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Posted
6 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:


I assume they have less shares to buy for employees than they did 5 years ago because the stock has moved up faster than total comp. 

 

They repurchased a million shares! 

 

Plus it was a joke!

 

Posted (edited)
3 hours ago, gfp said:

 

In past years they have tended to purchase the shares for this purpose (treasury shares to be issued later for compensation) at the beginning of the year and the shares purchased later in the year - like these recent purchases - have gone towards cancellation.

 

During all of 2025 they purchased 118k shares for Treasury.  In Q1 this year they purchased 52k shares for Treasury.  I believe we may see additional purchases for Treasury this year.

 

(corrected number of shares)
 

Edited by Hoodlum
Posted
14 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

 

During all of 2025 they purchased 118k shares for Treasury.  In Q1 this year they purchased 52k shares for Treasury.  I believe we may see additional purchases for Treasury this year.

 

(corrected number of shares)
 

 

I noticed that total dollar value of Shares Purchased for Treasury dropped from $240M in 2024 to $189M in 2025.  I am not sure of the reason for this drop as I would expect the total dollar amount to gradually grow over time as the number of employees increase.  So the total dollar amount that is purchased for treasury in 2026 could vary as well.

Posted
6 minutes ago, Hoodlum said:

 

I noticed that total dollar value of Shares Purchased for Treasury dropped from $240M in 2024 to $189M in 2025.  I am not sure of the reason for this drop as I would expect the total dollar amount to gradually grow over time as the number of employees increase.  So the total dollar amount that is purchased for treasury in 2026 could vary as well.


I believe they’re opportunistic with even the shares purchased for comp so it has some lumpiness 

Posted (edited)
14 hours ago, gokou3 said:

Updated 2025–2026 NCIB Running Ledger

  • TSX Approved Program Maximum: 2,187,316 shares

  • Absorbed in Q4 2025 (Corrected): 464,742 shares

  • Absorbed in Q1 2026: 374,883 shares

  • Absorbed in April 2026: 17,100 shares

  • Absorbed in May 2026 (via SEDI): 170,000 shares

  • Absorbed in June 2026 (via SEDI): 499,413 shares

  • Total Program Shares Cancelled to Date: 1,526,138 shares

Remaining NCIB Runway

  • Remaining Purchase Capacity: 661,178 shares (valid through September 29, 2026)

 

For the remaining purchase capacity I believe you would also need to include the shares purchased for Treasury.  There were 25k shares purchased in Q4 and 52k shares purchased in Q1.  I am not sure what was purchased for Treasury in Q2.  

 

Edited by Hoodlum
Posted (edited)

It appears Fairfax has been very busy on the share buyback front over the past 9 months (Q4-2025 + Q1 + EQ2-2026). We will get confirmation on Q2 amounts when Fairfax reports results.    

  • Shares repurchased: 1.5M, for $2.48B, or ~$1,637/share
  • Diluted share count reduced: 6.6%
  • Total capital returned to shareholders (including dividend): $2.81B

Clearly, Fairfax feels their shares are trading at a very attractive valuation. And they are acting with conviction. 

 

image.png.4419f34a7668f957acd2fd633f77968d.png

 

----------

 

Shareholder Friendly Management

 

It is counterintuitive, but for long-term shareholders a low share price can actually be a gift — if the company is aggressively repurchasing shares. This is especially true when the discount persists for years.

 

Buffett highlighted two major benefits.

 

1. Higher Per-Share Intrinsic Value

 

This is straightforward arithmetic. When a company repurchases undervalued shares, the ownership stake of remaining shareholders increases. Intrinsic value per share rises immediately.

 

2. A Signal of Shareholder-Friendly Management

 

This second benefit is more subtle — and often underappreciated.

 

When management consistently repurchases stock below intrinsic value, it signals disciplined, shareholder-oriented capital allocation rather than empire building. Over time, investors reward this behavior with a higher valuation multiple.

 

Buffett explained it this way in Berkshire Hathaway’s 1984 Annual Report:

 

 

“The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurchases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons - one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.

