Fairfax 2024

[Viking]

23 minutes ago, Hamburg Investor said:

What else can you say but: Thank you!
The picture gets richer every time thanks to the different perspectives you offer and which are necessary for a deeper understanding.

What strikes me when watching your last chart: Every single "Non-Berkalike" (I don't like the term, but still...) exploded in valuation, meaning the Price CAGR exceeds the book value CAGR in that 5 year view by miles:

Non-Berkalikes:
- Intact: 6.8% (17.7% minus 10.9%)
- WRB: 11.7%
- Chubb: 7.8%
- AIG: 11.9%

While the Berkalikes (including the original):
- BRK: 1.0% (14.3% minus 13.3%)
- MKL: (4.0%)
- FFH: 1.0%

On average the non-Berkalikes Price increase exceeded Book value growth by 9.6%, while the Berkalikes performed (0.6%) in that category. And Apart from AIG, the non-Berkalikes are currently all valued higher (PB ratio). And AIG should certainly be excluded for other reasons. Is this simply coincidence, as its only seven data points? Or is it due to the unorthodox, difficult to understand structure with "owned businesses" and the high level of involvement in publicly traded companies? A different shareholder structure? Mr. Market is going nuts again?

Anyhow I would be quite happy if the share price could stay where it currently is and Prem would buy back the company with the profits from the next few years. In less than a decade, the company would belong to the readers of cobf...

 

@Hamburg Investor  Yes, i like to look at Fairfax in lots of different ways. None on their own are perfect. But looked at together, i think it is possible to sketch a pretty accurate picture of the company and its valuation.

 

One of the lesson’s for me with Fairfax over the past couple of years is how long it takes for narratives to change for companies. Even when the facts are clearly saying something quite different. This is actually good news for investors. In situations where fundamentals are improving faster than what is being reflected in the narrative it means you have lots of time to learn and get your position size right. 

Edited February 22 by Viking

[SafetyinNumbers]

1 hour ago, Hamburg Investor said:

Anyhow I would be quite happy if the share price could stay where it currently is and Prem would buy back the company with the profits from the next few years. In less than a decade, the company would belong to the readers of cobf...

I am curious what percentage CoBF owns of Fairfax. It could be a material number!

[backtothebeach]

2 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

I am curious what percentage CoBF owns of Fairfax. It could be a material number!

 
My guess is around $1B = 4-5%.

[Cigarbutt]

2 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

Yes - thanks, I changed that.

The comment was not to make you "change that", it was because several aspects of your post are interesting and, before commenting on this specific aspect, i wanted to make sure we were on the same page. The 2001-4 topic is both interesting and, especially, relevant for today (i think).

From 2004:

Later in the report:

Reserving

All in all, I am very happy to report that our reserves held up well. Any development at Northbridge and OdysseyRe was absorbed in their excellent combined ratios.

-----

FFH expanded ++ in the late 1990s during an unusually soft market (during the nadir of the cycle in fact) and invested in very very poor underwriters (means bad results now and bad results to come when the tide goes out on reserves). So thanks to very unusual and large covers (Chubb- and SwissRe- like), thanks to the very hard market that followed (2001-4) and (critical for FFH survival) thanks to FFH's unusual ability to raise capital in a quite constrained time for them, FFH was able to absorb the HUGE negative results from the late 1990s that eventually were recognized and was even able to report decent combined ratios with a positive trend from 2001 to 2004.

Now in 2024, 'we' have just lived through a moderate hard market for a few years and now, what could happen?

[dartmonkey]

4 hours ago, valuesource said:

Short interest on TMX actually increased slightly.  I'd also like to hear @sleepydragon's take.

 

 

This FFH.U entity is new to me. I have usually bought FFH in CAD, but journalled it all over to my US account as FRFHF shares in order to avoid the automatic conversion of the USD dividend into CAD at disadvantageous exchange rates (TD Direct Investing likes to gouge its customers this way; one of these days I will get around to transferring these assets into Interactive Brokers which treats customers properly for commissions and especially forex and interest rates, but I have so far left it there because I have the same Fairfax shares there for >10 years...) Anyways, FFH.ca and FRFHF are the 2 share formats I am familiar with, and the ones I see quotes for on most financial sites. But what is FFH.U ? Is this just shorthand for the US FFH shares that trade OTC as FRFHF, or is it something else?

