Fairfax 2026

[mananainvesting]

I pulled this with the help of Notebooklm and chatgpt (could have errors and the table is missing some years). Fairfax has compounded book value over the years even when combined ratio has been high, only over the last 5-10 years has its insurance combined ratio gotten better. Also, one can see they have for the most part always had more float to equity, which means most of their returns came from investing. Now over the last few years I believe this has changed, their insurance operations have gotten much better and their investing returns will only have to do modestly well going forward to get really good overall returns (as long as the insurance operations keep performing), I think they have enough float leverage that even if premium growth rates slow down or even go down, imo it will still result in very good return (>15%).

Obviously nothing is given but imo this is one of the very few companies out there at such low valuations levels for such a fantastic business + management! I am extremely long Fairfax Financial and open to changing my mind if circumstances change (basically not married to the idea).  

 

[Hoodlum]

44 minutes ago, mananainvesting said:

I pulled this with the help of Notebooklm and chatgpt (could have errors and the table is missing some years). Fairfax has compounded book value over the years even when combined ratio has been high, only over the last 5-10 years has its insurance combined ratio gotten better. Also, one can see they have for the most part always had more float to equity, which means most of their returns came from investing. Now over the last few years I believe this has changed, their insurance operations have gotten much better and their investing returns will only have to do modestly well going forward to get really good overall returns (as long as the insurance operations keep performing), I think they have enough float leverage that even if premium growth rates slow down or even go down, imo it will still result in very good return (>15%).

Obviously nothing is given but imo this is one of the very few companies out there at such low valuations levels for such a fantastic business + management! I am extremely long Fairfax Financial and open to changing my mind if circumstances change (basically not married to the idea).  

 

 

What is interesting is that the Float/BV ratio for 2025 was the lowest ever for Fairfax.  We may see that drop again a bit more this year.  Fairfax is still able to earn ~$200US/share in this soft insurance environment by pulling back on low profit lines in certain regions.  This is much different that prior soft markets where Fairfax kept a much higher Float/BV ratio and shows how their insurance businesses have improved with better managed risk to larger Cat events.

[mananainvesting]

2 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

 

What is interesting is that the Float/BV ratio for 2025 was the lowest ever for Fairfax.  We may see that drop again a bit more this year.  Fairfax is still able to earn ~$200US/share in this soft insurance environment by pulling back on low profit lines in certain regions.  This is much different that prior soft markets where Fairfax kept a much higher Float/BV ratio and shows how their insurance businesses have improved with better managed risk to larger Cat events.

Agreed, they don't have to reach for premiums/float!

[kab60]

1 hour ago, mananainvesting said:

I pulled this with the help of Notebooklm and chatgpt (could have errors and the table is missing some years). Fairfax has compounded book value over the years even when combined ratio has been high, only over the last 5-10 years has its insurance combined ratio gotten better. Also, one can see they have for the most part always had more float to equity, which means most of their returns came from investing. Now over the last few years I believe this has changed, their insurance operations have gotten much better and their investing returns will only have to do modestly well going forward to get really good overall returns (as long as the insurance operations keep performing), I think they have enough float leverage that even if premium growth rates slow down or even go down, imo it will still result in very good return (>15%).

Obviously nothing is given but imo this is one of the very few companies out there at such low valuations levels for such a fantastic business + management! I am extremely long Fairfax Financial and open to changing my mind if circumstances change (basically not married to the idea).  

 

The industry has been in a hard mkt since like 2018. A very hard one last 5 years, which is the period everyone seems to cite as evidence their operations have improved. I won't repeat the same point, but it is a very cyclical industry. I would encourage users to read commentary from the brokers 

[Viking]

4 hours ago, kab60 said:

That is clearly not my return expectation going forward. I am looking at stuff that will do +15% between earnings+growth, and then I turn over the book regularly to harvest multiple re-ratings as/if they occur to juice ROE.

 

If I had to hold forever, I would go Fairfax over Lancashire. Shorter term, I prefer Lancashire. I think there is surprisingly little talk on here about the industry cycle. Broker commentary on lack of price discipline is pretty bad, but who knows if that is priced in. What I do know is that it increases likelihood of M&A.

 

@kab60 underwriting income represents only about 22% of Fairfax's various earnings streams. This is much less than traditional P/C insurers (who are closer to 45% or more I think). Does this split matter in your analysis?

