Fairfax 2026

[djokovic1]

3 hours ago, yesman182 said:

Is the valuation framework you laid out on page 14 the framework Markel laid out in last years annual report? 
 

i hope your investors do well! 

thanks! Yes it is. It also uses 2025 YE numbers for all companies so the discount for Fairfax and Markel today will be larger than what’s shown there and Berkshire is likely also at a small discount. Because income statement and balance sheet for all is larger than at YE 25.

Edited Friday at 03:59 AM by djokovic1

[TG]

3 hours ago, djokovic1 said:

thanks! Yes it is. It also uses 2025 YE numbers for all companies so the discount for Fairfax and Markel today will be larger than what’s shown there and Berkshire is likely also at a small discount. Because income statement and balance sheet for all is larger than at YE 25.

Insightful report, thank you! Recently read a quite exenstive report doing a deep dive and breakdown of Markel - coming out at more or less the same discount. Next to BRK and FFH, MKL is quite the weight in my portfolio so I genuinely hope management ups the ante with the buybacks at these valuations. I don't expect them to be as opportunistic as FFH, but still. I like the general set up of these three names over time, with FFH probably being the powerhouse whereas MKL and BRK I'd say still about 10+%-ish returns (hopefully MKL a bit more though).

[nwoodman]

2 hours ago, TG said:

Insightful report, thank you! Recently read a quite exenstive report doing a deep dive and breakdown of Markel - coming out at more or less the same discount. Next to BRK and FFH, MKL is quite the weight in my portfolio so I genuinely hope management ups the ante with the buybacks at these valuations. I don't expect them to be as opportunistic as FFH, but still. I like the general set-up of these three names over time, with FFH probably being the powerhouse, whereas MKL and BRK I'd say still about 10+%-ish returns (hopefully MKL a bit more though).

No question about Fairfax; however, the current Berkshire price has me placing some small orders for the first time in years.  While the graph below is more of a market anchoring mechanism.  I think, after the interview the other night, the timing is pretty clear on what this has all been building towards in terms of buybacks.  No offence to Tom, but he still leaves me cold in terms of the babble speak. I am sure they will do OK, but the other two are laser-focused.  Fairfax is a no-wholes-barred capital allocation/recycling machine.  Berkshire is an inertia machine with the patience of Jobe and a right tail that builds as long as this market does its whacky thing.  I do think that Berkshire shareholders will gain somewhere between 0.25-0.5% because of Greg giving some rigour and accountability to the existing assets.  That is probably what has piqued my interest more than anything.  My capital is on Fairfax winning the compounding race over the next 10-15 years, but I am sure second- and third-place do well too. I still wouldn't rule out Berkshire surprising, simply because they are playing a game in terms of FI and dry powder that the other two simply aren't.

 

[Eldad]

17 hours ago, djokovic1 said:

 

Thank you everyone for the feedback and in general I have to shout out to CoBF. For no company have I learned so much by just being engaged on a forum with so many informed posters who in my opinion are in the top 1% of investors (maybe even better) w.r.t understanding the nuances of Fairfax in a deep way. And the best part its free...When I presented, I mentioned a big part of my conviction building was reading Viking's book cover to cover (and 25 of Prem's annual reports in a row). 

RRR, I have thought about this question and it's a good one. There are two angles I would answer it with:

 

i) The investment leverage an insurer operates with is linked to the mix of equity proportion in the investments. Equity requires more regulatory capital against it, fixed income less. So all else, if you have more equity in the book, you investment leverage has to run lower.

Take a look at the leverage Berkshire and especially Markel had in earlier days. When they had a lower proportion of equity in the book, their investment leverage was much higher.

 

These charts are evidence and should give you confidence that Fairfax is operating at a higher leverage partly because they can because their equity book is smaller than Berkshire and Markel. What is great about that set up today is that, have a meaningful part of the book in Fixed income is great because you earn 5% on it! Which is why today, Fairfax has the best set up with the highest ROE (as shown in my presentation). (In a zero rate environment it won't work as well i.e you would rather have lower leverage with as much in equities as possible).

