Fairfax 2025

[Viking]

2 hours ago, 73 Reds said:

@Viking excellent post.  There is one additional factor in determining when, or whether to sell a stock.  That is the optionality of the company to leverage its past and present success into future successful endeavors.  Companies that operate in narrow fields should almost always be sold if and when its industry or sector undergoes fundamental deterioration for any reason - even the best companies in a slowing or failing industry can't defy gravity.  Diversified companies that can transition from one industry, or even sub-sector to another are worthy of holding for a very long time as long as management is capable of handling change - like Berkshire and Microsoft just to name two.  Personally these are the only types of companies I care to own in size and since there aren't that many of them it makes investing in stocks a lot easier.    

@73 Reds, you make a great point. As much as Fairfax has grown its P/C insurance business over the past 10 years, underwriting profit only represents about 20% of its 5 different income streams. When the P/C insurance business shifts from hard market to soft market Fairfax will simply/easily shift capital from insurance to other better returning opportunities. Even when the P/C insurance market softens, Fairfax will be able to continue to deliver a strong ROE. It is uniquely positioned today in this regard in P/C insurance. 
 

Buffett was able to deliver outstanding ROE for BRK shareholders for decades. Regardless of the P/C insurance cycle (hard or soft market). Fairfax, because of the platform it has today and the external environment, is similarly positioned today. I don’t think Fairfax sill deliver an ROE has high as the one BRK delivered in the 1980’s and 1990’s. But I do think Fairfax will be able to deliver a very good ROE in the coming years. Although, as a outlined in my previous post in this thread, Fairfax will do it in a very different way than BRK did.  

Edited July 5, 2025 by Viking

[73 Reds]

26 minutes ago, Viking said:

@Maverick47, my view is a number of factors have come together for Fairfax over the past 5 years that have resulted in a unique business model in P/C insurance. 
 

I don’t think it is the Berkshire Hathaway business model (conglomerate). 
 

Fairfax has built a unique platform. Their focus the past 10 years has been to aggressively grow their insurance business. Much more so that BRK ever has. As a result, Fairfax has been increasing the amount of leverage it has (to float) on a per share basis.
 

At the same time, the quality of their insurance business has improved dramatically. I just finished reading Mark Adee’s book, Once and Future Crum and Forster, and it provided more insight into the many improvements. 

• https://www.cfins.com/the-once-and-future-cf-landing/

At the same time, Fairfax has built out a wonderful investment management platform. It has spent decades building extensive capabilities. Venture capital (start-up) investor. Private equity investor (LBO light). International investor (India, Greece). Value investor. Sometimes they are planting acorns that are growing to oaks (to steal a metaphor from Mark Adee). Other times that are more tactical. 

They have a wonderful breadth of capabilities. 
 

At the same time, Fairfax has been building out its business/relationships with outstanding external capital allocators. This is having a big impact on deal flow - they are likely now getting many more juicy opportunities than they have the money for - a first class problem to have. 
 

Bottom line, Fairfax’s investment management business is much more diversified than Berkshire Hathaway has ever been. That also bodes well for longevity of its model - it is increasingly not reliant on any one person. 
 

The external environment has also changed in recent years. We have moved away from a zero interest rate world (with suppressed volatility). And we appear to moving into a higher inflation/interest rate regime (with higher volatility). The current external environment is ideally suited to Fairfax and their business model. 
 

When I put it all together, I think Fairfax is poised to perform exceptionally well over the next 5 years. I think a 15% ROE is a good baseline number to use (on average). I think this estimate has a margin of safety built into it. 

@Viking, your comment about ZIRP is so true.  When it became apparent that BRK could not compete with free money (and therefore appeared to stagnate) I was hopeful that the company would evolve in one or two ways - either start buying up real estate in large chunks or create something (anything!) within its circle of competence, either or both using other peoples' free money.  I kind of view that time as a missed opportunity for Berkshire.  One can wonder if we enter another such period of near -0- interest rates whether Berkshire, or for that matter Fairfax will get a bit more creative to take advantage of the opportunity.

[Marco Van Basten]

5 hours ago, 73 Reds said:

@Viking excellent post.  There is one additional factor in determining when, or whether to sell a stock.  That is the optionality of the company to leverage its past and present success into future successful endeavors.  Companies that operate in narrow fields should almost always be sold if and when its industry or sector undergoes fundamental deterioration for any reason - even the best companies in a slowing or failing industry can't defy gravity.  Diversified companies that can transition from one industry, or even sub-sector to another are worthy of holding for a very long time as long as management is capable of handling change - like Berkshire and Microsoft just to name two.  Personally these are the only types of companies I care to own in size and since there aren't that many of them it makes investing in stocks a lot easier.    