 

PS: Moving forward investment gains will be a larger source of earnings for Fairfax than underwriting income. And we now have $3.9B in excess of FV over CV... this is a leading indicator of how strong investment gains will be in the coming years (with Q2 being a good example). Traditional P/C insurance companies do not have this income stream at all (let alone $3.9B sitting there waiting to be harvested).

 

Of course, there are other examples of hidden value not captured in the $3.9B, with BIAL being a good example. This is a massive asset that is growing in value each year. Traditional P/C insurance companies do not have these assets as well. 

Edited May 5 by Viking

[mananainvesting]

24 minutes ago, kab60 said:

The industry has been in a hard mkt since like 2018. A very hard one last 5 years, which is the period everyone seems to cite as evidence their operations have improved. I won't repeat the same point, but it is a very cyclical industry. I would encourage users to read commentary from the brokers 

I hear you and I will be watching the results of the company closely.

In the spirit of learning (mostly for me), by your logic, don't most good insurance companies/their investors during soft market just give up on insurance and come back only during hard markets (assuming they can time it perfectly)?  The insurance business through cycles but  generates float which when managed prudently along with a good combined ratio is what attracted Buffett and similar people?

I think where you are coming from is a valuation perspective, but shouldn't we just let winners do their thing and not disturb compounding? Unless the valuation gets crazy, in this case I think most would agree that is not the case. 

[roundball100]

6 minutes ago, Viking said:

 

@kab60 underwriting income represents only about 22% of Fairfax's various earnings streams. This is much less than traditional P/C insurers (who are closer to 45% or more I think). Does this split matter in your analysis?

 

PS: Moving forward investment gains will be a larger source of earnings for Fairfax than underwriting income. And we now have $3.9B in excess of FV over CV... this is a leading indicator of how strong investment gains will be in the coming years (with Q2 being a good example). Traditional P/C insurance companies do not have this income stream at all (let alone $3.9B sitting there waiting to be harvested).

 

Of course, there are other examples of hidden value not captured in the $3.9B, with BIAL being a good example. This is a massive asset that is growing in value each year. Traditional P/C insurance companies do not have these assets as well. 

For a number of years (well beyond the "seven lean years"), there were nothing but headwinds facing each dimension of FFH.  Over the past 5+ years, it seems there have been nothing but tailwinds.  Some of the tailwinds will at some point again become headwinds- this is predictable (softer markets, lower interest rates, catastrophe losses).  The hope is that the prevailing winds have changed and are for the most part, at our (FFH) backs.  We should also count on the appearance of unexpected (new, unpredictable) headwinds - in the past, for example, the short attack, the basis of which was entirely ill-founded (it was closer to sinking the company than many of us realized, according to The Fairfax Way).  But I believe (hope) the understanding of the company by those who have carefully documented its many aspects now provides some confidence that there is (distinct from the past) a significant margin of safety. Does that summarize things fairly?

[Viking]

3 minutes ago, roundball100 said:

For a number of years (well beyond the "seven lean years"), there were nothing but headwinds facing each dimension of FFH.  Over the past 5+ years, it seems there have been nothing but tailwinds.  Some of the tailwinds will at some point again become headwinds- this is predictable (softer markets, lower interest rates, catastrophe losses).  The hope is that the prevailing winds have changed and are for the most part, at our (FFH) backs.  We should also count on the appearance of unexpected (new, unpredictable) headwinds - in the past, for example, the short attack, the basis of which was entirely ill-founded (it was closer to sinking the company than many of us realized, according to The Fairfax Way).  But I believe (hope) the understanding of the company by those who have carefully documented its many aspects now provides some confidence that there is (distinct from the past) a significant margin of safety. Does that summarize things fairly?

I agree we need to be open minded about how we analyze and value Fairfax. Interest rates are a great example. Yes, there is a good chance they could go lower from here. That was the big worry with Fairfax 6 months ago. And what has happened? Interest rates have moved much higher.

 

Where do interest rates go from here?
 

We have to options:

• Lower
• Higher

My view is both possible outcomes need to be incorporated into models for Fairfax. 
 

What I find many investors (and analysts) do is think about headwinds. And ignore tailwinds. 
 

From my perspective that is not a balanced approach. 