 

 

 

ii) The second lens I would use is to say, the amount of leverage Fairfax can take is highly regulated and scrutinised. So they are maximising the amount of leverage they can take based on regulatory constraints. The reason that's not risky as typical leverage because majority of the leverage comes from float which can be though of long term negative cost of capital debt. As opposed to debt which has positive cost of capital (ie interest payments) and covenants against it which can hinder you in the short term even if 1 year is bad eg. Covid but float doesn't have the same downside.

Fairfax leverage is still fairly risky even if it’s float though right? If there is a really bad worldwide catastrophe event Fairfax could easily have its entire book equity taken to zero. BRK with 0.5 float leverage would likely be hurt badly but would immediately be maybe one of the few underwriters writing new business on earth. Am I wrong in thinking this? 

[Duke In Shadows]

Ki is fundamentally a superior business to the more flashy Lemonade. all fairfax holders should be intrigued with what Ki is doing within the Insurtech space.

[Maverick47]

24 minutes ago, Eldad said:

Fairfax leverage is still fairly risky even if it’s float though right? If there is a really bad worldwide catastrophe event Fairfax could easily have its entire book equity taken to zero. BRK with 0.5 float leverage would likely be hurt badly but would immediately be maybe one of the few underwriters writing new business on earth. Am I wrong in thinking this? 

What sort of worldwide catastrophe could do this?  Currently, Fairfax manages its modeled weather and property insurance related catastrophe exposure (hurricanes, storms, wildfires, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc) and controls its business such that less than once in 250 years (less than 0.4% probability in any given year) the aggregated catastrophe losses might approach 15% of equity.  Since in a typical year, they expect to earn a 15% return on equity, this essentially is the same as saying they wouldn’t earn a profit in such a year, and equity would remain flat, not anywhere near going to zero.

 

Suppose Fairfax is exposed to roughly 1% of the world’s insured catastrophe losses (probably roughly right) then it would take $500 to $600 billion of global insured catastrophe losses for Fairfax’s equity not to grow in a given year, but for total shareholder equity to remain untouched.  That’s the sort of year we would expect to happen perhaps once every 350 years or so.

 

How do you erase $30 billion of Fairfax shareholder equity through global catastrophes?  You’d need global insured catastrophe losses to be roughly 7 times that size, or perhaps $3.5 to $4.2 trillion.

That’s an industry extinguishment level of losses, with perhaps only Berkshire and a few insurers that didn’t have any property insurance exposures surviving.   Even Berkshire couldn’t write all the business that the failed industry could no longer cover, so there would have to be a recapitalization of almost the entire primary property insurance and reinsurance industry, assuming the remaining civilization and global economy was in a state that would even need insurance any more.

 

It could “happen” sure…but so could an asteroid strike similar to the one that killed off the dinosaurs 60 million years ago, or a Yellowstone super volcano eruption that happened 640,000 years ago.

If anything like this happens, and I am still even alive myself, I think that the performance of my investment portfolio, including Fairfax, is not going to make the top ten list of things I’d be worried about.

 

 

 

[Eldad]

2 minutes ago, Maverick47 said:

What sort of worldwide catastrophe could do this?  Currently, Fairfax manages its modeled weather and property insurance related catastrophe exposure (hurricanes, storms, wildfires, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc) and controls its business such that less than once in 250 years (less than 0.4% probability in any given year) the aggregated catastrophe losses might approach 15% of equity.  Since in a typical year, they expect to earn a 15% return on equity, this essentially is the same as saying they wouldn’t earn a profit in such a year, and equity would remain flat, not anywhere near going to zero.

 

Suppose Fairfax is exposed to roughly 1% of the world’s insured catastrophe losses (probably roughly right) then it would take $500 to $600 billion of global insured catastrophe losses for Fairfax’s equity not to grow in a given year, but for total shareholder equity to remain untouched.  That’s the sort of year we would expect to happen perhaps once every 350 years or so.

 

How do you erase $30 billion of Fairfax shareholder equity through global catastrophes?  You’d need global insured catastrophe losses to be roughly 7 times that size, or perhaps $3.5 to $4.2 trillion.

That’s an industry extinguishment level of losses, with perhaps only Berkshire and a few insurers that didn’t have any property insurance exposures surviving.   Even Berkshire couldn’t write all the business that the failed industry could no longer cover, so there would have to be a recapitalization of almost the entire primary property insurance and reinsurance industry, assuming the remaining civilization and global economy was in a state that would even need insurance any more.

