Fairfax 2026

[Hamburg Investor]

1 hour ago, Viking said:

There are a lot of parallels with Fairfax today and BRK in the 1980’s/1990’s. Yes, there are also important differences. One being Fairfax is much more levered to float. Another being how it does capital allocation (different does not mean worse). Another being Fairfax is international.

 

+1

 

One other big difference versus BRK in the 1980s/1990s is that Fairfax is already returning large amounts of capital through both dividends and buybacks, while Berkshire did neither. In 2024 Fairfax returned about $1.93–1.95B to shareholders, roughly 50% of earnings, and in 2025 it returned about $1.94–1.96B, roughly 40–41% of earnings.

 

That matters because a great business that retains 100% of earnings gets big very fast, and the bigger it gets, the harder it becomes to reinvest every new dollar at the same high rate. A business that can instead use a meaningful part of earnings to buy back stock below intrinsic value can keep compounding per-share value at a very high rate without needing the whole enterprise to become gigantic.

Buybacks (below iv) hold market cap down AND push iv/share!

 

Take a simple example: start with 1,000 shares and 100,000 of equity, so intrinsic value starts at 100 per share. Assume both companies earn 18% annually for 20 years (I am oversimplifying iv as bv to keep the example shorter). Company A reinvests 100% of earnings. Company B retains only half and uses the other half to repurchase shares at 75% of intrinsic value. 
 

After 20 years, Company A has 1,000 shares outstanding, equity of about 2,739,303, and intrinsic value per share of about 2,739. Company B has only about 117 shares left, equity of about 560,441, and intrinsic value per share of about 4,787. 

 

 

That is the punchline: Company B ends up with only about one-fifth the market cap of Company A, and only about 117 shares left out of the original 1,000, yet it creates vastly more value per share for the continuing owners.

 

Bigger is not better if the smaller company is buying in stock below intrinsic value. 

 

So yes, Fairfax may be entering a Berkshire-like capital allocation phase. But because Fairfax pays a dividend and is aggressively shrinking the share count when the stock is cheap, the per-share compounding path could end up looking meaningfully better than many investors expect.

[Hoodlum]

10 minutes ago, Hamburg Investor said:

+1

 

One other big difference versus BRK in the 1980s/1990s is that Fairfax is already returning large amounts of capital through both dividends and buybacks, while Berkshire did neither. In 2024 Fairfax returned about $1.93–1.95B to shareholders, roughly 50% of earnings, and in 2025 it returned about $1.94–1.96B, roughly 40–41% of earnings.

 

That matters because a great business that retains 100% of earnings gets big very fast, and the bigger it gets, the harder it becomes to reinvest every new dollar at the same high rate. A business that can instead use a meaningful part of earnings to buy back stock below intrinsic value can keep compounding per-share value at a very high rate without needing the whole enterprise to become gigantic.

Buybacks (below iv) hold market cap down AND push iv/share!

 

Take a simple example: start with 1,000 shares and 100,000 of equity, so intrinsic value starts at 100 per share. Assume both companies earn 18% annually for 20 years (I am oversimplifying iv as bv to keep the example shorter). Company A reinvests 100% of earnings. Company B retains only half and uses the other half to repurchase shares at 75% of intrinsic value. 
 

After 20 years, Company A has 1,000 shares outstanding, equity of about 2,739,303, and intrinsic value per share of about 2,739. Company B has only about 117 shares left, equity of about 560,441, and intrinsic value per share of about 4,787. 

 

 

That is the punchline: Company B ends up with only about one-fifth the market cap of Company A, and only about 117 shares left out of the original 1,000, yet it creates vastly more value per share for the continuing owners.

 

Bigger is not better if the smaller company is buying in stock below intrinsic value. 

 

So yes, Fairfax may be entering a Berkshire-like capital allocation phase. But because Fairfax pays a dividend and is aggressively shrinking the share count when the stock is cheap, the per-share compounding path could end up looking meaningfully better than many investors expect.

 

Thanks @Hamburg Investor for sharing this as I had not thought of the buybacks like this.    So basically we could have a longer runway that Berkshire with greater price/share gains, before our larger size reduces future growth.  This is of course dependent on continued future opportunities for share buybacks.

[dartmonkey]

2 hours ago, Viking said:

What is happening? Fairfax is entering its “BRK 1980’s/1990’s” phase where capital allocation and compounding will be the primary driver of growth in economic/intrinsic value moving forward (not top line growth in the P/C insurance business). BRK delivered outstanding growth in economic/intrinsic value per share in soft insurance markets in the 1980’s and 1990’s and I suspect Fairfax will do the same in the coming years.

 

There are a lot of parallels with Fairfax today and BRK in the 1980’s/1990’s. Yes, there are also important differences. One being Fairfax is much more levered to float. Another being how it does capital allocation (different does not mean worse). Another being Fairfax is international.

We have talked about this before, but I looked up what year Berkshire was about the same market cap as Fairfax, and it is roughly at the end of 1995, when Berkshire had a US$38b market cap like Fairfax today.

 

If you adjust for inflation, $38b in 2025 is the equivalent of about $17.5b back in 1995, so we need to go a bit farther back. At the end of 1992, Berkshire had a market cap of about $14b, a little smaller than Fairfax's present value adjusted for 129% inflation isnce then, but by the end of 1993, it was about $30b, as new accounting rules meant that the stock positions were marked to market. 

 

So Fairfax is very roughly Berkshire's size around the beginning of 1992, or 34 years ago.

 

My hope is that Fairfax will buy back enough shares to materially slow its growth, so that it retains its ability to invest widely; Berkshire started far too late, in retrospect, despite his admiration for Henry Singleton and his share repurchases: https://www.google.com/search?q=buffett+on+henry+singleton&oq=buffett+on+henry+singleton&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIICAEQABgWGB4yBwgCEAAY7wUyBwgDEAAY7wUyBwgEEAAY7wUyBwgFEAAY7wUyBwgGEAAY7wXSAQkxMDA1MWowajeoAgCwAgA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#fpstate=ive&vld=cid:7c22ca26,vid:ePg5JxYChgE,st:0

 

 

[Hamburg Investor]

45 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

This is of course dependent on continued future opportunities for share buybacks.

 

Yes - let's just hope for a relatively low FFH share price, so below iv,  for longer. At least for the ones of us planning to not going in and out, the overall return will be higher.