 

“The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company’s market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. 

 

“This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer...  

 

Warren Buffett – Berkshire Hathaway 1984AR

 

 

Edited by Viking
Posted
2 hours ago, jbwent63 said:

The huge buybacks in June give us a strong hint at their analysis of capital allocation. They spent about $800 million USD on those buybacks that could have been used for other purposes, investments in bonds, equities, minority buybacks etc. Gives you a sense of how overvalued the markets are in their (and many other people's) minds. I'm interested to see if they sold BB to fund any of this. Secondly, I think we have an option to purchase minority interest in Allied World this summer/fall. I wonder if this buyback is instead of that, or in addition to that investment.

 

Always interesting times at Fairfax.

If they think that markets are overvalued, then they are not looking hard enough.  Plenty of great businesses at very attractive valuations 

Posted (edited)
2 hours ago, Viking said:

It appears Fairfax has been very busy on the share buyback front over the past 9 months (Q4-2025 + Q1 + EQ2-2026). We will get confirmation on Q2 amounts when Fairfax reports results.    

  • Shares repurchased: 1.5M, for $2.48B, or ~$1,637/share
  • Diluted share count reduced: 6.6%
  • Total capital returned to shareholders (including dividend): $2.81B

Clearly, Fairfax feels their shares are trading at a very attractive valuation. And they are acting with conviction. 

 

image.png.4419f34a7668f957acd2fd633f77968d.png

 

----------

 

 

Shareholder Friendly Management

 

It is counterintuitive, but for long-term shareholders a low share price can actually be a gift — if the company is aggressively repurchasing shares. This is especially true when the discount persists for years.

 

Buffett highlighted two major benefits.

 

1. Higher Per-Share Intrinsic Value

 

This is straightforward arithmetic. When a company repurchases undervalued shares, the ownership stake of remaining shareholders increases. Intrinsic value per share rises immediately.

 

2. A Signal of Shareholder-Friendly Management

 

This second benefit is more subtle — and often underappreciated.

 

When management consistently repurchases stock below intrinsic value, it signals disciplined, shareholder-oriented capital allocation rather than empire building. Over time, investors reward this behavior with a higher valuation multiple.

 

Buffett explained it this way in Berkshire Hathaway’s 1984 Annual Report:

 

 

“The companies in which we have our largest investments have all engaged in significant stock repurchases at times when wide discrepancies existed between price and value. As shareholders, we find this encouraging and rewarding for two important reasons - one that is obvious, and one that is subtle and not always understood. The obvious point involves basic arithmetic: major repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. When companies purchase their own stock, they often find it easy to get $2 of present value for $1. Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended.

 

“The other benefit of repurchases is less subject to precise measurement but can be fully as important over time. By making repurchases when a company’s market value is well below its business value, management clearly demonstrates that it is given to actions that enhance the wealth of shareholders, rather than to actions that expand management’s domain but that do nothing for (or even harm) shareholders. Seeing this, shareholders and potential shareholders increase their estimates of future returns from the business. 

 

“This upward revision, in turn, produces market prices more in line with intrinsic business value. These prices are entirely rational. Investors should pay more for a business that is lodged in the hands of a manager with demonstrated pro-shareholder leanings than for one in the hands of a self-interested manager marching to a different drummer...  

 

Warren Buffett – Berkshire Hathaway 1984AR

 

 

 

Share buybacks are clearly the dominant use of capital for Fairfax. At 0.9% yield, the dividend is small. But when combined with the buybacks, the total of $2.8 billion over nine months is significant.

 

The interesting thing is this is not the only thing Fairfax is doing on the capital allocation front. Here are a few things from 2026:

  • AGT Foods: converted sponsor notes to equity ($249M) + add to position ($146M)
  • Under Armour: add to position ~$265M?
  • Exit Occidental for proceeds of ~$303M?
  • Foran was taken out by Eldorado Gold
  • Sale of ~50% of Poseidon for proceeds of $1.9B
  • Purchase of Kennedy Wilson for $1.6B
  • Purchase of Peller Estates for $279M

Pending:

  • Orla Gold takeout by Equinox Gold: set to close in Q3?
  • Sale of Eurolife's life insurance business: set to close Q3?

