finally released (they were a bit slow).  

 

 

• Net loss .24/share or $25M
• book value 5.47/share
• p 58 ..Material weakness found in the internal control of financial reporting framework. Basically, they were evaluating the portfolio investment properly.  Although, the problem has been remedied and no restatement was necessary.
• superficial observation - the financial statements are a lot more glossier (ex more pictures) than FFH.  I am guess they have to do more to market the company to potential investors.
• I still have to read the report in greater detail

[jfan]

I guess I just enjoy self-flagellation and the prospect of throwing more good money at bad investments. At these current prices, it seems that we might be getting an opportunity to buy a (decent? good?) African asset manager at very reasonable price with the downside backed by FFH and Conlog assets (from their CIG investment). Almost everything else has been written off or some collection of debt has occurred already.

 

The demographic trends seem right. Access to private capital is limited but improving. Seems like fertile ground for a decent asset manager to find opportunities. 

 

The structure seems about right with alignment between Helios and FFH. 

 

The questions are:

1) can they raise enough 3rd party capital and get their AUM to $6.9 billion (roughly double of their AUM pre-merger) and achieve 40% pre-tax operating margins (pre-merger margins at Helios Investment Partners were ~ 18-20% assuming a 25% tax rate)?

2) How much better is Helios at achieving decent returns? So far they are raising capital for Fund IV, invested in Trone and NBA Africa, and I assume as well as rejigged their public market investments (Not much disclosure here but the portfolio is above costs).

 

https://qz.com/africa/2158408/private-capital-flow-into-africa-more-than-doubled-from-2020-to-2021/

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/05/study-shows-virtual-capital-for-african-startups-is-steeply-increasing/

https://www.brookings.edu/essay/africas-economic-recovery-financing-robust-post-pandemic-growth/

 

Can someone talk me down from the edge (again)?

 

[petec]

I find this tempting too although I worry that fundraising & deployment has been slow since the deal closed. Maybe I am just impatient, or have missed some news.

[jfan]

https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/africa-focus-spring-2021/private-equity-africa-trends-and-opportunities-2021

 

https://thecapitalquest.com/2022/01/14/meet-the-most-active-private-equity-investors-in-africa/

 

Helios gets a mention in the 2nd article.

[jfan]

https://blogs.imf.org/2021/04/05/how-rising-interest-rates-could-affect-emerging-markets/

 

https://blogs.imf.org/2022/01/10/emerging-economies-must-prepare-for-fed-policy-tightening/

 

This is an interesting blog for those following emerging markets by the IMF.

[elliott]

On 11/21/2021 at 9:44 PM, jfan said:

Alternatively, could just invest with Helios Investment Partners instead.

 

Do you have access to their funds?

[elliott]

On 11/14/2021 at 5:52 AM, Xerxes said:

Compare that some guy sitting in NYC flipping options and stocks like burgers.

 

 

Wiklerson was the boss but as I posted some time ago there was also Pactorum permanently in Africa, and then the rest of the team which I would say included people from FAH that were supposed to review the investment ideas. What I mean is that either those verifying the ideas did poorly, or simply did not do their job, and that I think goes further than Wilkerson.

 

I am considering this again, but I would love to know if somebody has found a way to invest in African stocks directly, for example in the NSE (kenya).

 

[jfan]

4 hours ago, elliott said:

 

Do you have access to their funds?

No

[wondering]

Interview with Tope Lawani from March 2022

 

 

- first 26 minutes about his background and personal history

- 26 minutes onward talks about starting Helios and the investments

- telecom towers in Africa, and the barriers to entry in Africa

- Oil investments

- banking in Africa.  It's ripe for e-banking or phone-banking.  It's cost-prohibitive for the average African to have a traditional savings account

 

My current thinking on Helios Fairfax (note - I am greatly influenced by the other contributors to the discussion eg. Viking, Petec and others)

- HFP is still cleaning up the mess left behind original Fairfax Africa team

- in the last year or so made a new investment in a Morrocan grocery chain

- emerging markets is getting killed right now with rise of US dollar etc.

