Insurance Brokers (MMC, AON, AJG, WTW, BRO)

[MMM20]

18 hours ago, UK said:

 

Would it be possible to get this chart with longer period and perhaps with some peers added:)? 

 

 

 

10-year performance (from roughly the same valuations): 

 

 

AJG and BRO seem like the best bets at a backward looking high level as these things all trade at basically the same valuation again nowadays (same as each other and same as a decade ago), unless i'm missing something.

 

 

Edited February 14 by MMM20

[dealraker]

On 2/13/2026 at 12:14 PM, Marco Van Basten said:

@dealraker, I would NOT own BUD or HSY here, volumes flat to down, little pricing power.  I'd bite the bullet, sell, pay the capital gains tax and buy SPGI & MCO.  I am wrestling with whether I should sell my CASY that I bought on 01/31/2024.  

Marco I bought BUD recently in the Bud Light freakout in the $40's and added in the $50's.  Bought HSY several times from  155 down into the $140' or so.  Plan to keep both as this is a trust fund for great nieces and nephews who are literally watching the process.  To think I could go so far as to try to train them to be active traders is so far beyond any endeavor I would attempt is an under-statement, something I can't fathom.  I think about 1-5% of people can outperform the market and I sure don't want to mislead these young people into thinking "this is how you do it" when the odds of failure are dominate.

Edited February 14 by dealraker

[Spekulatius]

10 hours ago, kab60 said:

You think that's representative of the future? That capital allocation, management and organic growth prospects haven't changed?

 

Brown & Brown and AJG both recently did massive deals. That seems to be one reason why the future might not resemble the past.

 

Also, even if it does resemble the past, TIKR tells me BRO and AJG have done like a ~9% CAGR last 20 years (with a ~1% divy on top). That's less than I would've thought given quality of business, despite the recent drawdown. That rhymes with paying a (too?) high price for acquisitions/undisciplined M&A. I'd love to be proven wrong, but I wonder if there's a bit of institutional imperative at work here. They all seem to engage in the same expensive M&A, enjoying a bit of multiple arbitrage, and the timing of BRO and AJG making massive acquisitions is also interesting/worrisome.

 

 

They have been doing the same thing (acquiring smaller brokerages and in some cases larger ones.). Both BRO and AJG have done this and coincidentally both did a larger acquisition last year as well. So, yes, you can get the idea about capital allocation and operator acumen based on past results. I am not sure much has changed.

 

They even told us how much they spent acquiring and what multiple they pay (10x EBITDA and later they went tup to 12x) . As far as I can l they did them in an accretive manner, even the large ones last year. You could tell by the fact that they used stock to pay for them that they thought their stock wasn’t cheap at that time.

[UK]

9 hours ago, MMM20 said:

 

 

 

10-year performance (from roughly the same valuations): 

 

 

AJG and BRO seem like the best bets at a backward looking high level as these things all trade at basically the same valuation again nowadays (same as each other and same as a decade ago), unless i'm missing something.

 

 

 

 

 

[MMM20]

On 2/13/2026 at 8:28 AM, kab60 said:

Also, even if it does resemble the past, TIKR tells me BRO and AJG have done like a ~9% CAGR last 20 years (with a ~1% divy on top). That's less than I would've thought given quality of business, despite the recent drawdown. That rhymes with paying a (too?) high price for acquisitions/undisciplined M&A.

Did you check the starting point for valuation? BRO P/E got cut in half over ~20 years, a ~400 bps annualized headwind. Over the past decade they’ve grown EPS ~15% (~4x) and with no change in P/E that (plus div) was our return. So FWIW, a mid teens EPS compounder for decades. These are still bespoke and CYA business needs, unit growth and operating leverage should drive it as soft pricing comes and goes, they’re the most efficient operator with scale economies increasing, the industry still seems fragmented enough, target multiples are ostensibly coming down, they should delever relatively quickly, and they still have major skin in the game.
 

