John Hjorth

On overall basis, I do, actually. The question is if this is warranted, or I'm naive. Perhaps it's not only about the Danish legal system, but also about that I live a place, where we have some kind of a "dual legal" system - the legal system and The Law of Jante. Parts of the Danish press practise The Law of Jante zealously. Here is a hilarious example. ["You can't speed up a Tesla when it's standing still" and "I haven't filed a police report for violence against me by the officers because they were two against one." [ : - D]] The real problem is that I may be severely biased here because I forget about such cases [related to equality for the law] in the long run - simply because I don't give a damn about them [like example above], and because I haven't really seen some appalling evidence that there exist exemptions from equality for the Law. There is a risk that the casuality in this line of thinking may be logically flawed. So, thank you for asking, wachtwoord.

Greg, Thank you for elaborating with specific examples. After reading your post I understand your position better. Some of those examples have actually hit the Danish press. I read it as yet another token of USA gradually becoming more divided [without the intent to turn this topic into politics].

They just need to get hold of his blackmail material ( tapes?). I agree it could be interesting. Also, do all scumbags bank with Deutsche Bank? Personally I think Spekulatius' take on the situation is the key to understanding the real situation as of now.

I'm so shocked by reading the last few posts in this topic, honestly, Predators are everywhere, not just in the US, also in tiny Denmark [for my part]. Absolutely terrible stories pops up now and then - also here. Those cases are however still dealt with in the court system. -Do you not trust the US legal system? [opinions of Canadians are not relevant here]

Thank you for your post, Cigarbutt, My immediate reaction to your numbers : 0_0. I've actually never paid any real attention to that part of Berkshire's securities portfolio, nor the size of that particular part of it. - - - o 0 o - - - Then [- naturally! - ] some basic numbers digging : Berkshire "bond portfolio" [called in the financials : "Investments in fixed maturity securities"] : [All figures in USD B] EOP2019Q2 : 19.962 EOP2018Q4 : 19.898 EOP2017Q4 : 21.353 EOP2016Q4 : 23.432 - - - [Here I'm inserting a dotted line, because the accounting definition for this part of the portfolio was changed between EOP2015Q4 and EOP2016Q4][1] --- EOP2015Q4 : 25,998 EOP2014Q4 : 27.397 EOP2013Q4 : 28.785 EOP2012Q4 : 31.449 EOP2011Q4 : 31.222 EOP2010Q4 : 33.803 EOP2009Q4 : 35.729 EOP2008Q4 : 27.115 EOP2007Q4 : 28.515 EOP2006Q4 : 25.300 EOP2005Q4 : 27.420 - - - o 0 o - - - There is no practical way to adjust EOP2005Q4 - EOP2015Q4 figures to figures based on principles for the following period, based on [for us] available information. It looks more to me like Cigarbutt here has been hinting, implying, or perhaps even suggesting : "It's not about a ""min. USD 20 B in cash & cash equivalents" Berkshire contingency liquidity rule", more like a ""min. USD 20 B in cash & cash equivalents AND USD ~20 B in bonds all times" Berkshire contingency liquidity rule". - - - o 0 o - - - Note 1 : Before [somewhere] between EOP2015Q4 and EOP2016Q4 : US T-Bills could be part of : a. Cash and cash equivalents [if maturities was less than three months when purchased. b. Investments in fixed maturity securities. [Here understood as "total value of US T-Bills minus [a]"]. After [somewhere] between EOP2015Q4 and EOP2016Q4 : US T-Bills could be part of : c. Cash and cash equivalents [if maturities was less than three months when purchased. d. Short term investments in US T-bills ["short term" is here defined in US GAAP and IFRS as "with maturity within one year after the balance sheet date". e. Investments in fixed maturity securities. [Here understood as "total value of US T-Bills minus [c] - [d]"].

