S&P indexing is moronic right now

[no_free_lunch]

Thank you boiler maker.

 

Cigarbutt, this is possible.  Earnings + dividend should provide a roughly 100-200% return above inflation over next 20 years assuming constant valuation.  If we are on the lower end of that return (100%), and if valuations were cut in half then you would roughly match inflation.  Bonds are yielding about inflation so that should be roughly ERP 0.  Definitely possible, we have seen worse.

 

Only question is what to do for someone with an existing portfolio.  What time of allocation would you use then?

[Cigarbutt]

no_free_lunch,

 

"Only question is what to do for someone with an existing portfolio.  What time of allocation would you use then?"

 

I only wish I had an answer.

 

We all have to come to our own personal decisions.

 

Maybe I don't know what I'm doing or maybe it takes character to sit there and do nothing with all that cash (Munger).

I hate to think that I'm a know-nothing but it's possible.

 

Want to learn and that's why I'm here. In the meantime, will continue to search companies (properly?).

[rukawa]

-What the graph and basic deductions mean:

--)% equity allocation in the aggregate is essentially explained by change in price.

--)so we can conclude that markets are cyclical (we won't get the Nobel prize for that conclusion).

 

Concluding that markets are cyclical and predicting future returns are two very different things. He predicts future 10 year returns given today's info and he does it better than CAPE and other intrinsic metrics which to me is very impressive.

 

--)another consensual conclusion is that if markets are high, returns will tend to be lower going forward (no need for thousands of words here).

 

How do you know markets are high as you put it? That is the crux of the issue. He identifies a clear way to determine that. You take for granted something that is enormously important as if its absolutely nothing. It would be like be saying investing is simple...just buy low and sell high. Its not simple because knowing when something is low isn't obvious. And know when its high is also not obvious. Almost all of this thread concerns whether the market is low or high. He gives a way better than any other to figure that out.

 

The points of my last post:

These statements are truisms and derive form basic math.

These statements, as expressed, suggest (wrongly in my opinion) that what causes markets going up or down is the actual "participation" of investors or absence thereof in the markets.

 

So you are saying his statements are truisms which implies its impossible for them to be false. Simultaneously you believe the statements to be wrong. His statements cannot be truisms because they predict the future. And your statements above are contradictory...you can't say something is obviously true and simultaneously say I don't think its true.

 

What seems to be surprising to the author of the article and the author of the previous links that you provide is not surprising at all. It can simply be explained by basic mathematics.

 

There is absolutely nothing in basic math that can explain any of this. There is nothing that requires equity allocations to mean revert.

[Cigarbutt]

Let’s see if we can agree on a few things.

 

From the graphs (and basic math), we can infer that the major factor explaining (did not say causing) the change in % investor equity allocation is change in share price.

 

The author shows that there is a tendency to have an inverse relationship between % investor equity allocation (and therefore share price) and returns going forward.

 

This is just another example of valuation tools (stock market cap/GDP etc) used to infer forward returns.

 

For example: (graph using marketCap/GVA)

https://www.hussmanfunds.com/wmc/wmc170306.htm

 

And I agree in principle. But these subsequent return "indicators" are not true "predictors", they are variables that will reveal self-fulfilling prophecies associated with the direction of prices in the context of mean-reverting financial variables. If you don't "believe" in mean reversion, just think of this concept as variations along the trend.

 

There is nothing to suggest that % investor equity allocation is the single greatest predictor, as the author suggests in the title.

 

In fact, the two lines on the graphs will continue to show a tendency to converge but the correlation may weaken intermittently. See recent update related to an alternative presentation that you provided in this discussion.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-rising-stock-ownership-by-us-households-may-be-a-bad-omen-2017-03-16

 

Now to go back to the thread, if you look at these types of analysis, the expected subsequent return over the next 10 to 12 years should gravitate towards the range of 0 to 2% per year. Quite unusual. No?

 

Now, if your time horizon is 10 to 12 years and you reasonably expect that kind of return when you invest in an index fund, then everything is OK.

 

But I doubt that the passive investing pool of investors truly understand the implications.