Buffett would probably tell us we’re still paying up a little bit around ~15x, but maybe it’s worth it in these circumstances? Or wait and see what happens with the Howden lawsuits before making this/these bigger?

 

Edited February 15 by MMM20

[Spekulatius]

The Spec rule applies to insurance brokers as well: “ Over a long enough period, every stock trades like dog shyte at some point”

Edited February 14 by Spekulatius

[73 Reds]

14 hours ago, dealraker said:

Marco I bought BUD recently in the Bud Light freakout in the $40's and added in the $50's.  Bought HSY several times from  255 down into the $240'so.  Plan to keep both as this is a trust fund for great nieces and nephews who are literally watching the process.  To think I could go so far as to try to train them to be active traders is so far beyond any endeavor I would attempt is an under-statement, something I can't fathom.  I think about 1-5% of people can outperform the market and I sure don't want to mislead these young people into thinking "this is how you do it" when the odds of failure are dominate.

In hindsight, when otherwise fine, long-standing brands and stocks are punished for temporary group-think it is often a good time to buy them.  I completely agree with your thoughts on active trading but believe even less people can really achieve sufficient outperformance to warrant the effort.  Beyond that, and apologies to those here who sit in front of their screens every day reading 10ks and 10qs scouring for the next cheap stock, it is boring as hell as compared to sunshine, fresh air and plenty of other stimulative activity in which to engage.   

[UK]

Gemini:

Conclusion: The Strategic Imperative for the "Bionic Broker" 
The insurance brokerage industry is not facing an "existential threat" from AI and digital 
transformation, but it is undergoing a fundamental "structural reset".17 The competitive moat 
that protected the sector for a century is being rebuilt. The "data moat" of the past is being 
replaced by a "speed-to-quote" and "analytical insight" moat. The "relationship moat" is 
evolving from one based on personal familiarity to one based on the delivery of "fair value" 
and "resilience-as-a-service." 
The "bionic broker"—one who successfully blends human expertise with agentic technology—
will be the winner in this new landscape. By automating the routine, specializing in the 
complex, and pivoting to holistic advisory, brokers can not only defend their existing moats 
but expand into new areas of value creation. The 2026 market volatility should be viewed not 
as a sign of the industry’s decline, but as a "catalyst for its evolution".26 
In an era of climate change, cyber warfare, and geopolitical instability, the world’s need for a 
high-performing insurance industry has never been greater.34 The brokers who thrive will be 
those who recognize that their role is not just to sell a policy, but to provide the strategic 
guidance that helps individuals and businesses navigate an unforgiving world.23 The path 
forward is clear: leverage modern solutions, embrace the power of AI, and remain the 
indispensable partner that clients trust to protect their future. 

Broker Moat.pdf

[kab60]

18 hours ago, MMM20 said:

Did you check the starting point for valuation? BRO P/E got cut in half over ~20 years, a ~400 bps annualized headwind. Over the past decade they’ve grown EPS ~15% (~4x) and with no change in P/E that (plus div) was our return. So FWIW, a mid teens EPS compounder for decades. These are still bespoke and CYA business needs, unit growth and operating leverage should drive it as soft pricing comes and goes, they’re the most efficient operator with scale economies increasing, the industry still seems fragmented enough, target multiples are ostensibly coming down, they should delever relatively quickly, and they still have major skin in the game.
 

Buffett would probably tell us we’re still paying up a little bit around ~15x, but maybe it’s worth it in these circumstances? Or wait and see what happens with the Howden lawsuits before making this bigger?

 

 

I only have quick access to TIKR, which shows 9% CAGR since sometime in 2005 (as far back as it goes). I'm sure part of the surprisingly mediocre result is multiple compression (TIKR valuation data doesn't go that far back), but it's not like 15x is a crazy low multiple for a mature company in a mature industry.