 

It could “happen” sure…but so could an asteroid strike similar to the one that killed off the dinosaurs 60 million years ago, or a Yellowstone super volcano eruption that happened 640,000 years ago.

If anything like this happens, and I am still even alive myself, I think that the performance of my investment portfolio, including Fairfax, is not going to make the top ten list of things I’d be worried about.

 

 

 

Thanks that puts it in perspective 

[SafetyinNumbers]

Just now, Eldad said:

Thanks that puts it in perspective 

To add to what @Maverick47wrote. They use dollar limits too so even in some crazy cat event they should come out ok. In fact, the premium growth would be huge so would probably lead to multiple expansion soon after and higher forward returns because of the hard market. It’s definitely risk, but it’s not as risky as it’s perceived. 
 

Others have posted this chart but I think it also shows that FFH hasn’t been increasing its cat risk. My understanding is they took price but didn’t increase exposure. A lot of premium growth has come from the E&S market parts of which are now also soft. 
 

[Maverick47]

4 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

To add to what @Maverick47wrote. They use dollar limits too so even in some crazy cat event they should come out ok. In fact, the premium growth would be huge so would probably lead to multiple expansion soon after and higher forward returns because of the hard market. It’s definitely risk, but it’s not as risky as it’s perceived. 
 

Others have posted this chart but I think it also shows that FFH hasn’t been increasing its cat risk. My understanding is they took price but didn’t increase exposure. A lot of premium growth has come from the E&S market parts of which are now also soft. 
 

The only thing I’ll add on a personal note is that in over 30 years in the industry, with managing catastrophe exposure at the top of my responsibilities, there were at least three separate years in which inappropriate management of investments and poor management of the interest rate risk impact on fixed bond portfolios damaged the company I worked for more severely than the catastrophe risk that I was focused on ever did.

 

Two of those events happened since 2000 — the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 and the increase in interest rates in 2022.  The first resulted in the company I worked for being bought out by a larger competitor.  The second resulted in sales of non core subsidiaries and employee layoffs in a successful effort to rebuild the capital base and reduce the expense levels going forward.

 

I was fortunate enough to be a “casualty” in the second event.  By virtue of severing my employment relationship a few years earlier than I would have chosen had I been left to my own devices, I received access to my retirement account years earlier than if I hadn’t been laid off.  I rolled it over to a self directed retirement account and put the lion’s share into Fairfax and Berkshire, two companies I knew had not made the same mistakes my own employers had.

 

The market value increase in Fairfax alone since then has been the equivalent of five years of my previous annual salary level.  So I definitely do have a soft spot in my heart for the company and what it has meant to me personally.

 

 

[RRR]

Thanks everyone for weighing in - a few of these answers, especially the concrete numbers around BV/cat losses etc., really helped clear my thinking on this.

[villainx]

9 hours ago, Maverick47 said:

What sort of worldwide catastrophe could do this?

 

Since I'm watching on Prime, astrophage?

 

 

[Maverick47]

1 minute ago, villainx said:

 

Since I'm watching on Prime, astrophage?

 

 

Yep!  Just started watching it myself!

[Parsad]

3 hours ago, villainx said:

 

Since I'm watching on Prime, astrophage?

 

 

 

LOL!  Saw that last week!

 

Just saw The Odyssey today.

 

Cheers!

[Hoodlum]

2 hours ago, Parsad said:

 

LOL!  Saw that last week!

 

Just saw The Odyssey today.

 

Cheers!

Seeing The Odyssey today with my son. 
 

Also, Fairfax continues to buy Indian Bonds.  
 

https://m.economictimes.com/markets/bonds/fairfax-picks-up-half-of-3-year-government-bonds-at-auction/amp_articleshow/132473875.cms

[Hoodlum]

While I am familiar with Fairfax Digital Services I came across this site for Fairfax GCC that I never heard of before.  The site mentions that they have worked with the Fairfax subs for many years.  Is this accurate?  

 

https://fairfaxgcc.com

[gfp]

13 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

While I am familiar with Fairfax Digital Services I came across this site for Fairfax GCC that I never heard of before.  The site mentions that they have worked with the Fairfax subs for many years.  Is this accurate?  

 

https://fairfaxgcc.com

 

Thanks for posting that site, I hadn't seen it before either.  Digitide came out of Quess so this is all in the family.

