Share Repurchases

[Swedish_Compounder]

Dynamic has a very valid Point. It seems that the market does not appreciate the fact that they committed USD 10B to OXY during Q2.

 

I was thinking about where Berkshires numbers will be 10 years from now if Buffett takes a 10 year long nap and basically does nothing during those 10 years.

 

Stock portfolio:

If the existing stock portfolio of around USD 200B is well composed and increases in value by 6% per year, it will be worth USD 358B, Before tax liability.

 

Cash flow:

2018 cash flow from operations minus depreciation (removed depreciation to adjust for growth CapEx) was USD 28B. If we assume that it grows by 3% per year, free cash flow 10 years from now will be USD 37B.

 

Cash position: Around 320 BUSD of cash will have been added to the current balance of around 130 BUSD. Thus, the cash balance will be around USD 450B.

 

What do I want to say with this? I am not sure. Probably that Berkshire is a low risk investment and that two or three major acquisitions together with increased repurchases and additions to the stock portfolio could lead to a value four times the current market cap 10 years from now.

 

[gfp]

Are you including the bond portfolio in "cash and equivalents" ?  Just curious how you figure $139 Billion as the cash balance

 

I have taken a good look at the situation reported in the 10-Q now.

 

It seems that although Float has risen to about $125 billion, the cash and equivalents have increased further to $139 billion.

 

It seems that with regard to the portfolio, if I take my quarter end value (excluding KHC) and add the 31,081,000 shares of BAC that were added at $29.00 closing price, then subtract the -43,387,980 USG holding at $43.50 Knauf takeover price, I get a portfolio valuation of $200,597 million versus Berkshire's 10-Q $200,516 million based around the previous 13F filings.

 

I'm usually a little bit out, but it doesn't look as though Berkshire has been buying a lot of stocks net in the quarter.

[Dynamic]

Yeah, that's what I did. I need to strip that out, as it's more long-term and more prone to variations in current market value.

 

I should instead have used:

Cash and cash equivalents (<3mth Treasuries)	41,375,000,000
Short-term investments in US Treasury Bills	77,745,000,000
Total Cash & Equivalents on hand	119,120,000,000

[Jurgis]

Dynamic has a very valid Point. It seems that the market does not appreciate the fact that they committed USD 10B to OXY during Q2.

 

I was thinking about where Berkshires numbers will be 10 years from now if Buffett takes a 10 year long nap and basically does nothing during those 10 years.

 

Stock portfolio:

If the existing stock portfolio of around USD 200B is well composed and increases in value by 6% per year, it will be worth USD 358B, Before tax liability.

 

Cash flow:

2018 cash flow from operations minus depreciation (removed depreciation to adjust for growth CapEx) was USD 28B. If we assume that it grows by 3% per year, free cash flow 10 years from now will be USD 37B.

 

Cash position: Around 320 BUSD of cash will have been added to the current balance of around 130 BUSD. Thus, the cash balance will be around USD 450B.

 

What do I want to say with this? I am not sure. Probably that Berkshire is a low risk investment and that two or three major acquisitions together with increased repurchases and additions to the stock portfolio could lead to a value four times the current market cap 10 years from now.

 

So you magically get 15% annualized return even though all parts you mentioned grow way less than that.  ::)

 

With huge simplifications, BRK is trading at ~11.6x your 2018 CFFO and you expect it to trade at 35x your 2028 CFFO in 2028.  ::)

[Swedish_Compounder]

Jurgis, yes,and that is because the stock is under-valued today.

 

What I tried to convey was that with share repurchases, acquisitions and stock additions it could be worth four times more per share in 2028 (I wrote market cap, but meant value per share). What it will trade for might be different than hat it is worth though.

 

Imagine that they do two USD 100B acquisitions during the coming five years, which will each provide USD 12B cash flow ten years from now (not impossible) then cash flow ten years from now would instead be USD 61B.

 

Assume they can add USD 100B of equity holdings over the years, which grow in value to 200B, then the stock portfolio will grow to USD 550B (possible / likely scenario, to be honest I also Think the existing holdings will grow more than 6% a year given many if the larger holdings very strong balance sheets and heavy repurchase activity).

 

Assume they repurchase 3,5% of outstanding shares each year, which would decrease the share count by 30% (not so likely maybe given the recent snail pace).

