John Hjorth

Wow! - 65 votes right now... This comes to mind:

Og, who are you, posting here on CoBF? Are you the provider & interviewer on this podcast? [Please leave Spekulatius out of this question.]

Please take the poll. And please feel free to comment the way you like. Gross position defined as if you use leverage.

Dynamic, lol. Well, the chess watch on that has perhaps not only run out - Perhaps the metal parts of it are now already recycled into a SUV right front fender. On a serious note, I'm happy I in this topic opted for voters to edit. Errare humanum est.

Bumping this up for informational purpose here - here, especially for Dynamic : You should be able to fine tune your vote - with an "Edit vote" button, if you feel inclined to do so. Also, I suppose - by logic - that option disappears within 90 days.

Bumping this up by quoting, with attachment! - - - o 0 o - - - Anybody of my fellow board members willing to take firm, unconditional & binding WAG [<- learned that expression from longinvestor! [ : - D ]] stab at: Berkshire portfolio material [quantified by name] additions [net] in 2018Q4, Berkshire buybacks in 2018Q4, measured in USD B, & Berkshire liquidity EOP 2018Q4 [Total cash plus US T-Bills] ? [ : - ) ] BRK_-_Estimated_selfimposed_acquisition_capacity_in_USD_M_in_AAPL_and_relevant_US_banks_EOP_2018Q3_-_20181218.xlsx

Holdings Channel : All Stocks Held By Sprucegrove Investment Management Ltd. as of September 30th 2018.

bizaro, Thanks for the examples, but please try to keep this "general" [faithful to the general line of thinking of Pete]. Examples [why not start based on what some CoBF members would consider "homebias"] : [VWS.CPH] - Vestas Wind Systems A/S : Near death experiences two times, if you include its predessescors. New and current management steered the ship off the cliff. Forward looking: A steal? I [still] don't know. [Great management now, not sure of the business prospects going forward, - before : documented awfull management, in a "?" business. [What will it get you, if you buy it now?] [DANSKE.CPH] - In rear hindsight, a great business [a minor part of it being absolutely rotten], earlier run by bad & by principles, incompetent management. Now new management. [What will it get you, if you buy it now?]

No, I don't think so - they're tightly related. Pete, I hope I've understood your "No" here as to you, I'm not clogging up the topic. To me, it's like a two dimensional proposition [here : simplified]: Company : Good - mediocre - bad, Management : Good - mediocre - bad. That simplified perception gives you 9 applicable investor modus operandi [please feel free to refine, if needed]. ... They are all some sort of opportunity of dumpster diving for a value investor, based on variant perceptions to market, market sentiment, company sentiment etc. -No matter what you do, the price you pay matters.

Hi John, that's fine. I often edit my posts several times after I write them and I'm sure people end up seeing multiple versions. I try not to offend anyone more than is necessary, although I do admit my sarcasm runneth over from time to time. Graham, I see you read my reply to you exactly the way it was meant. [ : - ) ] Please just ditch and disregard mentally the posts in this topic, that you personally consider dishonest - A tiny test by supplementary questions does not hurt, and it's it: No reply is also a reply. [ : - ) ] - Simply waste of mental energy for your part. [i've been there, done that, got that shirt for prior years ... [i.e.: outstanding return relatively to CoBF average in an up year, combined with reported > 50% percent average cash position during the year, and no visible activity during the year here on CoBF on what that particular CoBF member has been up to during the year, - and no reply to my question.] -Let it go!

That's a great topic, Pete, because I think it's NEW!, As investors [at least, the long term of us], we certainly need both a good company and a good management to create good investment outcomes. So to me personally, it's somehow a twisted, outdated phrase. Personally, - and somewhat related to the topic - I also question the existence in real life today of "the company, that could be run by any idiot, because, eventually, it will". [i hope I'm not clogging up the topic here.]

Graham, Thank you for your latest edit of your last post. Please remember that there is no right of withdrawal of your original post, as it ends up in many CoBF members' inboxes via notifications.