[Hoodlum]

3 minutes ago, Viking said:

I agree we need to be open minded about how we analyze and value Fairfax. Interest rates are a great example. Yes, there is a good chance they could go lower from here. That was the big worry with Fairfax 6 months ago. And what has happened? Interest rates have moved much higher.

 

Where do interest rates go from here?
 

We have to options:

• Lower
• Higher

My view is both possible outcomes need to be incorporated into models for Fairfax. 
 

What I find many investors (and analysts) do is think about headwinds. And ignore tailwinds. 
 

From my perspective that is not a balanced approach. 

I suspect most investors and analysts believe interest rates will go lower vs go higher.  I believe much of this is due to recency bias, as interest rates were lower for much of the past 15 years until recently.  So they look at the current “high” interest rates as an aberration, rather than being closer to historical norm. 

[kab60]

54 minutes ago, Viking said:

 

@kab60 underwriting income represents only about 22% of Fairfax's various earnings streams. This is much less than traditional P/C insurers (who are closer to 45% or more I think). Does this split matter in your analysis?

 

PS: Moving forward investment gains will be a larger source of earnings for Fairfax than underwriting income. And we now have $3.9B in excess of FV over CV... this is a leading indicator of how strong investment gains will be in the coming years (with Q2 being a good example). Traditional P/C insurance companies do not have this income stream at all (let alone $3.9B sitting there waiting to be harvested).

 

Of course, there are other examples of hidden value not captured in the $3.9B, with BIAL being a good example. This is a massive asset that is growing in value each year. Traditional P/C insurance companies do not have these assets as well. 

Yes, it does. It's why I keep saying there's massive torque to rates and what attracted me in the first place, as rates shot up and Fairfax just sat there (combined with a favorable industry backdrop). It will be interesting to see how the navigate the current cycle, because everybody is flush with capital after some gangbusters year, which tend to mean a period of very lean if not years with losses. It also makes Fairfax interesting from a portfolio perspective given it's basically a bunch of levered, short duration t-bills (if one is into that).

 

As for forward investment gains, they're very transparent about their unmarked gains. Realizing them doesn't really change anything for me, even if does for accountants.

 

Yes, other P&C companies don't have a BIAL. They don't waste 10 years' worth of compounding either by making a massively offside bet. Yes, that's in the past. But expecting them to just hit winners from here doesn't make any sense either.

[SafetyinNumbers]

12 minutes ago, kab60 said:

As for forward investment gains, they're very transparent about their unmarked gains. Realizing them doesn't really change anything for me, even if does for accountants.

 

Not really. The FV over CV isn’t really explored for consolidated positions. I think there is potentially $4b of value there. Ki on an IPO might have another $2b in gains. Even if Eurobank is disclosed, it’s arguably worth a lot more than 8x EPS based on ROTBV. I think most investors value Fairfax off of book value but whatever you do is working for you. 

[giulio]

1 hour ago, kab60 said:

The industry has been in a hard mkt since like 2018. A very hard one last 5 years, which is the period everyone seems to cite as evidence their operations have improved. I won't repeat the same point, but it is a very cyclical industry. I would encourage users to read commentary from the brokers 

I hope the image is readable. Just wanted to highlight that CR for FFH has been in very good shape since at least 2013 (I don't track earlier years), with the exception of 2017 (big acquisition). 

What many cite is that since 2020 BOTH underwriting profits and investment gains have been performing pretty well.

@Viking maybe rates stay around where they are? + or - 50bps? It's also a possibility...ECB is about to raise rate apparently! 

[LC]

One way I sporadically think about Fairfax is the interplay between:

 

-interest rates

-equity investments

-insurance operations

 

When interest rates are rising, equity valuations are generally decreasing.

And demand for insurance premiums is higher, and therefore combined ratio is higher

The offset is that investors can capture duration.

 

When rates are low or falling: higher equity valuations, less demand for premiums and therefore lower CR

 

I am not sure this is totally accurate but it's a mental framework I use for insurance-investors...curious what the board thinks.

 

[Eldad]

2 hours ago, LC said:

One way I sporadically think about Fairfax is the interplay between:

 

-interest rates

-equity investments

-insurance operations

 

When interest rates are rising, equity valuations are generally decreasing.

And demand for insurance premiums is higher, and therefore combined ratio is higher

The offset is that investors can capture duration.