 

If these things would happen and we value the operating earnings at 14 times cash flow, we would get a value of ((61*14)+550)/0,965^10=2005, which is rougly four times the current market cap.

 

Given recent comments from WEB, I do not think the repurchases will be that large, but if they get lucky, the acquisitions could be larger than assumed above.

 

I Believe the "Buffett sleeps for ten years" scenario is a low case and the above possibility is a high case. The outcome will probably be in between with value probably being a triple from todays market price. This makes it a very safe stock to own and even recommend to long term oriented family and friends in my opinion.

[Jurgis]

Jurgis, yes,and that is because the stock is under-valued today.

 

What I tried to convey was that with share repurchases, acquisitions and stock additions it could be worth four times more per share in 2028 (I wrote market cap, but meant value per share). What it will trade for might be different than hat it is worth though.

 

Imagine that they do two USD 100B acquisitions during the coming five years, which will each provide USD 12B cash flow ten years from now (not impossible) then cash flow ten years from now would instead be USD 61B.

 

Assume they can add USD 100B of equity holdings over the years, which grow in value to 200B, then the stock portfolio will grow to USD 550B (possible / likely scenario, to be honest I also Think the existing holdings will grow more than 6% a year given many if the larger holdings very strong balance sheets and heavy repurchase activity).

 

Assume they repurchase 3,5% of outstanding shares each year, which would decrease the share count by 30% (not so likely maybe given the recent snail pace).

 

If these things would happen and we value the operating earnings at 14 times cash flow, we would get a value of ((61*14)+550)/0,965^10=2005, which is rougly four times the current market cap.

 

Given recent comments from WEB, I do not think the repurchases will be that large, but if they get lucky, the acquisitions could be larger than assumed above.

 

I Believe the "Buffett sleeps for ten years" scenario is a low case and the above possibility is a high case. The outcome will probably be in between with value probably being a triple from todays market price. This makes it a very safe stock to own and even recommend to long term oriented family and friends in my opinion.

 

IMO you are way overoptimistic.

 

I'd bet about 2:1 that BRK will return less than 15% annual in coming 10 years. (Not an actual bet )

 

But hey I'll happily take that 15% if it comes.

 

Good luck

[Swedish_Compounder]

 

IMO you are way overoptimistic.

 

I'd bet about 2:1 that BRK will return less than 15% annual in coming 10 years. (Not an actual bet )

 

But hey I'll happily take that 15% if it comes.

 

Good luck

 

Well, if you read what I am writing, I am not forecasting 15% CAGR. It is a possible high case scenario. It is not my base case scenario. So I will also take the bet you propose that actual growth will be below the high case scenario.

 

 

 

[John Hjorth]

Jurgis, yes,and that is because the stock is under-valued today.

 

What I tried to convey was that with share repurchases, acquisitions and stock additions it could be worth four times more per share in 2028 (I wrote market cap, but meant value per share). What it will trade for might be different than hat it is worth though. ...

 

It's way off, Swedish_Compounder,

 

I was in doubt what you meant by your first post about it here, but not after your last post partly quoted above. You're in your calculations ignoring some material perspectives in the interactions between the income statement, the balance sheet & the cash flow statement, that can't be ignored, because it's about accounting logic [, and your post is about book value].

 

Here I'll mention just three - here in order by significance - the most significant placed first, and two of them about the most significant liabilities, by order:

 

1. Float, and the income from it

 

From the press releases, Berkshire float EOP 2017 was approx. USD 114 B, while at EOP2018 it was approx. USD 125 B - an increase during 2018 of USD 8 B [which was a great year with regard to growth in insurance float]. Your calculation considers that earnings [addition to book equity], while it is just growth in some net insurance assets and liabilities in the group balance sheet. Btw, you can't even estimate it by the posts in the 2018 cash flow statement as adjustments to net earnings to arrive to cash flow from operating activities [uSD 3.449 B + USD 1.114 B + USD 1.174 = USD 5.737, which is not near USD 8, ref. the press releases - some posts must be lumped together in the cash flow statement to keep it on one page].

 

Earnings from float is the investment income from the cash made available by the float minus cost of float. See a post by me in the MKL topic about cost of float. Some people think it is [[[combined ratio in percent]/100]-1], [like in "combined ratio is 95%, so cost of float is minus 5%"]. It isn't.