[SafetyinNumbers]

51 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

 

This FFH.U entity is new to me. I have usually bought FFH in CAD, but journalled it all over to my US account as FRFHF shares in order to avoid the automatic conversion of the USD dividend into CAD at disadvantageous exchange rates (TD Direct Investing likes to gouge its customers this way; one of these days I will get around to transferring these assets into Interactive Brokers which treats customers properly for commissions and especially forex and interest rates, but I have so far left it there because I have the same Fairfax shares there for >10 years...) Anyways, FFH.ca and FRFHF are the 2 share formats I am familiar with, and the ones I see quotes for on most financial sites. But what is FFH.U ? Is this just shorthand for the US FFH shares that trade OTC as FRFHF, or is it something else?

FFH, FRFHF and FFH.U are all the same shares. FFH.U is simply the USD listing on the TSX. FIH.U is the Fairfax India ticker and it trades in USD too. FIH doesn’t have a C$ ticker on the TSX although it could if they wanted to pay for it. 

[dartmonkey]

1 hour ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

FFH, FRFHF and FFH.U are all the same shares. FFH.U is simply the USD listing on the TSX. FIH.U is the Fairfax India ticker and it trades in USD too. FIH doesn’t have a C$ ticker on the TSX although it could if they wanted to pay for it. 

 

Yes, this is what I expected, except I can't find a quote for FFH.U on TD Direct Investing or Yahoo or Seeking Alpha ; well actually, yes, on TD Direct Investing there is a stale quote of $903.32 (bid $1013, ask $1019) so I suppose there are occasional trades. I am familiar with the TSX having .U shares denominated in USD, like FIH.U, which actually trades that way, and for FFH.U, I suppose this just means that the TSX will purchase FFH shares using USD funds, but given the absence of an active market on the Toronto exchange, buying or selling them that way would not seem optimal.

 

Of course, once you have them, it makes no difference whether they are called FFH.to or FFH.U or FRFHF - a share is a share. But when people here refer to FFH.U, are they just referring to the USD value of FFH shares, usually obtained by looking at where they're trading over the counter in New York as FRFHF?

Edited February 22 by dartmonkey

[gfp]

6 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

 

Yes, this is what I expected, except I can't find a quote for FIH.U on TD Direct Investing or Yahoo or Seeking Alpha ; well actually, yes, on TD Direct Investing there is a stale quote of $903.32 (bid $1013, ask $1019) so I suppose there are occasional trades. I am familiar with the TSX having .U shares denominated in USD, like FIH.U, which actually trades that way, and for FFH.U, I suppose this just means that the TSX will purchase FFH shares using USD funds, but given the absence of an active market on the Toronto exchange, buying or selling them that way would not seem optimal.

 

Of course, once you have them, it makes no difference whether they are called FFH.to or FFH.U or FRFHF - a share is a share. But when people here refer to FIH.U, are they just referring to the USD value of FFH shares, usually obtained by looking at where they're trading over the counter in New York as FRFHF?

 

Sounds like you confused some tickers there unintentionally.  FIH.U and FFXDF (OTC) are Fairfax India.  The others mentioned above are Fairfax Financial.

[dartmonkey]

32 minutes ago, gfp said:

 

Sounds like you confused some tickers there unintentionally.  FIH.U and FFXDF (OTC) are Fairfax India.  The others mentioned above are Fairfax Financial.

Yes, you're right, and twice for good measure. Corrected now.

 

I think I have my answer, that no real trading is done on the TSX with the FFH.U ticker, and I am guessing it's just a way of referring to the US price of Fairfax, avoiding the hard-to-remember FRFHF OTC ticker that actually gets traded, but if I'm wrong, someone please correct me.

[SafetyinNumbers]

29 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

Yes, you're right, and twice for good measure. Corrected now.

 

I think I have my answer, that no real trading is done on the TSX with the FFH.U ticker, and I am guessing it's just a way of referring to the US price of Fairfax, avoiding the hard-to-remember FRFHF OTC ticker that actually gets traded, but if I'm wrong, someone please correct me.

You are correct FFH.U doesn’t trade much but if one uses the FFH bid/ask and converts to USD to place an order an arb will likely provide a fill. I do think people use the FRFHF quote when discussing the price (and its usually close enough) but taking the FFH price and converting to USD at the posted rate is probably more accurate. 
 

