gfp

I think no firm was willing to assist with the bond because of its size, the fact that surety bonding is not very profitable at all, and the lack of suitable collateral by the defendant. He had some brokerage collateral but pledged it to Chubb for the earlier bond. I think Greenberg was very clear that he would be willing to write the bond and ignore politics if there was suitable collateral posted. We know he wasn't just talking because he had just done it. We know Buffett would want very good collateral - T-bills to maybe a 2 year note but I would be shocked if Buffett accepted anything less secure than that for a barely profitable surety bond for a customer who has a reputation for not paying.

Thanks. That reminds me, it's time for a new Demario Davis jersey $$$

Is that like $29-30 Billion valuation or have the number of shares changed?

I wouldn't say this repurchase pace is "heavy." It will be interesting to see the split between A-shares and B-shares repurchased in the 10-Q. I think it is quite possible that Warren was offered a block of A-shares and he has shown a preference for retiring A-shares before he leaves the scene.

Yes, they have a fiduciary duty to the FFH shareholders and they made what they felt was the right long term decision. The key word is long term. You lay it out in your post.

That's true in theory but in practice it is not easy to buy $110 million worth of FIH.U shares without drastically moving the price. I think it just comes down to 'fair and friendly' and doing the right thing and it comes back around over and over when you always try to behave that way.

It's important to own the landfills - anybody can win a contract to pick up the cans but nobody is granting a permit for a new landfill. The owner of our local landfill, Fred Heebe of River Birch Landfill, is ridiculously rich. I haven't seen a comprehensive biography of Huizenga but this thirty year old article tells a lot of his life story. There is always mafia-adjacency in a business like these, at least in the early years. It's a long article. You'll have to read past the testicle twisting... https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/wayne-huizenga-the-unauthorized-biography-17392137

Thanks for sharing your work Viking. On Eurobank dividends, if we are already recognizing our entire pro-rata share of Eurobank's earnings, why would we benefit from their dividend? Cash in FFH's hands is different than cash retained at Eurobank, but it should not be double counted.

Dinar is probably talking about Fairfax India being classified as a PFIC for US-based investors. I'm not sure it still is, but Americans can hold it inside an IRA type account and avoid the hassles.

BRK proxy - https://www.sec.gov/ixviewer/ix.html?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000119312524069107/d512828ddef14a.htm

Not sure where to post this, either here or in the old Atlas thread but here is the year end 20-F from Atlas / Poseidon, which still reports to the SEC for the Fairfax shareholders who are interested: https://www.sec.gov/ixviewer/ix.html?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1794846/000162828024011260/atco-20231231.htm

You see this sort of "float" with some subscription based businesses where a subscription is sold (cash comes in on day one as total billings) but profit is only recognized over the life of the subscription. I just analyze these companies based on the cash billings and not on GAAP. Some companies are required to hold most of that upfront cash on the books (maybe they offer money back guarantees or have to hold some of it as restricted cash or whatever) so it earns 5% today and more or less in other interest rate environments. A well run, growing insurance business isn't really paying back the float - it is just a revolving fund of fungible capital that should grow over time if conditions are right. Better than the 'un-earned revenue' type of float Anterix would have.

Clearly we are back from the doldrums of exclamation point frugality

I do think the impact of the short report was evident in the increased line by line detail on what the valuations were on each balance sheet mark. A lot more detail than prior years and the intent was obviously to show that these valuations are not crazy reaches.

h/t to kingswell newsletter for highlighting Charlie's memorial service at Harvard Westlake School - Mohnish appears to be the only attendee to post selfies from the event -

The idea is that the pension plan partners won't get stuck with illiquid and unsaleable stock of private businesses. They aren't ever going to IPO or force a sale of a subsidiary but the language is there to protect them. It really is just preferred equity pawn-shop behavior with a friendly partner.

look at all those green candles - what a crap short sale

I don't think Berkshire needs to fill Charlie's board seat since he was not an independent director and Berkshire already had two additional "vice chairmen" (a role that is also not required). But this article got me thinking that Don Graham would probably be a trusted addition by Warren and Berkshire's business with Graham Holdings is concluded as far as I know. Bonus points that Graham is not a fund manager, as the BRK board is a bit heavy on that particular profession. https://www.wsj.com/articles/warren-buffett-minds-the-gaap-berkshire-hathaway-annual-report-earnings-4f6aa571

CIBC raises FFH target to C$2000 from C$1700 fwiw (not much)

https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/indias-iifl-finance-raise-242-mln-via-rights-basis-non-convertible-debentures-2024-03-13/

I guess the closest we have is Matt Levine's column at Bloomberg. Usually pretty hilarious.

Awesome thanks - they obviously hired a talented designer and put a bunch of work into producing it. I figure somewhere there is a big stack of them.

Yeah, I am definitely not advocating for borrowing against Berkshire or any other stock with margin debt (despite the fact that I sometimes do it - but I'm a big boy and I understand the risks). There are other ways to add leverage to your financial life that are far less dangerous for those that are impatient or whatever.

I don't think the insurance companies have that type of dividend capacity to send the money to the holdco for repurchases. And, of course, you couldn't successfully tender for 2/3rds of the stock at current prices and get it (or much at all).

On the subject of Buffett and debt and Berkshire board members making well timed moves with the stock... In 1976 Warren convinced his Mother to sell her 5,272 shares of BRK.A to his sisters Doris & Bertie for $5,440 plus a $100,000 note (to Mom, not the bank or margin). They each got 2,636 A-shares at about $40/share while coming up with only about $2/share in cash. 95% leverage. Kind of puts his stories from this year's annual letter about his sister being one of the greatest investors of all time all on her own into perspective. Charlie Munger did a similarly well-timed masterstroke of estate planning near the absolute bottom of stock prices in the GFC - he got 2,000 A-shares out of his estate, sold to family members in exchange for a promissory note. On 11/20/2008, with BRK.A at $77,500. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1067983/000118143108063602/xslF345X03/rrd224408.xml