 

2. Deferred taxes.

 

Taxes paid by Berkshire "normally" [<- in the meaning : seen over a longer range of years] are lower than taxes charged to the income statement, the difference being deferred and provided in the balance sheet. 2018 is not "normal" [because of the large decline in the market value of the stock portfolio], and the same can be said about 2017 because of the tax reform. [This however pulls the other way than bullet 1 - the point again here is that your basis for extrapolation if off].

 

3. Estimate of maintenance CAPEX.

 

Investments in property, plant, equipment & equipment held for lease are bigger than depreciation and amortization.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

Let's go back again to "Share repurchases" [ : - ) ]

[Swedish_Compounder]

Hi there John,

 

No, my post was not about book value. It was about intrinsic value. I do not value companies based on book value.

 

I know there are many technicalities which could be discussed, such as the value of float and float increases and the value of deferred taxes. I also know that  maintenance CapEx is a bit higher than depreciation.

 

However, who said that those factors are not discounted properly when valuing that cash flow at 14x for a great set of assets when other great companies such as CostCo, UNP, Coca Cola, P&G etc are valued north of 20 times free cash flow?

[John Hjorth]

Swedish_Compounder,

 

I hear you, but I still think we eventually should discuss Berkshire valuation methods in another topic than this, to avoid clogging things up too much. [ : - ) ]

[John Hjorth]

Like so many other Berkshire investors, I picked the 2019Q2 10-Q just after it was made available on the Berkshire website Saturday [my local time, that's at 14:00 in the afternoon]. I dived directly into the information about share buybacks in the cash flow statement and the specification of the buybacks. Next, a glance on the information about the five large stock positions, remembering Dynamic's prior comments here on CoBF about BAC. No surprise for me there - it looked to me, that Dynamic was head-on.

 

Then I just tried to "feel" myself : "My stomach - & what was going on inside my head?" I thought : "Great! - No frustrations or the like - just nothing going on in "my system"". -I am now really mentally and emotional detached to the lagging capital allocation in Berkshire! - That has "just" taken me six months to get so far! ... [The 2018Q4 13F/HR and the 2018 10-K in combination caused some strong and strange reactions at me ... - I did not sell though on the following Monday after the 10-K, or later.]

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

Then this "150"-thingy popped up in my mind ... -What was it, and where?! I had to really concentrate and think carefully, digging in my memory. I came to the conclusion, that it was related to some comments from Mr. Buffett about share buybacks at an AGM a few years ago - perhaps in 2017? [perhaps before, perhaps later?] - and particularly : How [the h**k] do I trace & find it again?!

 

Next, I fairly quickly realized, that the fast & easy solution was to grab Joel's Buffett Compilation was the way to go, because it's a searchable pdf-file. I then grabbed the file [already downloaded many times, so last version [- my SSD must be female, because it's pregnant!] I expanded the index in the file and started a search from first page of the 2017 AGM transcript, searching for "150". Outcome : Bingo! - yes, there it was - p. 4,100 [of [as of now] 4,953 pages [ 0_0]] :

 

... But like I say, at a certain point, the burden of proof really shifts to us, big-time. And there's no way I can come back here three years from now and tell you that we hold 150 billion or so in cash or more, and we think we're doing something brilliant by doing that.

 

After that I have done the following :

 

1. Saturday : Read the whole actual question from Mr. Gelb in the transcript and the full responses from both Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.

2. Saturday : Looked up that particular session on the CNBC Buffett  Archieve [ Link ] - it 's question #2 in the afternoon session at the 2017 AGM, properly marked, just click on it.

3. Saturday : Repeated bullet #1.

4. Yesterday [Tuesday] : Repeated bullet #2 - but this time focusing on Mr. Munger's appearance under Mr. Buffett's comments [to me : no real reaction, and most of all, no ping time after "Charlie?"]

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

More later [also yesterday], I scrolled through the AGM 2018 & 2019 transcripts and read the Q&As about share buybacks - all as I personally consider general, to some extent and varying degrees also evasive As.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

Again, I do not any longer get hit by frustrations over the situation [i may elaborate on that], I don't hope for anything, & I try my very best not to speculate about this matter at hand.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

What do you get out of all this?