[villainx]

6 hours ago, Hoodlum said:

Seeing The Odyssey today with my son. 

 

How old?  My kid is 11 and wasn't sure how bad R rating is.

[Hoodlum]

27 minutes ago, villainx said:

 

How old?  My kid is 11 and wasn't sure how bad R rating is.

My son is in his mid 20s.  I am not sure if an 11 years would appreciate it. 
 

Edited yesterday at 03:19 PM by Hoodlum

[Hoodlum]

35 minutes ago, gfp said:

 

Thanks for posting that site, I hadn't seen it before either.  Digitide came out of Quess so this is all in the family.

yes, I realized that connection after I posted.  I am surprised this relationship was never previously mentioned in a report or conference call. 
 

Digitide's MFX unit has been the technology backbone of Fairfax P&C carriers since 2002.

 

Edited yesterday at 03:17 PM by Hoodlum

[Wanderer]

A new video discussing Fairfax: 

 

[Maverick47]

2 hours ago, Wanderer said:

A new video discussing Fairfax: 

 

Really enjoyable so far.  I did notice something jarring at the 10:45 mark.  Metlen Energy is described as being incredibly cheap at a PE ratio of 0.20.  The host indicated he thought that must be a mistake so he had to check on whether it was true.  I looked at the stock quote from the London Stock Exchange in Yahoo Finance, and sure enough the PE ratio was listed as 0.2 there.  However, the market cap is about $6.2 billion, and the TTM earnings are $315 million.  
 

So it is a mistake.  The true PE ratio should be displayed as 20.0 not 0.20.

 

Reminds me of the advice that if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is.  And a 0.20 PE ratio certainly sounds too good to be true.

 

 

[Hamburg Investor]

2 hours ago, Maverick47 said:

Really enjoyable so far.  I did notice something jarring at the 10:45 mark.  Metlen Energy is described as being incredibly cheap at a PE ratio of 0.20.  The host indicated he thought that must be a mistake so he had to check on whether it was true.  I looked at the stock quote from the London Stock Exchange in Yahoo Finance, and sure enough the PE ratio was listed as 0.2 there.  However, the market cap is about $6.2 billion, and the TTM earnings are $315 million.  
 

So it is a mistake.  The true PE ratio should be displayed as 20.0 not 0.20.

 

Reminds me of the advice that if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is.  And a 0.20 PE ratio certainly sounds too good to be true.

While „If it sounds to be too good, it probably is“, is a really good advice, Metlen for me personally is a reminder, that it can always be the other way around:

 

When the greek crisis kicked in, the average PE ratio of the greek stock market was 3 or 4. So I checked a lot of greek stocks back than, and Mytilineos (that was the name of Metlen around 2012), seemed a good company - but I never bought it! That would have been around a 25 bagger since 2012 until today.

 

So I was thumb sucking. I saw that. I just didn’t pull the trigger.
 

I saw a lot of Greek companies being dirt cheap; but I was too cautious. I always thought about, what would happen, if the greek state as a whole would fail or would slip into getting a socialist state - could I really oversee that? So I held Biffetts „Don‘t loose money“ and the „if it’s too good to be true“ higher. I was wrong!
 

But not everything was bad: I was interested in Fairfax that time anyway, and I saw Prem investing Mytilineos. So it kind of brought me to thinking more about Fairfax and investing more into it. Prems way of thinking resonated a lot with me. More than Buffetts or Gayners.
 

I found a lot of other cheap European stocks outside of Greece at that time, but Prem invested in some Greek and I think Irish stocks, which I thought about.

 

It was really amazing for me: Nobody thougt or wrote about any of those cheap European stocks, I thought about; and noone invested into them. Noone - but Prem!

 

So I myself invested in other micro caps without that political risk and did really good anyway, beating the S&P500 by double digit percentages for 2 or three years after tax (and you pay 27% taxes in Germany…). But than I decided to head more into the direction of longterm investing; I was bad with the timing, especially regarding Fairfax, but MKL and BRK had better times before as well.
 

Staying the course with a mix of hard value investing and Momentum my results would have been really better.
 

But I am an amateur investor and at that time, I wanted to have more time for my spouse, life, instead of sitting hours and hours in the evening after work, trying to find informations about micro caps (some interesting stocks just gave investor relations information i greek language…).