 

When rates are low or falling: higher equity valuations, less demand for premiums and therefore lower CR

 

I am not sure this is totally accurate but it's a mental framework I use for insurance-investors...curious what the board thinks.

 

May have you CR high and low backwards accidentally. Low interest rate means more supply of underwriting capital and less profitable (higher CR)

 

But generally they counteract each other which I think was your point. 

[Eldad]

3 hours ago, LC said:

One way I sporadically think about Fairfax is the interplay between:

 

-interest rates

-equity investments

-insurance operations

 

When interest rates are rising, equity valuations are generally decreasing.

And demand for insurance premiums is higher, and therefore combined ratio is higher

The offset is that investors can capture duration.

 

When rates are low or falling: higher equity valuations, less demand for premiums and therefore lower CR

 

I am not sure this is totally accurate but it's a mental framework I use for insurance-investors...curious what the board thinks.

 

Also, I think most insurers have a bunch of bonds and are going to try to grow revenue as much as possible every year. When interest rates go up, their bonds go down and they lose all their surplus capacity. This creates the boom time, hard markets for Fairfax and BRK that wait on price. 

[LC]

Yes that's right and explained much more clearly. The point being there is some 'natural' counterbalance between key drivers of Fairfax's earnings streams. It gives them options depending on the economic circumstance, which IMO is a key successful investment characteristic. 

[TwoCitiesCapital]

I think there is the natural counterbalance between the three contributors to earnings. 

 

There is also the natural compounding of the exception all earnings post-good years.

 

Both have been mentioned at separate times throughout the Fairfax threads, but both matter. 

 

Earning $200+/share in 2025 may have be considered exceptional or "over earning". Earning $200/share in 2030 when book value should feasibly be $1000+ higher isn't as much so. 

 

So while we can say $200/share on earnings may represent peak of the insurance cycle, in 2-3 years it could also represent their trough earnings pending what opportunities they've had to deploy capital. 

 

This isn't to say their won't be fluctuations, but the cheapness of the stock itself relative to its earnings and the thoughtfulness at which those earnings are deployed also lends itself to the counter-cyclical nature as retained earnings compound and generate their own earnings. 

 

If the stock ever rerates, this retained earnings portion will matter less because it's a smaller portion of EV, but as long as it remains this cheap and earning 15-20% ROEs, that retained earnings component is meaningful over a 3-5 year forward horizon 

Edited May 6 by TwoCitiesCapital

[kab60]

12 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

Not really. The FV over CV isn’t really explored for consolidated positions. I think there is potentially $4b of value there. Ki on an IPO might have another $2b in gains. Even if Eurobank is disclosed, it’s arguably worth a lot more than 8x EPS based on ROTBV. I think most investors value Fairfax off of book value but whatever you do is working for you. 

I don't understand the condescending attitude. It's as if you're married to ideas and and hate pushback/other views; be it SCR/MEG, Atento (bust), Lavoro (bust) or CNXC (close to bust?). I'm trying to add perspective and gain nothing from pushing back a bit against a board of Fairfax followers. Personally, I'm here here for the pushback. Hopefully it makes me avoid some pitfalls and aware of whatever blind spots I might have (there's plenty!).

Edited May 6 by kab60

[SafetyinNumbers]

46 minutes ago, kab60 said:

I don't understand the condescending attitude. It's as if you're married to ideas and and hate pushback/other views; be it SCR/MEG, Atento (bust), Lavoro (bust) or CNXC (close to bust?). I'm trying to add perspective and gain nothing from pushing back a bit against a board of Fairfax followers. Personally, I'm here here for the pushback. Hopefully it makes me avoid some pitfalls and aware of whatever blind spots I might have (there's plenty!).

I’m sorry if I come across condescending, I’m actually trying to do the opposite and highlight there is no right way to invest. I make plenty of mistakes as you pointed out (and will make plenty more) and I know a lot of people like yourself have much better performance than I do. I think the market structure has left the market inefficient and some strategies/processes are better at taking advantage of it than others so investors should do what works for them.
 

Like you, I’m looking for pushback. When I surveyed a bunch of professional investors about Fairfax, one of the top three reasons they didn’t own it was because they had higher return expectations which helps explain to me why the opportunity is available. Often, they use conservative instead of realistic forecasts which I think ignores the right tail potential at Fairfax but also it’s hard to see how it doubles in a year. There is plenty of other stuff in my portfolio that can do that but as you rightly pointed out, I may be very wrong on. 
 