 

I mean : Is this "150 billion"-comment from Mr. Buffett to you an indication of an inflexion point? -Maybe just a soft one? [longinvestor Mr. Buffett time ago has called it a "filled bladder syndrome" [ : - ) ] -So "inflexion point" in that terminology meant as the approximate stage where the "filled bladder syndrome" escalades to an "overflow issue"].

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

I would like to read your take, thank you.

[Guest longinvestor]

I don’t claim authoring the full bladder analogy. Buffett said that. I hope that I attributed it so. Such glove fitting phrases come only from Buffett, teacher of 80 years

[John Hjorth]

You actually didn't, longinvestor,

 

Ref. here :

 

Buffett is really wary of doing stupid things because of the cash build. He addressed that as the full bladder syndrome during the last meeting. I read this as saying that even the best allocators have this urge. With the five capital allocation priorities laid out there are many people who've been deploying Berkshires cash, not just Buffett. Caution should serve well here. The fat pitches will come. If not enough of those do, it won't be a calamity to return capital. Also how much of this angst over cash has to do with it crossing $100B. $40 or $60B is also a shitload. They've been there for 10+ years already.

 

So my bad. I've edited my post accordingly.

[SwedishValue]

To me it seems pretty likely that one out of two things I number below will likely happen. I give these two a combined probability of more than 80%:

 

1. Market drops more than 30%, and stays below the -30% treshold for at least six months.

2. Buffett will have more than 150 BN USD cash at hand at the 2021 AGM.

 

Personally, I’d rather take the over than the under for 150 BN USD in cash for the AGM 2021. Buybacks will happen every quarter until then, but their combined volume for the next two years will most likely be below 10BN.

 

An interesting aspect of this is that it should make Berkshire more likely to be targeted by corporate raiders and broken up and dissolved once Buffett is gone. Having 20%+ of the market cap available as distributable cash helps any corporate raider. And without Buffett, there will not be a big controlling shareholder.

[AdjustedEarnings]

This situation has become really silly where WEB is anchored to his idea (and passion) of turning one dollar into more than a dollar, without actually doing so. On one hand he says the market is really undervalued if rates are sub-2%. On the other hand, he buys little (in the market, public or private, or on the repurchase). For their own purchases and repurchases they're probably using a 9-10% threshold or something in that range which, of course, will not be met in a sub-2% world. Waiting for a deal amounts to betting on rates and/or cycles (which they say they don't do). Central banks are now driving DOWN rates. So it may well be another 5 years before BRK does a deal. If that deal (in 2024) is anything less than $200 billion, ROE from this point on will be disappointing. I've written on this topic before but it just keeps getting sillier each year. Warren is right to think that BRKB is probably not worth more than $220, probably because they will always have a cash drag and not enough opportunities. He loves the buybacks at AAPL and loved them at IBM, but the same logic doesn't seem to apply to BRKB. We have to adjust our prospective ROEs down accordingly. It's probably heretical to say to the group here but I feel it's not totally rational of WEB to act this way. He just doesn't believe in shrinking the base when it comes to his own company. This view has been held since at least 1995 (when they said they wouldn't buy it back even at a 25% discount):

 

https://www.thehobbyistinvestor.com/berkshire-hathaway-1995-annual-meeting-audience-question-39/

 

I think his passion, desire to invest, and getting larger is getting in the way of "per share" results. In many of these situations, he has always said in hindsight that they should've acted differently (e.g. when they didn't buy back after 1999, when they raised the threshold from 1.1x to 1.2x, etc.). Frankly, if they're not going to do a buyback at these prices, they should pay a dividend. I know the tax argument, but would you rather pay 15%-20% and invest the money in the rest of our portfolio or have BRK keep it in cash for you. The opportunity cost seems higher than the tax you'd pay.

 

The OXY deal has a nice coupon but I cannot say with certainty that these seemingly attractive coupons are necessarily that attractive looking at the price and structure of the transaction. It seems like something they got into where the like the terms but not the business because they cannot find anything else (like Salomon and US Air back in the day). Leveraged Kraft deal as well as TXU all did not go as well as anticipated and were ones where the terms were attractive but the business dicey. What do the others here think?

[SHDL]

I’m personally not too bummed by the ever increasing cash pile at Berkshire because I can neutralize it by holding more BRK shares and less cash myself.  However I understand the frustration of fund managers who have a meaningful chunk of their portfolio in BRK.  I’ve read several reports recently about such managers finally giving up and selling. 