I agree and disagree.  In general I agree, but I am reminded of the tobacco sector - when the sector flipped from volume growth to volume decline, it clearly deteriorated, in addition when the tobacco litigation kicked up in gear in the 1990s/2000s, again the industry deteriorated.  Yet the returns to investors continued to be superb for decades.  

[Viking]

1 hour ago, TB said:

@Viking - great posts. I hold Fairfax and will be very glad if they do 15%+ ROE for a long time. Their investments in India and Greece have worked out wonderfully. Here are some factors that come to mind that can derail the 15%+ ROE for a very long time. Every business has cyclicality some because of the business and some because of other factors. Here are some risks I see for Fairfax 

 

(1) Price/book is elevated by historical metrics, book value is also higher now because of IFRS accounting compared to GAAP by about $100 - 200/share

(2) Leadership transition - I personally think Buffett should have transitioned out to non executive chairman position several years back. Watsa is also getting up there in years.

(3) Insurance business is on an up cycle because of interest rates/hard market and the US interest rates most likely will come down

(4) Seven years of famine and seven years of feasting. The current feast cycle has legs for a couple of more years.

(5) Insurance book is already at 50% of Berkshire's which is 25x bigger by market cap.

(6) Leverage - Fairfax is highly leveraged still, leverage can cut both ways.

(7) Political factors - government always interferes if a company becomes too big/powerful compared to the government. Mr Watsa (senior and junior) handled the India situation skillfully by cultivating a personal friendship with Prime Minister Modi in India though gov to gov relationship is strained. It is getting to a large market cap situation in Canada.

@TB, in terms of ROE, I think 15% is a good baseline average to use for the next 5 years. That is as far as my crystal ball sees. 
 

I think you do a good job of highlighting some risks. But I think if you look at the risks it makes sense to also look at the opportunities (the things that could drive a higher ROE that 15% on average). My guess is the opportunities are greater than the risks. That is why I think my 15% ROE estimate is conservative. 
 

What are some of the opportunities? I am on dish detail tonight. More to come  

[Marco Van Basten]

17 minutes ago, Viking said:

@TB, in terms of ROE, I think 15% is a good baseline average to use for the next 5 years. That is as far as my crystal ball sees. 
 

I think you do a good job of highlighting some risks. But I think if you look at the risks it makes sense to also look at the opportunities (the things that could drive a higher ROE that 15% on average). My guess is the opportunities are greater than the risks. That is why I think my 15% ROE estimate is conservative. 
 

What are some of the opportunities? I am on dish detail tonight. More to come  

15% on reported book value or real/adjusted/marked to market book value?  Thank you.

[Viking]

Ok, what are some of the opportunities for Fairfax to deliver an ROE that is higher than 15%?

 

@TB, I will start with the counter/quick thoughts on the items on your list:

 

1.) BV is materially understated. Excess of FV over CV is probably about $2.6 billion at June 30 = $120/share. It is increasing at about $600 million per year for the past 5 years. This value creation is not captured in past accounting results (like EPS, BV or ROE). It WILL get captured at some point (Fairfax is very opportunistic in surfacing value like this). When it gets surfaced, reported earnings will pop. And ROE will pop.
2.) Leadership transition: Fairfax has been transitioning to the next generation of leadership over the past 5 years. Fairfax’s bench is very strong (employee retention has been outstanding). The people they are transitioning to/giving more responsibility to are internal and look very capable. Peter Clarke is just one of many good examples. 
3.) In a soft insurance market Fairfax will likely get an opportunity to grow their P/C insurance business (many insurance stocks will be on sale). They were able to grow in the last soft market when they were cash constrained (they are no longer cash constrained). 
4.) Fairfax underperformed from 2010 to 2020. They look well positioned to now outperform from 2020 to 2030. 
5.) Fairfax’s - measured by market cap - is a very small company. They are in the sweet spot (in terms of size) - big enough to have a large opportunity set but not too big (like BRK).

6.) Fairfax has been upgraded by the ratings agencies twice in the past 30 months (AM Best, S&P Global). The reason? The much improved financial position of Fairfax and the stability of future earnings. 
7.) Fairfax has done a good job of navigating the political situation in its various markets. This will likely continue (look at their most recent hire in India). 