 

7 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

If you adjust for inflation, $38b in 2025 is the equivalent of about $17.5b back in 1995, so we need to go a bit farther back. At the end of 1992, Berkshire had a market cap of about $14b, a little smaller than Fairfax's present value adjusted for 129% inflation isnce then, but by the end of 1993, it was about $30b, as new accounting rules meant that the stock positions were marked to market. 

 

I really like you adjusting the share price for inflation!

I am asking myself, if BRK pre 1992 (or its market cap) shouldn't be adjusted to that new accounting rules, on top of that.

In other words: A change in accounting rules shouldn't define the year, in which year FFH could be compared to BRK. But that's what you describe: An older (not so transparent) accounting rule held BRKs market cap down.

So if pre 1993 BRKs market cap was (only) inflated for an older accounting reason (and assuming todays accounting rules are more like the 1993 ones), than shouldn't we guess, when BRKs market cap would have standed at $17.5b, if the accounting rules would have changed earlier? BRK grew heavy in those years, so maybe 1990 or 1991 would be more accurate. At least, when we'd like to understand BRKs "intrinsic growth" of those years.

 

 

In any case, comparing the market cap performance whilst accounting rules have changed  – which lead for the price more than doubling in a single year – paints a somewhat distorted picture.
 

But I am unsure if I get the change un accounting rules right etc.; so I may well be wrong.
 

BRK was different in so many ways and the time isn't comparable; E. g. Treasury yields were at 7.5%.

 

[dartmonkey]

48 minutes ago, Hamburg Investor said:

am asking myself, if BRK pre 1992 (or its market cap) shouldn't be adjusted to that new accounting rules, on top of that.

In other words: A change in accounting rules shouldn't define the year, in which year FFH could be compared to BRK. But that's what you describe: An older (not so transparent) accounting rule held BRKs market cap down.

So if pre 1993 BRKs market cap was (only) inflated for an older accounting reason (and assuming todays accounting rules are more like the 1993 ones), than shouldn't we guess, when BRKs market cap would have standed at $17.5b, if the accounting rules would have changed earlier? BRK grew heavy in those years, so maybe 1990 or 1991 would be more accurate. At least, when we'd like to understand BRKs "intrinsic growth" of those years.

I think your thinking is correct but it is difficult to say what Berkshire's market cap would have been under current accounting rules without doing a lot more analysis.

 

The important thing is that it was bigget than Fairfax (adjusting for ionflation) in 1993 and may have already been bigger by 1991 or 1992. So Berkshire has about a 34-35 year headstart on Fairfax. And as you and hoodlum have pointed out, Fairfax will not grow as fast as Berkshire if it spends a significant part of its earnings on buybacks, so hopefully we will have considerably more than 35 years before Fairfax reaches Berkshire's current size. Of course, there's no guarantee that Fairfax will continue to have the opportunity of buying back shares at such low prices, but so far, so good.

[SafetyinNumbers]

4 hours ago, dartmonkey said:

I think your thinking is correct but it is difficult to say what Berkshire's market cap would have been under current accounting rules without doing a lot more analysis.

 

The important thing is that it was bigget than Fairfax (adjusting for ionflation) in 1993 and may have already been bigger by 1991 or 1992. So Berkshire has about a 34-35 year headstart on Fairfax. And as you and hoodlum have pointed out, Fairfax will not grow as fast as Berkshire if it spends a significant part of its earnings on buybacks, so hopefully we will have considerably more than 35 years before Fairfax reaches Berkshire's current size. Of course, there's no guarantee that Fairfax will continue to have the opportunity of buying back shares at such low prices, but so far, so good.

I think it’s interesting to look at the 25-35 yr trailing returns of BRK and compare them to an expected forward range for Fairfax. I think BRK was a much harder buy back then than FFH is now. My expected return on FFH is also higher than what BRK actually did. I think the market structure is why the opportunity exists. 

[Munger_Disciple]

On 4/20/2026 at 11:56 AM, Hamburg Investor said:

+1

 

One other big difference versus BRK in the 1980s/1990s is that Fairfax is already returning large amounts of capital through both dividends and buybacks, while Berkshire did neither. In 2024 Fairfax returned about $1.93–1.95B to shareholders, roughly 50% of earnings, and in 2025 it returned about $1.94–1.96B, roughly 40–41% of earnings.

 

That matters because a great business that retains 100% of earnings gets big very fast, and the bigger it gets, the harder it becomes to reinvest every new dollar at the same high rate. A business that can instead use a meaningful part of earnings to buy back stock below intrinsic value can keep compounding per-share value at a very high rate without needing the whole enterprise to become gigantic.

Buybacks (below iv) hold market cap down AND push iv/share!

 

Take a simple example: start with 1,000 shares and 100,000 of equity, so intrinsic value starts at 100 per share. Assume both companies earn 18% annually for 20 years (I am oversimplifying iv as bv to keep the example shorter). Company A reinvests 100% of earnings. Company B retains only half and uses the other half to repurchase shares at 75% of intrinsic value. 
 

After 20 years, Company A has 1,000 shares outstanding, equity of about 2,739,303, and intrinsic value per share of about 2,739. Company B has only about 117 shares left, equity of about 560,441, and intrinsic value per share of about 4,787. 

 

 

That is the punchline: Company B ends up with only about one-fifth the market cap of Company A, and only about 117 shares left out of the original 1,000, yet it creates vastly more value per share for the continuing owners.

 

Bigger is not better if the smaller company is buying in stock below intrinsic value. 

 

So yes, Fairfax may be entering a Berkshire-like capital allocation phase. But because Fairfax pays a dividend and is aggressively shrinking the share count when the stock is cheap, the per-share compounding path could end up looking meaningfully better than many investors expect.

 

I think about this differently. In your simplistic example, both companies A & B are growing their IV at the same rate; one is buying back stock at discount to IV, so naturally it's going to do better.

 

But this doesn't imply your conclusion: "because Fairfax pays a dividend and is aggressively shrinking the share count when the stock is cheap, the per-share compounding path could end up looking meaningfully better than many investors expect" is correct.

 

At the end of the day, book value is the owners' capital base of the company. If the incremental dollar of earnings can be reinvested within the company at a very attractive rate of return, that is almost always the best use of capital, not share buybacks (assuming stock trades at a premium to book) or dividends. If the dollar is used for buybacks instead, it will result in shareholders owning < $1 of additional book value as opposed to owning $1 of (very attractive) book value if the capital is reinvested. Thus the CEO should compare the return from buyback to return from reinvestment of the same dollar inside the company & only do buybacks if there are really no better alternatives for reinvestment inside the company. 