Amazon link. Available in English, French & Italian. After reading the April 2016 review of the English version of the book I immediately pressed the buy button on Amazon UK : I expect multi-level entertainment! [ : - P ]

Thank you to all for some high quality posts since my last post, Lots to think about. [ : - ) ] To me, it's inspiring and educational to read your posts, because the situation can be approached & looked at from several angles. - - - o 0 o - - - I have read that particular blog post by The Brooklyn Investor discussed by KFS and Mephistopheles before, I suppose it must have been just after it was posted late 2017, most likely because it was mentioned here on CoBF. What caught my eye reading it this time [, not last time] was the large movements in cash during the period 2001 - 2004 [both years included]. [uSD 5.863 B EOP2001 -> USD 40.020 B EOP2004], so I dived into the cash flow statements for those years [i've never really looked closer at these earlier - they are somehow "just history" to me]. It became clear to me, that Mr. Buffett was rolling out of bonds with - at least some - duration to cash and cash equivalents because of low bond yields and really no other attractive allocation alternatives, to some extent like in today's environment. I found this on p. 5 in the 2003 Annual Report : So, basically nothing new under the sun, just that 16 years have passed. Berkshire still doing basically the same thing it always has, and "everything in life is just phase", and Berkshire is "now in a phase" similar to 2003, [and "this phase too will eventually pass" - one way or another ...]. So, in short - It's just "business as usual" at Berkshire, in a way [like it has always been].

Great idea with a recapitalization here, gfp, CAT & DE - not now, but in the next severe downturn. I think CAT has done really well since the GFC. Mr. Gates owns CAT right now, if I remember correctly. I'm not sure Mr. Buffett likes their financing arms though. Mr. Buffett could likely get better financing terms under the Berkshire umbrella for both compared to them as standalones, or provide group internal financing. - - - o 0 o - - - [J/K : Add to that : No need for an elephant gun to catch caterpillars and deers.]

I would posture these impairments are new ones, Dynamic, Please see the KHC 2018 10-K, p. 41. Please take a look at the basic assumptions for growth in the defined CGUs [1.5% - 4.7%], while there really isen't any growth. -Also [same p.]: The wonders of GARP investing. Lack of growth can easily make capital disappear in GARP investing. Spekulatius would say in his mother tongue : "Keine hexerei, nur behändichkeit!" - I think KHC is absolutely uninvestable directly because of this. I'm sorry I never got to a short write-up about the KHC 2018 10-K in the KHC topic, after recognizing this.

I couldn't find a topic about Bill Browder in the General Discussion forum, so I'm posting it here : All this is actually blowing up exactly today in the Danish Press : Boersen.dk [August 7th 2019, 21:00] Opinion - Flemming Rose: Maybe Bruun & Hjejle should have received the Cavling-prize instead? [This is the foreword to a book [written in Danish language] to be released on August 12th 2019 called :"The wizard: The story about Danske Bank, money laundering and the man, who betrayed the world".] Boersen.dk [August 7th 2019, 21:00] Opinion - Bill Browder : The business man Bill Browder about the money laundering case: Flemming Rose should be ashamed. Boersen.dk [August 7th 2019, 21:00] Opinion - Berlingske - Berlingske: Flemming Rose's criticism of the money laundering case is a deep delusion - copying the already known, primarily Russian, criticism of Browder: https://borsen.dk/nyheder/opinion/artikel/1/385595/berlingske_flemming_roses_kritik_af_hvidvasksagen_er_en_dyb_vildfarelse_-_kopierer_den_allerede_kendte_primaert_russiske_kritik_af_browder.html?utm_source=opinion&utm_campaign=nyhed_04 [for a reason unknown to me, I can't fetch and embed this link] - - - o 0 o - - - I can't wait to lay my hands on that new book about all this mess in the beginning of next week. I may end up feeling like a victim of ticket scalping though. Edit : No tweet from Mr. Browder about this - hmm ...

You actually didn't, longinvestor, Ref. here : So my bad. I've edited my post accordingly.

