Iran - Israel - Gaza Conflict

[mcliu]

Ontario. Are you in Quebec?

I think Ontario's in a bigger mess than most of the country because most newcomers end up here.

[mcliu]

2 hours ago, Xerxes said:

100%

 

And pay our NATO bills.

it ain’t free.  

 

Also crime. People are buying bollards for their driveways cause car theft has gotten so bad.

 

We just don't have the budget for NATO because so much money is wasted here. CAD is breaking record lows. We don't even know what the deficit looks like for this year. Govt is bent on spending more and more. I guess that's what we should expect when the guy in charge thinks the "budget will balance itself".

[Xerxes]

1 hour ago, mcliu said:

Ontario. Are you in Quebec?

I think Ontario's in a bigger mess than most of the country because most newcomers end up here.

yeap. 
La Belle Province. 

[Spekulatius]

Fighting two wars is getting expensive:

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-budget-deficit-dips-79gdp-oct-despite-higher-war-expenses-2024-11-11/#:~:text=The ministry said that despite,first 10 months of 2024.

 

[mcliu]

This is kind interesting. Israel has been running annual budget deficit (3-7%) for the last 25 years.

 

But because their GDP has grown so quickly. Debt to GDP has gone from ~90% of GDP to ~60%.

 

[mcliu]

https://nationalpost.com/news/hamas-vastly-inflated-gaza-death-statistics-study-shows

[Spekulatius]

On 12/14/2024 at 2:39 PM, mcliu said:

This is kind interesting. Israel has been running annual budget deficit (3-7%) for the last 25 years.

 

But because their GDP has grown so quickly. Debt to GDP has gone from ~90% of GDP to ~60%.

 

Yes, if you run a 4% deficit and have 4% growth, your debt/income ratio stays the same.

[Dinar]

I would be very careful in comparing budget deficit as a % of GDP and debt/GDP across countries.  In some countries (Italy, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, most of Africa, Egypt, etc) there is a very high cash economy as a % of GDP that is not recorded.  In other places such as Germany/Switzerland/Netherlands/Sweden/Finland, I would assume much less tax evasion.  

[Spekulatius]

35 minutes ago, Dinar said:

I would be very careful in comparing budget deficit as a % of GDP and debt/GDP across countries.  In some countries (Italy, Israel, Russia, Ukraine, most of Africa, Egypt, etc) there is a very high cash economy as a % of GDP that is not recorded.  In other places such as Germany/Switzerland/Netherlands/Sweden/Finland, I would assume much less tax evasion.  

Germany has a decent cash economy too, I can assure that. Germans like paying in cash, getting paid in cash for good reasons and it’s not just because modern payments don’t exist. You get a better deal from a small contractor paying on cash than with credit or check, same than in the US. FWIW, the last car I bought in Germany from a dealer ( a low mileage almost new Vorführwagen)  was paid in cash and I got a very good deal on that one, that was in the 90‘s but I am sure I could do the same thing now.

[mcliu]

23 hours ago, Spekulatius said:

Yes, if you run a 4% deficit and have 4% growth, your debt/income ratio stays the same.

Rare to see this today! All major economies are seeing debt/gdp ratios exploding higher.

 

On 12/15/2024 at 2:26 PM, mcliu said:

https://nationalpost.com/news/hamas-vastly-inflated-gaza-death-statistics-study-shows

Surprise surprise, Palestinian health authority aka Hamas dramatically over-inflates Gaza civilians deaths.

 

[Xerxes]

1 hour ago, mcliu said:

Surprise surprise, Palestinian health authority aka Hamas dramatically over-inflates Gaza civilians deaths.

 

is that a re-post of yesterday.
 

Why is it surprising that Hamas inflates numbers. Hamas does make up a lot of stuff. 

 

directionally though, does it matter ?  

 

[mcliu]

3 hours ago, Xerxes said:

is that a re-post of yesterday.
 

Why is it surprising that Hamas inflates numbers. Hamas does make up a lot of stuff. 

 

directionally though, does it matter ?  

 

How is it a genocide?

Edited December 17 by mcliu

[Xerxes]

Genocide  ? where does that comes from 

 

I thought we were friends. We were exchanging jokes about Trudeau just a moment ago. Now I am put on spot and required to take sides on this genocide discussion. 
 

good lord. 
 