Fairfax has also been very active with debt issuance (and some cancellation).

 

Of note, the insurance business continues to grow modestly.

 

Bottom line, there is a lot going on under the hood in addition to meaningful stock buybacks.

Edited by Viking
Posted
On 7/9/2026 at 1:14 PM, Crip1 said:

Wow...early June is right about when the share price hit rock bottom. Openly wondering where the share price would be now if these purchases had not happened. Clearly, not too many buyers out there...except for the investors who know more about the company than anyone.

 

-Crip

 

BTW, in that table, what does vol mean? It doesn’t seem to mean volume, here, or at least, if it does, it would just be the volume of shares purchased by Fairfax. For instance, in the first line, $944,698,824 is clearly the amount paid (in $C), +416,600 vol seems to be the number of shares purchased, $2267.6400 is the price paid per share (in $C, surely as a block trade), and 500,140 seems to be the cumulative number of shares repurchased within some period of time - is it 30 days? Or quarter to date? Where is this table coming from?

 

The 416,600 shares represent about 2% of shares outstanding, and the cumulative total of 500,140 is clearly higher than 2%.  I think they can exceed the 2% 30-day limit, not because they are buying them on another exchange (these are in $C so I presume they are on the TSX) but rather because that 2% clause only applies to investment funds, not insurance companies or conglomerates. The 2 limits that apply to Fairfax are the 5% of all outstanding shares in a year and the 25% of average daily volume, but with the latter rule not applying to block trades like the 416,600 shares purchased in the week before June 30 and filed on July 9. 

Posted
57 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

The 2 limits that apply to Fairfax are the 5% of all outstanding shares in a year and the 25% of average daily volume, but with the latter rule not applying to block trades like the 416,600 shares purchased in the week before June 30 and filed on July 9. 


Isn’t the limit 5% of shares outstanding OR 10% of the float? It’s interesting they include treasury shares in the float. 

 

 

IMG_8013.jpeg

Posted

 

4 hours ago, netcash1 said:

Another smaller benefit of Fairfax's disciplined buyback strategy is the future reduction of dividend distributions.

Good point.  By year end, I imagine the share count reduction over the last 10 years or so will be in the range of 7 million.  That’s a net reduction of over $100 million per year in required annual dividend distributions. 

Posted
4 hours ago, netcash1 said:

Another smaller benefit of Fairfax's disciplined buyback strategy is the future reduction of dividend distributions.

Also juices up the EPS reported. 

Posted

Pardon me if this is a basic question, but I’m trying to understand the mechanics of converting Fairfax’s TRS position into share buybacks.

My understanding is that the TRS has appreciated substantially since it was established—perhaps on the order of 4X and thus 75–80% of its value is capital gains. If that’s correct, then when the position is eventually settled, Fairfax would likely realize a significant taxable capital gain.

If that’s the case, am I correct in thinking that they can’t simply “cancel” the shares represented by the TRS? Instead, wouldn’t they first have to settle the TRS, pay any applicable corporate tax on the realized gain, and then repurchase shares in the market (or through a negotiated block purchase) in order to actually reduce shares outstanding?

If my understanding is correct, it seems there could be an advantage to unwinding the TRS when Fairfax’s share price is lower rather than higher. A lower share price would mean:

  • A smaller gain realized on the TRS, resulting in less tax being paid.
  • The same amount of after-tax capital could then retire more shares through buybacks.

The tax paid is real cash leaving the company, whereas the benefit of any future appreciation in the repurchased shares accrues to continuing shareholders without an immediate corporate tax cost.

For example, all else being equal, it would seem more attractive to unwind the TRS and buy back shares at around $1,600 per share than at $1,900.

Am I thinking about this correctly, or am I missing an important aspect of how the TRS settlement and buyback process actually works?

Posted
8 hours ago, Txvestor said:

Pardon me if this is a basic question, but I’m trying to understand the mechanics of converting Fairfax’s TRS position into share buybacks.