 

Don’t want too pound too much on the issue but correlation is not causation. Some time ago, I read an article showing a correlation between breast cancer risk for women and the number of bathrooms in the house. The first thing to do is to rule out spurious correlation (statistical fluke). If a “true” correlation, before moving to a house with no bathrooms, it may be helpful to try to figure the driving force(s) behind this correlation. Referring to the link on reply #46, the driving forces behind rising share prices (and % investor equity allocation), in the last 20 to 30 years, have not been based upon fundamentals but on PE expansion and increased net margins.

 

Disclosure: believer in long term mean-reverting tendencies.

Also liked that book:

https://www.amazon.com/Unexpected-Returns-Understanding-Secular-Market/dp/1879384620

 

[rukawa]

There is nothing to suggest that % investor equity allocation is the single greatest predictor, as the author suggests in the title.

 

I agree with most of what you wrote except what is above. There is something very strong to suggest that it is the single greatest predictor...it fact that its extremely good. See the following graph:

http://i2.wp.com/www.philosophicaleconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/linearavg1.jpg

 

Its an extremely tight fit. You can compare it to CAPE which has the following graph. CAPE is the best "intrinsic" value indicator and has a much worse fit:

http://i2.wp.com/www.philosophicaleconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/linearshiller1.jpg

 

Anyways I'm going to update everything this weekend and see what its predicting.

 

 

[Cigarbutt]

OK. Just beware of adventurous curve fitting.

http://www.philosophicaleconomics.com/2013/12/valuation-and-returns-adventures-in-curve-fitting/

"But, admittedly, the metric doesn’t deserve the reputation for predictive precision that the chart, by chance, affords it."

[Cigarbutt]

Thought the following is interesting in terms of expectations:

http://www.collaborativefund.com/blog/were-all-out-of-touch/

http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/events/seminars/capitalMarket/2008/1032_S_Nagel.pdf

 

What's the point:

Your investing experience (especially the recent one (recency bias), and actually going through booms and busts even a long time ago) will have, in general, a significant impact on your risk/return expectations.

 

So, the decision to index/invest or not, for the typical investor, has a lot to do with when you were born and when you started investing.

Of course, as individual investors with strong egos, that does not really matter.

The trouble/challenge/fun aspect of this is that you find out how you did only looking retrospectively.

The future, as always, remains uncertain. Focus on process, they say, not results.

 

The first step though is to win the genetic lottery.

http://tonyisola.com/2017/11/if-you-are-reading-this-you-already-won-the-genetic-lottery/

 

[investmd]

I have the opposite opinion of the current masses on Indexing (right now).  More than any other time in history that I can think of, almost everyone seems on one side of the boat in recommending and liking indexing.

In practice if you buy the S&P 500 it is like you are buying one massive US Company.  And if that Company is way overvalued your returns will stink until value catches up with the price.  And currently the S&P is a ripoff - especially with low GDP growth.  At something like 26x P/E you might have 7-9 years of 1% return per year while the downside could be 30-50% in the near term. 

 

Previous market bubbles saw individual and institutional investors excited over individual stocks.  Today indexes are all the rage.  I guess the koolaid tastes too great - until one's liver stops working.

 

I generally agree with indexing but at fair or undervalued levels.  Not today.

 

 

Have followed with interest this thread started by LongHaul. Tried to re-read most of it to see if there is a consensus opinion on one side or the other. My summary of the thread is that although there are a variety of opinions, the majority do NOT feel that S&P indexing is moronic right now. Reasonable conclusion?

 

Whilst arguments have been made in the thread for overvaluation of equities and high % of portfolios in equity, I have to think that long term index investing is still the optimal strategy for 90+% of people who are not part of this Board. If a friend with reasonable intellect but  little interest/understanding of markets asked me how they should invest their savings, I think I would still suggest broad spectrum, ultra low fee ETFs, ie: the Buffett suggestion. After reading this thread, is this wrong?

 

For those of us on this Board who seek alpha, index investing might be more reasonable when valuations are not so high, but it is likely not moronic now. 

[clutch]

For those of us on this Board who seek alpha, index investing might be more reasonable when valuations are not so high, but it is likely not moronic now.

 

Well, if you seek alpha, you should never index, regardless of valuations.

 

It's really simple. Indexing -> your return = market average, therefore alpha = 0.