 

[mcliu]

1 hour ago, Xerxes said:

Genocide  ? where does that comes from 

 

I thought we were friends. We were exchanging jokes about Trudeau just a moment ago. Now I am put on spot and required to take sides on this genocide discussion. 
 

good lord. 
 

 

Sorry, it's more of a rhetorical question. Anyone with common sense knows what's happening in Gaza is a tragedy but not a genocide. The media is at fault for parroting Hamas figures without skepticism.

 

Anyhow it's absurd that these Palestinian "anti-zionist" supporters are protesting in Jewish neighbourhoods in Canada as if they have any influence over Israeli policy.

 

It sounds like Israel and Hamas are close to a ceasefire agreement. 

https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-gaza-war-ceasefire-egypt-qatar-264087c7a547031a9433ecbbdcd920d2

[Xerxes]

https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/12/why-did-iran-allow-assads-downfall?lang=en

 

Unlike in 2016, when Iranian ground forces complemented Russian air support in the siege of Aleppo, neither patron demonstrated the will or capability to launch a similar counteroffensive. Both powers had grown increasingly frustrated with Assad’s intransigence. For Russia and Iran, Assad was their man until he wasn’t.

 

By early 2024, both Iran and Russia had changed when it came to the Syrian president. Russia was particularly incensed by his repeated violations of the Idlib deescalation agreement and stubborn resistance to any form of a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile, Iran found its once-considerable influence over Damascus steadily eroding, with Assad increasingly charting an independent course that often conflicted with Tehran’s regional objectives. Iran’s suspicions of Assad deepened after a series of leaks disclosed the movements of IRGC officials that culminated in Israeli strikes on these officials in Syria. The Quds Force, once given relatively free rein in Syria, now found its movements increasingly restricted by the Syrian authorities, with Assad refusing to allow the use of the Golan Heights as a potential front against Israel. Perhaps most provocatively, Damascus had begun limiting Shiite religious activities throughout Syria—a direct challenge to Iran’s efforts to expand its ideological and cultural influence in the region.

 

By the time rebels launched their offensive, neither Iran nor Russia saw sufficient value in expending further resources to prop up a regime that had become more liability than asset.

…,.

 

Iran’s initial response suggested a familiar playbook—the mobilization of Iraqi militias to shore up Assad’s defenses. However, the Iraqi government refused to allow these forces to cross into Syria. Rather than challenge this decision, Iran acquiesced with surprising ease. In a stunning development, Iranian-backed forces abandoned their most strategic asset—control of the Syrian-Iraqi border crossing—without any resistance. The IRGC and pro-Iran Iraqi fighters had already pulled out of Deir al-Zor before Kurdish forces moved in, leading to the swift capture of the crucial Qa’im-Bukamal border crossing by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

 

……

 

The governorate of Deir al-Zor and its border crossing at Bukamal had served as Iran’s crown jewel in Syria, representing a vital link in Tehran’s regional ambitions. After capturing control of Deir al-Zor from the Islamic State group in 2017, Iran transformed this eastern Syrian region into a crucial corridor for projecting power across the Levant. The Qa’im-Bukamal crossing became the linchpin in Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon, facilitating the movement of weapons, fighters, and supplies to its proxy forces throughout the region.

 

The significance of Deir al-Zor was not just in its logistical value. Iran had invested heavily in securing this territory, establishing a network of military bases, and cultivating deep ties with local tribal leaders. The Iranians exploited Arab grievances against both the Islamic State and later the SDF, while simultaneously using the region to pressure U.S. forces stationed at the Tanf garrison and near the Conoco gas field. Iranian-backed militias frequently launched attacks against American positions from this territory, making it a theater in the broader U.S.-Iranian regional competition. Yet when Assad’s regime began to fall apart, Iran made the surprising decision to cede this vital territory to the SDF. This retreat perhaps reflected a more nefarious, long-term strategy—betting that the persistent tensions between Kurdish forces and the local Arab population and Turkish-backed rebel forces would eventually create new opportunities for a return of Iranian influence.

Edited 19 hours ago by Xerxes

[Spekulatius]

I think it’s right to say that Syria wasn’t worth doubling up on for both Russia and Iran for the reasons mentioned. The Assad regime was just a lousy partner and both Iran and Russia are weakened by the other wars that make it harder to allocate more resources to this tertiary battlefield.

 

I am fairly sure that Iran is closely watching the situation and  plans for some comeback eventually.