Dividends are even worse use of capital than buybacks for obvious reasons (taxes, reinvestment etc.) and should only be considered if (1) there are no internal reinvestment opportunities and (2) stock is trading at or above intrinsic value, conservatively calculated. Prem used to be against dividends until he did a 180 degree conversion due to his personal cash flow needs. He has a mental block against selling a small portion of his shareholding (even the subordinate voting shares it seems) every year for his personal needs, which I would imagine is a better outcome for him. Even great founders have mental blocks, for example Buffett's lifelong love affair with airlines, and his angst about buybacks for a long time. 

 

Given that FFH can't possibly allocate more capital to insurance business since the u/w cycle has turned for worse (not including buying out minorities here), buybacks are probably a good and safe use of excess capital. 

Edited April 21 by Munger_Disciple

[Hamburg Investor]

3 hours ago, Munger_Disciple said:

At the end of the day, book value is the owners' capital base of the company. If the incremental dollar of earnings can be reinvested within the company at a very attractive rate of return, that is almost always the best use of capital, not share buybacks (assuming stock trades at a premium to book) or dividends.

 

I think we are talking past each other a bit.

I was not arguing that buybacks are always better than reinvestment. I was pointing out a structural difference: Fairfax today pays a dividend and buys back stock, while Berkshire in the 1980s/1990s did neither.

 

That likely means Fairfax will grow total market cap more slowly than a pure 100% reinvestment model. But it may also compound intrinsic value per share better than many expect if repurchases continue to happen at a meaningful discount to intrinsic value.

 

And in the real world, the question is almost never whether a company can reinvest 100% of earnings at its historical average ROE. The real question is what to do with the portion of earnings that cannot be redeployed internally at equally attractive rates.

 

A reported 18% ROE does not mean every incremental dollar earns 18%. It only means the blend of decisions, some very good and some not, produced 18% on average. In practice, no allocator gets only the winners.

 

That is why buybacks below intrinsic value can be so powerful. The hurdle is not the company’s historical average ROE. The hurdle is the return available on the next dollar retained.

 

In the best version of this, management funds the clearly superior internal opportunities first and then uses the residual capital to buy back stock below intrinsic value. That is a very strong combination: you get the upside of the best internal opportunities without forcing capital into the weaker tail of the opportunity set.

 

Put differently, management can sometimes buy more of its own business, and more of its own future capital allocation, at a discount. That is a high hurdle for most alternative uses of capital.

 

So yes, internal reinvestment is best when it can be done at very high returns and in size. But that does not contradict my point. My point is simply that Fairfax’s path from here is likely to look different from old Berkshire’s path: less about maximizing absolute size, more about maximizing per-share value creation.

 

And by not getting too big too quickly, Fairfax may preserve higher incremental returns for longer.
 

[Munger_Disciple]

1 hour ago, Hamburg Investor said:

 

I think we are talking past each other a bit.

I was not arguing that buybacks are always better than reinvestment. I was pointing out a structural difference: Fairfax today pays a dividend and buys back stock, while Berkshire in the 1980s/1990s did neither.

 

As I pointed out, dividends is a terrible use of capital given that Prem's goal is to internally compound book value @15%. I would rather Fairfax buys back stock with all the excess capital that can't be invested internally as long it trades below intrinsic value. 

 

1 hour ago, Hamburg Investor said:

A reported 18% ROE does not mean every incremental dollar earns 18%. It only means the blend of decisions, some very good and some not, produced 18% on average. In practice, no allocator gets only the winners.

 

My previous post referred to "return on incremental dollar" which you seem to have missed. So we are on the same page. However I would note that Prem's stated goal is 15% return on incremental dollars retained. 

 

1 hour ago, Hamburg Investor said:

My point is simply that Fairfax’s path from here is likely to look different from old Berkshire’s path: less about maximizing absolute size, more about maximizing per-share value creation.

 

And by not getting too big too quickly, Fairfax may preserve higher incremental returns for longer.
 

 

I think you give too little credit to Berkshire & Buffett. I don't believe Buffett ever wanted to grow Berkshire's asset base at the expense of growing per share intrinsic value. If you even causally read past Berkshire annual reports, you would notice that Buffett almost always referred to maximizing per share intrinsic value. 

 

Finally, the focus should not be on getting big or small, but incremental returns on reinvested capital, and the comparison to alternatives. 

Edited April 21 by Munger_Disciple

[dartmonkey]

1 hour ago, Munger_Disciple said:

 

2 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

 

I think we are talking past each other a bit.

I was not arguing that buybacks are always better than reinvestment. I was pointing out a structural difference: Fairfax today pays a dividend and buys back stock, while Berkshire in the 1980s/1990s did neither.

Expand  

 

As I pointed out, dividends is a terrible use of capital given that Prem's goal is to internally compound book value @15%. I would rather Fairfax buys back stock with all the excess capital that can't be invested internally as long it trades below intrinsic value. 

 

2 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

A reported 18% ROE does not mean every incremental dollar earns 18%. It only means the blend of decisions, some very good and some not, produced 18% on average. In practice, no allocator gets only the winners.

 

My previous post referred to "return on incremental dollar" which you seem to have missed. So we are on the same page. However I would note that Prem's stated goal is 15% return on incremental dollars retained. 

 

2 hours ago, Hamburg Investor said:

My point is simply that Fairfax’s path from here is likely to look different from old Berkshire’s path: less about maximizing absolute size, more about maximizing per-share value creation.

 

And by not getting too big too quickly, Fairfax may preserve higher incremental returns for longer.
 

Expand  

 

I think you give too little credit to Berkshire & Buffett. I don't believe Buffett ever wanted to grow Berkshire's asset base at the expense of growing per share intrinsic value. If you even causally read past Berkshire annual reports, you would notice that Buffett almost always referred to maximizing per share intrinsic value. 

 

Yes, Buffett said all this forever, but he didn’t repurchase shares, until recently, so I think it’s fair to judge him based on what he did, not what he said. 

 

Watsa bought back 1/4 of Fairfax’s shares in the last 5 years, starting when it was the size of Berkshire in about 1980-1985. Berkshire started doing buybacks in 2011, so Fairfax has a head start of 20-25 years.