My understanding is that the TRS has appreciated substantially since it was established—perhaps on the order of 4X and thus 75–80% of its value is capital gains. If that’s correct, then when the position is eventually settled, Fairfax would likely realize a significant taxable capital gain.

If that’s the case, am I correct in thinking that they can’t simply “cancel” the shares represented by the TRS? Instead, wouldn’t they first have to settle the TRS, pay any applicable corporate tax on the realized gain, and then repurchase shares in the market (or through a negotiated block purchase) in order to actually reduce shares outstanding?

If my understanding is correct, it seems there could be an advantage to unwinding the TRS when Fairfax’s share price is lower rather than higher. A lower share price would mean:

  • A smaller gain realized on the TRS, resulting in less tax being paid.
  • The same amount of after-tax capital could then retire more shares through buybacks.

The tax paid is real cash leaving the company, whereas the benefit of any future appreciation in the repurchased shares accrues to continuing shareholders without an immediate corporate tax cost.

For example, all else being equal, it would seem more attractive to unwind the TRS and buy back shares at around $1,600 per share than at $1,900.

Am I thinking about this correctly, or am I missing an important aspect of how the TRS settlement and buyback process actually works?


It’s like saying I should sell my FFH now because if I wait 5 years I’ll have to pay more taxes. That’s a good thing. I think it’s the same here. To me the point of the TRS is to let FFH maintain its leverage (via buybacks) even if the stock gets expensive. 

Posted (edited)
11 hours ago, Txvestor said:

My understanding is that the TRS has appreciated substantially since it was established—perhaps on the order of 4X and thus 75–80% of its value is capital gains. If that’s correct, then when the position is eventually settled, Fairfax would likely realize a significant taxable capital gain.

 

The P/L - less financing fees - is settled either monthly or quarterly (I can't recall which). All of the profits they've made have already been booked and taxes paid except the most recent 1- or 3-month period. 

 

11 hours ago, Txvestor said:

If that’s the case, am I correct in thinking that they can’t simply “cancel” the shares represented by the TRS?

 

Typically, either party could end the contract at any given settlement date. Fairfax has the option to discontinue the swaps basically at any time. 

 

11 hours ago, Txvestor said:
  • .For example, all else being equal, it would seem more attractive to unwind the TRS and buy back shares at around $1,600 per share than at $1,900.

 

 

Depends on what your objective is - minimize taxes or maximize exposure to your own shares. The TRS allow exposure to the Fairfax shares with only 10-20% of the required notional paid. The other 80-90% can buy more shares....but yes, you'll pay more taxes. 

Edited by TwoCitiesCapital
Posted
13 minutes ago, TwoCitiesCapital said:

Depends on what your objective is - minimize taxes or maximize exposure to your own shares. The TRS allow exposure to the Fairfax shares with only 10-20% of the required notional paid. The other 80-90% can buy more shares....but yes, you'll pay more taxes. 


It’s probably the cheapest leverage they have and from my framing that’s what the TRS are cheap (variable) leverage. Buy now pay later for share buybacks. The side benefit is that when the shares trade down, they reduce earnings and BVPS which allows the NCIB to pick up shares cheaper all else equal.

Posted
2 hours ago, SafetyinNumbers said:


It’s probably the cheapest leverage they have and from my framing that’s what the TRS are cheap (variable) leverage. Buy now pay later for share buybacks. The side benefit is that when the shares trade down, they reduce earnings and BVPS which allows the NCIB to pick up shares cheaper all else equal.

 

That‘s an interesting observation, and another accounting difference between share repurchases and the TRS, since swings in share price don’t affect earnings if they have bought back shares but do affect earnings and book value if they have established TRS instead. This means that the TRS might tend to increase volatility, which is just what we should want, given the fact that Fairfax takes advantage of low share prices to repurchase more shares. 

 

Share repurchase limit is 10% of float, or 2.1m shares, yes, thanks for the correction. That means they still have about 0.7m shares they can repurchase this year. 

