shhughes1116

NATO is not going to strike Russia, unless Russia strikes NATO first. I see it more likely that the West provides Ukraine with multiple mobile nuclear weapons, just enough to cause Putin to think twice about striking Ukraine. on a semi-related note, heavy artillery on the Zaporizchzhia front today and the Ukrainians removed some of their minefields recently. Things might get saucy soon around Melitopol and Mauriopil.

Remember that what they say publicly is usually different from what happens behind the scenes, especially as it relates to training in the military. The folks mobilized will not receive more than a week of training. They will be lucky to receive any real training. Much of the training cadre was deployed to Ukraine already, and historically most of the training funding has been siphoned away through corruption - recruits are lucky if they even get to fire their weapon before deployment. if you thought you saw canon fodder over the last six months, this will be worse. Think of the opening scene to the move Stalingrad. “Rifle for you, ammunition for you. When the man in front drops the rifle, the man in back picks up the rifle.” That’s the approach they are using.

People keep suggesting that negotiation is possible with Putin. It is not. For Putin, negotiations and cease fires are simply an opportunity to re-arm and re-position combat units for the next round of war. The Russians and their collaborators are panicking. They’ve hastily called for referenda between Sept 23 and Sept 27, and the Duma is bringing back Stalin-esque laws, such as criminalizing the act of surrendering with a 10-year prison sentence. if I was a betting man, we are going to see the Ukrainians blow a hole in the Russian line in Zaporizhzhia that is timed to coincide with the referendum. Head south to Mauiopil and Melitpol, and then wheel west towards Crimea. This makes the Russian positions in Kherson untenable, and opens the door to Crimea. The Russian collaborators will have to choose between running a sham referendum or fleeing to save their lives.

Yes. I believe this is a turning point in the war. As I previously described, the trajectory of manpower for Ukraine is up, and the trajectory of manpower for Russia is down, and this gap is widening. Each passing day sees more combat-ready Ukrainian troops and fewer combat-ready Russian and Russian proxy troops. Ukraine is rotating front-line units, and has been doing that for 45-60 days now. That gives you a sense for how they see their manpower situation along the front. Five observations about the battlefield: 1. There are 10k Ukrainian combat troops - a little more than 2 maneuver brigades - that are being trained in the UK. Their training is coming to an end and will return to Ukraine soon. 2. By my estimation, the Ukrainians have another 2-3 maneuver brigades - 12k-18k - that are in Ukraine, have been equipped and trained, but not deployed to the front-lines. These maneuver brigades probably became a lot more mobile with all of the mechanized equipment captured during the recent Krakiv counter-offensive. 3. The more capable Russian combat units were re-deployed to Kherson. They have been fixed there by the Ukrainian's slow-moving, methodical counter-attack. Because the bridges have been destroyed or heavily damaged, they are unable to be effectively re-supplied, and they are unable to retreat with their heavy equipment. The troops that would have defended Crimea are instead fighting in Kherson. They are on the wrong side of the river. 4. Along the Donbas, the Russians are bleeding themselves dry near/around Bakhmut. This appears to be the last area where they have the strength to carry out offensive operations. 5. Winter is coming, and with that, offensive operations will slow. Maybe another 45 days before the weather starts slowing down operations in Ukraine. So what are Putin's options? Realistically, he does not have any non-nuclear options. 1. "Hold the line" in Ukraine. But, the Russian's don't have enough troops to defend the Donbas front, the Zaporizhzhia front, and the Kherson front. They are vulnerable in each of these places, and Ukraine can pick and choose which area to exploit. And by my estimation, the Ukrainians have the American equivalent of an overstrength armored Division waiting in reserve, perfect for exploiting a deep breakthrough in any of these three fronts. 2. "Conquer more land in Ukraine in order to force Kyiv to capitulate" The Russians don't have enough troops to force a breakthrough on any of these three fronts. 3. "Mobilize for a holy war in Ukraine." If he calls for a general mobilization, I think he likely gets f**ked by a general uprising. 4. "Claim that de-nazification was successful and retreat/leave." If he leaves/retreats, I think he get's f**ked by the even more extreme Russian nationalists/fascists. 5. "Blackmail Europeans with nat gas." Putin hopes for an apocalyptic winter in Europe, and hopes gas prices blow through the roof, forcing European governments to make nice with Russia and stop arming Ukraine. Hope is not a valid investment strategy, and is definitely not a valid military strategy. 6. "Go nuclear." Claim that Russian's territory is threatened by Ukrainian attacks on Donestsk and Luhansk, and utilize multiple tactical nukes in Ukraine. I think 1-4 are unlikely. I think Putin will hope for #5, but this won't be successful because he underestimates the resolve of European governments to support Ukraine. That leaves Putin with #6 - tactical nukes. I believe Putin will try to use tactical nukes in Ukraine because he believes NATO will not react to this. I don't know what would prevent this from happening. - Historically a lone rational actor in the Russian Armed Forces has prevented nuclear escalation, but this is a very different situation from those historical precedents. - Given how Ukraine has acquitted themselves in this war, the West could secretly arm Ukraine will multiple nuclear weapons, and tell Putin that Ukraine will be given the green-light to use these nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear provocation from Russia. but this would open Pandora's box for future nuclear proliferation. If Putin does not use tactical nukes, then I think Ukraine defeats the Russians on the battlefield while Putin watches helplessly.