 

With both companies doubling their value every 4 years or so, that means Fairfax started when it was about 2^5 or 2^6 times smaller, i.e. 32-64 times smaller. I think that gives Fairfax both a longer runway and, to the extent that shares remain cheap, an advantage in securing great per share returns. 

[Munger_Disciple]

1 hour ago, dartmonkey said:

Yes, Buffett said all this forever, but he didn’t repurchase shares, until recently, so I think it’s fair to judge him based on what he did, not what he said. 

That's a fair criticism, Buffett could have bought back a ton of stock cheaply especially during 2011-2014 time period. I would cut him a bit of slack though; he (like most people) underestimated how long the zero interest rate environment would last, and hence might have misjudged reinvestment possibilities. But certainly he was reluctant with buybacks post GFC when the stock was very cheap during the 2010-2015 time period. His acquisition record post-BNSF deal was not also great (except for Allegheny). 

 

Abel on the other hand will be very decisive with buybacks IMO; he pretty much said that in the annual letter & the following interview. That bodes well for Berkshire shareholders. 

 

I think Berkshire 's no dividend policy (as long as > $1 of market value is created for each retained $1) is the correct one for shareholders unlike Fairfax's. But I agree that Fairfax executed buybacks far better than Berkshire to-date. 

Edited April 22 by Munger_Disciple

[hardcorevalue]

It was always apparent to me that buffett may have been a little too conservative. 

 

Now I get exactly why he is but I think most shareholders would have been ok with a bit more leverage. (survivorship bias I know!)

 

But we get that with Prem and Fairfax. Such a fantastic set up for the company.

 

So happy for the Fairfax team to have gone through so much and just be crushing it since the pandemic.

 

 

 

 

[Mystery Guest]

Dont Forget that in Canada, money borrowed to invest in Dividend paying Candadian Corporations, 

is tax deductible so the dividend provides more flexibility for people with substantial shareholdings. 

ie senior employees and long term shareholders 

 

We can assume that Prem borrowed the 150M to buy shares a while ago and the interest he carried 

to make that trade would have been deductible from his income. 

 

 

 

[djokovic1]

Chubb and WRB with solid results for Q1. No major cats (last year was cali wildfire). Mid single digit premium growth. Seeing increased competition especially on property side.

[rogermunibond]

P/C and reinsurance is hitting a soft market now?

[thedanmancan]

Hi! I created a spreadsheet (thanks Claude!) that gets "live" data from Google Finance to track the daily fluctuations in Fairfax's public securities book vs the last reported 13F/10-Q. Feel free to access it and let me know what you think! Have given "comment" rights to everyone

 

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wg2oKy6VsgrQuaRrSpSoJCpsvpgnpipyvG4qm-TnuRg/edit?gid=490300723#gid=490300723

Edited April 23 by thedanmancan

[mengan]

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/fairfax-likely-to-buy-10-more-in-iifl-capital-via-preferential-allotment/articleshow/130429428.cms

 

"Mumbai: Prem Watsa-backed Fairfax Financial Holdings is set to increase its stake in IIFL Capital Services through a preferential allotment in a transaction estimated around ₹1,000 crore, multiple people aware of the discussions told ET."

[Viking]

P/C Insurance - Structural Strength Revealed - Insights From the 2026 AGM - Part 1

 

Introduction

 

Property & casualty (P/C) insurance has historically been the foundational economic engine behind leading insurance conglomerates. At Berkshire Hathaway, it enabled decades of above-average compounding.

 

At Fairfax, its importance is even greater.

 

Fairfax is more leveraged to insurance float than Berkshire was at a comparable stage. As a result, understanding the quality, structure, and evolution of Fairfax’s insurance operations is essential to evaluating the company’s long-term earning power and intrinsic value.

 

The April 16, 2026 AGM provided an unusually transparent window into that engine—not just through senior leadership, but through the operators running the business day to day.

 

Why the 2026 AGM Matters

 

Fairfax continues to distinguish itself through openness.

 

Rather than tightly controlling messaging, the company brought forward leaders across the insurance platform—Andy Barnard, Brian Young, Lou Iglesias, and Silvy Wright—alongside Prem Watsa and Peter Clarke.

This matters for three reasons:

• Depth of insight: Investors hear directly from operators, not just executives
• Organizational visibility: Reveals strength of bench and succession planning
• Cultural transparency: Demonstrates how decentralization actually functions

Over time (multiple AGM’s), this approach compounds in value. Investors are not simply evaluating reported results—they are evaluating the system that produces those results.

 

A Unifying Theme: Structure Over Cycle

 

Across all speakers, one message was consistent:

 

Fairfax’s insurance performance is structural, not cyclical.

 

Current results are not simply a function of a favorable insurance market. They are the outcome of deliberate decisions made over decades—particularly around leadership, culture, and capital discipline.

 

1. Prem Watsa: People, Not Cycles, Drive Outcomes

 

Prem’s opening remarks did not focus on the near-term insurance outlook. Instead, he reframed the discussion around what he views as the true foundation of Fairfax’s success: people and long-term decisions.

 

Key Ideas

 

Best acquisitions = foundational moves,

• Markel (1985): established Fairfax in the P/C insurance business
• Skandia America Re (1996): pivotal because it led to recruiting Andy Barnard

People drive performance

• Significant effort to recruit Barnard
• His leadership has shaped Fairfax’s insurance operations over decades

Long-term transformation of the insurance business

• In 2011, insurance leadership was consolidated under Barnard
• Goal: build an insurance franchise with a reputation equal to Fairfax’s investment arm
• Result: insurance is now a core strength of the company

Interpretation

Fairfax’s underwriting performance today reflects institutional capability—not cyclical tailwinds. The competitive advantage is embedded in people and culture.

 

2. Andy Barnard: From Preparation to Performance

 

Barnard provided a clear framework for understanding Fairfax’s evolution over the past 15 years:

 

Phase 1: Build (2011 – 2019)

• Expansion through acquisitions (Allied World, Brit)
• Strengthening leadership and structure
• Integration and cultural alignment
• Development of international operations

Phase 2: Execute (2020 – 2025)

• Premiums nearly doubled (primarily organic)
• Underwriting profits more than quadrupled
• Full participation in a favorable market

Interpretation

The “hard market” did not create Fairfax’s results—it revealed them.