 

[dartmonkey]

ok, that's helpful. Your table does show that the volume of FFH.U that is traded is minimal, 0-20 trades in the last few months, with 0 and 1 being by far the most common volume in a given day. I have no idea what the columns after 'T-TSX' mean ('U-NEO-ATS', 'A-Alpha', etc.), but I probably don't need to know!

 

[Crip1]

7 hours ago, backtothebeach said:

 
My guess is around $1B = 4-5%.

Well, I have a half billion so do the rest of you have the other half billion? 

 

-Crip

[SafetyinNumbers]

2 hours ago, dartmonkey said:

 I have no idea what the columns after 'T-TSX' mean ('U-NEO-ATS', 'A-Alpha', etc.), but I probably don't need to know!

 

They are alternative trading systems or alternative exchanges in Canada. FFH looks like it trades around 60-70% of its Canadian volume on the TSX. The rest trades on these alternative venues.

[Hamburg Investor]

16 hours ago, backtothebeach said:

 
My guess is around $1B = 4-5%.

How do you get to that estimate? Seems a lot to me, but I have no clues whatsoever.

Edited February 23 by Hamburg Investor

[Hamburg Investor]

16 hours ago, Cigarbutt said:

The comment was not to make you "change that", it was because several aspects of your post are interesting and, before commenting on this specific aspect, i wanted to make sure we were on the same page. The 2001-4 topic is both interesting and, especially, relevant for today (i think).

From 2004:

Later in the report:

Reserving

All in all, I am very happy to report that our reserves held up well. Any development at Northbridge and OdysseyRe was absorbed in their excellent combined ratios.

-----

FFH expanded ++ in the late 1990s during an unusually soft market (during the nadir of the cycle in fact) and invested in very very poor underwriters (means bad results now and bad results to come when the tide goes out on reserves). So thanks to very unusual and large covers (Chubb- and SwissRe- like), thanks to the very hard market that followed (2001-4) and (critical for FFH survival) thanks to FFH's unusual ability to raise capital in a quite constrained time for them, FFH was able to absorb the HUGE negative results from the late 1990s that eventually were recognized and was even able to report decent combined ratios with a positive trend from 2001 to 2004.

Now in 2024, 'we' have just lived through a moderate hard market for a few years and now, what could happen?

Thanks, @Cigarbutt, that's really helpful. I know I have to dig deeper into what happend especially at the beginning of the century for getting a deeper understanding.

It sounds like you want to name other points - what is it?

Edited February 23 by Hamburg Investor

[Cigarbutt]

4 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

...to dig deeper...
..other points?

One has to wonder if your time is well spent on some shared minutiae here but your posts triggered some kind of trip to memory lane (and a thick file). Disclosure (variable position sizing for me over time) and opinion: the 'market' has often gotten FFH's valuation approximately right but not always. For example around +/- 2001-2, the market's quotes resulted in an opportunity to buy an uncomfortable asset at quite a steep discount, meaning, as an equivalent, that one could buy an insurer with a price embedding some kind of an additional adverse reserve development cover and potential upside for better underwriting going forward (and some other potential upside to be uncovered over time). Now, from the underwriting point of view (a key ingredient for FFH), it looks like the market presents (has been presenting for some time) another opportunity by being too slow in applying a premium necessary for a much improved and consistent insurance underwriter (the picture has been changing for some time now but, from the legend, apparently Newton only realized some deep insights about gravity when the apple actually fell).

-----

The following is a fragment of stuff i've been following. Warning: it may contain errors and some 'in-house' numbers are clearly not up to USGAAP/IFRS standards.

Ok, we could talk hours but i aim to visit my mother-in-law today (who shows significant cognitive decline) in order to play Bingo with her so i'll stick to some essentials?

Some comments

-AY CR adj. is an in-house measure to represent FFH accident year combined ratio adjusted for reserve development (including run-off) and catastrophes % points.

-CR as reported is FFH as reported.

-comm. CR is a reasonable proxy to compare under, ie US commercial lines

Some 'messages'

-AY CR is a reasonable way to assess performance over time. For FFH, compare 2007-16 to 2017-23.