But there is much more. 
 

Fairfax is littered with examples of equities/holdings that are materially undervalued on its books (not just the excess of MV over CV that I mentioned earlier).

• Fairfax India’s MV is its stock price. Its stock price is way under its BV. Its BV is way under its intrinsic value. The poster child here is BIAL. How undervalued is BIAL? My guess is well over $1 billion. 
• What is Ki going to be worth in another couple of years?
• What is Poseidon worth? 
• What is Recipe and AGT Foods worth? 

For the past 5 years an enormous amount of value is being created in Fairfax’s collection of equity holdings. This is not being captured in accounting results. But it will be in the coming years (as I said, Fairfax is very good at surfacing value that is hidden on its balance sheet).
 

There is also going to be enormous value creation with the equity holdings in the coming years. Fairfax has partnered with an exceptional group of founders/CEO’s/entrepreneurs. This is a new development - what we see the next 5 years could be special (in terms of value creation).
 

Fairfax also has resource holdings with material upside potential:

• Orla gold: we could be in the early innings of a bull market in gold.
• Foran Mining: copper prices are expected to be materially higher in the coming years.

And I haven’t even discussed what they are going to do with +$4 billion in earnings each of the next 5 years… how will they allocate it? What incremental return will it deliver in year 3 and 4 and 5? Fairfax’s capital allocation the past 5 years has been exceptional. The value creation has been massive. Do we expect them to suddenly get stupid?

 

I could go on. Bottom line, Fairfax has many tailwinds that are not baked in to my 15% ROE estimate (on average) for the next 5 years. 
 

Please note, I am not expecting a smooth 15% per year. 

Edited July 6, 2025 by Viking

[Viking]

35 minutes ago, Marco Van Basten said:

15% on reported book value or real/adjusted/marked to market book value?  Thank you.

Reported BV. That is the number most people focus on. 
 

The silver lining to having an understated BV is it makes it easier to deliver a high ROE. 

[SafetyinNumbers]

38 minutes ago, Marco Van Basten said:

15% on reported book value or real/adjusted/marked to market book value?  Thank you.

I like this illustration of the composition of ROE. Underwriting has tailwinds because of reserve release cycle even if the insurance market softens. Cost of debt is fixed. The wild card is investment returns but investment yield has a strong base given fixed income is contributing 5.1% and the average maturity suggests that persists. One can speculate on what equity returns will be but as Viking has highlighted there are a lot of unbooked gains that will boost ROE for years to come and some of the holdings are carried at high earnings yields like Eurobank. I find it really hard to see ROE averaging under 15% for the next five years. In fact, I think the odds of 20% are better than 15%. The beauty is I’m paying for 10% at best.
 

[Viking]

8 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

I find it really hard to see ROE averaging under 15% for the next five years. In fact, I think the odds of 20% are better than 15%. The beauty is I’m paying for 10% at best.

 +1

Edited July 6, 2025 by Viking

[73 Reds]

12 hours ago, Marco Van Basten said:

I agree and disagree.  In general I agree, but I am reminded of the tobacco sector - when the sector flipped from volume growth to volume decline, it clearly deteriorated, in addition when the tobacco litigation kicked up in gear in the 1990s/2000s, again the industry deteriorated.  Yet the returns to investors continued to be superb for decades.  

Yeah, tobacco is an exception though the returns have been primarily from high dividends for long periods of time.  Management rightfully returns nearly all net profits to shareholders and barriers to entry preclude the possibility of any real competition to existing companies.  Also, the transition from cigarettes to NGPs demonstrates the original point.

[Xerxes]

On not selling ….

 

Interview with Steve Ballmer and his Microsoft holding. 

 

“I got this question once. I'm a member of a country club in LA, and one of the things country clubs do sometimes is they'll do Q&A with members to entertain, and I did a Q&A with a friend of mine at the club and who had been president of the club, actually, and also kind of knows Charlie Munger pretty well, and Charlie Munger is there as well. And Charlie Munger comes up to him beforehand, and to me, I know Charlie through Bill and Warren, and says, if you call on me, I have a question, as only Charlie can.

So, you did a Charlie episode. So, we do our panel thing, the two of us, and then Q&A, Charlie gets up to the mic. He's not moving super well, but he gets up to the mic, and, oh, Charlie, we can call on you.

And Charlie says, Steve!

You know, I'm wondering why you held on to your Microsoft stock when your partners over there didn't. I know you're not that smart. I said, no, Charlie, but I'm not loyal.”