 

Years of preparation positioned the company to capitalize when conditions turned favorable.

 

3. Brian Young: Discipline in a Softening Market

 

Brian Young grounded the discussion in current performance and market conditions.

 

2025 Performance Snapshot

• Underwriting profit: $1.8B
• Combined ratio: 93%
• Cat losses: $1.2B (4.8 pts)
• Favorable reserve development: 19 consecutive years

Operating Quality

• Broad-based execution across ~30 companies
• No negative surprises (all companies met or exceeded expectations)
• Reserves function as a long-term store of value 

Market Behavior

• Pricing is softening
• Increased underwriting selectivity
• No pressure to grow without margins

AI Strategy

• Decentralized, bottom-up implementation
• ~75 participants, 100+ use cases
• Focus on efficiency (loss ratio, expense ratio)
• Importantly, not a job displacement strategy

Interpretation

Fairfax is behaving like a high-quality insurer late in the cycle:

 

Protect margins. Preserve capital. Avoid undisciplined growth.

 

4. Allied World: A Platform Built for Cycles

 

Lou Iglesias demonstrated how Fairfax executes at the operating level.

 

Performance

• Record underwriting profit and net income
• ~$7.4B in premiums
• Continued global expansion

Despite a softening market, conditions remain rational

• Pricing is more competitive, but not collapsing
• Terms and conditions are holding
• Margins remain acceptable

 Structural Advantages

 

1. Flat Organization

• Faster decision-making (minimal bureaucracy)
• Authority pushed to underwriters (point of action)

2. Diversification

• 40+ products
• 29 offices globally
• Multiple earnings streams reduce volatility

3. Underwriting Discipline

• Willingness to walk away
• Ability to restructure deals (rather than accept poor terms)
• Embedded cultural behavior

Underlying Driver: People

• Experienced underwriters
• Low turnover
• Deep cycle knowledge

Interpretation

Allied World is not reacting to the cycle—it is structurally designed to manage it.

The key in softer markets is limiting mistakes – preserving capacity for future opportunities when conditions turn favorable again.

 

5. Northbridge: Discipline Over Growth

 

Silvy Wright provided a Canadian lens.

 

Snapshot

• ~$3.4B revenue
• #3 commercial insurer in Canada
• Delivered strong results despite no growth in 2025

Strategic Positioning

• Rising price competition
• No compromise on underwriting standards – no pressure to write unprofitable business
• Focus on claims, expenses, and customer outcomes (service, safety, building loyalty)

Long-Term Orientation

• Patience: growth deferred until economics justify it
• Targeted expansion for future growth (e.g., renewable energy)
• 70% employee own Fairfax stock → strong alignment with shareholders

Interpretation

No growth is not weakness—it is discipline.

Northbridge is optimizing for long-term value, not short-term premium volume.

 

6. Peter Clarke: Scale and Global Optionality

 

Clarke highlighted two structural advantages:

 

1. Global Diversification

 

Strong growth outside North America:

• South Africa: +20%
• Colonnade: +18%
• Asia: +15%
• Polish Re: +15% 

This enables:

• Capital reallocation across markets
• Offset to regional pricing pressure
• Sustained overall performance

2. Scale

• ~$33B in premiums
• Broad global platform

Scale improves:

• Risk diversification
• Data and underwriting insight
• Competitive positioning

Interpretation

Fairfax’s global footprint is a strategic asset. It allows the company to navigate local cycles while maintaining consolidated strength.

 

Synthesis: What the AGM Reveals

 

Across all perspectives, a coherent picture emerges:

 

1. The Insurance Business Is Now a Core Strength

Not historically true—but now clearly established.

 

2. Results Are Structural, Not Cyclical

Driven by leadership, culture, and discipline—not market conditions alone.

 

3. The Organization Is Built for Cycles

• Decentralized decision-making
• Embedded underwriting discipline
• Long-tenured operators

4. Capital Discipline Is Intact

No pressure to grow at the expense of profitability.

 

5. Global Scale Provides Flexibility

Geographic diversification allows dynamic capital allocation.

 

Conclusion

 

The 2026 AGM reinforced a critical conclusion:

 

Fairfax’s P/C insurance platform has matured into a high-quality, structurally advantaged underwriting franchise.

 

What investors are seeing today is not a peak—it is the visible output of a system built over decades.

 

As the cycle softens, the real test begins. Based on the evidence presented, Fairfax appears positioned not just to withstand that transition—but to use it as the next stage in long-term value creation.

 

Continue to next post to read transcript from AGM.

[Viking]

P/C Insurance - Structural Strength Revealed - Insights From the 2026 AGM - Part 2

 

Transcript from Fairfax’s AGM – April 16, 2026 (lightly edited to make it more readable)

 

 

Question from Jeff Stacey

 

Prem and Peter, our first question is about the current insurance environment. The question is as follows. Fairfax had record underwriting profits in 2025 of $1.8 billion and achieved its objective of $1.5 billion. You commented, however, in your shareholder letter that insurance pricing is beginning to soften. I would appreciate hearing any additional comments you might have about the current insurance underwriting environment. And specifically, do you think that Fairfax can still achieve its $1.5 billion underwriting profit target in a soft insurance market?

 

V. Watsa - Founder, Chairman & CEO

 

Thank you, Jeff. Peter will usually answer this. But we do have Andy Barnard, Brian Young, Lou Iglesias and Silvy Wright here. So, we'll ask them instead. As Andy makes his way up to speak, let me just say… yesterday I had people ask me: “What is the biggest -- best -- acquisition you've ever made?” The best one is Markel Insurance - the first one (1985) - because otherwise, you're not in the P/C insurance game. And the second best was a small company called Skandia America Re (1996). 

 

And why? Because I had to get someone to run Skandia. I went to New York three times to get Andy Bernard. The first time he said, "You got to be kidding me.” Over dinner he said, “I'm not going to leave Transatlantic to come and join Skandia." That's how it began. After a second and third attempt, ultimately, we were fortunate to get him 30 years ago. He's had a huge impact on Fairfax. In 2011, all of the insurance companies began reporting to him. After he started in his new role – 15 years ago (2011) – he said that he hoped that the insurance business will have the same reputation of being fantastic like the investment business that we had at the time. And the investment business did a little less well, and the insurance business has done fabulously well. Andy, over to you. Come on in.