- a few questions - when will the US dollar adjust downward?  When will institutional investors start investing in Africa and emerging markets in a bigger way?

- once Wall Street returns to Africa, Helios is positioned way to capture some of that money.  and therefore, more management fees for Helios Fairfax

- note - I am invested in Helios Fairfax but I am down a lot  

 

[jfan]

On 9/3/2022 at 11:03 AM, wondering said:

note - I am invested in Helios Fairfax but I am down a lot  

@wonderingThanks for posting this video. I quite enjoyed it. Tope is very articulate and seems like an intelligent and shrewd operator. Africa does seem to have many opportunities and the paucity of institutional funds is definitely advantageous for Helios, being a first mover with permanent capital. It was insightful to learn that the opportunities like cellular towers are similar but different in an African context. Similarly, how bank profitability is very different due to the large mobile penetration but high # of unbanked individuals. 

 

I think it is very hard to say when Africa will attract institutional interest again. I think this microcap special situation/start-up will require a 10+ year investing time frame with very uncertain IRRs but the probability of a zero with Tope in charge is much reduced. 

 

PS - I am down a lot too

Edited September 6, 2022 by jfan

[Viking]

On 9/3/2022 at 8:03 AM, wondering said:

Interview with Tope Lawani from March 2022

 

 

- first 26 minutes about his background and personal history

- 26 minutes onward talks about starting Helios and the investments

- telecom towers in Africa, and the barriers to entry in Africa

- Oil investments

- banking in Africa.  It's ripe for e-banking or phone-banking.  It's cost-prohibitive for the average African to have a traditional savings account

 

My current thinking on Helios Fairfax (note - I am greatly influenced by the other contributors to the discussion eg. Viking, Petec and others)

- HFP is still cleaning up the mess left behind original Fairfax Africa team

- in the last year or so made a new investment in a Morrocan grocery chain

- emerging markets is getting killed right now with rise of US dollar etc.

- a few questions - when will the US dollar adjust downward?  When will institutional investors start investing in Africa and emerging markets in a bigger way?

- once Wall Street returns to Africa, Helios is positioned way to capture some of that money.  and therefore, more management fees for Helios Fairfax

- note - I am invested in Helios Fairfax but I am down a lot  

@wondering thanks for posting the link. It certainly looks like Fairfax has picked the right long term partner to get exposure to Africa. 
 

Fairfax Africa and Helios Fairfax is a great example of what i like to call ‘old Fairfax’ and ‘new Fairfax’. Fairfax Africa was started because Paul Rivette saw what Fairfax India was doing (quite successfully) and felt it could easily be duplicated in Africa. In theory, sounded like a great idea. In practice, it was a disaster.
 

There was significant financial damage done directly to Fairfax. Does anyone know what the actual financial hit has been so far? My guess is more than $200 million (i actually have refused to do a deep dive on Fairfax Africa because it was such a shit show). There was also significant reputational damage done to Fairfax. Investors in Fairfax Africa got taken out behind the woodshed. And yes, it was Fairfax’s fault. Because Fairfax was borderline negligent in how it handled the whole Fairfax Africa affair. This was not some outside company… Fairfax Africa was Fairfax’s baby.  

 

“Trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to repair.” One of the reasons Fairfax stock trades at the low multiple it does today is because many investors no longer trust Fairfax. The ‘equity hedge/short’  fiasco was the big screw up with an 11 year impact on results. Fairfax Africa was another, smaller, screw up. 
 

Helios Fairfax is the ‘new Fairfax’ part of the story. After a few year, Fairfax recognized its mistake with Fairfax Africa. It found the right partner to get exposure to Africa (Helios). It paid a heavy price (write downs). But Fairfax now looks well positioned to benefit over the coming decade as Africa develops. 
 