 

 

I think these things look pretty compelling here (although I'm not sure they're the most compelling in the current environment), not least because I think the narrative is stupid, and in my experience, if you're right on the narrative (being wrong), you usually make money whether you pay 10x or 15x.

 

@Spekulatius, I don't think doing 'accretive' deals means much in relation to creating value. It's easy to do EPS 'accretive' deals if you lever up a little. I think looking at some suitable return metric, say ROE, is helpful when looking at serial acquirers over a multiyear period. I would venture perhaps a couple of things have changed in the industry. PE money has flooded into the space given how attractive of a business it has been historically. I don't have the answers here, but I think it's telling that GTCR started Assured Partners in 2011 from scratch and sold to AJG in late 2024 for +13B. I've often wondered why Buffett didn't venture into the industry given he has lots of firsthand experience with brokers. But I guess the reason might be that the biggest assets walks in and out of the door every day. The lawsuit against Howden might be indicative of how valuable these fee earners are.

 

Again, I think it's a pretty good idea, and I think it makes money. I was just surprised when I looked at returns over the last two decades, and I think one reason why they've been closer to market average than spectacular is that a lot of the growth comes through expensive M&A. ROE is rather unspectacular for both BRO and AJG, which I think are peoples' favorites. I have no clue if the large deals they recently did affects their ability to do small 'tuck-in' acquisitions at lower prices as they eliminated two competitors, but I guess the risk is another one will just pop up, flush with PE money, and M&A almost becomes a form of maintenance capex.

Edited February 15 by kab60

[UK]

1 hour ago, kab60 said:

 

I only have quick access to TIKR, which shows 9% CAGR since sometime in 2005 (as far back as it goes). I'm sure part of the surprisingly mediocre result is multiple compression (TIKR valuation data doesn't go that far back), but it's not like 15x is a crazy low multiple for a mature company in a mature industry.

 

 

I think these things look pretty compelling here (although I'm not sure they're the most compelling in the current environment), not least because I think the narrative is stupid, and in my experience, if you're right on the narrative (being wrong), you usually make money whether you pay 10x or 15x.

 

@Spekulatius, I don't think doing 'accretive' deals means much in relation to creating value. It's easy to do EPS 'accretive' deals if you lever up a little. I think looking at some suitable return metric, say ROE, is helpful when looking at serial acquirers over a multiyear period. I would venture perhaps a couple of things have changed in the industry. PE money has flooded into the space given how attractive of a business it has been historically. I don't have the answers here, but I think it's telling that GTCR started Assured Partners in 2011 from scratch and sold to AJG in late 2024 for +13B. I've often wondered why Buffett didn't venture into the industry given he has lots of firsthand experience with brokers. But I guess the reason might be that the biggest assets walks in and out of the door every day. The lawsuit against Howden might be indicative of how valuable these fee earners are.

 

Again, I think it's a pretty good idea, and I think it makes money. I was just surprised when I looked at returns over the last two decades, and I think one reason why they've been closer to market average than spectacular is that a lot of the growth comes through expensive M&A. ROE is rather unspectacular for both BRO and AJG, which I think are peoples' favorites. I have no clue if the large deals they recently did affects their ability to do small 'tuck-in' acquisitions at lower prices as they eliminated two competitors, but I guess the risk is another one will just pop up, flush with PE money, and M&A almost becomes a form of maintenance capex.

 

Some very good points, thanks!

 

I agree, they a not "crazy cheap" yet. But in my opinion, these are one of the better businesses ever, with a quality perhaps even on par with V/MA? Durable, low capex,. inflation resistant, in the consolidating industry, ran by capable operators/owners. What it is not to like here even at 15x? But what I am afraid (and could be wrong here), there is perhaps a decent chance (50/50) these can actually get to a crazy level (lets say 10-12x?), because if the softness in the insurance market materializes down the road this year (as it seems will be the case), combination of it (temporary cyclical slowdown) with all this AI disruption fear craze could provide us with more/really exciting happy hour:). So as always, timing is a bitch, and I have no idea how to approach this problem. But under the right circumstances, especially if FFH would go up some 10-20+ percent (or even stays flat) and these will go more down (10-20), I think I could even imagine rotating my extra FFH allocation to brokers easily. This is an awesome time to be in a market for an active investor:), lets see how it goes!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[kab60]

3 hours ago, UK said:

 

Some very good points, thanks!