 

From Acquired: The Steve Ballmer Interview, Jun 1, 2025

https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/acquired/id1050462261?i=1000710802439&r=8786
This material may be protected by copyright.

[Hoodlum]

I noticed that reserve releases in the US averaged 1% over the past 25 years. Fairfax’s reserve release last year was 2.4% and likely similar this year, with the increases largely due to the claims from the 2022 Hurricane season.  
 

But I wonder if we will starting seeing somewhat higher reserves for claims, due to greater uncertainty and possibly higher inflation than we had prior to COVID.  This is somewhat baked in to the CR but could be another development to monitor. 

 

https://www.swissre.com/institute/research/sigma-research/Economic-Insights/reserving-higher-uncertainty.html

 

Reserve developments in some key markets suggest that there is a high reserve buffer. US insurers have released reserves consistently since 2006. In the US, the average reserve development has been a 1% release per year for the past 25 years (see Figure 1). In the UK, meanwhile, the long-run trend in reserve development has been close to equilibrium, without large releases. Underwriters in continental Europe have historically been conservative in their loss estimates, and releases in the years leading up to 2021 have been even larger than the already-significant historical average.

Edited July 6, 2025 by Hoodlum

[TwoCitiesCapital]

1 hour ago, Xerxes said:

On not selling ….

 

Interview with Steve Ballmer and his Microsoft holding. 

 

“I got this question once. I'm a member of a country club in LA, and one of the things country clubs do sometimes is they'll do Q&A with members to entertain, and I did a Q&A with a friend of mine at the club and who had been president of the club, actually, and also kind of knows Charlie Munger pretty well, and Charlie Munger is there as well. And Charlie Munger comes up to him beforehand, and to me, I know Charlie through Bill and Warren, and says, if you call on me, I have a question, as only Charlie can.

So, you did a Charlie episode. So, we do our panel thing, the two of us, and then Q&A, Charlie gets up to the mic. He's not moving super well, but he gets up to the mic, and, oh, Charlie, we can call on you.

And Charlie says, Steve!

You know, I'm wondering why you held on to your Microsoft stock when your partners over there didn't. I know you're not that smart. I said, no, Charlie, but I'm not loyal.”

 

From Acquired: The Steve Ballmer Interview, Jun 1, 2025

https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/acquired/id1050462261?i=1000710802439&r=8786

 

This material may be protected by copyright.

 

A little confused by the story. Is the bolded part supposed to actually read that he IS loyal which is why he didn't sell? 

[SafetyinNumbers]

2 hours ago, Hoodlum said:

I noticed that reserve releases in the US averaged 1% over the past 25 years. Fairfax’s reserve release last year was 2.4% and likely similar this year, with the increases largely due to the claims from the 2022 Hurricane season.  
 

But I wonder if we will starting seeing somewhat higher reserves for claims, due to greater uncertainty and possibly higher inflation than we had prior to COVID.  This is somewhat baked in to the CR but could be another development to monitor. 

 

https://www.swissre.com/institute/research/sigma-research/Economic-Insights/reserving-higher-uncertainty.html

 

Reserve developments in some key markets suggest that there is a high reserve buffer. US insurers have released reserves consistently since 2006. In the US, the average reserve development has been a 1% release per year for the past 25 years (see Figure 1). In the UK, meanwhile, the long-run trend in reserve development has been close to equilibrium, without large releases. Underwriters in continental Europe have historically been conservative in their loss estimates, and releases in the years leading up to 2021 have been even larger than the already-significant historical average.

I’m not sure how helpful average reserve releases are when analyzing Fairfax. I don’t think excess reserves have anything to do with any specific event but just a very disciplined reserving culture and the long duration of their claims (average 4 years). In hard markets, reserves are higher because pricing is higher and expected profits are the consistent. That is writing to a 95 combined. Four years later assuming no unfavourable developments, the reserves start getting released.

I know it’s more complicated than I am making it seem but it’s the framework that helps me appreciate the cyclicality of reserve releases. Raymond James in the chart below shows how reserve releases went up a dozen years ago and stayed elevated for the next 7 years. We could be at the beginning of that sort of cycle which means underwriting profits are a tailwind for years to come.

 

 

 

 

[Xerxes]

1 hour ago, TwoCitiesCapital said:

 

A little confused by the story. Is the bolded part supposed to actually read that he IS loyal which is why he didn't sell? 

probably a typo in the transcript. 
 

he is loyal. And that is why he is holding. 

