Cigarbutt

^I would say it's likely to be an accrual issue at the end of periods. The change in treasury stock reported on the balance sheet and equity sections reflects the transaction dates and the cash flow reported reflects the settlement (T+2) dates. So, there may exist a temporary difference for some transactions made near period ends. In the end, it will tend to even out. i assume 2018 transactions did not occur near period ends.

You may try this guy: https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/raymond-tellier He has relevant experience (including with SARS) and uses a balanced approach. It's not clear if private ventures are his thing but given enough $, who knows?

Can you imagine if Obama or W. Bush gave this job, during a pandemic with 70k deaths so far, to his cousin or brother-in-law or whatever? Deep state is to blame. It's a witch hunt - nobody wants to work for El Presidente. Only some true patriots like Jared-boy are sacrificing their lives and working 24 hour days covering the holes left by the evil apparatchiks who are gleefully pushing for Trump's downfall! Shame on deep state! Go Jared-o! Make vaccine great again! In my opinion, Trump is just Chavez with a better starting point in terms of institutions and economy. Chavez was roasted early on for running the country “like his hacienda“, that’s exactly what Trump does. Chavez even had his own news show on TV where he would endlessly blabber nonsense without script just like Trump “Coronavirus show”. Both are populists . They are really two sides of the same coin. Given enough time ( which he won’t have because of term limits) we would end up at the same point. Jared&Ivanka ticket is the workaround to the term limits. Trump is putting them into visible positions. Perhaps the following quote from Why Nations Fail is relevant in a time when we're hoping that viral genetic drift will go in the right direction: "These differences are often small to start with, but they cumulate, creating a process of institutional drift. Just as two isolated populations of organisms will drift apart slowly in a process of genetic drift, because random genetic mutations cumulate, two otherwise similar societies will also slowly drift apart institutionally. Though, just like genetic drift, institutional drift has no predetermined path and does not even need to be cumulative; over centuries it can lead to perceptible, sometimes important differences. The differences created by institutional drift become especially consequential, because they influence how society reacts to changes in economic or political circumstances during critical junctures." i don't think the US will fail because it has so much capital (human, social and otherwise) but one should be careful with institutional drift of the secret sauce recipe.

For the coagulation part, it's been suggested that anticoagulation could be associated with a better outcome for more severe presentations but most people admitted in ICUs these days typically get anticoagulation anyways so this does not seem promising in terms of more than a possible marginal improvement in some cases. The more promising treatment options will likely directly interfere with the viral load itself and not with the consequences of the virus. From the Massachusetts General Hospital guidelines "All patients admitted to MGH for COVID-19 (including non-critically ill) should receive standard prophylactic anticoagulation with LMWH" Looks like all admissions, not just ICU. It appears that CV patients somehow (especially the sicker cohorts) are relatively more prone to blood clots and related complications versus comparable 'populations' of sick people coming in the hospital. The specific CV mechanism of action is still unknown but it's helpful to remember that very sick patients (from any causes when basic body defense mechanisms are overwhelmed) tend to run into various forms of multi-organ failure which often includes various forms of intravascular clotting disarray. The point i was politely trying to make is that agents that are used when the process is far advanced are unlikely to induce miracle changes in results. The typical CV patient that enters a hospital will typically carry associated risk factors (age, obesity, diabetes, hypertension etc) that (in themselves and based on guidelines that existed before CV) are sufficient to prescribe a blood thinner such as LMWH (not to be confused with LVMH) so this heparin 'breakthrough' is unlikely to be a new significant independent factors for CV patients. When poor results happen in large waves, it's probably useful to think upstream as much as possible (drug that stop and reverse rising viral load) and you may even consider how come there is such a basin of at-risks patients in the population (the host). Of course, this is not reserved to the healthcare system; it happens all the time in the financial world also (low tendency to think upstream) and people hope for miracle cures in hard times while underemphasizing what led there in the first place. It's surprising how many diseases eventually go away on their own, almost spontaneously. For some however, waiting for complications can hurt one's health.

For the coagulation part, it's been suggested that anticoagulation could be associated with a better outcome for more severe presentations but most people admitted in ICUs these days typically get anticoagulation anyways so this does not seem promising in terms of more than a possible marginal improvement in some cases. The more promising treatment options will likely directly interfere with the viral load itself and not with the consequences of the virus.