 

I agree, they a not "crazy cheap" yet. But in my opinion, these are one of the better businesses ever, with a quality perhaps even on par with V/MA? Durable, low capex,. inflation resistant, in the consolidating industry, ran by capable operators/owners. What it is not to like here even at 15x? But what I am afraid (and could be wrong here), there is perhaps a decent chance (50/50) these can actually get to a crazy level (lets say 10-12x?), because if the softness in the insurance market materializes down the road this year (as it seems will be the case), combination of it (temporary cyclical slowdown) with all this AI disruption fear craze could provide us with more/really exciting happy hour:). So as always, timing is a bitch, and I have no idea how to approach this problem. But under the right circumstances, especially if FFH would go up some 10-20+ percent (or even stays flat) and these will go more down (10-20), I think I could even imagine rotating my extra FFH allocation to brokers easily. This is an awesome time to be in a market for an active investor:), lets see how it goes!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I don't think these are comparable to M/VA. Those run a global duopoly which takes little to no capital to run, have high fixed costs + low all-in cost to customers (so building a competing offering is almost impossible), they benefit from inflation and enjoy structural tailwinds as payments move digital.

 

V/MA grows without having to retain much capital, whereas BRO/AJG continually pay rather high prices for acquisitions to keep the machine growing + they too benefit from 'risk' inflation. While V/MA have been shrinking the float, those brokers been growing shares outstanding as they 'reinvest' through M&A. It's an attractive industry due to opaque terms and pricing and fragmentation on both the supplier as well as customer side. But like other capital light but 'human heavy' companies/sectors (like consulting), there is no free lunch. Here M&A is a combination of growth+maintenance capex, and looking at the ROE, the returns aren't particularly great (due to price paid). The 'issue' for brokers is your most valuable assets are free to leave. A ham sandwich could run V/MA for years without anyone noticing.

 

I'm not trying to dunk on BRO/AJG, but those players , but there's a reason why the ROE/TSR is so different, and I think the above is part of the reason why.

Edited February 15 by kab60

[UK]

1 hour ago, kab60 said:

I don't think these are comparable to M/VA. Those run a global duopoly which takes little to no capital to run, have high fixed costs + low all-in cost to customers (so building a competing offering is almost impossible), they benefit from inflation and enjoy structural tailwinds as payments move digital.

 

V/MA grows without having to retain much capital, whereas BRO/AJG continually pay rather high prices for acquisitions to keep the machine growing + they too benefit from 'risk' inflation. While V/MA have been shrinking the float, those brokers been growing shares outstanding as they 'reinvest' through M&A. It's an attractive industry due to opaque terms and pricing and fragmentation on both the supplier as well as customer side. But like other capital light but 'human heavy' companies/sectors (like consulting), there is no free lunch. Here M&A is a combination of growth+maintenance capex, and looking at the ROE, the returns aren't particularly great (due to price paid). The 'issue' for brokers is your most valuable assets are free to leave. A ham sandwich could run V/MA for years without anyone noticing.

 

I'm not trying to dunk on BRO/AJG, but those players , but there's a reason why the ROE/TSR is so different, and I think the above is part of the reason why.

Sure, you are right re my a bit hyperbole comparison to a payment networks, historically though, and what bring us next 10 years, is the question.