I'm just kicking in a footnote here. I looked up the FFH portfolio at Dataroma, using the "activity" button for Fairfax. [it would be like searching for a needle in a haystack that perhaps not was there to walk through the filings directly.] There is no sign of VRX for the FFH portfolio on Dataroma. So I think it's safe to say that FFH has not been long VRX in the last few years [after 2013 - VRX tanked in 2016]. Thank you for a great discussion in this forum [not only in this topic] about FFH lately, especially to Pete.

Today, I've had an exchange on Twitter with Gísly [CoBF member: Sportsgamma], that I consider worth repeating here : Gísly: <Please put in here some kind of amusement expressed by me> After which I got from Gísly.

Thank you for a mutual mind provoking statement. Time will tell.

aws, Yes, very provoking statement from me in my last post, I'll give you that. But - at least to me - that's just a part of being a Berkshire investor - a positive one, may I add. [Mr. Buffett operating in the fat [read: [almost] unthinkable] tails. He is [historically proven] extremely good at this. Again, please look at the data, that I've provided in my last attachment in this topic. Berkshire AAPL position EOP 2018Q3 [ex. NEAM] : 252,478,779. Average daily volume according to Yahoo Finance : 42,876,784. So, why shouldn't Mr. Buffett trade it, if he felt inclined to? -He is not constrained by liquidity in the stock here and can do the trade without any kind of flagging. My above statement was not some sort of prediction.

Parslaars, That's really bad to read. My best wishes for the health & future of your child!

Thanks Hjorth. I'd missed that. I'm getting the low 160's as the basis through Q3. You're welcome Libs, Today I've been thinking more about how to proceed with this reverse engineering of the AAPL position. I've come an interim conclusion so far, that I'm on a wild goose chase here, contemplating to do Sisyphus work. This is about what's been going on with Berkshire's AAPL position i 2018Q3 [not so much for the two quarters prior in 2018]. The point here is, that Mr. Buffett may have trimmed the AAPL position on it's way up in the run-up to the top near EOP 2018Q3, and may have have trimmed it further down on the slide on the other side of the top, perhaps even without buying near yearend and its recent lows as of now. There is no legal way to find out, until we see the next Berkshire portfolio report on EDGAR mid February. There is nothing to triangulate on, nor even to intercept on - because we have only two dots hanging up in the sky [on EDGAR] - Berkshire's EOP 2018Q2 & EOP 2018Q3 AAPL positions. So please stay open minded towards that Berkshire's AAPL position at YE2018 [with regard to number of shares] may be lower than at EOP 2018Q3.

I suppose your point of measurement here is EOP 2018Q3, - which in this market development since then is ages ago.

Viking, Thank you very much for keeping us in loop with regard to updates on relevant US macro stuff [macro stuff, that matters, by the way!]. I have now put it [the Gundlach presentation] in my calendar, so that I don't miss it, and I'm looking forward to that. [ : - ) ]

StubbleJumper, I know for a fact that won't happen as long as Mr. Buffett is alive - perhaps not even before his estate is finally settled. The reason is that it hoses some dividend taxes into the coffers of the US IRS, generates cash for Mr. Buffet that he does not want or need, and thereby also dilutes his gift promises. So you know it, too. The wonders of having a controlling shareholder ... I think it's called so.

Libs, It's in my last attachment in this topic. [The last known one, that is, ref. globalfinancepartners.]

Exactly - what globalfinancepartners just said. So from here: High hopes for continued scrambling around below 200 for the B, combined with high daily volumes!