 

Speaking of which, I have yet another silly theory about Buffett’s Master Plan: he’s intentionally repurchasing shares as slowly as he can in order to reconfigure the shareholder base to his liking before he retires.  Well, ok, I said “silly” but I’m only half joking. 

[AdjustedEarnings]

I’m personally not too bummed by the ever increasing cash pile at Berkshire because I can neutralize it by holding more BRK shares and less cash myself.  However I understand the frustration of fund managers who have a meaningful chunk of their portfolio in BRK.  I’ve read several reports recently about such managers finally giving up and selling. 

 

Speaking of which, I have yet another silly theory about Buffett’s Master Plan: he’s intentionally repurchasing shares as slowly as he can in order to reconfigure the shareholder base to his liking before he retires.  Well, ok, I said “silly” but I’m only half joking.

 

That works in theory but cash in your hands means you can invest in anything else you like (even if not now but in the future) v/s your cash inside BRK means it can only go into their restricted universe of 50-60 companies, of which none are cheap. Or it has to go into deals like OXY. I think CM was correct to predict that they'll get more liberal w/ repurchases. There's simply no other alternative. But I do think Buffett will fight it for a good while (as he has) before eventually it's done. I have a good size personal position in BRK, but not huge.

[SHDL]

That works in theory but cash in your hands means you can invest in anything else you like (even if not now but in the future) v/s your cash inside BRK means it can only go into their restricted universe of 50-60 companies, of which none are cheap. Or it has to go into deals like OXY.

 

Yes, that’s something to keep in mind.  In my case though I'm using a pile of cash that was not going to be invested in anything (other than T-bills and such) anyway so it makes no real difference, at least for the time being.

[Mephistopheles]

I'll say once again (because nobody replied the first time), that I think Buffett is a more of a macro guy than we think. He thinks BRK is cheap, but just thinks there will be greater opportunities in the near future. Same reason he bought JPM, just not a whole lot.

[SHDL]

I'll say once again (because nobody replied the first time), that I think Buffett is a more of a macro guy than we think. He thinks BRK is cheap, but just thinks there will be greater opportunities in the near future. Same reason he bought JPM, just not a whole lot.

 

I think this is right.  He significantly reduced his equity exposure both in 1969 (by closing his partnerships) and in 1998 (via the GenRe transaction), both at/near major inflation adjusted cyclical peaks, and then loaded up later when things got cheaper.  Will this be his third time?  We shall see...

[Viking]

I'll say once again (because nobody replied the first time), that I think Buffett is a more of a macro guy than we think. He thinks BRK is cheap, but just thinks there will be greater opportunities in the near future. Same reason he bought JPM, just not a whole lot.

 

I think this is right.  He significantly reduced his equity exposure both in 1969 (by closing his partnerships) and in 1998 (via the GenRe transaction), both at/near major inflation adjusted cyclical peaks, and then loaded up later when things got cheaper.  Will this be his third time?  We shall see...

 

Let’s hope this is true. Bottom line, i think a shitstorm is coming. It this happens it increases the odds that Buffett will find an elephant at a price he likes (similar to his railroad purchase). Perhaps something he already owns a piece of. The fact Buffett has been building cash for years is a positive for investors who are buying stock today at prices under $200.

[KFS]

It seems like everyone here is fixated on the cash position and WB's apparent resistance to putting the cash to work.... But I think it would be interesting to challenge this with an updated analysis of cash/cash equivalents vs growth in float, similar to the brooklyn investor's article below from a couple years ago.  It basically concludes that the cash stockpile is actually a reflection of Buffet's bearishness on bonds (bond balance down, cash up), and not really a reflection of Buffett hoarding or stockpiling....  The total of cash, cash equivalents, and fixed income investments as a percentage of float has been pretty consistent for a long time, and the cash/equiv just appears to be very high because the fixed income is relatively low in the mix.

 

http://brooklyninvestor.blogspot.com/2017/11/is-buffett-bearish.html

 

His bearishness on bonds is very clear and has been reiterated several times recently, for instance here and here...

 

 

Interest rates may not rise in the immediate future, but WEB is a patient man.  He has stated over recent years "It is idiotic to buy bonds."  This also fits with his large investments in banks/financials which will benefit from rising interest rates over time, so of course he sees a lot of value there.

