Buffett buybacks: Could Berkshire tender stock?

[wescobrk]

At where it closed today, I think it is around 1.25 book reasonably projected for year end?

It if closes lower again then we are pretty close to the 1.2. Looks like getting close to an all in on Berkshire?

[aws]

Don't forget to subtract the massive portfolio losses from book value.  I haven't calculated it exactly but it's closer to 1.40 than to 1.20 for sure.  Part of it would depend on if they need to write down their Kraft, not sure of the rule on that.  Market value is below Kraft book value but they account for it on the equity method.

[John Hjorth]

Why are you gents even discussing Berkshire book value per share in relation to what's ongoing in this topic? The rest of the crowd here at CoBF in this topic left that paradigm July 17^th 2018.

[Dynamic]

I think $169-$170 is likely closer to 120% of year end Book Value assuming today's prices hold for the remaining trading days, possibly a bit lower if they've been buying a lot of stocks and they've gone down further since. However I think Intrinsic Value will have increased a little since Q3 so today's price would still be attractive in the long run

 

 

[Guest longinvestor]

Why are you gents even discussing Berkshire book value per share in relation to what's ongoing in this topic? The rest of the crowd here at CoBF in this topic left that paradigm July 17^th 2018.

 

Why are folks still using a BV multiple, that too in the 1.1x to 1.3x zip code? It’s the number that’s readily calculable. And there’s comfort in anchoring to the paradigm. Plus Buffett is no longer tipping his hand as to calculating intrinsic business value. “Do your own calculation” was the message they sent as they changed the buyback regime. And Buffett admitted to being wrong about the prior scheme. May the market be slow to come to it’s senses. “If there weren’t so many idiots, we wouldn’t be so rich, would we, Warren?” Munger at the 2016 AGM.

 

At this point, back of the envelope math is all that’s needed. Subtract investment portfolio from market cap and see what the rest of the company is selling for! It’s mouth watering enough that I am 90% in Berkshire.

[John Hjorth]

Attached is my stab of today at reverse engineering of Berkshire 2018Q3 buybacks.

 

Comments:

 

Posted by globalfinancepartners in this topic several months ago - on October 6^th 2018, actually:

 

My understanding is that they are limited by rule 10b-18 to buying no more than 25% of the daily volume.  They are also not supposed to trade in the final 10 minutes before the close.

 

I would be very surprised if Warren purchased anywhere close to 25% of the daily volume of the combined share classes.  My impression is that he would feel that repurchase activity near the 25% level would influence the share price more than he desires.  It is impossible to completely eliminate your influence on the share price (witness the generally rising stock, closure of A/B share premium/discount, etc).

 

If I had to guess, I would guess that Berkshire established a 10b5-1 plan specifying a maximum price and a percentage of the trailing ADV to purchase.I would guess that they specified somewhere around 10-15% of the Average Daily Volume, not to exceed 25% on any given day unless a large transaction was privately negotiated outside the plan (which would not be considered to be protected by the safe harbor of the plan).

 

They probably filed the 10b5-1 plan directly following their 10Q, allowing them to begin purchases under the plan immediately.  Buffett would receive daily trade confirms but isn't supposed to have any other communication with the broker he chose to administer the plan.  So he would know what was purchased each day and "we bought a little" is very difficult to quantify when you are talking about a half-trillion dollar market value enterprise...

 

We'll find out soon enough with the next 10Q and we can try to reverse engineer the % of daily volume they specified...

 

To me, this "hunch" of globalfinancepartners' appears to me almost spooky. It seems to be totally spot on. Please also look up posts by globalfinancepartners since October 6^th 2018 in this topic for more confirmation on that particular matter.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

-Maybe globalfinancepartners is psychic, or perhaps he just happens to own a crystal ball, that actually works!

[aws]

I updated my spreadsheet on portfolio losses to today's numbers.  Pretax QTD market loss is now 49.1B, which is 38.8B or 15.76 per B share after tax if you use a 21% tax rate.  With a total market cap loss of 64.9B QTD on Berkshire overall, that implies the operating company and cash are worth 8.51% less today than on 9/30.  And since you figure they probably had decent operating profits it's more like a 10% drop.  Certainly seems much more in the buyback range now than it did a week ago, although obviously all other stocks they are looking at probably dropped more than 10%, so we'll have to wait and see what they actually did.