StubbleJumper & alwaysinvert, How do you feel and think about the whole thing today Monday? - In a time context, your posts was just after the Berkshire 10-Q was released. Now we have had ongoing discussion during the weekend and analysis of the 10-Q, and it has come up that about ~USD 15B has been allocated to financials during 2018Q3 [- of the ~USD 15 B ~USD 6 B allocated to BAC -], on top of the share buyback of ~USD 1 B in the quarter. Furthermore considerations/speculations [ time will tell ] that more capital has been allocated to perhaps BK, USB & GS, perhaps even new positions in financials. Personally, I was a bit disappointed just after the release of the 10-Q, too. After a couple of nights sleep on it, I have a good feeling about this here Monday morning. The upward trend in liquidity surplus has been turned, and Berkshire is still the Rock of Gibraltar. All in all, not that bad, because it's actually able to generate good earnings and cash flow as it is. John, Since the beginning, I have been skeptical of the Apple position because it struck me as outside of WEBs circle of competence and it has always struck me as a desperate move to deploy a large amount of cash. The catalyst for that move has never quite been obvious to me -- what has Apple done in the past 12 or 18 months that suddenly merited such a large chunk of shareholders' capital? The price didn't plunge rapidly to make it a 50 cent dollar. Nope it was bought on fundamentals and operating results. But, after racking up $110B± of cash it looks like brk is grasping for reasons to not initiate a healthy sized dividend or to not buy back a large slug of shares. Turning to the purchase of large US financial companies (banks), nearly everybody on this board took a high conviction position about 5 or 6 years ago and we have made out like bandits. The banks are still a buy, IMO, but are not as cheap as when we were all pounding on the table about BAC or JPM back in '11 or '12. So why is brk suddenly taking a high(er) conviction position in the banks right at this moment? A what point during the past five or so years were the US banks not an obvious purchase? To be blunt, it was value in plain sight. How did brk accumulate $110B± of cash when the banks have been an obvious outlet to deploy cash for the past 20 or so quarters? The actions of the past year or so have struck me as a desperate effort to deploy cash and deny a basic reality. That reality is that cash from ops is basically $40b per year. Take off something for maintenance capex, new plant and equipment, and opportunistic acquisitions and you're looking at reasonably reliable cash surplus of about $20b per year. The opportunities to deploy that much capital on an ongoing basis are not available in sufficient quality and high enough expected return to continue retaining 100 percent of earnings. SJ I'm sorry for the dense quotation above - Here I'm going back to this particular post by StubbleJumper from about two months ago, which was a direct reply to me, which I somehow managed to miss to thank you for StubbleJumper. So, thank you StubbleJumper, & please accept my apology for a very late reply here. - - - o 0 o - - - Here, this is particularly for me about Berkshire's position in Apple. Yes, it's in a way "controversial" to me, too. I've been thinking a lot about it lately, and have also felt forced to do some work on the company to get a better understanding, simply because of the size of the position for Berkshire. -And yes, then comes in the recent events with Apple... I'm in my early innings with Apple, still, but I like it. What has happened while Mr. Buffett has built the position - now to the largest one - is so far to me like a page intentionally left blank. So I have tried to do something about that, by just looking at some data, in a structured way, yet without getting into some real tinkering with data. So the file contains right now just a pile of data, but on the tab "Interim overall assessment" I have structured them to give a visual overview for the first three quarters of 2018. [Data for building the position for 2016 & 2017 I just consider history - but important data for understanding Berkshire's cost of the AAPL position]. Just by looking at the structured data for the three quarters, I feel quite confident, that Mr. Buffett hasen't been buying at wrong prices in 2018Q4, because he hasen't bought much in 2018Q3 on its way up. At least that feels comforting. [Personally, I'm totally indifferent towards the wild gyrations in the stock lately - but the cost of the position matters to me long term]. Some time ago I posted here in this topic some calculations of what Mr. Buffett max. could pour into AAPL, based on EOP 2018Q3 market prices [uSD ~50 B], which I ref. above feel confident hasen't taken place in 2018Q4. - - - o 0 o - - - The liquidity of the AAPL stock is much better than BRK.A/BRK.B - So how do you think Mr. Buffett has instructed the broker to buy AAPL during the first three quarters of 2018? - Let me hear you, and I'll start tinkering the data. - - - o 0 o - - - File attached. BRK_-_Reverse_engineering_of_AAPL_position_-_2018Q1_-_2018Q4_-_Beta1_-_20190104.xlsx

Surely you know about his giving program? He is actively trying to make his wealth go to zero. This exchange is actually a bit funny! [ : - ) ] - Serious mistake in those original gift letters, giving away 5 percent each year, while Berkshire grows ~10 percent each year. So he fails miserably! [ : - ) ] -Mr. Munger would call Mr. Buffett a young, failing overachiever, still collecting more nudgets than he gives away!