 

Andrew Barnard - Chairman of Fairfax Insurance Group

 

Thank you very much, Prem, for all of that. I'm going to let Brian and the others talk about our position, the market and our prospects. As Prem mentioned, I've been in this role now for 15 years, and I thought I'd just give a little brief broad perspective on how I look back on that.

 

I divide that 15 years, which started in 2011, into two periods. First, 2011 up to 2019. Looking back with the benefit of hindsight – this was a period of preparation. During that period, we added Allied World and Brit – two very powerful new platforms with capabilities that really build out our suite of products. We had Crum & Forrester, bolstering its capabilities. We had a few small acquisitions. Earlier on in that time Northbridge finished its integration, which really positioned it as a much stronger company. And of course, during this time, Odyssey and Zenith flourished. (Yes, Zenith had a few tough years at the beginning.) And we built out the international operation during the latter part of that first period. As Peter mentioned, it has become a significant business that we think will serve us well in the future.

 

This was really a period of preparation that brought us to 2020. At Fairfax, across our companies, we now had in place excellent leaders, leaders that are fully aligned with Fairfax’s culture, that embody the trust, the transparency, the talent that without which our decentralized system could not function. That's all in place as we roll into 2020. Of course, the big thing at the start of the year was the pandemic. A lot of companies heading to the hills, a lot of uncertainty. Plus, we had a very attractive hard market that had already been underway – and I think the pandemic just accelerated it. So, we were at that time in just a unique position because of our structure, our capability, our leadership to thrive. And thrive, we did.

 

Over the subsequent years, we go into the second period, 2020 up to 2025. From 2020, we virtually doubled our premium volume, and almost all of that was organic with the one exception of GIG. The vast majority of that growth was organic, driven by our companies by their leaderships, by their management teams. And more importantly than that, our underwriting profit over that period more than quadrupled. This is where we really came into our heyday.

 

Today, to 2026, we're recognized as an underwriting powerhouse in the industry by the marketplace, by the rating agencies. We had huge increases in our ratings over the last 1.5 years.

 

Looking back on it all over the past 15 years – with the benefit of hindsight – we just positioned ourselves so favorably to really take off when the market conditions were supportive of that strategy. 

 

I believe that what we built is built to last. It is built to withstand the pressures of the market cycle. Those who follow the industry know that we're in a softening cycle where things become more challenging. But we're very confident about our capabilities – about our management abilities – to navigate through some more challenging times and to sustain superior performance as we go into the future from here.

 

I've been in this industry now for close to 50 years. I've been at Fairfax for 30 years. I'm not going anywhere quite yet. However, my good friend and partner of the last 36 years, Brian Young, is taking on a larger and larger share of the oversight responsibilities in Fairfax. Those of you who have followed Odyssey will know Brian took the helm in 2011. It's very clear that Brian is someone that knows how to make money in this business. And so, I think our future is very, very bright as we move forward from here. So let me turn the microphone over to my friend, Brian Young.

 

Brian Young - President of Fairfax Insurance Group

 

Thank you, Andy. I learned some big news a few minutes ago. Andy told me that he is going to be a grandfather for the third time. So big hand to Andy.

 

I will cover the AI question (from earlier), the current market environment and our ability to generate an underwriting profit in the current environment. 

 

But first I want to highlight, as Peter mentioned, $1.82 billion of underwriting profit in 2025, fractionally higher than $1.79 billion in 2024. Combined ratio of 93%. Embedded in that was 4.8 points of CAT loss or the $1.2 billion, the biggest being the California wildfires in Q1.

 

Within the 93%, we benefited from 2.9 points of favorable reserve development. And it's important to note that Fairfax has had 19 consecutive years of favorable reserve development for the last 2 decades. Our reserves have been a store of value. 

 

As you all know, all of our companies are really focused on disciplined underwriting and strong reserving. Prudent reserving is really foundational to disciplined underwriting. We have more than 30 operating companies. Nearly all of them equalled or exceeded expectations from an underwriting perspective in 2025. The small number that didn't – we weren't expecting them to make underwriting profits given the market circumstances that they faced. 

 

So, there were no negative surprises in any of our companies. I'd like to highlight a few standout performers, focused first on the big companies. Let's start with the most recent recipient of the Athappan Award, Allied World. Our largest insurance company generating record underwriting profit of $546 million – a fantastic result. Congratulations, Lou and to the team. I'm going to let Lou come up and tell us what the secret sauce is that's made Allied World so successful.

 

The second company I'd like to highlight is last year's recipient of the Athappan Award, Northbridge. Silvy and team delivered the lowest combined ratio, at 88.3%, of all our big companies. In the last 4 out of 5 years, Northbridge has delivered a combined ratio below 90%. And Silvy will come up after Lou and give us an update on Northbridge.

 

Turning to the international side. We generated $220 million of underwriting profit, more than double what we generated in 2024. The standout performers – Colonnade, Bryte and Singapore Re – all generated record underwriting profits. Singapore Re, headed by Philippe Mallier, had not only the lowest combined ratio on the international side, they had the lowest combined ratio of all of our companies at 77%. Well done, Philippe.

 

Our premiums were $33.3 billion. It is slowing down. The market is getting more challenging, no doubt. And we have to exercise more discipline. We have to be more selective in the risks that we take. We have to focus on our line size deployment. But we still think there's opportunity out there in the market. The sectors of the business that are under the most pressure are the ones that have generated the most profit. So yes, the margins are shrinking, but we still think the margins are ok. When the margins are not there - when there is not that margin of safety we need to take on the volatility of insurance – then we're going to scale back. There's no pressure on any of our companies to write for top line growth. And I've experienced that at Odyssey working there for 28 years, leading it for 14 years, never did I or any of our people have any pressure to write for top line.

 

On the question of AI, it's important in our decentralized structure, innovation comes from the ground. It can't be forced from the top down. And we've got 30-plus wonderful businesses. Everyone is focused. AI may well be very transformative. We're not at the cutting edge, and we don't really want to be at the cutting edge. We're where we think we need to be in the pack with the rest of the insurance industry. 

 

To understand and take advantage of the innovative things that we're doing at the company level, we formed an AI working group, across the Fairfax organization. We have more than 75 people participating in the working group. We have developed more than 100 use cases. We have a SharePoint site. If we develop a use case in a company in a certain part of the world, we can share that with the other companies through the forum, through the SharePoint site.