[Hoodlum]

51 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:

I’m not sure how helpful average reserve releases are when analyzing Fairfax. I don’t think excess reserves have anything to do with any specific event but just a very disciplined reserving culture and the long duration of their claims (average 4 years). In hard markets, reserves are higher because pricing is higher and expected profits are the consistent. That is writing to a 95 combined. Four years later assuming no unfavourable developments, the reserves start getting released.

I know it’s more complicated than I am making it seem but it’s the framework that helps me appreciate the cyclicality of reserve releases. Raymond James in the chart below shows how reserve releases went up a dozen years ago and stayed elevated for the next 7 years. We could be at the beginning of that sort of cycle which means underwriting profits are a tailwind for years to come.

 

 

 

 

it would be interesting to better understand what drives the changes in reserve releases, to help predict what the future releases could be. 
 

The chart from Raymond James shows how we could experience multiple years of >$1B in reserve releases, considering the growth in the Fairfax insurance subs from 10 years ago. 

[SafetyinNumbers]

1 hour ago, Hoodlum said:

it would be interesting to better understand what drives the changes in reserve releases, to help predict what the future releases could be. 
 

The chart from Raymond James shows how we could experience multiple years of >$1B in reserve releases, considering the growth in the Fairfax insurance subs from 10 years ago. 

Ultimately it comes down to pricing and experience over time. If there were negative reserve developments we would have seen a true up already. That suggests we should see reasonably high reserve releases. I think it’s impossible to predict with any precision and I don’t see a reason to as an investor. It’s enough that it’s a tailwind. Expectations are for a ~95 combined so each point they come in below that boosts ROE by ~1%.

[Hoodlum]

On 7/5/2025 at 4:37 PM, Viking said:

 

At the same time, the quality of their insurance business has improved dramatically. I just finished reading Mark Adee’s book, Once and Future Crum and Forster, and it provided more insight into the many improvements. 

• https://www.cfins.com/the-once-and-future-cf-landing/

 

Thank @Viking for posting that link.  I did just read from Fair and Friendly to the end, and may read the rest when I have time.  This quote likely sums up how how much has improved in management over the years.

 

Hard as it is to imagine now, Fairfax did not always have an easy time hiring top talent. Today’s leadership meetings give off a “United Nations of Fairfax” vibe – as Fairfax attracts the best and brightest people from all over the world. In the old days, those meetings had more of a “grizzled North American turnaround guys scowling at each other” feel. Fairfax’s latest acquisitions came with known, superior management teams — and today Fairfax has a deep bench to tap for succession events. None of those were really options with the C&F acquisition — senior management was moving on and Fairfax needed to find a brand-new team.

[bluedevil]

Viking,

 

On the art of NOT selling, I would recommend listening to some of the talks from Chuck Akre.  A now retired investor with an incredible record.  His formula was finding exceptional companies with a high return on equity; buying at a price that would let him enjoy at least the same compounding experienced by the business (ie multiple would either expand or stay constant); and not selling at any price so long as the business retained its exceptional characteristics, regardless of how high the multiple went.  But if he thought the business had eroded and lost its exceptional characteristics, he would sell right away. 
 

I believe he compounded at around a 15% clip for a long time, without leverage.  A great thinker on investing who I learned a lot from.  
 

His talk at Google from 2017 below:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited July 7, 2025 by bluedevil

[Viking]

7 hours ago, Hoodlum said:

Thank @Viking for posting that link.  I did just read from Fair and Friendly to the end, and may read the rest when I have time.  This quote likely sums up how how much has improved in management over the years.

 

Hard as it is to imagine now, Fairfax did not always have an easy time hiring top talent. Today’s leadership meetings give off a “United Nations of Fairfax” vibe – as Fairfax attracts the best and brightest people from all over the world. In the old days, those meetings had more of a “grizzled North American turnaround guys scowling at each other” feel. Fairfax’s latest acquisitions came with known, superior management teams — and today Fairfax has a deep bench to tap for succession events. None of those were really options with the C&F acquisition — senior management was moving on and Fairfax needed to find a brand-new team.

@Hoodlum, that is s great quote from The Once and Future C&F book from Marc Adee. Reading the book gave me a much greater appreciation of the incredible journey that Fairfax and its P/C insurance businesses have been on for the past 25 years. It largely helps confirm much of what I suspected was/is happening. 
 