 

Edit: Post didn't age well as I wrote it when the market was down for the day.

 

 

I ran some calculations to add additional perspective to market price change in Berkshire since prior quarter end and its portfolio holdings.  I used the data from the CNBC portfolio tracker and I excluded the handful of stocks under $400mm in holdings which in the aggregate are less than $1 billion total.  I attached my spreadsheet with more details but I wanted to point out a few things:

 

Berkshire's market cap has fallen much slower than the average stock it holds.  In fact, the majority of the decline since prior quarter's end was the decline in portfolio value.  Assuming a tax rate of 21%, Berkshire's portfolio has lost 11.69 in per B share value after tax, compared to the market price drop of 18.94 over the same period.  The roughly 42% of market cap weighted to the portfolio accounted for 62% of Berkshire's decline.  If you subtract out the impact of the investment portfolio then Berkshire's market cap of remaining assets dropped by 5.82%. 

 

So effectively Berkshire the operating company is 5.82% cheaper that it was on 9/30, when the average company in the S&P 500 is 13.8% cheaper.  I would have to think that heavily skews in favor of NOT buying in Berkshire over other opportunities.  Or maybe he's buying back so much that the price is propped up a bit and otherwise would have fallen closer to market average.

 

As an aside, how much do you think the market is going to overreact when they see Berkshire's enormous net loss for the quarter?  We're already at something like $25 billion after tax loss here assuming good operating earnings.  Since it seems like everything is more volatile and short-term oriented lately I could see a big drop if we are still in a weak market then, even though it is obviously old news by that point.  That might be the time the buybacks kick into high gear.

brk_declines.xlsx

[John Hjorth]

With now one trading day left in 2018, based on the reverse engineering of the 2018Q3 market data and data about actual buybacks in 2018Q3, it looks like buybacks for USD ~4 B at an average share price of USD ~201 [at 10 percent of average daily volume, & average buyback price calculated as B share equivalents] for 2018Q4.

BRK_-_Calculation_of_maximum_share_buybacks_period_20181001_-_20181228_-_v1_-_20181229.xlsx

[Guest compoundsnowly83]

Seems to make sense. I always wondered from a capital allocation perspective why Berkshire would rather own other stocks than buyback his own shares as the implied assumption is that the other stocks are a better valuation.

 

However, I think the analysis is somewhat flawed in that it ignores a key point of capital allocation.  Berkshire has the option of buying back stock which includes all of his shares at the new "discount" and this should not be ignored from the decision making process. It also allows capital to be allocated to some securities (i.e. the bank stocks) where the ownernship is capped at 10% and buying the individual stock is not an option.

 

 

[John Hjorth]

compoundsnowly,

 

The tool calculates buybacks measured in USD as a function of buyback threshold and percentage of daily volume, based on actual market data. [it can't think! [ : - ) ]]

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

PS : I like your board handle!

[Guest longinvestor]

Seems to make sense. I always wondered from a capital allocation perspective why Berkshire would rather own other stocks than buyback his own shares as the implied assumption is that the other stocks are a better valuation.

 

However, I think the analysis is somewhat flawed in that it ignores a key point of capital allocation.  Berkshire has the option of buying back stock which includes all of his shares at the new "discount" and this should not be ignored from the decision making process. It also allows capital to be allocated to some securities (i.e. the bank stocks) where the ownership is capped at 10% and buying the individual stock is not an option.

 

This is true. My emphasis on all. The freedom from limits is a huge opportunity over everything else (securities, even whole companies) given the size of Berkshire. Arguably they can keep buying for the next decade at the right price. To maximize the opportunity to buy, we should expect management to talk down (or don't talk at all) the stock versus talk it up, like all other managements do. My curiosity is up as to how the annual letter addresses the topic of the attractiveness of the buyback, how it is clothed. As a shareholder, low stock prices makes me feel richer. It is slowly sinking in for me that this is a good thing. Test of patience. Additionally, it will be fascinating to watch how the market pricing mechanism adjusts to buybacks. Should be fun days ahead.