^It's well known that older people tend to be more risk-averse. Many reasons for that. Some work has shown that experience may very well be associated with (more capacity for?) risk-taking, which seems to go against the age factor but greed and fear are not processed in the same areas of the brain. Mr. Zell has given thought (and money) to the subject of risk. https://www.businessinsider.com/billionaire-sam-zell-business-advice-risk-2017-6 https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/news_articles/2007/zell-leadership-award-coverage.aspx He's known to have said that, to be successful, one has to be right about 70% of the times so betting against him is reasonable but he doesn't come across as somebody who would be fearful, only because of age. And he's certainly not senescent.

^Unsolicited noob's take becoz this is so fascinating. The German High Court is basically sending a message of conditional love in the asymmetric relationship. The ECB is looking for creative ways to engage in monetary financing of national budget deficits, which is verboten at this point. The idea is to present the solidarity project as a continuation of Good Ole QE. The Supreme Court supports the cooperation but is also asking the Brussels' people for a more detailed risk-benefit analysis. Typically, the ivory-tower money authorities suggest that a without-QE would-have-been world would have been absolutely catastrophic, an assumption impossible to verify. Just like when giving insulin to a diabetic or heroin to a drug addict may be life saving, in a way, is it not reasonable to wonder about fundamentals once in a while? FWIW, i just finished Changing Fortunes (1992) by Mr. Paul Volcker (and Mr. Toyoo Gyohten) and it's incredibly relevant to the German high judicial opinion. To make a long story short, international cooperation is critical and central banks need to fill the vacuum as a lender of last resort but the outcome is always related to the underlying fundamental solvency of the situation. As Mr. Volcker explains, national solvency is an elusive concept but in the end why risk having to deal with an even larger problem? Of course, there is never a good time to ask such a question. The following link is relevant and recent. It also has the advantage of having been published before the German judgement. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ecb-needs-to-embrace-covid19-monetary-financing-by-paul-de-grauwe-2020-03

That and the fact that, during the first leg down, he let the large long-short part of his fund go net long (typically long convertible preferred vs short common). 1930 was a year when Mr. Graham tried to limit the damage by 'covering' and bringing down margin debt. Results: Benjamin Graham Joint Account* Dow Jones Industrials 1930 1929 -20% -15% 1930 -50% -29% 1931 -16% -48% 1932 - 3% -17% For entire period -70% -74% *numbers integrating regular distributions made along the way Note: on a money-weighted basis, results are even more brutal as fund investors withdrew amounts during the earlier years. The above results are illustrative only, have little predictive power and perhaps should be used only as some kind of stress test if you enter the period with about 44% leverage, like Mr. Graham did. It looks like Mr. Buffett wants to enter this period with a slightly excessive cash position. Who could blame him? It's been said that Mr. Graham eventually regretted not following the advice of Mr. Dix, the 93-year old retired businessman whom he met in early 1930.

Thank you Vinod and the transcript (even if the body language, tone etc are missing) was an efficient way to get through the event. Apologies to burden this thread with historical nonsense but Mr. Buffett refers to 1955 senate hearings which has a section between Senator Fulbright and Mr. Benjamin Graham (see below if interested) and which contains delicious verbal exchanges. https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/sites/valueinvesting/files/files/DOC014%281%29.pdf As Mr. Buffett says being smart doesn't correlate 100% to being wise but Mr. Graham had a unique way to explain things. i would say there are relevant comments versus where we stand today. For those using a rule of three for the interest levels gravity rule, when Mr. Graham testified in early 1955, 10-yr rates were the same as in 2019. Since 2019, 10-yr rates got divided by four and stock market cap to GDP is now about 4 times the level in 1955 so mathematically, it makes sense.. It's fascinating that (page 527) Mr. Graham candidly reports that he "had pretty well anticipated the 1929 decline". It's what happened after that induced a post-traumatic disorder of sorts which infused a huge dose of humility and resulted in Mr. Graham, in 1955, to suggest that prudence was in order even if most indicators revealed a very reasonable risk-reward profile, especially given a long term perspective, because he always remained, after, animated by an unusual degree of fear when there was a market swing from doubt to confidence. Mr. Buffett refers also to those hearings and to Mr. William McChesney Martin who also testified but the punchbowl comment was made by Mr. Martin later in 1955 when he presented to a group of bankers: "The Federal Reserve, ... , after the recent increase in the discount rate, is in the position of the chaperone who has ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up." So, who knows where we are now, in terms of party momentum? Maybe a way to try to answer is to use the opening passage of Mr. Martin's speech, that fall when referring to the teacher who, year after year, kept asking the same exam questions: "When he was asked how his students could possibly fail the test, he replied simply, ''Well, it's true that the questions don't change, but the answers do.""