[Junior R]

Quote

Brown & Brown, Inc. acquires the assets of The Protectorate Group Insurance Agency, Inc., doing business as American Adventure Insurance

 

[MMM20]

Worth a read. Maybe PE forced selling of private players over the next few years (???) will drive multiples down and intrinsic value up at the public consolidators?

 

 https://iansbnr.com/the-ai-risk-for-insurance-brokers-part-i/

 

 

Edited February 17 by MMM20

[rogermunibond]

@MMM20 good read. it would seem that PE-owned insurance brokers for the most part don't have a big share of the market that MRSH and AON play in.  what abouth small and medium sized business?  makes sense for TWFG and GSHD to get sold off more than the bigger brokers.

 

there's a loolapalooza effect coming with PE owned companies getting EBITDA hits, debt hair cuts, then write downs in BDC, PE-owned insurance portfolios, and private credit CLOs.

[Eldad]

53 minutes ago, MMM20 said:

Worth a read. Maybe PE forced selling of private players over the next few years (???) will drive multiples down and intrinsic value up at the public consolidators?

 

 https://iansbnr.com/the-ai-risk-for-insurance-brokers-part-i/

 

 

I think he is right on it being about valuation for Saas and brokers and not necessarily about the most likely things to be disrupted. Warren has said all you need to have an insurance underwriter is capital and brains. Obviously that sounds like something AI would be very good at, but it trades at 12x earnings so there is no big move down. But the brokers were at 27-30x earnings. It’s more about general unknowns across the whole market and more uncertain future earnings. 

[dwy000]

57 minutes ago, Eldad said:

I think he is right on it being about valuation for Saas and brokers and not necessarily about the most likely things to be disrupted. Warren has said all you need to have an insurance underwriter is capital and brains. Obviously that sounds like something AI would be very good at, but it trades at 12x earnings so there is no big move down. But the brokers were at 27-30x earnings. It’s more about general unknowns across the whole market and more uncertain future earnings. 

I suspect the difference in multiples is that to be an underwriter you need capital and brains. To be a broker you dont even need the capital.  Its almost infinite returns as a service only business.

[rogermunibond]

1 hour ago, dwy000 said:

I suspect the difference in multiples is that to be an underwriter you need capital and brains. To be a broker you dont even need the capital.  Its almost infinite returns as a service only business.

 

As a broker, your moat walks out the door every night.  Isn't a lot of capital tied up in the relationships?

 

[gfp]

On 2/13/2026 at 3:25 PM, gfp said:

 

WTW:

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1900425/000114053626000022/xslF345X03/form4.xml

 

On 2/13/2026 at 8:44 AM, gfp said:

Insider purchases ought to start trickling in.  Sure sounded like Pat Ryan would be in the market next week.

 

First one I noticed was AON:

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1023262/000119312526048871/xslF345X03/ownership.xml

 

And another million bucks at WTW

 

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2028612/000114053626000024/xslF345X03/form4.xml

[formthirteen]

 

[kab60]

1 hour ago, formthirteen said:

 

 

In a market with plenty of competition, it seems likely to me that everyone will adapt these tools, and thus the economic benefit mostly goes to consumers. Of course, if it means insurance becomes cheaper, we might get a bit of additional market growth.

 

AIG has been talking extensively about AI and their work with Palantir. I think AIG is pretty attractive here around BV, but all the AI talk, to me, is honestly a bit upsetting. We'll see how it plays out, given how early it still is, but you'd think AIG would have gotten their cost ratio below 30%, if what they're doing is such a gamechanger. You'd also think they'd ramp buybacks instead of dialing back and making deals. Anyway, anyone interested in the space should definitely take a look at AIG and see how it develops. AI or no AI, they should be able to take cost out. Also, I wonder if agents handling a ton of submissions also means there will be more submissions in the future (from agents).

 

Anyway, having looked a bit more at the brokers, I think Ryan Specialty would be my pick. Wholesale brokers have become very consolidated, and they seem to benefit from all the M&A amongst retail brokers. You also have very high insider ownership and a fresh buyback announcement, which I think has high signal value, given insiders are paying for more than 50% of it.