The reason i keep bringing up the equity hedges and today, Fairfax Africa, is so we - and Fairfax - do not forget the very serious mistakes made by the management team at Fairfax in the still recent past. Because those (and other) past mistakes cost Fairfax (and Fairfax shareholders) hundreds of millions of dollars every year for over a decade. Those mistakes also eviscerated any trust that existed between Fairfax and much of their former shareholder base.

 

I really like what i have been seeing from Fairfax the past 4 or 5 years. I probably come across as being quite the fan boy. I don’t think i am… my eyes are wide open. It will take years of good decision making, communication and performance for Fairfax to earn back the trust it has (deservedly) lost with investors. 

Edited September 6, 2022 by Viking

[petec]

On 9/6/2022 at 11:15 PM, Viking said:

@wondering thanks for posting the link. It certainly looks like Fairfax has picked the right long term partner to get exposure to Africa. 
 

Fairfax Africa and Helios Fairfax is a great example of what i like to call ‘old Fairfax’ and ‘new Fairfax’. Fairfax Africa was started because Paul Rivette saw what Fairfax India was doing (quite successfully) and felt it could easily be duplicated in Africa. In theory, sounded like a great idea. In practice, it was a disaster.
 

There was significant financial damage done directly to Fairfax. Does anyone know what the actual financial hit has been so far? My guess is more than $200 million (i actually have refused to do a deep dive on Fairfax Africa because it was such a shit show). There was also significant reputational damage done to Fairfax. Investors in Fairfax Africa got taken out behind the woodshed. And yes, it was Fairfax’s fault. Because Fairfax was borderline negligent in how it handled the whole Fairfax Africa affair. This was not some outside company… Fairfax Africa was Fairfax’s baby.  

 

“Trust takes years to build, seconds to break, and forever to repair.” One of the reasons Fairfax stock trades at the low multiple it does today is because many investors no longer trust Fairfax. The ‘equity hedge/short’  fiasco was the big screw up with an 11 year impact on results. Fairfax Africa was another, smaller, screw up. 
 

Helios Fairfax is the ‘new Fairfax’ part of the story. After a few year, Fairfax recognized its mistake with Fairfax Africa. It found the right partner to get exposure to Africa (Helios). It paid a heavy price (write downs). But Fairfax now looks well positioned to benefit over the coming decade as Africa develops. 
 

The reason i keep bringing up the equity hedges and today, Fairfax Africa, is so we - and Fairfax - do not forget the very serious mistakes made by the management team at Fairfax in the still recent past. Because those (and other) past mistakes cost Fairfax (and Fairfax shareholders) hundreds of millions of dollars every year for over a decade. Those mistakes also eviscerated any trust that existed between Fairfax and much of their former shareholder base.

 

I really like what i have been seeing from Fairfax the past 4 or 5 years. I probably come across as being quite the fan boy. I don’t think i am… my eyes are wide open. It will take years of good decision making, communication and performance for Fairfax to earn back the trust it has (deservedly) lost with investors. 

 

+1

 

I think Tope is an outstanding long term partner.

[Xerxes]

At September 30, 2022 common shareholders' equity was $524.4 million, or book value per share of $4.85 with 108,193,971 shares outstanding, compared to $591.9 million, or book value per share of $5.47 with 108,259,645 shares outstanding, at December 31, 2021, a decrease of 11.3%.

 

Microsoft Word - HFP - 2022 Q3 Press Release - FINAL - Nov 10 2022 (heliosinvestment.com)

 

Grind continues. $524 million of book value selling for $147 million in the market.

 

 

[wondering]

Year end for Helios Fairfaix Partners released.  Pretty much as expected - not great.  But similar to the theme the Viking used with FFH, this is a ship that is SLOWING turning around.

 

I guess my question is - at what point does Helios become interesting again?

 

https://www.heliosinvestment.com/uploads/files/HFP-2022-Q4-Press-Release_1.pdf