It's probably best to avoid questions, if possible. At times, evoking voluntary simplicity may do the trick as people don't feel challenged then. Humans compare by definition.

You realize (do you?) that your statement, as phrased, could be a source of mental anguish. Perhaps helpful to use the Brooklyn Investor's lens (no this is not a post about market timing, or is it?): http://brooklyninvestor.blogspot.com/2017/11/is-buffett-bearish.html Using similar methodology and incorporating the latest released data, the coverage stands at 117-8%. Maybe helpful to remember that 1997 and 1998 were special years, as GenRe was acquired and BRK picked up 19B of bonds as part of 15B of float (unaudited, from handwritten notes). So 1999 may be a better year for comparison (pro-forma if you like), especially keeping in mind some of the comments made then. i think Mr. Buffett was made aware of this coverage data and apparently said that it happened to be a fortuitous correlation.Perhaps fortuitous but interesting nonetheless.. When he purchased GenRe, he had mentioned that he was "creating Fort Knox here". Perhaps 2020 is a time when we are collectively running out of Fort Knoxes.

^The above link (apple.news) also mentions the resiliency (lack of) of the health care system. Healthcare, almost by definition, is a very low productivity area and this aspect has been underlined with the recent pandemic. In the last few years, some have wondered at the absent productivity paradox in relation to various technologies, automation and artificial intelligence. The virus has considerably burdened the system (broken supply chains, safety procedures, awkward basic equipment, long cleaning phases in between cases) that will take a long time to dissipate and may not go back to the old normal. Tele-consultation is on the rise but, just like with the recent application of electronic records, it is being realized that the development is ill suited for a large number of applications and rarely result in a net positive result, at least at this point, in terms of a productivity enhancement activity. The positive mostly came from resiliency at various levels with elaboration of various evidence-based guidelines, protocols and simple clinical algorithms. It seems that the present level of organization is not ready, at large, for positive productivity steps as it labors to supply basic protective equipment to employees and often faces drug shortages. Of course, productivity improvements will come and the virus could have been a trigger but it may take a while. I was getting ready to short Surgical Partners (SGRY) before the virus as its innovation was mostly financial engineering in nature and its focus was not on end customer value enhancement. It looked like it was ready to be reorganized but was saved by central junk bond buying authorities. In order to know how this will play out, one has to wait until the other side. https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2020/04/the-decline-of-the-innovation-state-is-killing-us.html it looks like some are ahead of the game for body bags and i guess somebody can run a twitter feed on that or whatever.

It seems that direct funding by the Fed to the lending facility (750B, leveraged 10 to 1), in the event of losses, would be illegal under present circumstances (there are reasons for that :) ). The framework has been set up with the assumption that the Treasury would (will?) take the loss. The Cares Act (specific section for "tax payer protection") specifies that lending to companies requires collateral (there are reasons for that :) ). Through the SPV the Fed secured collateral for a small fraction of the lending from the Treasury (...) and, for the leveraged part of the lending, is taking uncollateralized risky bonds as collateral(...). I agree that it's creative but it doesn't fit my definition of value creation. "But in this crisis, it is being asked to water down the collateral against which it will lend." By whom? i thought it was supposed to be an independent institution.

I'm no expert on this subject, but find it very interesting for portfolio asset allocation, so please forgive a perhaps naive question. Is mild deflation much worse than mild inflation? I ask as some people have suggested that Japan's livelihood does not seem to have suffered especially from mild deflation. So I am wondering if we are so afraid of deflation because of the 30s experience that it is like a 'System 1' thing - any mention of the subject makes us recoil. I suppose my instinct is that anything 'mild' is generally not a problem. Where the problem begins is if something cannot be controlled - and I know the fear of inflation is that once started properly, it is very hard to control. So perhaps the same is the case for deflation. Anyway, I welcome any thoughts, and will try to get to the interview. (n.b. I know that Japan has other problematic issues e.g. the enormous debt overhang. I also recall how the 'obvious thing' about debt in Japan has tripped people up so much, coining the term, the 'widowmaker trade' ). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-27/boj-ramps-up-stimulus-with-pledge-for-unlimited-bond-buying?srnd=markets-vp If I'd sit in the room where they make their announcements, I'd stand up and yell: "This is absurd, the Emperor has no clothes" but i'm just a guy whose main job this AM is to open the door for the cats to come in or leave. IMO, they have been flying blind for a while now but it looks more and more like a kamikaze operation. Somebody is bound to notice eventually and mild may become an irrelevant word. One thing that may be useful from the interview is the part about tipping points and potential non-linear changes. i wanted to remain silent here but you said "welcome any thoughts" so..