I hope there are no hard feelings and truly wishing you the best. 

[Viking]

14 hours ago, kab60 said:

Yes, it does. It's why I keep saying there's massive torque to rates and what attracted me in the first place, as rates shot up and Fairfax just sat there (combined with a favorable industry backdrop). It will be interesting to see how the navigate the current cycle, because everybody is flush with capital after some gangbusters year, which tend to mean a period of very lean if not years with losses. It also makes Fairfax interesting from a portfolio perspective given it's basically a bunch of levered, short duration t-bills (if one is into that).

 

As for forward investment gains, they're very transparent about their unmarked gains. Realizing them doesn't really change anything for me, even if does for accountants.

 

Yes, other P&C companies don't have a BIAL. They don't waste 10 years' worth of compounding either by making a massively offside bet. Yes, that's in the past. But expecting them to just hit winners from here doesn't make any sense either.

 

@kab60, it looks to me like you evaluate Fairfax (and insurance companies in general) primarily through the lens of underwriting profit and interest income. Please correct me if I am wrong. 

 

If true, is this how you would have evaluated BRK back in the 1980's and 1990's?

 

My view is to understand and value traditional P/C insurance companies, the two keys are underwriting profit and interest income.

 

My view is Fairfax is a very different animal. The key to understanding and valuing Fairfax is capital allocation. The insurance cycle matters, but much less than for a traditional P/C insurance company - and that is because Fairfax has many ways to grow earnings / economic value beyond just underwriting profit and interest income. 

 

I think the best way to think about Fairfax today is not to compare them to P/C insurance peers. Rather, it is to compare them to BRK back in the 1980's and 1990's. Insurance markets were soft and yet BRK was still able to compound capital at excellent rates of return. Why? Capital allocation decisions.

 

Of course, Buffett is the GOAT. I do not expect Fairfax to compound capital at the rates BRK did in the 1980's and 1990's. However, given what I have seen from management over the past 8 years or so, I think Fairfax can continue to compound capital at above average rates of return. This will allow them to compound shareholders' equity at above average rates of return in the coming years - even as the P/C insurance market softens.

 

Do you disagree with my basic thesis? I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss/debate.

Edited May 6 by Viking

[kab60]

2 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

I’m sorry if I come across condescending, I’m actually trying to do the opposite and highlight there is no right way to invest. I make plenty of mistakes as you pointed out (and will make plenty more) and I know a lot of people like yourself have much better performance than I do. I think the market structure has left the market inefficient and some strategies/processes are better at taking advantage of it than others so investors should do what works for them.
 

Like you, I’m looking for pushback. When I surveyed a bunch of professional investors about Fairfax, one of the top three reasons they didn’t own it was because they had higher return expectations which helps explain to me why the opportunity is available. Often, they use conservative instead of realistic forecasts which I think ignores the right tail potential at Fairfax but also it’s hard to see how it doubles in a year. There is plenty of other stuff in my portfolio that can do that but as you rightly pointed out, I may be very wrong on. 
 

I hope there are no hard feelings and truly wishing you the best. 

No worries and I'm sorry if it came across too harsh. There is no right way, and as I said, I like Fairfax over the long haul. I just think there are better opportunities in insurance right now, and that investors might be sleeping a bit on the cyclicality.  It's not a given they can keep growing float:equity as they have in the past, nor that the CR doesn't move substantially higher. Their equity portfolio has done well in recent years, but that's another engine that might get hit. I'm probably one of those who use conservative instead of realistic forecasts, which is what I alluded to before. It means I often cut off the right tail too soon, which is probably driven by my focus on the left tail.

[kab60]

1 hour ago, Viking said:

 

@kab60, it looks to me like you evaluate Fairfax (and insurance companies in general) primarily through the lens of underwriting profit and interest income. Please correct me if I am wrong. 

 

If true, is this how you would have evaluated BRK back in the 1980's and 1990's?

 

My view is to understand and value traditional P/C insurance companies, the two keys are underwriting profit and interest income.

