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Posted

Here's the summary of the post:

"Abel kept the Buffett Japan template — friendly, minority, tradition-respecting — and quietly stacked three layers on top of it that Buffett never used....Here is the synthesis, and the actual argument of this piece. The Tokio Marine deal is important not because $1.8 billion moves the Berkshire needle — it doesn’t — but because it solves a structural problem Buffett never solved: how to participate in mid-sized global deals when you are too big to bother with anything under $10 billion. The joint M&A clause lets Berkshire co-invest through Tokio Marine on deals in the $2–5 billion range where TMHD has execution capacity and local knowledge but TMHD might have run out of balance sheet. The quota share lets Berkshire add underwriting income without a full acquisition. The 2.49% equity stake, capped at 9.9%, keeps the relationship frictionless with the Japanese regulator and TMHD’s board. And the five-year exclusivity locks Berkshire into the partnership at a moment when every other Japanese insurer — Sompo, MS&AD — would, credibly, have been lining up for a similar arrangement."

Posted

Recent posted interview (recorded in February 2026) with trader Paul Tudor Jones, perhaps the polar opposite of Warren Buffett.

Jones makes numerous references to Buffett during the interview and how he underestimated and even criticized him over the years. How his view on Buffett has changed, including his realization that Buffett is one the best risk managers the world has ever seen. Not sure why it took him so long to come to that conclusion.

 

Anyway, at 23:40 minutes Tudor Jones mentions a recent interchange he had with Warren regarding the risks of AI. Jones had apparently attended a conference (on the potential risks of AI) 18 months ago and was alarmed by what he had heard and had spoken about it on CNBS. Mr Buffett had watched the piece and immediately reached out to him saying he completely agreed with Jones concerns. Buffett told Jones the "genie was already out of the bottle, and I don't think we can get it completely back in."

 

Tudor Jones:"I think he (Buffett) is completely on board with the belief that we have some very real threats from AI"

Tudor Jones goes on to describe what was discussed at the AI conference he attended which included AI modelers representing each of the major LLM companies. He apparently asked the modelers how the AI safety issue would be resolved. The consensus answer was that the AI safety issue would be resolved "when 50-100 million people die". Scary stuff.

 

A Saturday meeting question, on the potential future risks of AI on Berkshire's business and the world in general, would be a good one to ask.

Posted
On 4/28/2026 at 9:04 AM, NnnnotSoSmart said:

Recent posted interview (recorded in February 2026) with trader Paul Tudor Jones, perhaps the polar opposite of Warren Buffett. in general, would be a good one to ask.

 

Also, an amazing person.  I learned so much about trading, investing -- and kindness.   

Thank you!

Posted
1 hour ago, ratiman said:

This is a good post on the "Buffett puzzle"

 

https://www.creditbubblestocks.com/2026/05/the-buffett-puzzle.html

 

The puzzle is why Buffett invested in a lot of heavy capex and industrial businesses like energy, BNSF, and Precision Castparts when he could have just bought Visa at the IPO because Visa is a classic Buffett business. 


Good investments is also the exceptions not the rules. Capital intensive is ok as long as it’s regulated so you are guaranteed to get reasonable returns — especially for Berkshire its capital costs is 0 (insurance float). 
visa is a tougher business. Just look at how many payments providers were founded and still being founded trying to kill visa. Visa had to spend a fortune to protect its moat. And buffett already have AXP.

 

Posted
13 hours ago, ratiman said:

This is a good post on the "Buffett puzzle"

 

https://www.creditbubblestocks.com/2026/05/the-buffett-puzzle.html

 

The puzzle is why Buffett invested in a lot of heavy capex and industrial businesses like energy, BNSF, and Precision Castparts when he could have just bought Visa at the IPO because Visa is a classic Buffett business. 

 

I'm still unconvinced. I think prices are excessive. PE20 equals 20 years of earnings at no growth to "get back" your investment. So either, you bet your horse on growth or you bet someone else is willing to pay more for your assets later.

Both are gambling imo. when everyone starts normalizing these prices, it shows more that this is a peak of a bubble than anything else
 

Posted (edited)
17 hours ago, ratiman said:

The puzzle is why Buffett invested in a lot of heavy capex and industrial businesses like energy, BNSF, and Precision Castparts when he could have just bought Visa at the IPO because Visa is a classic Buffett business. 

 

I stopped reading his post at the sentence about BNSF earning a pittance on its replacement value. He's misreading Buffett's comment—it's fine that BNSF earns a pittance on its replacement value (hundreds of billions of dollars), what matters is Berkshire's return on the price it *paid* for BNSF, which was way, way below its replacement value. 

 

In fact, Buffett believes BNSF's high replacement value is a key source of its moat! Who would devote the capex to build a competitor that'd earn such meager returns on replacement value in the end? 