 

If they have spent $2.8b on shares this year, maybe they will get to about $3.7b by September, reducing share count by a stunning 10%, but also preventing them from getting that much bigger. For comparison, they had record profit of $4.8b last year, and paid out about $300m in dividends in January.

 

Yes they have sold some equities (Orla, Poseidon and Eurolife) but they can also buy back Allied and preferred shares, so altogether, 2026 will be a year where they will have postponed their growth in market capitalization, allowing them to remain that much longer in the sweet spot where they are big, but not so big that small investments stop moving the needle, a problem that Berkshire has run into by not paying dividends and only repurchasing small numbers of shares. 

 

There‘s a lot to be happy about with Fairfax in 2026, despite (and, to some extent, because of) the lull in its share price. 

 

Posted
9 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

 

That‘s an interesting observation, and another accounting difference between share repurchases and the TRS, since swings in share price don’t affect earnings if they have bought back shares but do affect earnings and book value if they have established TRS instead. This means that the TRS might tend to increase volatility, which is just what we should want, given the fact that Fairfax takes advantage of low share prices to repurchase more shares. 

 

Share repurchase limit is 10% of float, or 2.1m shares, yes, thanks for the correction. That means they still have about 0.7m shares they can repurchase this year. 

 

If they have spent $2.8b on shares this year, maybe they will get to about $3.7b by September, reducing share count by a stunning 10%, but also preventing them from getting that much bigger. For comparison, they had record profit of $4.8b last year, and paid out about $300m in dividends in January.

 

Yes they have sold some equities (Orla, Poseidon and Eurolife) but they can also buy back Allied and preferred shares, so altogether, 2026 will be a year where they will have postponed their growth in market capitalization, allowing them to remain that much longer in the sweet spot where they are big, but not so big that small investments stop moving the needle, a problem that Berkshire has run into by not paying dividends and only repurchasing small numbers of shares. 

 

There‘s a lot to be happy about with Fairfax in 2026, despite (and, to some extent, because of) the lull in its share price. 

 

Fairfax is but a tiny fraction of Berkshire's total market cap.  When Berkshire was the size of Fairfax, no one was even considering the possibility that Berkshire would outgrow its investment possibilities (I don't think they have even today).  And when Berkshire was worth just shy of $40 billion, that same $40 billion was worth a lot more.  No question, share buybacks are fine if they are the best investment available to management at the time.  My question always is whether that is the case.  Because of Berkshire's size, that question is more easily answered in favor of Berkshire.  Fairfax still has a lot of growth ahead and shrinking the balance sheet to such a large extent at this stage gives me pause.

Posted
50 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

Share repurchase limit is 10% of float, or 2.1m shares, yes, thanks for the correction. That means they still have about 0.7m shares they can repurchase this year. 


This would be by the September renewal. They can reup then albeit on the lower float size. 

 

52 minutes ago, dartmonkey said:

If they have spent $2.8b on shares this year

I think about it on a calendar year basis b/c of the disclosure around dividend capacity for the insurance subsidiaries. On that basis it’s $1.7b so far this year. I think they have $700m-1.3b left which should be enough to buy the 700k shares. They could always get more creative if those are easy to buy. 

Posted
39 minutes ago, 73 Reds said:

Fairfax still has a lot of growth ahead and shrinking the balance sheet to such a large extent at this stage gives me pause.


The share count is shrinking, the balance sheet is still growing. They are spending < earnings on buybacks.

Posted (edited)
11 minutes ago, SafetyinNumbers said:


The share count is shrinking, the balance sheet is still growing. They are spending < earnings on buybacks.

For me, the question is what they are spending it on.  Ironically, as a long time Berkshire shareholder, I felt the exact opposite way when Buffett completely shunned share buybacks, particularly during the dot com era and during the financial crisis though Buffett was understandably concerned more with the latter.  I guess my feeling is share buybacks should be a tool and are more appropriate for larger, more mature companies.  Truly hope they don't try to buy back 10% of the company each year for lack of other ideas.  

Edited by 73 Reds
word

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