How to Increase Berkshire Share Price?

[nickenumbers]

All,

 

I want your input, but I would prefer not to debate the premise in this topic as I really want to understand what you guys think.

 

Given Assumptions-

1.  Assume that BRK.B is worth say $250 per share (IV).

2.  Currently trading around $209 per share.

3.  Lets ignore the China/US current events on trade.

 

How does Berkshire close the gap between it's traded price and it's intrinsic value???

 

If it were a smaller company folks could attempt a tender offer or take a significant position and wage some type of proxy battle.

Or if WEB and CM believed there was value and timing, they would just go ALA Singleton [Teledyne], and start buying up shares.  Share repurchase.

 

If someone had big gigantic chutzpah they would take over/gain control and auction off the parts.

 

 

What else?

 

 

Perhaps when WEB or CM checks out to the big hotel in the sky, they are going to get off that gigantic pile of cash and finally start repurchasing shares.

 

Or, perhaps, I just need a bit more PATIENCE while WEB and CM play their hand.

 

 

What thoughts do the great members of COBF land have??

 

Thank you.

[Guest longinvestor]

You preceded me in posting on this topic. Only that (as uncomfortable it is for me), I honestly think that Buffett (but not Munger) is doing all he can to tamp down any expeditious rise in the stock price. My own wag on his reason for doing so are three fold:

 

1. Talking up the stock will keep them from executing plan B of buying  >$100 B of stock. Plan A is to wait for the phone to ring with the guy on the other end has his hat out for >$100B. Buffett would rather not think about plan C or D. He would much rather check in to the hotel High.

2. The expectation of beating the index is hard enough for him lately; he’s preparing shareholders to lower expectations on the next guy. Should a lot of the shareholder base move over to the index, the next Guy will be able to buy lots of stock back. It will become Plan A for him.

3. Entering shareholders are likely to be disappointed if the stock trades above IV or even at IV. The expectation of outperformance is etched deep in the collective consciousness. Buffett has 70 years of experience dealing with partners’ expectations and Act II is coming up with the transition. Act I was in 1967-69.

 

Personally I can endure another 2-5 years of prices in the current realm of pricing.

 

[cubsfan]

You preceded me in posting on this topic. Only that (as uncomfortable it is for me), I honestly think that Buffett (but not Munger) is doing all he can to tamp down any expeditious rise in the stock price. My own wag on his reason for doing so are three fold:

 

1. Talking up the stock will keep them from executing plan B of buying  >$100 B of stock. Plan A is to wait for the phone to ring with the guy on the other end has his hat out for >$100B. Buffett would rather not think about plan C or D. He would much rather check in to the hotel High.

2. The expectation of beating the index is hard enough for him lately; he’s preparing shareholders to lower expectations on the next guy. Should a lot of the shareholder base move over to the index, the next Guy will be able to buy lots of stock back. It will become Plan A for him.

3. Entering shareholders are likely to be disappointed if the stock trades above IV or even at IV. The expectation of outperformance is etched deep in the collective consciousness. Buffett has 70 years of experience dealing with partners’ expectations and Act II is coming up with the transition. Act I was in 1967-69.

 

Personally I can endure another 2-5 years of prices in the current realm of pricing.

 

I think this is insightful and as Howard Marks might say - second level thinking. Buffett and successors have a tough job but they remain disciplined on

what they are willing to pay. At the shareholder meeting, everyone trying to pin them down on a buyback number, etc.  This reminds me of those several years prior to 2008, when so many shareholders screamed at each meeting about him carrying so much cash.

 

Late in the cycle he said something to the effect of "you won't like the conditions that exist if we can put all this money to work".

Worth remembering that.

[nickenumbers]

Cubsfan does have me thinking. 

 

Related, perhaps they are waiting on another 2008 crash and they are going to repurchase a significant number of shares then...  I kinda buy it but I would like to see them dial up the repurchase now, and should there be a significant down turn, they buy like crazy..  I think they are still limited by the daily trading volume.

 

They had a chance in 2008 and they didn't take it.  I get that times change and their options/alternatives have changed.. 

 

[Guest longinvestor]

Something else to consider. Buffett has been clearly saying that the businesses they are being offered for outright purchase have not been at prices they are willing to pay. Relative to what? Berkshire Hathaway shares. I suppose they are watching the delta and it could soon be “obvious” in Munger’s words. It’s been their script forever to judge deals with the next best one. One day the best one could  be their own stock.