 

If one thinks indexing is moronic because of market valuations, what's the alternative for non-stock-pickers? Cash? Canadian real estate? maybe Bitcoin??  ;D

 

[Packer16]

I have read this thread and I think there are a few frame issues.  First, most if not all the indicators of an expensive market are based upon periods of time when interest rates were much higher so IMO using much of this data becomes less relavent in today's environment because your choices are different, in terms of returns investing in low risk fixed income.  Also, the idea of being able to predict expected returns is powerful but illusive as the historic track records in helping asset allocation has been poor (see Grantham's & others LT predictions).

 

Also, what data do you have for a zero ERP?  As far as I can see this does not exist but support of an ERP in the 4 to 6% forward looking ERP does exist from Damodaran on his NYU site & the historic ERP is in this range.

 

Packer

[Cigarbutt]

You may be right in a lot of ways.

In investing, the rear-view mirror is always clearer then the windshield.

Who can say what's in store: a dreaded black swan?, a new Gilded Age? or just sideways muddle through?

Who cares in a way. Historically, one has to care only rarely and caring has a price.

 

The bottom line for expectations about the next few years is that the outlook for returns is colored by our interpretation of present levels and our interpretation of fundamentals (also sentiment) going forward. This is art and science.

 

As far as the ERP "concept", Asness, Arnott and Bernstein, Gross (Bill), and others have given rational explanations about the possibility of (much) lower ERPs than "conventionally" accepted in general and even negative numbers for certain relatively long periods. I can provide specific references about this but suggest that it is probably not worth your time unless you have a quasi-autistic interest in the matter.

 

To keep the discussion on solid ground, here are some interesting (and perhaps relevant) historical facts:

-the time it took for an index to reach back to the same level,

  DJ        1929 to 1954  (yes 25 years, but more like 16 to 17 years if you think in total returns)

  S&P      1968 to 1979  (time of relatively high inflation, ouch)

 

I know, this is retrospective cherry picking and dividend yields were relatively higher during these periods of the past but these two periods represent about 30 to 35% of the last century when the going forward ERP for the typical investor was closer to zero or even negative.

 

In terms of low interest rates, if they remain low, stocks may be cheap but, to make a long story short, I submit that there may be an element of double counting here.

 

For instance, if you buy a house and get an unusually low 5yr rate on your 95% value mortgage, a reasonable assessment of margin of safety may have to include scenarios whereby interest rates may be different down the road. I am assuming here that the "value" of the house itself is not overvalued because of the low interest rate "environment"...

 

For additional perspective, debt can be thought of as forward consumption brought today. This would imply that you will eventually consume less (especially if recent debt accumulation has been unusually high). So, if recent returns have been unusually good, irrespective of interest rates, future returns may be unusually lower.

 

The fact that there is no place to hide is not sufficient, in itself, to justify higher valuations.

 

Long post as I have spent quite some time on this issue in the last few months, which is unusual.

 

Opinion

 

In terms of "framing issues", if I would run a fund now, I would close it and distribute funds (not because of retrospective reasons) because I think that, for the next +/- 10 years, there is an unusually high risk of disappointing returns and, to link with this thread, if history is any guide, I would submit the opinion that, for the typical market participant, there is an unusually high risk of permanent capital loss.

 

This is a zero-sum game against the average.

That's why I'm here.

I expect that future posts will eventually focus on the flip side of the coin.

 

[SharperDingaan]

You may be right in a lot of ways.

In investing, the rear-view mirror is always clearer then the windshield.

Who can say what's in store: a dreaded black swan?, a new Gilded Age? or just sideways muddle through?

Who cares in a way. Historically, one has to care only rarely and caring has a price.

 

The bottom line for expectations about the next few years is that the outlook for returns is colored by our interpretation of present levels and our interpretation of fundamentals (also sentiment) going forward. This is art and science.

 

As far as the ERP "concept", Asness, Arnott and Bernstein, Gross (Bill), and others have given rational explanations about the possibility of (much) lower ERPs than "conventionally" accepted in general and even negative numbers for certain relatively long periods. I can provide specific references about this but suggest that it is probably not worth your time unless you have a quasi-autistic interest in the matter.

 

To keep the discussion on solid ground, here are some interesting (and perhaps relevant) historical facts:

-the time it took for an index to reach back to the same level,

  DJ        1929 to 1954  (yes 25 years, but more like 16 to 17 years if you think in total returns)

  S&P      1968 to 1979  (time of relatively high inflation, ouch)

 

I know, this is retrospective cherry picking and dividend yields were relatively higher during these periods of the past but these two periods represent about 30 to 35% of the last century when the going forward ERP for the typical investor was closer to zero or even negative.