Edited by charlieruane
Posted
1 hour ago, charlieruane said:

 

I stopped reading his post at the sentence about BNSF earning a pittance on its replacement value. He's misreading Buffett's comment—it's fine that BNSF earns a pittance on its replacement value (hundreds of billions of dollars), what matters is Berkshire's return on the price it *paid* for BNSF, which was way, way below its replacement value. 

 

In fact, Buffett believes BNSF's high replacement value is a key source of its moat! Who would devote the capex to build a competitor that'd earn such meager returns on replacement value in the end? 

+1. I felt as much re: Buffet's rationale for BNSF.

Posted (edited)
1 hour ago, charlieruane said:

 

I stopped reading his post at the sentence about BNSF earning a pittance on its replacement value. He's misreading Buffett's comment—it's fine that BNSF earns a pittance on its replacement value (hundreds of billions of dollars), what matters is Berkshire's return on the price it *paid* for BNSF, which was way, way below its replacement value. 

 

In fact, Buffett believes BNSF's high replacement value is a key source of its moat! Who would devote the capex to build a competitor that'd earn such meager returns on replacement value in the end? 

 

💯

 

Buffett said many times that BNSF earns a pittance on replacement value but then they paid a tiny fraction of the replacement value when they bought BNSF, so return-on-Berkshire's equity is pretty decent. 

 

I think this blogger completely misses the big picture of Berkshire. It's not that Buffett doesn't love businesses that produce great earnings w/o requiring any capital. Of course he does; but there aren't that many that are in his comfort zone (where he can see how the business looks 10 years from now), that are available for a reasonable price. When he found one (apple), he loaded up. Meanwhile they need an outlet for reinvestment for all the cash being generated where they can earn a decent if unspectacular returns on capital that involves huge capex dollars. Therefore the pivot to relatively safe, capital intensive businesses like BHE, BNSF & other industrial companies. The whole idea is to keep the reinvestment engine going as long as they can. At some point they will reach a plateau (I hope that day is far off) but I consider it a sad day for Berkshire shareholders. 

Edited by Munger_Disciple
Posted
30 minutes ago, Munger_Disciple said:

Therefore the pivot to relatively safe, capital intensive businesses like BHE, BNSF & other industrial companies. The whole idea is to keep the reinvestment engine going as long as they can.

Plus, the moat of these capital intensive regulated businesses strengthen during inflationary periods, imho.

Posted

The message was very clear this weekend. "No one is going to push us around or tell us what to do."

 

BNSF is a HUGE part of that. 

Posted (edited)
22 minutes ago, Hektor said:

Plus, the moat of these capital intensive regulated businesses strengthen during inflationary periods, imho.

 

Actually no! That's one big risk with regulated capital intensive businesses. The rate increases have to be approved by regulators in each state who are political appointees. So they will delay the rate increases as long as they can. That's a disadvantage in an inflationary environment unfortunately. 


Berkshire is "partially" hedged due to the focus on wind and solar power but no, I wouldn't say that regulated utilities perform well under inflationary conditions. 

Edited by Munger_Disciple
Posted
5 minutes ago, Munger_Disciple said:

The rate increases have to be approved by regulators in each state who are political appointees. So they will delay the rate increases as long as they can. That's a disadvantage in an inflationary environment unfortunately. 

May be. But the moat strengthens. Who will plow in more/larger amount of capital to build a competitor that can only earn the same return as Berkshire.

Posted

Buffett's thinking on high capital intensity changed as he had more capital to manage and businesses that threw off more and more capital every year.  So his points on capex and inflation still hold, but he looked to invest in high capital intensity businesses where the moat (regulatory/legal, necessities of life, low cost/high need) are still strong. He kind of took on Morris Chang's high capital intensity strategy with TSMC.

 

BHE is hedged on energy better in some markets than in other markets.  MidAmerican is great, but PC, NV Energy are less hedged on solar/batteries/wind.

 

I think the big issue with regulated utilities is if under high inflation, their regulated ROE is lowered, while their maintenance capex and replacement capex costs rise substantially, making it harder and harder for them to provide power and guarantee reliability and safety.

Posted

Berkshire Picks Gen Re Chairman as Insurance Star Ajit Jain’s Successor

Charlie Shamieh, an insurance-industry veteran, is slated to succeed Jain whenever he is ready to retire

 

Berkshire Hathaway has selected Gen Re chairman Charlie Shamieh as the successor to longtime insurance mastermind Ajit Jain, aiming to ensure a smooth leadership transition at one of the conglomerate’s most critical businesses, people familiar with the matter said. 
 

Shamieh will step in to run Berkshire’s sprawling insurance arm when Jain decides to retire, the people said. Jain, a 74-year-old executive who Berkshire chairman Warren Buffett has said is irreplaceable, hasn’t signaled when he will step down. He is expected to remain in the role for the foreseeable future

 

 

https://www.wsj.com/business/berkshire-picks-gen-re-chairman-as-insurance-star-ajit-jains-successor-e857bb5f?st=c6BVTq

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