[John Hjorth]

... How does Berkshire close the gap between it's traded price and it's intrinsic value??? ...

 

nicke,

 

Here, I'm not debating your premises - more the question asked. And my basis is the question asked - literally.

 

Your question contains two components :

 

a. Market/trading price, &

b. Intrinsic value.

 

As a long term Berkshire long, I want b. Intrinsic value to go up going forward. a. Market/trading price is for me [from here, going forward] maybe an opportunity. Also for tax reasons [based on the local tax regime, that my family and I [no "we" here! [ ;- ) ]] are subject to, I actually want the market/trading price to go down going forward from here. [This may seem crazy, I'll be happy to elaborate, if wanted.]

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

So, the answer to your question depends on ones personal perspective [naturally]. Potential future net Berkshire buyers don't want the gap to close, while potential future Berkshire sellers want the gap to close.

[Spekulatius]

I believe they WEB is more concerned with increasing BRK’s intrinsic value than with closing the gap to NAV. Generally, NAV will follow Intrinsic value anyways and if there is a large gap between the two (I mean 40% or more, not the current 15-20% by my estimate) I think WEB will absolutely buy back or tender stock in size they my surprise some.

[John Hjorth]

I believe they WEB is more concerned with increasing BRK’s intrinsic value than with closing the gap to NAV. Generally, NAV will follow Intrinsic value anyways and if there is a large gap between the two (I mean 40% or more, not the current 15-20% by my estimate) I think WEB will absolutely buy back or tender stock in size they my surprise some.

 

I hope you're right, Spekulatius,

 

Because like nicke, I think that Berkshire, - at least as of now - trades well below intrinsic value.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

If I should elaborate a bit on my prior post, based on a more "loose approach" to the question asked by nicke, I think it could basically be boiled down to:

 

The way that the word "meaningful" is used [or abused?] in recent years at Berkshire headquarter [to me, at least by Mr. Buffett].

 

Please try to think of the phrase - so to say - "mirrored"/inverted in relation to frugality and cost conscience : "Every cent counts to get the dollars".

 

To me, there is some kind of shade of arrogance over it. I could also phrase it as if Berkshire investors are living with a condition of an extra [hidden] opportunity cost related to Mr. Buffett's definition - in this context - of "meaningful".

 

I suppose the meaning, perception and understanding of "meaningful" at Berkshire HQ also is relative with respect to individual persons. So, it's fairly easy countered by handing over materially more AUM to Mr. Combs & Mr. Weschler. I don't know if such decision is a board decision, or a decision to be made by Mr. Buffett alone, perhaps in cooperation with Mr. Munger, or perhaps even contractually laid out in advance with the two CIOs.

[nickenumbers]

Something else to consider. Buffett has been clearly saying that the businesses they are being offered for outright purchase have not been at prices they are willing to pay. Relative to what? Berkshire Hathaway shares. I suppose they are watching the delta and it could soon be “obvious” in Munger’s words. It’s been their script forever to judge deals with the next best one. One day the best one could  be their own stock.

 

Wow, that is an interesting flip of the analysis.  I hope that is the case and BRK is willing to repurchase.

 

Spekulatius also has some great points.  I am measuring success by closing the differential between IV and quoted Share price, and Buffett is assumed to be looking longer than that and focusing on increasing long term IV...  I think I am a little like the fan at the baseball park screaming "Would you SWING already...  you BUM!!!  SWING!!"

[Viking]

The challenge i have with Berkshire as a long term hold is if the stock trades below intrinsic value when Buffett is alive will this gap not get worse when he is no longer around?

 

Are people thinking Berkshire will trade at a higher (average) valuation when Buffett is no longer abound?

 

It is a conglomerate. Do these not typically trade at a fairly steep discount to the value of the underlying assets? Especially when breaking the company up is not an option.

[Guest longinvestor]

The challenge i have with Berkshire as a long term hold is if the stock trades below intrinsic value when Buffett is alive will this gap not get worse when he is no longer around?

 

Are people thinking Berkshire will trade at a higher (average) valuation when Buffett is no longer abound?