[gfp]

Thanks for the spreadsheet John.  Am I reading it correctly that your spreadsheet would predict somewhere between $4 Billion and $6.25 Billion in Q4 repurchases under the most likely set of 'rules' for their repurchase program?  (either 'cap' unchanged from Q3 or 'cap' based on fixed multiple of last reported BVPS)

 

It may disappoint some, but $5 Billion a quarter can be really great for BRK over time.  It's just a new, incremental, positive in the mix.  They are still looking for operating companies to buy

 

With now one trading day left in 2018, based on the reverse engineering of the 2018Q3 market data and data about actual buybacks in 2018Q3, it looks like buybacks for USD ~4 B at an average share price of USD ~201 [at 10 percent of average daily volume, & average buyback price calculated as B share equivalents] for 2018Q4.

[John Hjorth]

You're welcome, globalfinancepartners,

 

And yes, you interpret the output correctly. I have uploaded it here, with a "default setup" as the reverse engineered result [best fit from using the tool on 2018Q3 data "marked with the red cells". [buyback threshold for the B share = 209, combined with 10 percent of daily volume.]

 

If you have alternative / other expectations for the buyback threshold for 2018Q4, they are available for you in the spreadsheet, right there too, assuming 10 percent of daily volume while buying back.

 

I've chosen that particular default setup for the sheet, based on that I've been absolutely amazed - almost spooked - about that your in advance prediction for 2018Q3 was totally spot on.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

I'll update the sheet with the last trading day data [that won't change much, though] and also put in there some "bling" [charts and diagrams].

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

And I agree with you : Over time - if the share price stays low for prolonged periods - it could get meaningful for earnings per share going forward.

 

Berkshire is running at a clip now at about USD ~3 B per month in cash generation [mind provoking to think about, actually], so perhaps in the area of USD 4 B in buybacks in a quarter isn't that bad.

 

Naturally, what really matters the most - as also mentioned by compoundsnowly & longinvestor today - is what has happened in 2018Q4 with that available capital of USD 111 B EOP 2018Q3 - how much of it is put to work, and in what?

[Guest compoundsnowly83]

This will be a great tool that will continue to get refined as we continue to learn more about the buyback strategy.

 

One crazy question that I haven't seen posted before... could the change in buyback policy be a response to the large increase in net worth of Bezos? We all know how competitive Warren is and the increase in buyback and the increased ownership percentage may be the only way that Warren thinks he could become the richest person in the world.

[Guest longinvestor]

This will be a great tool that will continue to get refined as we continue to learn more about the buyback strategy.

 

One crazy question that I haven't seen posted before... could the change in buyback policy be a response to the large increase in net worth of Bezos? We all know how competitive Warren is and the increase in buyback and the increased ownership percentage may be the only way that Warren thinks he could become the richest person in the world.

Surely you know about his giving program? He is actively trying to make his wealth go to zero.

[John Hjorth]

This will be a great tool that will continue to get refined as we continue to learn more about the buyback strategy.

 

One crazy question that I haven't seen posted before... could the change in buyback policy be a response to the large increase in net worth of Bezos? We all know how competitive Warren is and the increase in buyback and the increased ownership percentage may be the only way that Warren thinks he could become the richest person in the world.

Surely you know about his giving program? He is actively trying to make his wealth go to zero.

 

This exchange is actually a bit funny! [ : - ) ] - Serious mistake in those original gift letters, giving away 5 percent each year, while Berkshire grows ~10 percent each year. So he fails miserably! [ :  -  ) ] -Mr. Munger would call Mr. Buffett a young, failing overachiever, still collecting more nudgets than he gives away!

[aws]

With today's selloff Berkshire seems the most relatively undervalued that I have seen since I have been tracking it.  It's only 3.2% off the lows from Christmas eve, compared to a 5.2% gain for the S&P 500.  Also, even with Apple trading at new lows the overall Berkshire portfolio is up 4.6% since that time so that doesn't explain any of the difference.  So relatively speaking Berkshire is about 2% cheaper than it was at the market lows late last year.

[Spekulatius]

With today's selloff Berkshire seems the most relatively undervalued that I have seen since I have been tracking it.  It's only 3.2% off the lows from Christmas eve, compared to a 5.2% gain for the S&P 500.  Also, even with Apple trading at new lows the overall Berkshire portfolio is up 4.6% since that time so that doesn't explain any of the difference.  So relatively speaking Berkshire is about 2% cheaper than it was at the market lows late last year.