 

Anyway, another thought, I always have: I think Prem wasn’t doing all that bad with his investment decisions in what we call „the lost decade“ today. That was not black and now it’s white. Altogether It was the darker side of grey, but the low interest rates weren’t helping the businesses with a moat, but the growth stocks. Today Prems investments are more on the brighter side of grey; but still, there was this other macro layer, and that shifted from dark to white today.

Edited 11 hours ago by Hamburg Investor

[Maverick47]

7 minutes ago, Hamburg Investor said:

While „If it sounds to be too could, it probably is“, is a really good advice, Metlen for me personally is a reminder, that it can always be the other way around…

 

When the greek crisis kicked in, the average PE ratio of the greek stock market was 3 or 4. I checked a lot of greek stocks back than, an Mytilineos (that was the name around 2012), seemed a good company - but I never bought. That would have been around a 25 bagger since 2012. But I was thumb sucking. I saw that. I just didn’t pull the trigger. I saw a lot of Greek companies being dirt cheap; but I was too cautious. I always thought about, what would happen, if the greek state as a whole would fail or would slip into getting a socialist state. So I held „Don‘t loose money“ high. 
 

But not everything was bad: I was interested in Fairfax and I saw Prem investing. So it kind of brought me to thinking more about Fairfax and investing into it. His way of thinking resonated a lot with me. I found a lot of other cheap European stocks outside of Greece at that time, but Prem invested in some Greek and I think Irish stocks, which I thought about. It was really amazing for me: Nobody thougt or wrote about all the cheap stocks, I thought about; and noone invested into them. Noone - but Prem!

 

So I myself invested in other micro caps without that political risk and did really good anyway, beating the S&P500 by double digit percentages after tax (and you pay 27% taxes in Germany…). But than I decided to head more into the direction of longterm investing; I was bad with the timing, especially regarding Fairfax, but MKL and BRK had better times as well. Staying the course with a mix of hard value investing and Momentum I would have been really better. But I am an amateur investor and at that time, I wanted to have more time for life, instead of sitting hours and hours in the evening after work, trying to find informations about micro caps (some interesting stocks just gave investor relations information i greek language…).

 

Anyway, another thought, I always have: I think Prem wasn’t doing all that bad with his investment decisions in what we call „the lost decade“ today. That was not black and now it’s white. Altogether It was the darker side of grey, but the low interest rates weren’t helping the businesses with a moat, but the growth stocks. Today Prems investments are more on the brighter side of grey; but still, there was this other macro layer, and that shifted from dark to white today.

I’ve really only invested on my own for the last decade or two, and the broker I use in the States really limits my ability to look outside to companies traded on other countries’ stock exchanges, unless their shares can be purchased over the counter such as with Fairfax.  
 

So for me, Buffett and Prem have been my back door into shares of companies traded on foreign exchanges.  Eurobank was one small exception for a while…I was able to pick up some shares over the counter until that avenue was closed for me….

 

So I can only imagine what it must have been like to see companies selling for low single digit PE ratios.  I had a few good buys on some good companies right after the 2008 Financial Crisis that I picked up a bit under 10 PE’s , some of which would have exceeded 10 baggers if I’d held onto them until today, but when a number of them doubled or tripled over a few years, I bailed out and redeployed elsewhere.  
 

Not sure if I’ll see a 25 bagger in the time I have left, but given Fairfax’s prospects, I should see it or more on at least a few of my Fairfax shares that I purchased years ago, which are 5 baggers currently.  Could conceivably get there in the next ten years or so with a little help from a multiple expansion!
 

 

 

[Maverick47]

On 7/17/2026 at 10:26 AM, SafetyinNumbers said:

They use dollar limits too so even in some crazy cat event they should come out ok. In fact, the premium growth would be huge so would probably lead to multiple expansion soon after and higher forward returns because of the hard market. It’s definitely risk, but it’s not as risky as it’s perceived

@SafetyinNumbers is spot on with how reinsurers are able to cap their exposure to catastrophe losses when they provide catastrophe reinsurance to a primary property insurer.  I’ll add another small nuance about cat reinsurance policy provisions that also is more favorable to reinsurers than to primary insurance companies.
 