Like so many other Berkshire investors, I picked the 2019Q2 10-Q just after it was made available on the Berkshire website Saturday [my local time, that's at 14:00 in the afternoon]. I dived directly into the information about share buybacks in the cash flow statement and the specification of the buybacks. Next, a glance on the information about the five large stock positions, remembering Dynamic's prior comments here on CoBF about BAC. No surprise for me there - it looked to me, that Dynamic was head-on. Then I just tried to "feel" myself : "My stomach - & what was going on inside my head?" I thought : "Great! - No frustrations or the like - just nothing going on in "my system"". -I am now really mentally and emotional detached to the lagging capital allocation in Berkshire! - That has "just" taken me six months to get so far! ... [The 2018Q4 13F/HR and the 2018 10-K in combination caused some strong and strange reactions at me ... - I did not sell though on the following Monday after the 10-K, or later.] - - - o 0 o - - - Then this "150"-thingy popped up in my mind ... -What was it, and where?! I had to really concentrate and think carefully, digging in my memory. I came to the conclusion, that it was related to some comments from Mr. Buffett about share buybacks at an AGM a few years ago - perhaps in 2017? [perhaps before, perhaps later?] - and particularly : How [the h**k] do I trace & find it again?! Next, I fairly quickly realized, that the fast & easy solution was to grab Joel's Buffett Compilation was the way to go, because it's a searchable pdf-file. I then grabbed the file [already downloaded many times, so last version [- my SSD must be female, because it's pregnant!] I expanded the index in the file and started a search from first page of the 2017 AGM transcript, searching for "150". Outcome : Bingo! - yes, there it was - p. 4,100 [of [as of now] 4,953 pages [ 0_0]] : After that I have done the following : 1. Saturday : Read the whole actual question from Mr. Gelb in the transcript and the full responses from both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. 2. Saturday : Looked up that particular session on the CNBC Buffett Archieve [ Link ] - it 's question #2 in the afternoon session at the 2017 AGM, properly marked, just click on it. 3. Saturday : Repeated bullet #1. 4. Yesterday [Tuesday] : Repeated bullet #2 - but this time focusing on Mr. Munger's appearance under Mr. Buffett's comments [to me : no real reaction, and most of all, no ping time after "Charlie?"] - - - o 0 o - - - More later [also yesterday], I scrolled through the AGM 2018 & 2019 transcripts and read the Q&As about share buybacks - all as I personally consider general, to some extent and varying degrees also evasive As. - - - o 0 o - - - Again, I do not any longer get hit by frustrations over the situation [i may elaborate on that], I don't hope for anything, & I try my very best not to speculate about this matter at hand. - - - o 0 o - - - What do you get out of all this? I mean : Is this "150 billion"-comment from Mr. Buffett to you an indication of an inflexion point? -Maybe just a soft one? [longinvestor Mr. Buffett time ago has called it a "filled bladder syndrome" [ : - ) ] -So "inflexion point" in that terminology meant as the approximate stage where the "filled bladder syndrome" escalades to an "overflow issue"]. - - - o 0 o - - - I would like to read your take, thank you.

Swedish_Compounder, I hear you, but I still think we eventually should discuss Berkshire valuation methods in another topic than this, to avoid clogging things up too much. [ : - ) ]

It's way off, Swedish_Compounder, I was in doubt what you meant by your first post about it here, but not after your last post partly quoted above. You're in your calculations ignoring some material perspectives in the interactions between the income statement, the balance sheet & the cash flow statement, that can't be ignored, because it's about accounting logic [, and your post is about book value]. Here I'll mention just three - here in order by significance - the most significant placed first, and two of them about the most significant liabilities, by order: 1. Float, and the income from it From the press releases, Berkshire float EOP 2017 was approx. USD 114 B, while at EOP2018 it was approx. USD 125 B - an increase during 2018 of USD 8 B [which was a great year with regard to growth in insurance float]. Your calculation considers that earnings [addition to book equity], while it is just growth in some net insurance assets and liabilities in the group balance sheet. Btw, you can't even estimate it by the posts in the 2018 cash flow statement as adjustments to net earnings to arrive to cash flow from operating activities [uSD 3.449 B + USD 1.114 B + USD 1.174 = USD 5.737, which is not near USD 8, ref. the press releases - some posts must be lumped together in the cash flow statement to keep it on one page]. Earnings from float is the investment income from the cash made available by the float minus cost of float. See a post by me in the MKL topic about cost of float. Some people think it is [[[combined ratio in percent]/100]-1], [like in "combined ratio is 95%, so cost of float is minus 5%"]. It isn't. 2. Deferred taxes. Taxes paid by Berkshire "normally" [<- in the meaning : seen over a longer range of years] are lower than taxes charged to the income statement, the difference being deferred and provided in the balance sheet. 2018 is not "normal" [because of the large decline in the market value of the stock portfolio], and the same can be said about 2017 because of the tax reform. [This however pulls the other way than bullet 1 - the point again here is that your basis for extrapolation if off]. 3. Estimate of maintenance CAPEX. Investments in property, plant, equipment & equipment held for lease are bigger than depreciation and amortization. - - - o 0 o - - - Let's go back again to "Share repurchases" [ : - ) ]

scorpioncapital, Your considerations are on a wrong basis. In the "Can Berkshire tender stock" topic we've reached the conclusion, that the share buybacks at Berkshire are not based on safe harbour rules, because Mr. Buffett & Mr. Munger want to buy back shares in an opportunistic way. Thus, Berkshire can't buy back shares in four silent periods during each year, which leaves only about 8 months left to execute share buybacks.