 

It is a conglomerate. Do these not typically trade at a fairly steep discount to the value of the underlying assets? Especially when breaking the company up is not an option.

 

Won't IV and market price merge eventually? The weighing machine thing.

[bizaro86]

The challenge i have with Berkshire as a long term hold is if the stock trades below intrinsic value when Buffett is alive will this gap not get worse when he is no longer around?

 

Are people thinking Berkshire will trade at a higher (average) valuation when Buffett is no longer abound?

 

It is a conglomerate. Do these not typically trade at a fairly steep discount to the value of the underlying assets? Especially when breaking the company up is not an option.

 

Why isn't breaking up BRK an option eventually?  It wouldn't be possible until WEB dies, as he would never do so and has control. But once his stock gets sold by the foundations however many years after his death it could happen. It would require a huge discount to IV, because of the huge amount of capital required.

 

The structure around the assets being held in insurance companies would also make it take a long time. Although if the insurance commissioner is letting them use $X for the value of a railroad in their statutory accounts, presumably they'd still be fine if they sold the railroad for $X in cash...

 

Spinoffs would be much less likely.

[Spekulatius]

The challenge i have with Berkshire as a long term hold is if the stock trades below intrinsic value when Buffett is alive will this gap not get worse when he is no longer around?

 

Are people thinking Berkshire will trade at a higher (average) valuation when Buffett is no longer abound?

 

It is a conglomerate. Do these not typically trade at a fairly steep discount to the value of the underlying assets? Especially when breaking the company up is not an option.

 

A conglomerate discount of 20% is not unusual and I have in fact seen much larger discounts in Holding co’s. Exor for example trades at a close to 40% discount to NAV.

[Rod]

The challenge i have with Berkshire as a long term hold is if the stock trades below intrinsic value when Buffett is alive will this gap not get worse when he is no longer around?

 

Are people thinking Berkshire will trade at a higher (average) valuation when Buffett is no longer abound?

 

It is a conglomerate. Do these not typically trade at a fairly steep discount to the value of the underlying assets? Especially when breaking the company up is not an option.

 

A conglomerate discount of 20% is not unusual and I have in fact seen much larger discounts in Holding co’s. Exor for example trades at a close to 40% discount to NAV.

 

If Berkshire plans to continuously buy back very large amounts of stock, then any conglomerate discount would be very positive for shareholders. It could increase the company's ROE by a couple percentage points per year.

[DooDiligence]

The challenge i have with Berkshire as a long term hold is if the stock trades below intrinsic value when Buffett is alive will this gap not get worse when he is no longer around?

 

Are people thinking Berkshire will trade at a higher (average) valuation when Buffett is no longer abound?

 

It is a conglomerate. Do these not typically trade at a fairly steep discount to the value of the underlying assets? Especially when breaking the company up is not an option.

 

Why isn't breaking up BRK an option eventually?  It wouldn't be possible until WEB dies, as he would never do so and has control. But once his stock gets sold by the foundations however many years after his death it could happen. It would require a huge discount to IV, because of the huge amount of capital required.

 

The structure around the assets being held in insurance companies would also make it take a long time. Although if the insurance commissioner is letting them use $X for the value of a railroad in their statutory accounts, presumably they'd still be fine if they sold the railroad for $X in cash...

 

Spinoffs would be much less likely.

 

I agree re: eventual breakup.

 

WEB has stated that he could post ginormous returns on a smaller base.

 

I say, "well, prove it."

 

I'm not sophisticated enough to imagine how the shrinking would play out but wouldn't mind seeing it happen with spinoiff's.

 

If BRK was primarily a risk management / finance operation with a smaller capital base, could Ted, Todd, Ajit & Greg shoot the moon over the next few decades?

[longterminvestor]

Actually the question is I would ask is the opposite, how to decrease the Berkshire Share Price?  Especially in the context of share repurchases.  And the answer is pretty simple.  Continue to run a boring, long lasting, enduring enterprise, do not offer quarterly guidance, run up an absurdly large cash horde that drags on Return on Assets, and smartly purchase assets that are undervalued compared to the risk free rate of return.