 

In terms of the AI use cases, most of them have really been focused on improving process, doing things faster and smarter – trying to underwrite more business efficiently through the use of AI. Using AI to inform our underwriting decisions.

 

Marc Adee (President of Crum and Forster) has used the phrase, and I think it's great, does AI bang the cash register, does it lower your loss ratio, does it lower your expense ratio? I would say right now we're not banging the cash register yet. With AI, we are able to underwrite more business using the tool than previously. Lowering the loss ratio, lowering the expense ratio in terms of the AI tools that we're using, that's really the focus.

 

And I think lastly, it's really important to say, and Prem has emphasized it ad nauseam that AI will not cost us any jobs. We don't believe in laying off employees. Period. And that includes AI. If AI allows us to operate more efficiently then maybe the rate of growth in our employee count will slow down, which will help the expense ratio. But it won't come at the expense of people. 

 

Thank you. Now I would like to turn it over to Lou.

 

Louis Iglesias - President of Allied World

 

Thank you, Brian. Great to see everybody. It's good to see so many of you, I only get to see once a year and talk about our businesses here at Fairfax and at Allied. And it's also not every day that I feel like Allied World has won the Stanley Cup. So we're really proud of that as well.

 

Brian mentioned our underwriting profit. We did have a record year last year on underwriting profit. We also had a high watermark on our net income. And I just want to recognize the investment group at Fairfax, who does a tremendous job on our portfolio. Having that type of net income really helps our cash flow and everything else. So, it's really, really good to see. 

 

We grew our company to $7.4 billion last year. And Brian talked about the market a bit. It is softening some. I would say it's getting a little bit more price competitive. But for those of you who've been with our industry for a long time, it's not a traditional soft market. We're not bottoming out.

 

Terms and conditions are holding pretty well. Combined ratios don't have so much pressure on them, still manage the profitability. There are opportunities around the world to be able to get some growth. So we're not giving up on that because I think there are certainly some opportunities. 

 

What I wanted to talk about just for a couple of minutes is what are some of the things that we do to help us manage the cycle. We feel like we've built a company that could perform in all segments of the cycle. And in order for that to happen, we have to execute on many strategies every single day. The company has to be structured in a way to give us that ability. There are a couple of things in there. 

 

The first thing to talk about is the structure of having a very flat organization. You see that elsewhere in Fairfax. We have a very flat organization at Allied. We don't have many layers. So strategies and communication moves quickly. This gives us the opportunity to move fast in different marketplaces around the world. So as the markets change, we can change strategies. We can execute on those strategies.

 

Our underwriters are at the desk since there's not lots of layers. They don't have to get multiple sign-offs to do their job to able to make a decision. We run with the mantra of hire really great people. And give them the authority and accountability to be able to get the job done. 

 

Additionally, we have product diversity – over 40 products. We are in 29 offices around the world – 11 countries and 4 continents. We're expanding our presence around the world geographically. So, the earnings stream is very diverse. And when we have that type of diverse earnings stream it really limits earnings volatility. So when the market starts to get a little bit tougher, it's really helpful to have different earnings streams because you may have to slow some down. If you're not getting the marketplace that you like in a certain product or a certain country, you're going to have to slow that down, but maybe there's an opportunity someplace else. So the diverse earnings stream is really very helpful. And I think you see that throughout Fairfax as well.

 

The third thing that I would touch on is underwriting discipline. Underwriting discipline helps in every marketplace, whether it's a hard market, soft market in the middle. It's extremely important. It runs through every Fairfax company. It's part of the culture of Fairfax. 

 

Now what does that mean really? Our underwriters understand rate adequacy, they understand when they're negotiating a deal, where that rate crosses the line to not being enough for the exposure that they're taking on. When we run into that situation, we have the ability to say no. We say no a lot more than we say yes.

 

But what we really prefer to do is to say, "No, we don't like the deal that way, but we do like it this other way. And we'll put a proposal out that works for us, and we hope works for the client. And we've been able to do business like that and sell deals like that fairly often, even in this marketplace when things are getting just a little bit softer. So that's been very helpful. 

 

Now nothing works without great people. And every year, I come up here, and I think I talk about how great the people are at Allied. We've had people with us for a very long period of time. They've seen all different cycles, so they understand how to manage in and through the different cycles. And we have a very low attrition rate at the company. So our people are really the key to making all the strategies work. 

 

And so for us, we're going to continue to do the things that we're good at. As the markets soften some, we're going to limit our mistakes so that when the market does get to a better place, we can do all the things that Andy talked about that we did a couple of years ago and not have any distractions. 

 

Thank you very much, everybody. Have a great day.

 

Silvy Wright - President of Northbridge Financial

 

Good morning, everyone. First, I'll start with a little confession to Lou. Northbridge employees wanted to do a Rory McIlroy (repeat as winners of the Athappan Cup), but we are happy that Allied World won this year.

 

First a little perspective on Canada. Northbridge represents the Canadian insurance operations for Fairfax. With $3.4 billion in revenue, we're the third largest commercial insurer in Canada. We have a very good position - maybe a smaller fish at Fairfax but a bigger fish in this country. 

 

What are market conditions? What happened in '25, as Lou said, the price competition really started to ramp up. And we're starting to see competitors trying to buy business. And sorry, I apologize for being a broken record, but once again, we are not pressured to write premium at a loss. And so, in 2025, our employees did the right thing. They remained disciplined, not only in underwriting but claims and expense management. But equally important, we doubled down on really focusing on customer loyalty, customer service and customer safety. So not only be there when things go wrong, but we're trying to help our customers have safer operations.

 

As a result, we did not grow in 2025. However, we did have a record year, as Brian noted. In 2026, it looks like the price competition continues and we will manage accordingly. Along with just being disciplined, we're also looking at building areas where we can grow when it's the right time to grow. For instance, increasing our lines on renewable energy in Canada. So just manage the market and then be ready to go when it's time. 

 

And one more comment. We talked about the culture many times and the beautiful word of being empowered not just at the president level, but throughout the company. I just wanted to share with you that our employees are like you, they're shareholders. Over 70% of our employees at Northbridge are shareholders. So not only are they empowered but they're owners in doing the right thing. Thank you.

 

V. Watsa - Founder, Chairman & CEO

 

Thank you very much Silvy. Peter, anything to add, final words, on the insurance industry?

 

Peter Clarke - President & COO

 

Sure. Just two quick things, Prem. And I mentioned in my remarks that we write $33 billion of premium across the world and that grew by 2.3% this year. 