Gents, please note that it's still only some hours ago, that alwaysinvert posted here on CoBF today: It just so striking. This - today - is his [Mr. Buffett's] favorite playground.

alwaysinvert, I have already omitted/excluded Mr. Buffett's conversion on July 1st ref. : These conversions being charity related - like Buffett's - seems highly likely.

Thank you for a convincing explanation, gfp, That said, personally I would have brought the buyback specification to tie with the cash flow statement for 2019Q1 by adding the USD 106 M to "Treasury stock acquired" in the cash flow statement and accruing the same amount in top of the cash flow statement in the adjustments to earnings in the line "Changes in operating assets - Other liabilities" [Consolidation adjustment, or just enter the actual settlement debt in the general ledger for the parent before firing up the consolidation system]. And well, it doesn't really matter - it's peanuts for Berkshire. - - - o 0 o - - - On another note more related to this topic - the possibility of a stock tender from Berkshire - and after spending a lot of time on Berkshire in the weekend - I did the same calculation that aws did to find out if shares were bought back in 2019Q3 till July 25th, and reached the same conclusion as aws. What caught my eye was the extent of conversions of A-shares - 5,919 converted in 2019H1 and 772 non-Buffett shares converted in the business days of the first 25 days of 2019Q3. Isn't that a lot? Anyone have any idea of what that activity is a token of? - It could be "the opposite" of a tender, i.e. Berkshire refusing to buy stocks from A-holders, who - for one reason or another - are in need for cash [Estate settlements or partly sales to cover inheritance taxes under transfer of shares within generations.]

scorpioncapital, I appears to me you have been looking at the movements in share counts for A & B in note 20 on p. 21. Those movements are half-year figures. You find the exact figures for the quarter on p. 47. The easiest way to get the capital spent in the quarter on buybacks is to look up treasury stock acquired in the cash flow statement and calculate the difference to last quarter [in casu : USD 2,133 M - USD 1,585 M = USD 548 M]. If you calculate directly based on the buyback specification, you get USD 442 M. The cash flow statement for 2019H1 ties with the buyback specifications for 2019Q1 and 2019Q2 on a total level, while there for 2019Q1 is an inconsistency between the cash flow statement and the buyback specification amounting USD 106 M. Because the numbers fits on a total level for 2019H1, I dare to posture that there is an error in the cash flow statement in the Berkshire 2019Q1 10-Q [0_0]+[*holding my head low* & *arms up in front of my head* for incoming rotten tomatoes, rotten eggs, Scud missiles and the like!]. - - - o 0 o - - - File with calculations attached. BRK_-_Analysis_af_share_buybacks_2019H1_-_v1_-_20190803.xlsx

bizaro, +1.

Nicke, coc's way to approach this is [on a technical/calculation level] exactly the way to go. [This post took me tremendous force to post, [after coc not so long ago ridiculed me here on CoBF for being a Danish CPA] [<- [ ; - ) ]]]. - - - o 0 o - - - Just the question implies that you're a thinker. A few years back here on CoBF I was by SharperDigaan introduced the concept of time weighted rate of return. [You'll have to lookup the posts by yourself.] Honestly, it was ringing for my ears. [Why wasn't I taught about this at the university?] More food for thought : Joel Stevens [CoBF member: racemize], Austin Value Capital: "Measuring Returns" [January 5th 2017].

nicke, Do you use M$ Excell? -If so, perhaps I can help you out here.

orion, To me personally, this is a great move, and you aren't really missing anything. Gísli [CoBF member Sportgamma] posted not so long ago in the EXOR topic here on CoBF a link to Gísli's website containing a spreadsheet containing a real time SOTP valuation of EXOR. [ Link ][Website post of December 8th 2018]. - - - o 0 o - - - It's just so great to have fellow CoBF members, who share wonderful stuff like this. - - - o 0 o - - - Edit: Somehow TwoCitiesCapital beat me to it.

Is that safe to do? - Wouldn't it be more safe buying some 30 years negative yielding German Bund? [<- J/K] - - - o 0 o - - - My addition to SCHO.CPH today was basically reinvestment of some dividends received in tax deferred accounts, where I'm maxed out on Berkshire [i can't in such accounts buy more than 20 percent in one stock ... -if just Berkshire B was liquid dual listed like BAM!]

Added to SCHO.CPH today.