-When compared to US commercial lines, FFH has done better for reported combined ratios but (opinion based on some minutiae not included here), it would look even better if their reserving process was less conservative (precision: conservative reserving is something to look for and not a comparative disadvantage). Also some years (2011 19.3, 2017 13.7, 2021 7.5), FFH had to absorb higher than usual catastrophe combined ratio points which helps to explain poorer performance vs commercial insurers in general. Also for the period 2017-23, FFH on average reported 7.3 catastrophe points compared to a slightly lower level of catastrophe combined ratio points before which also helps to 'justify' the lower superior more recent performance compared to commercial line insurers. My understanding is that FFH aims to maintain average catastrophe points to 6 combined ratio points or lower (something like that) and it appears that they are taking real actions to achieve this. Anyways, with FFH becoming international, more diversified and with more exposure to reinsurance, the commercial group comparative is becoming less relevant.

-The most important message perhaps is the fact that recently reported numbers over the last 2 or 3 years seem to confirm quite clearly a more positive path for further significant underwriting profitability. Starting with a baseline 87.8 and adding 6 points of catastrophe points and adjusting for expected reserve releases, it's very reasonable to expect reported combined ratios between 90 and 95% and likely closer to 90 than 95.

 

[dartmonkey]

2 hours ago, Cigarbutt said:

One has to wonder if your time is well spent on some shared minutiae here but your posts triggered some kind of trip to memory lane (and a thick file). Disclosure (variable position sizing for me over time) and opinion: the 'market' has often gotten FFH's valuation approximately right but not always. For example around +/- 2001-2, the market's quotes resulted in an opportunity to buy an uncomfortable asset at quite a steep discount, meaning, as an equivalent, that one could buy an insurer with a price embedding some kind of an additional adverse reserve development cover and potential upside for better underwriting going forward (and some other potential upside to be uncovered over time). Now, from the underwriting point of view (a key ingredient for FFH), it looks like the market presents (has been presenting for some time) another opportunity by being too slow in applying a premium necessary for a much improved and consistent insurance underwriter (the picture has been changing for some time now but, from the legend, apparently Newton only realized some deep insights about gravity when the apple actually fell).

-----

The following is a fragment of stuff i've been following. Warning: it may contain errors and some 'in-house' numbers are clearly not up to USGAAP/IFRS standards.

Ok, we could talk hours but i aim to visit my mother-in-law today (who shows significant cognitive decline) in order to play Bingo with her so i'll stick to some essentials?

Some comments

-AY CR adj. is an in-house measure to represent FFH accident year combined ratio adjusted for reserve development (including run-off) and catastrophes % points.

-CR as reported is FFH as reported.

-comm. CR is a reasonable proxy to compare under, ie US commercial lines

Some 'messages'

-AY CR is a reasonable way to assess performance over time. For FFH, compare 2007-16 to 2017-23.

-

 

 

How do you get a comparable AY number for recent years without the benefit of knowing what the future reserve developments will be? You seem to be assuming that adjustments will follow historical trends, for instance taking this years CR as reported from 93.2 to an AY CR of 89.0 over time, is that right? And with average AY CR's from 2017-2023 almost 10 percentage points better than published CR numbers, as opposed to 3 points lower from 2007 to 2016, we should conclude that either they are have gotten much better at underwriting, or their standards for reserving have gotten much worse recently. Hopefully the former. But might it be fair to say that part of the pessimism about how much this company is worth is based on the suspicion that their reserving standards may have slipped and that the CRs (and AY CRs) will not be as good as they look? Along with skepticism that interest rates will not hold up and that the company might return to buying Blackberries?

 

 

Edited February 23 by dartmonkey

[Masterofnone]

Meaningless conjecture- The price action the last two days has the feel of shorts covering on the bid and short-term traders taking their 10% on the ask.

[Cigarbutt]

9 hours ago, dartmonkey said:

...pessimism...suspicion...not be as good as they look? ...skepticism...

Maybe and the aim should be to try to (constructively) destroy the thesis, but in this specific case (expected underwriting results within the next few years, absent extrinsic material surprises)...

 

Every hard market is different:

and how a specific company opportunistically takes advantage of a specific hard market is different (just think of the opportunistic capital that comes in the market after very large catastrophe years):

Will string of startups truly benefit buyers? | Business Insurance

 

FFH has grown premiums very significantly during this last hard market (net premiums earned 2018: 12066.0M, estimated net premiums earned 2023: about 22100-22300M). Not as impressive as the growth in 2001 to 2004 but quite significant.