Random thoughts: -The Singapore experience is telling in the sense that it gives an indication of the potential costs involved for the various exit strategies, wherever one stands in the containment-mitigation spectrum (measures, time frame etc). CV is highly contagious, spreads (mostly) quietly and silently and has the potential to find the weakest links. With a starting population having low immunity.. -Testing healthcare providers and workers is a double-edged sword. Confidence requires testing but testing can reveal (based on on-the-ground experience in hospitals and chronic care homes as well as various hot spot reports) an extent of spread that requires massive quarantine. This can result in many people simply not showing up for work, in decimated supply chains of care and sometimes simply desertion of personnel during peak times (in my jurisdiction, for some chronic care homes, it has been necessary to call for and hire people not ready or trained to do the job and the army was even summoned in a few cases). This is certainly an area where non-linear changes can occur at certain levels. -Somebody below discusses the delicate issue of "years lost". Compared to the 1918 flu episode, the age profile is markedly different. In the US, for COVID-19, 3.2% of deaths occur in the 15-44 age bracket, 19.2% in 45-64 and 77.6% in the 65+ category (versus 16.0% of the population). The 1918 episode affected all age groups proportionally and the COVID-19 raises a delicate redistribution question. In a related way (clearly true in my jurisdiction but also corroborated elsewhere), because of confinement? and economic pressures?, domestic violence is on the rise while youth protection signaling is down at a time when it should be rising and this is likely due to a critical missing link when schools are closed. https://www.forbes.com/sites/richkarlgaard/2020/04/25/living-days-stolen--a-smarter-way-to-measure-covid-19-deaths/#7a1ed9d76184

The companies you mention are in an area i understand well. Will take a look and maybe start or participate in a separate thread? For the employers' liability side, the potential cost is still unknown and, using an insurance-like frame of mind, this is very difficult to price at this point. Jurisdictions (see example below) are now publishing (evolving) guidelines and law firms (smelling opportunities) publish their own versions on how to deal with this. If interested, listed below is a reference coming from Corvel (a company i know very well) that offers a webcast next week. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-response.html https://www.corvel.com/covid-19 CB, we can continue here. The Coronavirus thread is hard to navigate through the parochial US issues. California has this, which is BBSI’s big market. https://www.fresnobee.com/news/coronavirus/article242213436.html Oklahoma https://oklahoman.com/article/5660908/injured-workers-test-how-workers-comp-handles-covid-19 https://www.wcb.mb.ca/how-the-wcb-is-responding-to-covid-19 https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190801/NEWS08/912329903/Infectious-disease-risks-stump-employers# Seems people with occupational exposure are covered, basically healthcare workers. All others may be covered, but it isn’t clear. The potential shift in burden of proof (work versus personal exposure) is potentially ominous for private players as it would make the liability environment unclear and only suitable for underwriting by public entities (bailout mentality). Will look into NSP, BBSI and others within the next few weeks. On a related note, it looks like health insurers may 'benefit' in the short term due to shifting costs: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-healthinsuranc/us-health-insurers-benefit-as-elective-care-cuts-offset-coronavirus-costs-idUSKCN2291DY In the past, players like Centene, 'learned' to make money when more costs were transferred to the government's lap and there may be a short term opportunity here.

If you want to spend (waste?) time on this, Mr. Hunt sometimes refers to papers published by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This book (which was criticized for some statistical errors that did not change the materiality of conclusions) is an unusually light read for such an arid topic: https://www.amazon.com/This-Time-Different-Centuries-Financial-ebook/dp/B004EYT932/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=this+time+is+different&qid=1587956469&sr=8-1 The book came out in 2009 (!) and then they elaborated on the debt overhang topic, a topic dear to Mr. Hunt's heart: https://delong.typepad.com/w18015.pdf I guess you could say Mr. Lacy Hunt is a debt-pessimist and he has referred to an essay written by David Hume in 1752 titled Of Public Credit. There are also debt-realists. Mr. Alexander Hamilton, one of your Federalist founding father was a great example of that. It seems that our own rb on this board is also a member of that group. But the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement (with the Nixon Amendment) provided for the debt-optimists to dominate and it seems not a lot of people realize that the Agreement contained sunset provisions.

^At first glance, investing in Mexican airports, especially at this point, appears ballsy. Good luck. Something to consider if you want to play this: it seems ASR, because of the larger exposure to international travel and tourism, has the most to lose in the short to mid term but it (if it) stands to gain the most when the global economy recovers while the peso depreciates.