Think about buying an insurance policy on your own home.  You generally pay an agreed upon premium for a year for a variety of loss perils.  Say you pay $2500 premium for a year’s worth of coverage on a home estimated to cost $600,000 to rebuild.  The company might also agree to expand that amount by 25% in case of a total loss and it costs more to rebuild than originally thought.  Suppose on day 1 the home burns down in a wildfire and costs $750,000 to rebuild.  The company would pay that amount.  In this fictional world, suppose the home is completely rebuilt in 10 months and then in month 11 a tornado hits and destroys the rebuilt home.  The same policy continues to provide coverage for another $750,000.  A total of $1.5 million is paid out on a policy sold for $2,500.

 

Now suppose a reinsurer has agreed to provide a layer of coverage for aggregate losses of $100 million above a $100 million retention or deductible for the primary insurer for a single catastrophic event during the same year.  They charge $10 million for this policy.

 

Let’s say that the wildfire in month 1 cost the primary insurer a total of $95 million, destroying fewer than 100 homes insured by the primary company, so the reinsurer won’t pay anything as the losses did not exceed the $100 million deductible.

 

The tornado in month 11 is another matter.  Suppose the total loss to the primary insurer in this event is estimated at $300 million.  The reinsurer will have to pay the $100 million above the first $100 million event deductible, but then their coverage stops as they have a $100 million limit on their policy.  The primary insurer gets to pay the first $100 million and the third $100 million.

 

Now is where a very common provision of catastrophe reinsurance policies comes into play.  Almost invariably these will provide for at least one automatic reinstatement of coverage for the remainder of the year, with an additional premium due which is to be calculated “pro rata as to amount but not as to time”.

 

In the case of the tornado, 100% of the limit of the catastrophe policy was used up in the event.  It is then mandatory (not optional) that the primary insurer has to pay the reinsurer 100% of the original premium of $10 million for another $100 million limit to be reinstated and apply for the remaining month of the policy year.

 

Then a month later, a new annual catastrophe reinsurance policy must be purchased by the primary insurer, and if rates have increased as is likely, they might have to pay even more than $10 million for the same $100 million coverage limit for the next year.  Or, more likely, they will choose to purchase a higher limit since they just had a tornado that exceeded the limit of their prior year’s policy.  They might purchase a policy with $150 million of coverage on top of $150 million deductible.  And they might pay a higher rate for the larger policy…say $20 million.

Other ways primary insurers bear more risk then reinsurers:  besides capping their total dollar exposure to any single event, reinsurers also generally cap the number of catastrophes per customer to two per year.

 

I recall one calendar year early this century when a total of four separate hurricanes hit the state of Florida.  Ten Florida only primary home insurance companies went bankrupt, but not a single reinsurer.  The primary companies had purchased reinsurance policies with one automatic reinstatement, so had help from the reinsurers for hurricanes 1 and 2, but were completely on their own for the last 2.

Edited 10 hours ago by Maverick47

[Hamburg Investor]

1 hour ago, Maverick47 said:

I’ve really only invested on my own for the last decade or two, and the broker I use in the States really limits my ability to look outside to companies traded on other countries’ stock exchanges, unless their shares can be purchased over the counter such as with Fairfax.  
 

I would have bought Protektor Forsikring Years ago, but my broker didn‘t offer them; now that I read your post and rethink about it,  I remember there were some micro caps (like market cap of 100mn dollar or so), in Greece and other countries, my broker didn‘t trade. I don’t recall Metlen being one of those, so I think I can‘t blame anyone else.

 

Just lne other question regarding risk:

 

I am pretty sure FFH is really safe. All the inherent diversifications, limits in insurance, different cash flows… 

 

But of course, BRK is safer (less flost leverage) and MKL is too.

 

Or am I wrong…? Sometimes I ask myself, if having 20+ insurers all over the world, all learning from the other, with the right mindset, culture etc. could be less risky than even BRK (or MKL, having way smaller float leverage as well), which clearly is way less diversified in regional terms. 
 

I hold all 3 - BRK, MKL, FFH - while BRK and MKL are around 10% of my portfolio and FFH aroubd 45%. 
 

But maybe having 65% insurers FFH would even be less risky? I am pretty sure a 65% FFH would give better returns; but maybe it’s even less risky?