 

During a hard market, price of policies increase very likely ahead of underlying policy costs and underwriting standards tighten which very very typically results in reserves linked to "current" accident year policies to become redundant over the duration of the reserves. For all hard markets (not only the last three) (the opposite applies for soft markets but in the other direction), some time after the hardening starts, the accident year combined ratio will tend to (not always) go down (as was the case during the 2001-4 period for FFH) and reserve redundancies will very typically get recognized (as was the case for FFH in the years that followed the 2008-2012 hard market).

 

As far as catastrophe losses, it appears that FFH management is quite mindful of the potential lumpiness of results (in both directions) and they've periodically commented on that aspect, including after the difficult 2011 year and they seem to be focused on making a reasonable return over time and, in the last two years, have been reporting adjustments including reduced exposure at Brit.

-----

From now on, i will try to focus on the downside but (opinion) the progress that FFH has shown over the years on the underwriting front has been very impressive and (another opinion hopefully ahead of the cheery consensus) underwriting results are likely to drive various measures of return on capital.

Edited February 24 by Cigarbutt
spelling

[valuesource]

On 2/20/2024 at 8:21 AM, gfp said:

Thanks for the clarification.  I primarily use Interactive Brokers in the USA and I can never seem to find FFH.U (the US dollar traded Toronto shares) - does anybody else with IB have access to FFH.U ?  Fairfax India shows up no problem.

I see what you are saying about IB.  FFH.U does not come up in the search.  I generally agree with @SafetyinNumbers that FRFHF is the favoured approach to buying in USDs.  With IB the F/X rates are low enough to entertain buying on TMX (where most of the volume is).  There is, quite obviously, lots of arbitrage or at least electronic trading on TMX.  053 - Morgan Stanley, 039 - Merrill Lynch and 079 - CIBC are making it annoying to try to bid or offer any stock.  But you have to try to transact on TMX because it is the best market.

 

Another thing I've noticed is the action in the Market-on-close facility has been high for a while.  At times we've seen 100k shares trade MOC in a day.  MOC promotes liquidity at the end of day and allows Buy/Sell orders to be entered throughout the day with a published imbalance at 3:50pm.  Between 3:50 and 4:00pm offsetting orders are solicited and a price is determined according to supply/demand.  It's not moving the market much ($1-3 based on the size of the imbalance) but the volumes are material.

[glider3834]

On 2/24/2024 at 4:04 AM, Cigarbutt said:

My understanding is that FFH aims to maintain average catastrophe points to 6 combined ratio points or lower (something like that) and it appears that they are taking real actions to achieve this.

Peter Clarke did make point on a CC they are looking to grow premium while keeping their cat exposure about the same, so over time their cat loss should effectively be falling as percentage of overall net written premium and their combined ratio. 

 

And I think that is starting to show up in the numbers too, I did this table below which illustrates. 

 

 

 

 

Some comments on this table above.

 

1. Over the 2018-2023 period, Fairfax's share of global insured cat losses looks to have varied between 0.8% in 2020 to 1.0% in 2022. However, in the table above based on Munich re's estimates for global insured cat losses for 2018 & 2023, Fairfax's share of total global insured cat losses was almost the same in each year.

 

Munich re has global insured natural cat losses at US$80B in 2018 (Fairfax share US$752M or 0.940%) https://www.reinsurancene.ws/munich-re-pegs-2018-insured-cat-losses-at-80bn-double-the-30-year-average/and US$95B in 2023 (Fairfax share US$897M or 0.944%) https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/quakes-storms-cause-95-billion-insurance-losses-2023-munich-re-2024-01-09/

 

2. Fairfax's growth in net written premium over the 2018 to 2022 period was 76%. Over same period, appears that Global commercial P&C premiums grew 33%. So Fairfax appears to have more than 2x the industry growth rate, yet appears based on numbers above to have not done so by increasing cat loss exposure at same rate.

 

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/global-insurance-report-2023-expanding-commercial-p-and-cs-market-relevance

 

3. Just bear in mind with all above numbers & comments , these are based on Fairfax's results in last 5 years and Munich re estimates of industry cat losses. This information is useful, but of course, future loss or cat loss experience for Fairfax or Industry or both cannot be guaranteed.