 

In terms of low interest rates, if they remain low, stocks may be cheap but, to make a long story short, I submit that there may be an element of double counting here.

 

For instance, if you buy a house and get an unusually low 5yr rate on your 95% value mortgage, a reasonable assessment of margin of safety may have to include scenarios whereby interest rates may be different down the road. I am assuming here that the "value" of the house itself is not overvalued because of the low interest rate "environment"...

 

For additional perspective, debt can be thought of as forward consumption brought today. This would imply that you will eventually consume less (especially if recent debt accumulation has been unusually high). So, if recent returns have been unusually good, irrespective of interest rates, future returns may be unusually lower.

 

The fact that there is no place to hide is not sufficient, in itself, to justify higher valuations.

 

Long post as I have spent quite some time on this issue in the last few months, which is unusual.

 

Opinion

 

In terms of "framing issues", if I would run a fund now, I would close it and distribute funds (not because of retrospective reasons) because I think that, for the next +/- 10 years, there is an unusually high risk of disappointing returns and, to link with this thread, if history is any guide, I would submit the opinion that, for the typical market participant, there is an unusually high risk of permanent capital loss.

 

This is a zero-sum game against the average.

That's why I'm here.

I expect that future posts will eventually focus on the flip side of the coin.

 

You may find it useful to 'reframe' your thinking, and compare it to what you already know.

Think of a 25 year bond with a coupon of 8%, paying out interest every 6 months; in today's low rate environment the bond would value at a hefty premium.

 

If rates rise (mean reversion) the value of the bond will fall, but the coupon payments could be reinvested at higher rates than are currently the case. The time needed for the additional return on reinvested coupons to recover the MV loss on the bond, is the bonds duration - and measured in years. It is how long it will take to recover the immediate MV loss, all else equal.

 

Of course if you did not own the bond at the time rates rose - you would have no loss. If you thought the rate increase was a 'one-time' thing, you would also deploy your bond proceeds immediately after the rate increase to earn today's higher available return; but if you thought it was just the first of many coming increases, you would simply sit on your cash. In your example - liquidate the fund today, return the principal, and don't raise OPM again until you're pretty certain the rate increases have stopped.

 

In the real world, OPM fees are addictive; liquidation is the last thing a fund manager wants, as it ends their employment income.

However, an individual would simply use the bonds proceeds to pay off their debts and mortgages, save on their monthly debt service cost, and enjoy a big bump in their discretionary cash flow. Very different outcomes.

 

The lesson here is that as long as you do the same as everyone else (be a sheep), you WILL get fleeced;

but make a minor change - and YOU'RE the one doing the fleecing.

 

SD

 

 

 

[Packer16]

The interesting thing is none of the low ERP folks have addressed the interest rate issue and all the names you mentioned have a vested interest in investing is something in other than stocks as the assets they manage are not stocks and the fees they earn are far in excess of money they have made investing for their own accounts.  BTW the fees they charge are in excess of index funds by large amounts. 

 

You are correct about low ERP but in the late 1960s and the 1990s & the 2007 case interest rates were considerably higher on the order of 5 to 8%.  If you looks at Damodaran's data, the issues occur when the forward based ERP (based upon an implied ERP from forward looking FCF) is in the range of 3% (as it was in 1960s and 2007) and 2% (in the late 1990s).  Currently it is close to 5%, so we have a way to go.  Being a bear in the US market has generally been a losers game, so IMO you need to find a signal for an overvalued market relative to bonds, this occurred when the implied ERP was less than 3%. 

 

You may be right about an overvalued market but your conclusion is based upon the assumption of mean reverting interest rates to the average rate over the time period for which your valuation metric is being measured.  My observation about interest rates is the opposite of what is implied in the market is overvalued hypothesis, they trend.  If you look at history interest rates trend with inflation & inflation is dependent upon shortages.  If you can make a case for widespread persistent shortages and thus inflation & mean reverting interest rates, these guys would be correct but they have not made such as a case.  If you have heard one I would like to hear it.

 

Packer

 

Packer     

[Cigarbutt]

Your points are well taken and I want to move on.