 

Brkb still significantly outperformed the SPY over 1,3,6,12 month periods. I bought it cheaper in May last year. The stock was a safe haven until Dec 2018 when it started to crater with the market.

[aws]

I'm aware there has been outperformance vs. the S&P this past year, mostly due to the pops from the buyback announcement and Q3 earnings.  As an aside though, you can extend that time frame further back and find periods of underperformance despite that.  For example the S&P total return since 12/31/14 is 30% and Berkshire over the same time is 29%.

 

Anyway, my point isn't that it's the cheapest it has ever been.  I just have been tracking the interplay between Berkshire's share price, the S&P 500, and Berkshire's portfolio (as a proxy for Berkshire book value).  I expect those are the three most important things Warren would be looking at when making buyback decisions.  We have some data from prior repurchases about what things looked like when he was buying shares, so I'd just like to have a handle on how those factors have moved since then.

 

[John Hjorth]

 

The exact level of buybacks might not be clear, but what is clear is that it amounts to bugger-all in the context of BRK's cash balances.  The finished the quarter with, what, $95 billion in cash and short term investments?  So dropping a bil on buybacks hardly constitutes an aggressive, high conviction move.

 

I say either get serious about deploying some of that cash on buybacks, or institute a considerable cash dividend.  Buying Apple sharss soaked up some cash, but it really doesnt inspire confidence in management given previous observations about circle of competence.

 

 

SJ

If he doesn't make a sudden surprise tender like I originally speculated (and that's a low probability), it's hard to draw any other conclusions from this than that dividends are way closer than previously suspected. Barring an -08 type drawdown the idle cash will keep growing at a rapid clip. A luxurious problem to have, but these puny buybacks don't even offer a partial solution.

 

StubbleJumper & alwaysinvert,

 

How do you feel and think about the whole thing today Monday?

 

- In a time context, your posts was just after the Berkshire 10-Q was released. Now we have had ongoing discussion during the weekend and analysis of the 10-Q, and it has come up that about ~USD 15B has been allocated to financials during 2018Q3 [- of the ~USD 15 B ~USD 6 B allocated to BAC -], on top of the share buyback of ~USD 1 B in the quarter.

 

Furthermore considerations/speculations [ time will tell ] that more capital has been allocated to perhaps BK, USB & GS, perhaps even new positions in financials.

 

Personally, I was a bit disappointed just after the release of the 10-Q, too. After a couple of nights sleep on it, I have a good feeling about this here Monday morning. The upward trend in liquidity surplus has been turned, and Berkshire is still the Rock of Gibraltar. All in all, not that bad, because it's actually able to generate good earnings and cash flow as it is.

 

 

John,

 

Since the beginning, I have been skeptical of the Apple position because it struck me as outside of WEBs circle of competence and it has always struck me as a desperate move to deploy a large amount of cash.  The catalyst for that move has never quite been obvious to me -- what has Apple done in the past 12 or 18 months that suddenly merited such a large chunk of shareholders' capital?  The price didn't plunge rapidly to make it a 50 cent dollar.  Nope it was bought on fundamentals and operating results.  But, after racking up $110B± of cash it looks like brk is grasping for reasons to not initiate a healthy sized dividend or to not buy back a large slug of shares.

 

Turning to the purchase of large US financial companies (banks), nearly everybody on this board took a high conviction position about 5 or 6 years ago and we have made out like bandits.  The banks are still a buy, IMO, but are not as cheap as when we were all pounding on the table about BAC or JPM back in '11 or '12.  So why is brk suddenly taking a high(er) conviction position in the banks right at this moment?  A what point during the past five or so years were the US banks not an obvious purchase?  To be blunt, it was value in plain sight.  How did brk accumulate $110B± of cash when the banks have been an obvious outlet to deploy cash for the past 20 or so quarters?

 

The actions of the past year or so have struck me as a desperate effort to deploy cash and deny a basic reality.  That reality is that cash from ops is basically $40b per year.  Take off something for maintenance capex, new plant and equipment, and opportunistic acquisitions and you're looking at reasonably reliable cash surplus of about $20b per year.  The opportunities to deploy that much capital on an ongoing basis are not available in sufficient quality and high enough expected return to continue retaining 100 percent of earnings.

 

 

SJ

 

I'm sorry for the dense quotation above - Here I'm going back to this particular post by StubbleJumper from about two months ago, which was a direct reply to me, which I somehow managed to miss to thank you for StubbleJumper.