 

It's interesting when you look at the international operations and how we benefit from diversification and scale. Bryte in South Africa grew 20% this year, Colonnade 18%, Asia was up 15% and Polish Re was up 15%. And so even though North America rates are coming down, we're maybe not growing as much, we have all these opportunities around the world.

 

Secondly, I just have to comment that we have 2 cups in Fairfax. One is the Mr. Athappan Cup. And we also have a hockey game between the Fairfax head office and the Allied World Group, and unfortunately, now Allied owns both cups for this year and I have to say it did come into the evaluation process a bit, but we left that aside.

 

[Hamburg Investor]

On 4/22/2026 at 1:11 AM, Munger_Disciple said:

As I pointed out, dividends is a terrible use of capital given that Prem's goal is to internally compound book value @15%. I would rather Fairfax buys back stock with all the excess capital that can't be invested internally as long it trades below intrinsic value. 

Agree. I never wrote, that dividends are good. What makes you think that?

 

On 4/22/2026 at 1:11 AM, Munger_Disciple said:

My previous post referred to "return on incremental dollar" which you seem to have missed. So we are on the same page. However I would note that Prem's stated goal is 15% return on incremental dollars retained. 

I know. That's my point. We are at the same page. Yes, FFHs goal is 15%. My example with 18% is just that - an example. I just took it to show a general mechanism. 

 

 

On 4/22/2026 at 1:11 AM, Munger_Disciple said:

 

On 4/22/2026 at 12:21 AM, Hamburg Investor said:

My point is simply that Fairfax’s path from here is likely to look different from old Berkshire’s path: less about maximizing absolute size, more about maximizing per-share value creation.

 

And by not getting too big too quickly, Fairfax may preserve higher incremental returns for longer.
 

 

I think you give too little credit to Berkshire & Buffett. I don't believe Buffett ever wanted to grow Berkshire's asset base at the expense of growing per share intrinsic value. If you even causally read past Berkshire annual reports, you would notice that Buffett almost always referred to maximizing per share intrinsic value. 

 

Finally, the focus should not be on getting big or small, but incremental returns on reinvested capital, and the comparison to alternatives. 

Again, we are on the same page. I was referring to a path – something concrete that actually happened in reality, not just to a mental model.

There are several reasons why Fairfax could end up with more meaningful buybacks than Berkshire in practice:

1. For many years, Fairfax’s valuation has been on the low side. Even its index inclusion hasn’t really changed that. Berkshire’s situation was very different; the stock has generally traded at materially higher multiples. 
2. Buffett is far more famous than Prem. Berkshire is an American company that became a “must own” vehicle in the world’s deepest capital market. That global attention has tended to prevent Berkshire from trading at the kind of persistent discounts Fairfax has seen.
3. Prem is only about twenty years younger than Buffett, but Fairfax’s market cap lags Berkshire’s development by roughly 35 years, and Prem is already bringing the next generation to the forefront. It is unlikely that Prem will ever attract the same level of public attention Buffett had in the 1990s and 2000s, which in turn makes structurally lower valuations for Fairfax more plausible.
4. Prem started to use buybacks (and, when appropriate, share issuance) as part of his playbook much earlier in his career than Buffett. I don’t blame Buffett for not doing repurchases over the past 10–20 years – even the best investors don’t get every capital allocation decision exactly right. But it is at least plausible (and I would say likely) that Prem would have been more aggressive with buybacks in a situation comparable to Berkshire’s huge cash build-up in recent years.
5. ...

In that sense, my point was not that Buffett didn’t care about per-share intrinsic value – he clearly did. It was that the actual path Fairfax is on today could lead to less growth in market cap than Berkshire’s historical path.

And again: Being small is helpful, if high returns are wanted. The investment universe is larger when you’re smaller. That’s Buffett’s argument, not mine. As I recall, Buffett once said that he would still achieve 50% returns a year if he only had a million dollar to invest. And today he talks about how BRK might achieve a slight outperformance over long investment horizons. The only reason: size.

Edited April 23 by Hamburg Investor

[Hamburg Investor]

18 hours ago, thedanmancan said:

Hi! I created a spreadsheet (thanks Claude!) that gets "live" data from Google Finance to track the daily fluctuations in Fairfax's public securities book vs the last reported 13F/10-Q. Feel free to access it and let me know what you think! Have given "comment" rights to everyone

 

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wg2oKy6VsgrQuaRrSpSoJCpsvpgnpipyvG4qm-TnuRg/edit?gid=490300723#gid=490300723

Wow, thank you! Great job!

Do I get it right,

• ... that today the equity investments are up 10.3% since YE,
• ... while market value of FFH is down 5.2%,
• ... which means, the implied market value for the rest of FFH is valued -13.4% (so market value of FFH minus all equity investments, adjusted for buybacks)
  
  Just want to make sure, I get it right.
  
  It's really crazy, what one is able to do with AI and Claude. Thank you again!

[thedanmancan]

Yes that is correct. And this is also before dealing with the effects of the Poseidon sale ie the reduction in value is even greater taking that into account

[Hoodlum]

18 minutes ago, thedanmancan said:

Yes that is correct. And this is also before dealing with the effects of the Poseidon sale ie the reduction in value is even greater taking that into account

Thanks. I had missed this earlier.  Is there a way to add the FFH TRS shares 

[Txvestor]

On 4/22/2026 at 10:48 PM, thedanmancan said:

Hi! I created a spreadsheet (thanks Claude!) that gets "live" data from Google Finance to track the daily fluctuations in Fairfax's public securities book vs the last reported 13F/10-Q. Feel free to access it and let me know what you think! Have given "comment" rights to everyone

 

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1wg2oKy6VsgrQuaRrSpSoJCpsvpgnpipyvG4qm-TnuRg/edit?gid=490300723#gid=490300723

Any reason you didn't include the TRS position in this? I mean they've repeatedly stated that they consider it an investment, and it's grown into a rather large one at that. 

Edited April 25 by Txvestor

[Hoodlum]

The first Hurricane Season projection is on the lower end of average compared to prior years.  El Nino will start in May which will cause a warming of the Pacific and wind shear blowing east over the Atlantic.  

 

https://news.ncsu.edu/2026/04/2026-hurricane-season-could-see-12-to-15-named-storms-6-to-9-hurricanes/#:~:text=The Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 through Nov. 30.