Marc mentioned numerous times they were ‘planting acorns’ that have, over time, grown into oak trees. My guess is that was not just happening at C&F, but at most of Fairfax’s insurance businesses. It is amazing the turnaround that has happened since 2000 at the P/C insurance businesses. 
 

The book also provides many great examples of how P/C insurance companies can lose their way… and how long it can take to right the ship (sometimes decades). I also liked Marc’s style… he was very humble (you don’t know what you don’t know). 

[Viking]

4 hours ago, bluedevil said:

Viking,

 

On the art of NOT selling, I would recommend listening to some of the talks from Chuck Akre.  A now retired investor with an incredible record.  His formula was finding exceptional companies with a high return on equity; buying at a price that would let him enjoy at least the same compounding experienced by the business (ie multiple would either expand or stay constant); and not selling at any price so long as the business retained its exceptional characteristics, regardless of how high the multiple went.  But if he thought the business had eroded and lost its exceptional characteristics, he would sell right away. 
 

I believe he compounded at around a 15% clip for a long time, without leverage.  A great thinker on investing who I learned a lot from.  
 

His talk at Google from 2017 below:

 

 

 

@bluedevil, thanks for sharing… I’ll listen to the video in the next couple of days.

[Charlie03]

I highly recommend this when it comes to selling. Chris previously worked as an equity analyst at Akre Capital and most likely played a key role in discovering Constellation Software for Akre Capital — a position that has since become the firm's largest holding.

Chris Cerrone’s Writings.pdf

Edited July 7, 2025 by Charlie03

[Hoodlum]

Raymond James analyst Stephen Boland  is predicting a “stellar” quarter for Fairfax.  He has upgraded Fairfax from $2600 to $2900.  Waiting for the first Analyst upgrade to $3k cdn.  

 

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/investing/markets/inside-the-market/article-mondays-analyst-upgrades-and-downgrades-230/

 

“Many of Fairfax’s largest equity investments (e.g. Eurobank, Fairfax TRS, Digit) have seen considerable share price gains since the close of 1Q25, and while some of these are equity-accounted (and thus market gains excluded from book value), we estimate the fair value gain on Fairfax’s known public equity positions is $2.4 billion for the quarter,” he said. “We also believe the gap between the carrying value and book value for these investments has widened to $2.5 billion as of 2Q25, up from $1.4 billion at the end of 2Q25 and equivalent to 9 per cent of reported book value.

 

However, Mr. Boland also thinks “the market is well aware of this dynamic,” noting Fairfax shares are up 21.5 per cent in 2Q25, and his revised estimates “suggest the company is well on track to deliver a 20-per-cent-plus ROE this year.”

 

“To be clear, the shares still screen inexpensive; if we adjust our 2026 book value estimate for the current gap between reported and investment fair values, Fairfax is trading at 1.2 times 2026E book value – 36 per cent off our chosen peer group despite a superior (and we argue, more reliable) ROE outlook,“ he said. ”Recall this is a company that continues to execute across all facets of the business – solid underwriting performance, exceptional equity returns, and a low-risk, $2.5 billion+ interest/dividend revenue stream that we view as effectively locked-in for the next 3 years."

 

Retaining his “outperform” rating for Fairfax shares, Mr. Boland raised his target to $2,900 from $2,600. The average is $2,680.31.

 

“Unsurprisingly, Fairfax remains our top insurance pick and among our top picks overall,” he said. “The company has an abundance of excess capital (approximately $6-billion by our estimates), continues to buy back shares at attractive prices, and looks a reformed business since ending its shorting/hedging program in 2020. With the other insurers trading close to peak multiples following several years of hard market conditions, Fairfax remains the cheapest insurer in our coverage, notwithstanding a more diversified business mix that leaves it arguably less exposed to a softer North American P&C cycle. We are moving our BVPS and GAAP EPS estimates higher to reflect the strong quarterly investment gains, while increasing our target to $2,900 (from $2,600).”

 

Edited July 7, 2025 by Hoodlum

[hardcorevalue]

On 6/30/2025 at 8:32 AM, Junior R said:

one thing FFH should probably do eventually is a stock split

I sell everything if they ever split the stock

[dartmonkey]

10 minutes ago, hardcorevalue said:

I sell everything if they ever split the stock

Why?

 

I agree it would be largely pointless, but what harm would it do to split it 25:1 and have a share price of about C$100

 

No need for another split for another 10 years or so, even with 25% annual share price gains, making us all financially independent? (Except maybe you, because you don't like them doing something that at least 99% of other companies do?)