 

So, thank you StubbleJumper, & please accept my apology for a very late reply here.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

Here, this is particularly for me about Berkshire's position in Apple. Yes, it's in a way "controversial" to me, too. I've been thinking a lot about it lately, and have also felt forced to do some work on the company to get a better understanding, simply because of the size of the position for Berkshire.  -And yes, then comes in the recent events with Apple...

 

I'm in my early innings with Apple, still, but I like it. What has happened while Mr. Buffett has built the position - now to the largest one - is so far to me like a page intentionally left blank. So I have tried to do something about that, by just looking at some data, in a structured way, yet without getting into some real tinkering with data.

 

So the file contains right now just a pile of data, but on the tab "Interim overall assessment" I have structured them to give a visual overview for the first three quarters of 2018. [Data for building the position for 2016 & 2017 I just consider history - but important data for understanding Berkshire's cost of the AAPL position].

 

Just by looking at the structured data for the three quarters, I feel quite confident, that Mr. Buffett hasen't been buying at wrong prices in 2018Q4, because he hasen't bought much in 2018Q3 on its way up. At least that feels comforting. [Personally, I'm totally indifferent towards the wild gyrations in the stock lately - but the cost of the position matters to me long term].

 

Some time ago I posted here in this topic some calculations of what Mr. Buffett max. could pour into AAPL, based on EOP 2018Q3 market prices [uSD ~50 B], which I ref. above feel confident hasen't taken place in 2018Q4.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

The liquidity of the AAPL stock is much better than BRK.A/BRK.B - So how do you think Mr. Buffett has instructed the broker to buy AAPL during the first three quarters of 2018? - Let me hear you, and I'll start tinkering the data.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

File attached.

BRK_-_Reverse_engineering_of_AAPL_position_-_2018Q1_-_2018Q4_-_Beta1_-_20190104.xlsx

[rb]

I have a funny feeling that Berkshire has provided liquidity for Apple in the first quarter of 2019.  :D

[StubbleJumper]

I have a funny feeling that Berkshire has provided liquidity for Apple in the first quarter of 2019.  :D

 

 

I don't doubt it one bit.

[StubbleJumper]

 

The exact level of buybacks might not be clear, but what is clear is that it amounts to bugger-all in the context of BRK's cash balances.  The finished the quarter with, what, $95 billion in cash and short term investments?  So dropping a bil on buybacks hardly constitutes an aggressive, high conviction move.

 

I say either get serious about deploying some of that cash on buybacks, or institute a considerable cash dividend.  Buying Apple sharss soaked up some cash, but it really doesnt inspire confidence in management given previous observations about circle of competence.

 

 

SJ

If he doesn't make a sudden surprise tender like I originally speculated (and that's a low probability), it's hard to draw any other conclusions from this than that dividends are way closer than previously suspected. Barring an -08 type drawdown the idle cash will keep growing at a rapid clip. A luxurious problem to have, but these puny buybacks don't even offer a partial solution.

 

StubbleJumper & alwaysinvert,

 

How do you feel and think about the whole thing today Monday?

 

- In a time context, your posts was just after the Berkshire 10-Q was released. Now we have had ongoing discussion during the weekend and analysis of the 10-Q, and it has come up that about ~USD 15B has been allocated to financials during 2018Q3 [- of the ~USD 15 B ~USD 6 B allocated to BAC -], on top of the share buyback of ~USD 1 B in the quarter.

 

Furthermore considerations/speculations [ time will tell ] that more capital has been allocated to perhaps BK, USB & GS, perhaps even new positions in financials.

 

Personally, I was a bit disappointed just after the release of the 10-Q, too. After a couple of nights sleep on it, I have a good feeling about this here Monday morning. The upward trend in liquidity surplus has been turned, and Berkshire is still the Rock of Gibraltar. All in all, not that bad, because it's actually able to generate good earnings and cash flow as it is.

 

 

John,

 

Since the beginning, I have been skeptical of the Apple position because it struck me as outside of WEBs circle of competence and it has always struck me as a desperate move to deploy a large amount of cash.  The catalyst for that move has never quite been obvious to me -- what has Apple done in the past 12 or 18 months that suddenly merited such a large chunk of shareholders' capital?  The price didn't plunge rapidly to make it a 50 cent dollar.  Nope it was bought on fundamentals and operating results.  But, after racking up $110B± of cash it looks like brk is grasping for reasons to not initiate a healthy sized dividend or to not buy back a large slug of shares.