[formthirteen]

If a company had access to AI and worked really hard on disrupting an industry, what would the results be? What if three companies worked really hard on disrupting other companies using AI:

 

Upstart

Lemonade

Upwork

 

If a person asked Google's Gemini to analyze these companies and how they are disrupting the market, what would the results be?

 

Spoiler

Yes, the "redemption" is absolutely visible in the hard numbers as of early 2026. This is not just sentiment; the financial statements prove that these companies have fundamentally fixed the issues that nearly destroyed them in 2023.

Here is the "audit" of their success based on their late 2025/early 2026 financial reports.

 

1. Upstart (The Turnaround King)

The data shows a complete reversal from "survival mode" to "profitable growth."

• Income (The big surprise): In 2023/24, Upstart was losing hundreds of millions. By the end of 2025, they posted a Full Year Net Income of $53.6 million (GAAP). This is a massive swing from the previous year's $129M loss.

• Fundamentals (The Model Works): Their critical flaw was that they couldn't sell loans. In Q4 2025, 70% of their funding came from committed partners, meaning they are no longer relying on fickle market whims to survive. Their AI conversion rate improved to 19.4% (up from ~15%).

• Balance Sheet: They successfully reduced the risky loans held on their own books by 20% quarter-over-quarter. This de-risks the company significantly.

• Cash Flow: They generated $104.6 million in Free Cash Flow in Q4 2025 alone. They are now printing cash rather than burning it.

2. Lemonade (The Efficiency Machine)

Lemonade hasn't hit massive Net Income profit yet, but they have achieved the "Holy Grail" of insurance: underwriting profitability.

• Fundamentals (The Metric that Matters): The single most important number for an insurer is the "Loss Ratio" (claims paid vs. premiums collected). For years, Lemonade’s was terrible (>90%). In Q3 2025, it dropped to 62%, an all-time best. This proves their AI finally knows how to spot bad risks.

• Cash Flow: Crucially, they turned Free Cash Flow positive (~$18M in Q3 2025). They are no longer bleeding out their cash reserves to keep the lights on.

• Balance Sheet: They still sit on a fortress of ~$1 billion in cash, giving them years of runway to scale now that their unit economics actually work.

• Income: Revenue grew 42% YoY, proving they can grow fast without ruining their loss ratio—a feat investors didn't think was possible two years ago.

3. Upwork (The "Cash Cow" Pivot)

Upwork’s success is different. It is no longer a "hyper-growth" startup but a mature, highly profitable efficiency engine.

• Income & Cash Flow: Upwork is a cash machine. They generated $223 million in Free Cash Flow in 2025. Their Adjusted EBITDA margin hit a record 29%.

• The "Red Flag" Fundamental: While financially robust, their Active Clients dropped by 6% to 785,000. The "AI threat" is real: fewer people are hiring for simple tasks.

• The Counter-Move: However, they grew their "AI-related work" volume by 50% (>$300M annualized). They are successfully swapping low-value gigs for high-value AI expert work, which is why their profits are up even if their user count is down.

The Verdict on "Success"

Metric	Upstart	Lemonade	Upwork
Net Income	Profitable ($53M)	Still Net Loss (but narrowing)	Profitable ($115M)
Cash Flow	Positive (Printing cash)	Positive (Just turned corner)	Positive (Cash machine)
Key Fundamental	Loan funding secured (70%)	Loss Ratio fixed (62%)	Client count shrinking ()

Summary: The charts you uploaded aren't lying. Upstart and Lemonade fixed their broken business models, while Upwork optimized itself into a profit machine to survive the AI transition.