 

Look at BNSF 9 years later - no one talks about this.  BNSF has returned $33B in earnings to Berkshire and the cost of BNSF was $34B (Total Value of transaction was $44B) – so the cash outlay 9 years later has been returned and the only cost was the 6% of shares issued.  Best part of that deal is I speculate value of BNSF today is worth somewhere in the $150B-$175B.  The stock component of BNSF deal makes the real rate of return a little messy because 6% of shares outstanding to pay for BNSF in addition to cash.  Warren created $150B-$175B in value that is not listed as “an asset” on the balance sheet while giving up 6% of shares outstanding.  (I wouldn't even know how to evaluate the opportunity cost of the 6%, :-X).  This is radically simple and really doesn’t show. 

 

Breaking down the BNSF deal with small numbers but keeping the % intact, this is what I believe Buffet & Munger try to do everyday.  Buy a business for $100 that earns $5.  9 years later the same business earns $11.67 annually and growing.  If Berkshire can do that, then the value of the company SHOULD INCREASE but maybe it wont.  As someone said earlier in the thread, stock market value is a weighing machine.  And if the weighing machine becomes out of balance, that is when re-purchases of countless shares will be bought in.  But to have the patience to wait, wow.  Really tough when you have a cash pile of $114B and growing.

 

When the right deal comes along, they can deploy capital and do the same thing – if you could re-create today what happened with BNSF, Berk could buy 2 BNSF’s with cash and 9 years later add $300B-$350B to the value of Berkshire.  That equates to a 60% increase in enterprise value.  History shows that Berkshires value will not match what is truly at the earnings level.

 

I personally prefer to see the price GO DOWN, not up so shares can be purchased at a lower amount.  I think the bigger Berk gets, the more difficult it becomes to value for “The Street”.  And that’s just fine with me.   

 

[Guest longinvestor]

I am in longterminvestor’s camp. The market would be playing into Omaha ‘s hands as they struggle to value Berkshire properly. Looking back from, say, 2030, getting people off the BV multiple anchoring will be seen as a brilliant move, especially for remaining shareholders. Hope that’s enough time to pull off the $100 B of buybacks.

 

It’s quite a time of dichotomy we’re in the midst of. Berkshire is believed to remain in a state of permanent undervaluation (too big, value locked up, stubborn old men in charge) while the darlings (FANG’s) are believed to be in permanent heaven(winner take all, low incremental capital needs).

 

It’s really different this time.

 

 

[SwedishValue]

If we are at the year 2030 with Berkshire having bought back 100bn in stock, that would likely be less than 1/3 of the cash flow Berkshire has achieved up to that point - and that is assuming no acquisitions.

 

Having bought back 100bn worth of stock and letting the cash pile grow to 400bn during the same time is not my idea of great stewardship of capital. If repurchases make sense it makes sense doing them on a massive scale.

[Guest longinvestor]

If we are at the year 2030 with Berkshire having bought back 100bn in stock, that would likely be less than 1/3 of the cash flow Berkshire has achieved up to that point - and that is assuming no acquisitions.

 

Having bought back 100bn worth of stock and letting the cash pile grow to 400bn during the same time is not my idea of great stewardship of capital. If repurchases make sense it makes sense doing them on a massive scale.

Agree. Especially if buybacks is their solo act with the 400 B. I think they are poised to spend some 200B in incremental organic ideas. That warms my heart from a transition POV. Arguably those are relatively less mistake prone. I am thinking the next renewable energy project and double tracking at BNSF.

[nickenumbers]

You guys have some great, wonderful, outstanding opinions and thoughts.  Exceeding my expectations.

 

You are my TRIBE!

 

I have another question.  Is it the 13-f or 13-d that we are waiting to come out from BRK?

 

When will it come out?  5/14, 5/15 or 5/16?

 

Will said form [13-f or 13-d] have any note of the outstanding A and B shares of BRK at the time of the form issue [For example 5/15/19], like the 10K has a note of the outstanding shares at the time of issue of the 10-k?

 

I am basically trying to see if we will be able to determine if BRK repurchased any of its own shares in the last 2 weeks.

 

Thanks.

[Dynamic]

The 13-F must be filed 45 days after the quarter end, which means 15th May as April has 30 days (and 14th for all other months - Feb, Aug, Nov as the preceding month has 31 days)

 

That form does not disclose the Berkshire Hathaway share count. The front page of the 10-Q quarterly results is where you'll find the share count as of 25th April, which is the latest known.

