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Xerxes

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Xerxes last won the day on April 17 2024

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  1. I have to close the books for the 2024 year based on 12/27 market closure. I am travelling the last two days of December (12/30 and 31). in fact in the airport now. Will re-adjust return calculation according if needs be. though not sure if anything changes based on the last two days. 2024 => 37.94% 2023 => 24.81% 2022 => -11.48% 2021 => 20.09% 2020 => 11.36% The returns are not including crypto; and net of all cash injections. Crypto grew 96%. I have never outperformed the index by so much, made this much dollar in a given year, and this high % return at portfolio level. It was a good year. And the credit goes straight to all the people here. Too many to names. My portfolio churn is close to zero. But reading other posts and ideas helps me anchor the churn close to nil. I only sold Stelco (as I had no choice) and trimmed a bit of BIP-UN, which will go back to BN and BAM. Added mostly to existing names. TDG was the only new addition in 2024. The Bible say 7 years of fat years are followed by 7 years of lean years. So let’s see the next few years.
  2. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/12/why-did-iran-allow-assads-downfall?lang=en Unlike in 2016, when Iranian ground forces complemented Russian air support in the siege of Aleppo, neither patron demonstrated the will or capability to launch a similar counteroffensive. Both powers had grown increasingly frustrated with Assad’s intransigence. For Russia and Iran, Assad was their man until he wasn’t. By early 2024, both Iran and Russia had changed when it came to the Syrian president. Russia was particularly incensed by his repeated violations of the Idlib deescalation agreement and stubborn resistance to any form of a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile, Iran found its once-considerable influence over Damascus steadily eroding, with Assad increasingly charting an independent course that often conflicted with Tehran’s regional objectives. Iran’s suspicions of Assad deepened after a series of leaks disclosed the movements of IRGC officials that culminated in Israeli strikes on these officials in Syria. The Quds Force, once given relatively free rein in Syria, now found its movements increasingly restricted by the Syrian authorities, with Assad refusing to allow the use of the Golan Heights as a potential front against Israel. Perhaps most provocatively, Damascus had begun limiting Shiite religious activities throughout Syria—a direct challenge to Iran’s efforts to expand its ideological and cultural influence in the region. By the time rebels launched their offensive, neither Iran nor Russia saw sufficient value in expending further resources to prop up a regime that had become more liability than asset. …,. Iran’s initial response suggested a familiar playbook—the mobilization of Iraqi militias to shore up Assad’s defenses. However, the Iraqi government refused to allow these forces to cross into Syria. Rather than challenge this decision, Iran acquiesced with surprising ease. In a stunning development, Iranian-backed forces abandoned their most strategic asset—control of the Syrian-Iraqi border crossing—without any resistance. The IRGC and pro-Iran Iraqi fighters had already pulled out of Deir al-Zor before Kurdish forces moved in, leading to the swift capture of the crucial Qa’im-Bukamal border crossing by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). …… The governorate of Deir al-Zor and its border crossing at Bukamal had served as Iran’s crown jewel in Syria, representing a vital link in Tehran’s regional ambitions. After capturing control of Deir al-Zor from the Islamic State group in 2017, Iran transformed this eastern Syrian region into a crucial corridor for projecting power across the Levant. The Qa’im-Bukamal crossing became the linchpin in Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon, facilitating the movement of weapons, fighters, and supplies to its proxy forces throughout the region. The significance of Deir al-Zor was not just in its logistical value. Iran had invested heavily in securing this territory, establishing a network of military bases, and cultivating deep ties with local tribal leaders. The Iranians exploited Arab grievances against both the Islamic State and later the SDF, while simultaneously using the region to pressure U.S. forces stationed at the Tanf garrison and near the Conoco gas field. Iranian-backed militias frequently launched attacks against American positions from this territory, making it a theater in the broader U.S.-Iranian regional competition. Yet when Assad’s regime began to fall apart, Iran made the surprising decision to cede this vital territory to the SDF. This retreat perhaps reflected a more nefarious, long-term strategy—betting that the persistent tensions between Kurdish forces and the local Arab population and Turkish-backed rebel forces would eventually create new opportunities for a return of Iranian influence.
  3. https://amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/dec/17/bashar-al-assad-syria-russia-moscow-putin-middle-east Shortly after the beginning of the opposition offensive on Aleppo in November 2024, Russia clearly and deliberately decided not to save Assad. Analysts tend to explain this by pointing to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, which did not allow Russia to react in a timely and proper way to the new offensive by the Syrian opposition forces. This was not only about a dwindling number of soldiers, but also a decline in quality: Syria had turned into a kind of cesspool for Russia’s senior military ranks who had fallen out of grace in Moscow and those officers who wanted to escape the war in Ukraine. The main allies of Russia and Assad – Iran and its proxies – have also been weakened by Tehran’s confrontation with Israel. While these statements are mostly correct, they overlook another important factor: by 2024, Syria had transformed from an opportunity into an economic and political liability for Russia. Syria had lost its importance as an asset to project influence in the region. Within eight years of Russia’s intervention, a host of new – more important – factors shaping the Kremlin’s relations with the region emerged. These include Russia’s role within Opec, increased trade and intense diplomacy. Syria also lost its former significance as an element of communication with the west: the war in Ukraine both led to a reduction in contacts and became the main topic of discussion with Russia. The war economy created by Assad turned out to be such a toxic environment that even Russian businessmen accustomed to many challenges could not do business in it. At the same time, Assad’s political stubbornness, his refusal to compromise with domestic opposition and regional neighbours, and the constant balancing act between Moscow and Tehran, made his regime a difficult partner.
  4. $20 in 2024 and then fixed for a few years
  5. Steve didn’t die suddenly. He knew it was coming …
  6. I am guessing this has been debunked but a curious coincidence.
  7. lol we do not need Festivus to air out our grievances in this forum. We do it everyday. Everyday is Festivus on COBF. That said, Happy holidays and new year to all.
  8. https://www.albertapensionplan.ca Based on Alberta’ kindergarten math, CPP owe it half of its assets. Ain’t that cute ?
  9. Pretty good review on the topic
  10. thanks. I remember this vividly during the I think 2022 AGM. The audience was looking for a stock ticker, or sector to beat inflation, he gave them instead words of wisdom.
  11. I admit in contrast to last year 2024, there are barely any high conviction ideas in this thread for 2025 (Except some stuff on MSTR) speaks to lofty valuations
  12. Send in the Strumtruppen Tonight is the Night of the Long Knives … changing disloyal servers, the “lags” will be purged
  13. that is one hell of boring 1980-90s movie with an overacting Christopher Walken of which I no longer have any recollection
  14. definitely not the legacy satellite providers. It is a new industry in some ways. Starlink is to SpaceX, what Robotaxi is to Tesla, in term valuations of a recurring business vs. the valuation of the holding company and the capital-intensive side of the business (car making and rocket-launch, respectively). That is as far as my brain allows me to go.
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