 

My view is Fairfax is a very different animal. The key to understanding and valuing Fairfax is capital allocation. The insurance cycle matters, but much less than for a traditional P/C insurance company - and that is because Fairfax has many ways to grow earnings / economic value beyond just underwriting profit and interest income. 

 

I think the best way to think about Fairfax today is not to compare them to P/C insurance peers. Rather, it is to compare them to BRK back in the 1980's and 1990's. Insurance markets were soft and yet BRK was still able to compound capital at excellent rates of return. Why? Capital allocation decisions.

 

Of course, Buffett is the GOAT. I do not expect Fairfax to compound capital at the rates BRK did in the 1980's and 1990's. However, given what I have seen from management over the past 8 years or so, I think Fairfax can continue to compound capital at above average rates of return. This will allow them to compound shareholders' equity at above average rates of return in the coming years - even as the P/C insurance market softens.

 

Do you disagree with my basic thesis? I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss/debate.

I don't think I disagree per se, but I do think we see it from different angles.

 

If you think they're anywhere close to Buffett-like in their investment acumen, and deliver anything close to 12-15% on their equity positions, I can see why it makes sense to make it a massive position. I'd be stuffed to the gills if I thought so. I think it'll be a struggle to do anything market-beating given capital base and investment style, and given markets are generally expensive, and their cyclical holdings have done well, I worry if there's more downside than upside from the equity book.

 

My overall 'worry' is a scenario where CR moves closer to 100 as insurance cycle plays out (it's not like going above 100 is impossible...), equity markets tank and rates come down. That would be a big whammy. Offsetting that is that they have locked up a lot of interest income in the next 2-3 years, and I'd expect reserves to be stuffed for a rainy day, so it could become cheap on a P/TBV basis just as cash flows in from lack of insurance growth.

Edited May 6 by kab60

[SafetyinNumbers]

25 minutes ago, kab60 said:

If you think they're anywhere close to Buffett-like in their investment acumen, and deliver anything close to 12-15% on their equity positions, I can see why it makes sense to make it a massive position. I'd be stuffed to the gills if I thought so

Can you understand why I think they can return 12-15%+ on their equity positions over the next 5 years given what we know about the portfolio?

 

The equity portfolio has returned 20%+ for the last three years but a lot of that hasn’t helped book value or ROE yet because of equity and consolidation accounting. I don’t think the market is efficient and is factoring that in to current valuation but as we both know, I can be very wrong.

How much would you bet that Fairfax doesn’t return a 15% CAGR from here over the next 5 years? Can do it on BVPS share or stock price. 

 

[roundball100]

2 hours ago, Viking said:

 

@kab60, it looks to me like you evaluate Fairfax (and insurance companies in general) primarily through the lens of underwriting profit and interest income. [...]

 

My view is Fairfax is a very different animal. The key to understanding and valuing Fairfax is capital allocation. [...]

This seems increasingly true.  And for me, raises the question: should we compare FFH only to other insurance companies, or also other excellent capital allocators? From a Canadian perspective, CSU (Constellation Software) comes to mind.  But perhaps comparisons across entirely different industry sectors are too hard.

[kab60]

2 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

Can you understand why I think they can return 12-15%+ on their equity positions over the next 5 years given what we know about the portfolio?

 

The equity portfolio has returned 20%+ for the last three years but a lot of that hasn’t helped book value or ROE yet because of equity and consolidation accounting. I don’t think the market is efficient and is factoring that in to current valuation but as we both know, I can be very wrong.

How much would you bet that Fairfax doesn’t return a 15% CAGR from here over the next 5 years? Can do it on BVPS share or stock price. 

 

Do you mean whether or not they can 'realize' 12-15% annually given a lot of those gains have already been made just isn't accounted for yet so it's just a matter of them flipping the positions? I mean that doesn't seem like a high hurdle given how large the unrealized/unrecognized gains are, but that doesn't really matter to me. Is your point that the market doesn't grasp that and thus it's part of the opportunity? You might well be right. I wouldn't have a clue, but I don't think the market is that dumb.

 

I'd say in general, given their capital base, I wouldn't expect them to be able to pick equity investments doing 12-15% annually over a long period. I'd expect them to deliver a market-like return (whatever that'll be). Compounding capital just becomes much harder with size. If anyone thinks they can do 12-15% returns on their equity book over the long haul, investing here should be a slam dunk.

Edited May 6 by kab60