 

If a person asked Anthropic's Claude to fact check the Google Gemini claims using SEC reports, what would the results be:

 

Spoiler

  Summary Scorecard

  ┌──────────────────┬───────┬─────┐
  │     Verdict      │ Count │  %  │
  ├──────────────────┼───────┼─────┤
  │ CONFIRMED        │ 13    │ 65% │
  ├──────────────────┼───────┼─────┤
  │ APPROX CORRECT   │ 3     │ 15% │
  ├──────────────────┼───────┼─────┤
  │ MISLEADING       │ 3     │ 15% │
  ├──────────────────┼───────┼─────┤
  │ FALSE            │ 2     │ 10% │
  ├──────────────────┼───────┼─────┤
  │ Total verifiable │ 21    │     │
  └──────────────────┴───────┴─────┘

  Overall accuracy: 80% (Confirmed + Approx Correct) / Total

  ---
  Critical Findings

  The two FALSE claims are both about Upstart's cash flow — the single most important "proof" of turnaround. The text claims UPST generated $104.6M in Q4 FCF and is "printing cash." In reality, FY2025 GAAP free cash flow was -$148.1M, a massive deterioration from +$185.5M in FY2024. This is the opposite of "printing
  cash." The author likely confused EBITDA ($63.7M Q4) or an adjusted metric with actual cash generation.

  The 70% funding partners claim is misleading — it applies specifically to Auto & Home loans from 11 partners, not to Upstart's entire funding model. This distinction matters because the personal lending business (their core) has different funding dynamics.

  The Lemonade $18M FCF claim uses adjusted, not GAAP figures — GAAP quarterly FCF was only $2.6M. The adjusted figure excludes certain items that matter for cash position analysis.

  Upwork's numbers are nearly bulletproof — every claim checked out within rounding error, making it the most accurately characterized company of the three.

 

Final conclusion:

 

Spoiler

Accuracy inversely correlated with narrative intensity. Upwork's "boring cash cow" framing had perfect numbers. Upstart's "Turnaround King" framing — the most emotionally charged narrative — had the worst accuracy, with both FALSE claims landing on the single metric (cash flow) most central to proving a
   turnaround. This is a textbook example of confirmation bias in financial analysis: the stronger the story, the less rigorously the numbers get checked.

 

Anyone still believe in AI disruption?

Edited February 18 by formthirteen

[kab60]

Not me!

 

It's clearly powerful at coding (no wonder given it's structured text, outcomes can be verified and there's a ton of documentation), but for a lot of other tasks, it's dumb as cardboard given inherent limitations. I love it for research/search - feeding 10 annual reports into NotebookLM and prompting is much better than reading these things. And I don't doubt it can be very useful even with these limitations.

 

But, some of the claims being made seems beyond daft to me. I listened to Amodei on a long run yesterday, and he clearly took a page from Altman and Elon as to how to raise capital. He made it sound like his 2.500 man outfit would topple autrocracies around the world with his thinking machine. My God. 

 

I think there's a ton of money to be made here (but don't really think most software co's look attractive). But timing is tricky given all these grifters will be raising money later this year, and banks are looking forward to some massive fees.

 

 

Edited February 18 by kab60

[gfp]

5 hours ago, kab60 said:

Anyway, having looked a bit more at the brokers, I think Ryan Specialty would be my pick. Wholesale brokers have become very consolidated, and they seem to benefit from all the M&A amongst retail brokers. You also have very high insider ownership and a fresh buyback announcement, which I think has high signal value, given insiders are paying for more than 50% of it.

 

I would be surprised if we don't see some type of substantial insider purchase of RYAN shares by Pat in the very near future.  He has taken an interest in buying the stock to signal in the past and he has plenty of resources, even during the giant sucking of liquidity known as tax season.

[yesman182]

8 hours ago, kab60 said:

ou also have very high insider ownership and a fresh buyback announcement, which I think has high signal value, given insiders are paying for more than 50% of it.

Where are you seeing that level of insider ownership? Valueline says Pat owns 12% and other directors own 1%. I checked TIKR and saw something similar.