John Mauldin had this to say about the book (when GDP was still growing). https://www.mauldineconomics.com/frontlinethoughts/gdp-a-brief-but-affectionate-history GDP is one of those unloved things that people take for granted. Writing (and sharing) your review surely didn't 'count' in the official numbers but perhaps it should. :)

This is interesting. The debate here seems to be based on the following perspective: Is Chelsea ahead or behind the curve? -It seems that it's ahead of the curve in terms of spread. By simple extrapolation (rule of three basically without modification or modelization and using reported statistics). In a typical year, Chelsea should 'see' about 8 deaths from the flu (using state and national stats). This year, it looks like Chelsea has 'seen' so far about 40 Covid-19 deaths (not a direct number, obtained indirectly but method reasonable). This means (using a similar basic methodology) that, for the US at large to reach a similar 30% immunity, expected COVID-19 deaths would reach about 150-165k. -So, how do you want to go from here for the rest of your country?

Really? Flattening the curve strategies do not incorporate in their projections a positive black swan emerging: a vaccine, effective treatment, or heat/humidity reducing spread/severity/mortality (positive black swans) because this is impossible to predict. They also do not necessarily incorporate extra deaths from healthcare overload (which would be very hard to estimate). Hence our nonsense peddlers seize on this as "proof" that flattening has no real benefit. They are left out of models because it is impossible to model black swans (even positive ones) and extra deaths that result from overload. Just because they are left out does not mean these are not very real benefits of flattening (they are). As the bank example I used--if everyone goes to the bank to ask for their deposits all at once vs over time, you will see a real, nonlinear difference as the bank will fail in the fmr scenario. Again, I am not going back to square one (arguing about benefits of curve flattening which should have been settled 6 weeks ago) and coming down to the level of our great nonsense dwellers here... OK. Another question (or two) to help me understand then: Have South Korea, China (+ or - adjusted numbers) and New Zealand etc succeeded (past, present and future) or not in reducing the area under the curve? Staying away from sunk costs and how 'others' have been wrong before, then what's the implication for the US, in terms of go-forward policy?

The companies you mention are in an area i understand well. Will take a look and maybe start or participate in a separate thread? For the employers' liability side, the potential cost is still unknown and, using an insurance-like frame of mind, this is very difficult to price at this point. Jurisdictions (see example below) are now publishing (evolving) guidelines and law firms (smelling opportunities) publish their own versions on how to deal with this. If interested, listed below is a reference coming from Corvel (a company i know very well) that offers a webcast next week. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-response.html https://www.corvel.com/covid-19 Really?

Today (this is becoming a routine), we went to visit my wife's parents who live in a retirement home. We are not allowed inside. Snow has melted and it's getting nicer around here. So we go on the land beside the home (5-storey building) and "meet" them on their balcony (third floor). There are more people doing that so people keep some space between groups and we stand and sit on the grass and talk. Some people are creative. My mother-in-law is going through some cognitive decline and she's come to believe that it's the normal way to meet people now.

gfp,thank you for the clarification and the correction. It seems Dynamic could confirm the exact numbers here. i have an old file on USB and was sloppy for the more recent developments and assumed (wrongly) that ownership went up recently, which, likely, it did not. I was sloppy because i had to go and join the household for a visit (put in the anecdote section). So, the above post has been edited.

I saw an interesting post by an esteemed member but it disappeared (?). i think it's worth looking at. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36104/000120919120025632/xslF345X02/doc3.xml The filing (with the 10% rule in mind) implies an indirect ownership of 150.09M shares in USB. The following is submitted as food for thought, with reported dates corresponding to date of 13F-HR filing. https://www.cnbc.com/id/17162215 early 2006 6.11 Feb 15 2007 23.307 Feb 14 2008 23.307 Aug 14 2008 68.63 Feb 17 2009 67.551 May 14 2009 69.04 ... Feb 14 2017 85.06 Feb 14 2019 129.31 Feb 14 2020 132.46 Feb 15 2020 150.09 i've always liked USB to various degrees and have almost limitless financial respect for Mr. Buffett but, even if this needs to be seen from a long term point of view, with somebody's curse to move huge amounts of capital without moving the market, one needs to remember that the purchases made in 2006, 2007 and 2008 were made at about today's levels and purchases made in the last 3 years before the pandemic crunch were made at around 50$ per share. Edit, given gfp's feedback. From the 13f-HR Feb 14 2019 129.31 May 14 2019 132.46 Aug 14 2019 132.46 Feb 14 2020 132.46 The ownership in the recently released form 3 includes an expanded ownership profile and it looks like direct ownership has remained unchanged at 149.50 since last summer.