 

 

 

[Mephistopheles]

It seems like everyone here is fixated on the cash position and WB's apparent resistance to putting the cash to work.... But I think it would be interesting to challenge this with an updated analysis of cash/cash equivalents vs growth in float, similar to the brooklyn investor's article below from a couple years ago.  It basically concludes that the cash stockpile is actually a reflection of Buffet's bearishness on bonds (bond balance down, cash up), and not really a reflection of Buffett hoarding or stockpiling....  The total of cash, cash equivalents, and fixed income investments as a percentage of float has been pretty consistent for a long time, and the cash/equiv just appears to be very high because the fixed income is relatively low in the mix.

 

http://brooklyninvestor.blogspot.com/2017/11/is-buffett-bearish.html

 

His bearishness on bonds is very clear and has been reiterated several times recently, for instance here and here...

 

 

Interest rates may not rise in the immediate future, but WEB is a patient man.  He has stated over recent years "It is idiotic to buy bonds."  This also fits with his large investments in banks/financials which will benefit from rising interest rates over time, so of course he sees a lot of value there.

 

Buffett addressed the hypothesis that Brooklyn investor presented in one of the recent annual meetings. He and munger both said that it’s just a coincidence that cash/float ratio has been so steady over time. They basically said that if an elephant presented itself they’d pounce regardless of the ratio

[gfp]

Yeah, I agree - its a strong correlation with float growth but I really think its more of a reflection of the "problem" that money has always been flowing in faster than they can find intelligent places to put it.  Float growth has been a material component of incoming cash, and both cash from operations and float increases have to be invested.  Mungofitch over at the motely fool board showed how the overall allocation of cash to the entire investment portfolio isn't all that out of whack (I forget, but it's in the 30's % I think). 

 

Warren will probably borrow money as a component of any decently sized acquisition.  So, with other assets to sell, Berkshire can realistically afford an acquisition up to, say, $200 billion, if the opportunity presents itself.  Maybe he's holding out for Coke.  Charlie certainly seemed to indicate it was Warren's dream sub.  Realistically, Warren could probably spend more than $200 Billion for the right deal.

 

In the last few decades, Berkshire has never really been valued based on the potential energy of its buying power until a deal is announced and that potential becomes "kenetic" earnings.  No real value is given to the roller coaster chugging up the hill, and then the market suddenly thinks the company is worth more as it coasts down the other side.

[John Hjorth]

Thank you to all for some high quality posts since my last post,

 

Lots to think about. [ : - ) ] To me, it's inspiring and educational to read your posts, because the situation can be approached & looked at from several angles.

 

- - - o 0 o - - -

 

I have read that particular blog post by The Brooklyn Investor discussed by KFS and Mephistopheles before, I suppose it must have been just after it was posted late 2017, most likely because it was mentioned here on CoBF.

 

What caught my eye reading it this time [, not last time] was the large movements in cash during the period 2001 - 2004 [both years included]. [uSD 5.863 B EOP2001 -> USD 40.020 B EOP2004], so I dived into the cash flow statements for those years [i've never really looked closer at these earlier - they are somehow "just history" to me]. It became clear to me, that Mr. Buffett was rolling out of bonds with - at least some - duration to cash and cash equivalents because of low bond yields and really no other attractive allocation alternatives, to some extent like in today's environment.

 

I found this on p. 5 in the 2003 Annual Report :

 

We will continue the capital allocation practices we have used in the past. If stocks become significantly cheaper than entire businesses, we will buy them aggressively. If selected bonds become attractive, as they did in 2002, we will again load up on these securities. Under any market or economic conditions, we will be happy to buy businesses that meet our standards. And, for those that do, the bigger the better. Our capital is underutilized now, but that will happen periodically. It’s a painful condition to be in – but not as painful as doing something stupid. (I speak from experience.)

 

Overall, we are certain Berkshire’s performance in the future will fall far short of what it has been in the past. Nonetheless, Charlie and I remain hopeful that we can deliver results that are modestly above average. That’s what we’re being paid for.

 

So, basically nothing new under the sun, just that 16 years have passed. Berkshire still doing basically the same thing it always has, and "everything in life is just phase", and Berkshire is "now in a phase" similar to 2003, [and "this phase too will eventually pass" - one way or another ...].

 

So, in short - It's just "business as usual" at Berkshire, in a way [like it has always been].