 

"If you can make a case for widespread persistent shortages and thus inflation & mean reverting interest rates, these guys would be correct but they have not made such as a case.  If you have heard one I would like to hear it."

 

Here's a recent link:

https://www.hussmanfunds.com/comment/mmc171009/

 

I know, Mr. Hussman has been "wrong" for so long etc

My take is that he tries to explain that low interest rates explanations suffer form double counting and suggests that low interest rates may point to a low growth environment. You can't have your cake and eat it too argument. I think it makes some sense.

The issue for me is that, lately, I haven't found securities with a sufficient margin of safety; that's my problem. I am happy that others don't have this problem.

And this is not about looking for macro "signals".

I'm simply trying to understand.

 

Interesting times.

 

 

 

[Packer16]

Mr Hussman rather than making a case for scarcity, tries to tie the reason for low rates to lower growth than in the past but the reality is growth is positive and accelerating currently.  He does not even address the issue of large capital generation due to economic growth & how that effects interest rates or the fact that the demand for fixed income securities is going to be greater due to the aging of the population.  IMO Mr. Hussman is wrong & will be wrong as he only has his theories without much actual data.  On the other side you have Mr. Buffett and Prof. Damodaran with tons of historical data which tells a compelling story.  With Hussman you have a story with sparse data.  Who would you choose?

 

The question of margin of safety depends upon what benchmarks you are using for valuation.  If you are using historical ones, then your valuation may be to low for the current environment.  B. Graham has a similar issue in the early 1950s when he could not understand how securities were valued in the later 1950s vs the metrics he used from the 30s & 40s.  I am done also as you either agree with Hussman, Arnott, etc. or Buffett & Damodaran based upon the data.

 

Packer

[james22]

Hussman theorizes without data??

[Packer16]

I did say & meant little data in comparison to Damodaran not no data.  He also does not discuss the implicit assumption of little growth & whether this is actually true.  I agree there is slower growth but what specific growth rate would make his hypothesis untrue.  He does not state implicit assumptions then test them versus actual data.  He talks about temporary changes in interest rates, making an implicit assumption that rates are somehow going to go up, & calculates the effect of this temporary rate change.

 

Packer

[Liberty]

Once in a while, anyone should look to see if their theories have any value. Hussman has been wrong for so long, I wonder why anyone listens to him. Even if what he predicts does end up happening someday, someone would be richer by not having listened to him at all than by having listened to him. Opportunity costs are real.

 

The problem with perma bears in a world where stock markets are up way more than they are down on average over the long-term is that it leads to something like this:

 

"This is a fake market, a house of card, it'll crash any day now, look at these charts and metrics, better stay cash and/or short"

 

*market doubles or triples over many years*

 

"Any day now the big one will come!"

 

*Market falls 20%*

 

"This is the big one! The 50%+ drop, great depression, here we come! I'll just wait a bit more before deploying capital..."

 

*Market bounces back*

 

"This is a dead cat bounce, it'll start falling again any day now"

 

*Market keeps growing for a few more years before another 10% correction*

 

"The big one is coming any day now! We're still too high on the CAPE, look at the gold ratio, these debt levels... Someday I'll get to invest that cash at great depression levels!"

 

*years pass*

 

Meanwhile, someone who started with the same capital and just rode it all out in great companies generating good returns is probably 10x richer than the permabear.

[LongHaul]

Interest rates are the monkey in the room.  I really am unsure of how they affect market valuations.  This sounds stupid at first and super low interest rates likely push up earnings and P/E's but how much I am not sure. There is crowd psychology and then the interest rate effect and I can't untangle them.  Interest rates may be going up now though.  Let me repeat that - interest may be going up now.  And that is off of a ~100+ low for the 10 year.  I think we have all become numb to low interest rates that are probably the lowest in centuries.  Quite amazing actually.

 

I am in the camp that crowd psychology is the overriding driver.  In the early 50's (and early 09) interest rates were low and P/E's were low.  Pessimism was the driver.  Japan has had low interest rates for a long time and a wild stock market. 

 

Bears are always early unless they time the top perfectly which is impossible. Many bubbles I been in and heard about have had bears accurately call the bubble very early.  That is because they see the symptoms, stupidity and risk but the bubble just goes on and on. 