 

Turning to the purchase of large US financial companies (banks), nearly everybody on this board took a high conviction position about 5 or 6 years ago and we have made out like bandits.  The banks are still a buy, IMO, but are not as cheap as when we were all pounding on the table about BAC or JPM back in '11 or '12.  So why is brk suddenly taking a high(er) conviction position in the banks right at this moment?  A what point during the past five or so years were the US banks not an obvious purchase?  To be blunt, it was value in plain sight.  How did brk accumulate $110B± of cash when the banks have been an obvious outlet to deploy cash for the past 20 or so quarters?

 

The actions of the past year or so have struck me as a desperate effort to deploy cash and deny a basic reality.  That reality is that cash from ops is basically $40b per year.  Take off something for maintenance capex, new plant and equipment, and opportunistic acquisitions and you're looking at reasonably reliable cash surplus of about $20b per year.  The opportunities to deploy that much capital on an ongoing basis are not available in sufficient quality and high enough expected return to continue retaining 100 percent of earnings.

 

 

SJ

 

I'm sorry for the dense quotation above - Here I'm going back to this particular post by StubbleJumper from about two months ago, which was a direct reply to me, which I somehow managed to miss to thank you for StubbleJumper.

 

So, thank you StubbleJumper, & please accept my apology for a very late reply here.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

Here, this is particularly for me about Berkshire's position in Apple. Yes, it's in a way "controversial" to me, too. I've been thinking a lot about it lately, and have also felt forced to do some work on the company to get a better understanding, simply because of the size of the position for Berkshire.  -And yes, then comes in the recent events with Apple...

 

I'm in my early innings with Apple, still, but I like it. What has happened while Mr. Buffett has built the position - now to the largest one - is so far to me like a page intentionally left blank. So I have tried to do something about that, by just looking at some data, in a structured way, yet without getting into some real tinkering with data.

 

So the file contains right now just a pile of data, but on the tab "Interim overall assessment" I have structured them to give a visual overview for the first three quarters of 2018. [Data for building the position for 2016 & 2017 I just consider history - but important data for understanding Berkshire's cost of the AAPL position].

 

Just by looking at the structured data for the three quarters, I feel quite confident, that Mr. Buffett hasen't been buying at wrong prices in 2018Q4, because he hasen't bought much in 2018Q3 on its way up. At least that feels comforting. [Personally, I'm totally indifferent towards the wild gyrations in the stock lately - but the cost of the position matters to me long term].

 

Some time ago I posted here in this topic some calculations of what Mr. Buffett max. could pour into AAPL, based on EOP 2018Q3 market prices [uSD ~50 B], which I ref. above feel confident hasen't taken place in 2018Q4.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

The liquidity of the AAPL stock is much better than BRK.A/BRK.B - So how do you think Mr. Buffett has instructed the broker to buy AAPL during the first three quarters of 2018? - Let me hear you, and I'll start tinkering the data.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

File attached.

 

 

 

John,

 

Thanks for the note.  I tend to be very cynical about management teams and suspicious about the alignment of their interest with that of smaller shareholders.

 

I expect that when the numbers come out we will see more of the same from BRK.  The Apple position will be larger, the large slug of financial companies will almost certainly be a larger slug, and the BRK buybacks will be trivial.  IMO, this is a crying shame.  With BRK<$200 these days, it should be a no-brainer to buy back shares to increase SV for continuing shareholders. 

 

IMO, it's a case study of a misalignment of priorities.

 

 

SJ

[rb]

SJ, 10 billion dollars here, 10 billion dollars there, 20 billion dollars there.... Pretty soon we're talking big money. The buyback is what it is. It's been discussed here a lot. It's been suggested it's simple. My feeling, given WB's views of the issue, is that he has designed a smarter buyback system that has been suggested. It's simply not in the man's genes to just do what everyone else does.

[Spekulatius]

i bet Warren weighs the price declines for his holdings vs the price declines for BRK, and BRK until today has actually outperformed. My guess is that he put much more funds into adding to his holding than buying back BRK shares. This may changes, when the relative value proposition changes.