 

4. Key point with above, we are looking at Fairfax's cat loss experience where global industry cat losses in 2 periods are not too dis-similar in size - in 2023 they were around US$95B or 19% higher than 2018 at US$80B . If global cat losses were say 50% higher in 2023 vs 2018, then cat loss impact for Fairfax in CR points is going to be much greater and cat loss/NPW ratio higher. Of course, the flipside is that with every terrible cat year comes pressure for harder insurance pricing, which if it transpires would then be likely to show up in future combined ratios. 

 

Also just a reminder -please don't rely on my numbers or comments in this post  or any of my posts - always check them & do your own due diligence - my comments here are opinion and for entertainment, and this is not financial advice.

 

 

Edited February 25 by glider3834

[Cigarbutt]

23 hours ago, glider3834 said:

Peter Clarke...

And I think that is starting to show up in the numbers too, I did this table below which illustrates. 

 

https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/global-insurance-report-2023-expanding-commercial-p-and-cs-market-relevance

opinion for entertainment...

The link you mention also discusses the potential advantages of specialty lines. One of the keys for the transformation (survival) of Crum & Forster about 25 years ago was the rapid move out of commodity lines to more specialized lines with very obvious positive underwriting results. The specialty market has been growing faster than the general market and FFH has followed. When using a similar proportional table as the one you've included above (using the last 8 to 12 years), specialty lines (as defined by FFH) have grown a lot but not significantly versus total premiums at large.

 

For some years now, S&P Global has produced a ranking with the last one being:

"The U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Performance Rankings are based on statutory financial results collected and compiled by S&P Global Market Intelligence. They are determined using 13 financial metrics from 2022 statutory filings grouped into six buckets: rates of return, underwriting profitability, balance sheet expansion, investment performance, prior-accident-year reserve development and premium growth."

S&P Global describes how the above rankings show that some relatively small players have been able to grow profitably a lot from a small base and expanding into specialty markets. They also describe that FFH was able to grow profitably both their niche specialty segments and also their much larger portfolio of commodity-like products.

i would venture to say that there is some 'moat' in there, especially when considering the now longer-term track record.

Edited February 26 by Cigarbutt
spelling

[glider3834]

2 hours ago, Cigarbutt said:

The link you mention also discusses the potential advantages of specialty lines. One of the keys for the transformation (survival) of Crum & Forster about 25 years ago was the rapid move out of commodity lines to more specialized lines with very obvious positive underwriting results. The specialty market has been growing faster than the general market and FFH has followed. When using a similar proportional table as the one you've included above (using the last 8 to 12 years), specialty lines (as defined by FFH) have grown a lot but not significantly versus total premiums at large.

 

For some years now, S&P Global has produced a ranking with the last one being:

"The U.S. Property and Casualty Insurance Performance Rankings are based on statutory financial results collected and compiled by S&P Global Market Intelligence. They are determined using 13 financial metrics from 2022 statutory filings grouped into six buckets: rates of return, underwriting profitability, balance sheet expansion, investment performance, prior-accident-year reserve development and premium growth."

S&P Global describes how the above rankings show that some relatively small players have been able to grow profitably a lot from a small base and expanding into specialty markets. They also describe that FFH was able to grow profitably both their niche specialty segments and also their much larger portfolio of commodity-like products.

i would venture to say that there is some 'moat' in there, especially when considering the now longer-term track record.

good pick up cigarbutt cheers!

[Bryggen]

On 2/21/2024 at 2:59 PM, jbwent63 said:

I was just looking at the filing. Gurufocus states that FFH also acquired additional BB shares which appears to be false. It looks like one of the Watsa holding companies (The Second 810 Holding Co) acquired 129,000 shares and then Prem was awarded 296,571 shares upon leaving the board. I might be wrong but I don't think FFH has more BB shares and the note was repaid.

So, do we know for sure the news is false? Can anyone confirm? I was surprised by it. Thanks! Bry

[glider3834]

6 hours ago, Bryggen said:

So, do we know for sure the news is false? Can anyone confirm? I was surprised by it. Thanks! Bry

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/915191/000094787124000176/xslF345X05/ownership.xml