 

I would not take any kind of consensus on this topic.  Just like many other things in life you need to do your own research, thinking and analysis and come to you best conclusion and go with it.    Especially on this topic though because if the mass majority anywhere are in agreement it is probably better to take the contrary bet.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[clutch]

I would not take any kind of consensus on this topic.  Just like many other things in life you need to do your own research, thinking and analysis and come to you best conclusion and go with it.    Especially on this topic though because if the mass majority anywhere are in agreement it is probably better to take the contrary bet.

 

I wanted to press you on this since you started this topic...

 

First of all, this is a fact (not a consensus!): Indexing will generate market-average returns.

 

Given this fact and that overall market valuation is high (which implies that the expected market-average returns would be low), what should an investor do?

 

I see two conclusions:

1) Since the overall market valuation is high, you should pick stocks that are undervalued instead of indexing.

2) Since the overall market valuation is high and because stock picking is hard, you should invest in other assets (or just sit on cash).

 

Are you advocating any of these two, or something else?

[investmd]

 

 

Given this fact and that overall market valuation is high (which implies that the expected market-average returns would be low), what should an investor do?

 

I see two conclusions:

1) Since the overall market valuation is high, you should pick stocks that are undervalued instead of indexing.

 

#1 above intuitively it makes sense.  Problem, as I've learned, is that markets are highly correlated. If there were/when there is another black swan event resulting in a large correction/recession, likely all asset classes will be hit equally. So whether one holds ETFs or a portfolio of "undervalued" stocks, likelihood is both will be down 30%. The question is which is going to rebound better. 

 

 

[investmd]

 

Meanwhile, someone who started with the same capital and just rode it all out in great companies generating good returns is probably 10x richer than the permabear.

+1

[Nomad]

Are we so sure that the top value investors, as a group, have alpha? Take a look at the following "collective" portfolio based on the 13-Fs of the top value minds: http://minesafetydisclosures.com/collective-portfolio. Sort by the 'percentage of total portfolio' in descending order. What do you see?

 

WFC - 13.7%

AAPL  - 12.1%

BAC - 9.9%

BRK.B - 8.4%

AXP - 7.8%

MSFT - 6.8%

 

The names that are driving this portfolio of the "best and the brightest" are American large-caps found in the S&P 500. How much are you willing to bet that this portfolio outperforms the S&P over the next decade? And more importantly, if it does outperform, what do you think the degree of outperformance will be in relation to the transaction costs, time spent researching, etc. that were involved in its creation?

 

I don't pretend to know the answers to these questions, but I am genuinely curious. It seems like it could be very tough to beat the S&P by simply adjusting the weights of the large caps that are mostly found in that very same S&P, especially after transaction costs. If there isn't likely to be a significant degree of outperformance, I would probably be better off sticking my money in a vanilla S&P index fund and going to the beach. Agreed?

[oddballstocks]

 

Meanwhile, someone who started with the same capital and just rode it all out in great companies generating good returns is probably 10x richer than the permabear.

+1

 

And of course since indexes are market cap weighted they are essentially overweight 'great companies' meaning that index investors are doing just this.

 

If you want to buy the market leaders in each industry don't waste your time researching, just buy the index.  You will always be overweight the best, even when the best is shuffled around.

 

If you're looking to buy cheap companies and churn you can do better than the index somewhat easily if you have a disciplined process.  If you're buying 'the best' then it becomes really hard because these companies are A) in indexes and B) the largest positions in the index.  So you are essentially betting that you can find something better than the best companies in the market that hasn't been discovered yet.  That's really tough.

[Packer16]

As to interest rates, the 10-yr now is lower than 2009. In 2009 the 1-yr ranged from 2.65 - 3.55% and now it is 2.34%.  If you think interest rates are going up,  ask yourself why?  Interest rates are not mean reverting like stock prices.  They go in long waves & we are still in a downtrend trend caused by IMO a lack of inflation & a surplus of capital.  So what is the inflation thesis that is going to drive up interest rate or what is your capital destruction thesis that drive a capital shortage?  How do these compare to the status quo scenario.  Remember for the last 2 crashes we had (2000 to 2002 & 2008), interest rates were 6-7% and 5% respectively.  These were great magnets for the money invested in the stock market with 7-8% expected returns.  Today this magnet does not exist unless something changes.

 

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