(723,114 Class A + 1,368,243,498 Class B = 1,635,276.33 Class A equivalent or 2,452,914,498 Class B equivalent, economically).

The 10-Q revealed approx 1,635,433 Class A equivalent at 31st March (roughly 2,453,149,500 Class B equiv) which one would use to calculate items such as Book Value Per Share. That's the best guide to recent repurchase activity we have.

 

I hope to edit my thread regarding Look-Through Portfolio fairly promptly, but some of the news outlets will probably report on Berkshire's own 13-F before I get to it. Unlike me, other sources habitually ignore the New England Asset Management 13-F holdings (Other Manager Ref = "01 02" signifies Berkshire/Gen Re holdings there), which I include and they don't adjust for pension holdings or foreign holdings where known.

 

The only holdings I know are going to be different from 31st Dec 2018 are:

 

DAL Delta Air Lines - went over 10% accidentally so filed 13G and then increased to about 10.4%.

 

WFC Wells Fargo - trimmed position to 423-424 million shares, as it is every quarter, to remain below 10% to avoid becoming a Bank Holding Company. Value to nearest $0.1bn was disclosed in 10-Q as $20.9bn at 31st March. The only top-5 position to change share count materially.

 

AMZN Amazon - Buffett disclosed that Todd or Ted has bought some, so it's going to probably be a lot less than $13bn worth, as each of them manages about that amount of capital. My money would be on R. Ted Weschler, who I think was responsible for the initial stake in Apple according to an interview I once saw, but we won't know unless they happen to disclose it later. Also, we won't know for sure if any of this position will be for the benefit of pension fund beneficiaries rather than shareholders.

 

USG - This will presumably show up in the 13-F but the takeover by Knauf completed after the quarter end around 24th April for $43.50 per share in cash in addition to the October 2018 dividend of $0.50.

[nickenumbers]

I have really gotten a lot from all of your opinions and input.

 

I am not wedded to this argument that I am going to make, but I think it is worth considering.

 

 

An argument can be made that WEB/CM have become a version of the old school consolidated assets inside the company with strong control by a few managers/BOD.  [Like an old Railroad or Northern Pipeline.]  The ability for the public to buy into the entity is available and encouraged, but the public doesn't really have much chance of forcing BRK's hand to make use of its extremely large cash position and assets.  The Shareholders want them to use the cash to purchase businesses, or repurchase shares.  Isn't this a flavor of exactly what WEB did when he got into value investing.  He would Find something that trades at a discount to IV and go purchase it and wait until the scales change to make it rise to IV.  Or he would go activist and push and prod.

 

And here WEB is 40 yrs later with way way way more cash than he needs...  And he has fortified himself into a position where he can not be forced to act.

 

 

I am a super WEB/CM fan and I know they will continue to impress and astound us, but I think I see a little hypocrisy at play.

 

Does this dog hunt?  What do you guys think?

[Dynamic]

In my opinion they positioned themselves well to be able to ignore calls for them to act now and to ignore people on the sidelines shouting Swing You Bum!

 

The OXY preferred and warrants deal was a decent use of cash, but there's plenty of cash left.

 

In my opinion the float liability offsets the cash balance almost exactly when the market is fairly high like now, so there's no real cash drag, they're just earning the return on their non-cash assets, and I'm happy for them to wait. And when the market falls seriously, maybe it a year or two, and prospective returns improve, there will be opportunities for some greatly value-enhancing deals like the OXY one and possibly even some large acquisitions, which would then be leveraged by the use of float-funded capital. I'm happy for them to keep waiting for the fat pitch and I'm happy for them to limit my downside risk so well while producing something around 10% compound growth in IV.

 

I think many many others simply see the cash as a wasted opportunity, but I'm happy for them to be patient and just drip-feed it into suitable stocks while waiting for the fat pitches. I'm probably in the minority.

[Guest longinvestor]

I am sincerely hoping that the market gifts Buffett a 50 cent dollar on his own shares. Buffett grew up finding those routinely. Then he got weaned off of that by Munger in the flight to quality. Now they are forced to wait and they find themselves in a world in which  patience is rare. Especially the monumental variety like theirs.

 

It’ll be the proverbial last laugh.

[CorpRaider]

For nearly 60 years he's been saying his portfolio is likely to underperform in a rapidly advancing bull market and whoop some ass when the worm turns.