More CLMT.

Boris? Boris, is that you tweeting from the troll farm in the Urals? kidding aside, your take on this fails to recognize that Putin isn’t interested in negotiation or peace, and never was. For him, cease fires and peace deals are a time for Russian military forces to regroup, rearm, and prepare for the next military action. Three ways this ends: 1. Ukraine ceases to exist; 2. Russian army defeated in the field. 3. Putin dies. #1 will lead to subsequent invasion of Baltic countries. #2 will lead to #3.

One other point here. They don’t need ATACMS. They are about to get a bunch of 40ft patrol boats from the US. I’ll bet they mount Brinstone Missiles on the back of those boats, just as they did with small trucks. Not as lethal as a Harpoon, but likely painful enough to keep Russian boats in or near Sevastopol. And hitting a surfaced submarine would be lethal for the sub.

I don’t think the US will provide Ukraine with the ATACMS. But I think this might be used as leverage over Russia to unblock the Black Sea. “We will unblock Kaliningrad, and you will unblock the Black Sea and let Ukrainian ships sortie out of Odessa with grain. Otherwise, we will give Ukraine enough ATACMS to wipe Sevastopol off the face of the Earth.” i think the entire reason train and vehicular traffic to Kaliningrad was restricted was in order to create a bargaining chip for Ukraine. Kaliningrad and Sevastopol are Russia’s only two deep water naval ports that are ice free all year. If Kaliningrad is blocked by land, and inbound naval traffic can’t reach Sevastopol via the Bosphorous Strait, Russia has big problems with their fleet at sea for almost 50% of the year.

Amazing. I just read a puff-piece from an Indian defense “journal” and the content is identical, down to the grammatical errors. Ukraine did not have a large standing army. About 90k active duty guys in the Donbas right before the war started, serving a one year stint, along with “8 classes” of reservists who served their one-year stint in the Donbas between 2014 and 2022. Takes time to mobilize troops, re-train them, get them equipment. Their posture in the Donbas reflects this situation - they needed a way to soak up Russian pressure while they mobilize the population to fight back. And how do you soak up pressure? Heavy on fortifications and fixed positions, multiple lines of defense, willingness to trade territory for time, and fight your enemy in places where you take away their advantage (i.e. urban areas where the use of artillery creates even better defensive opportunities, and where you can cuddle up right next to the enemy line so he can’t bring in his heavy artillery). You know the problem with being an artillery-heavy army that uses very imprecise weapons? You need lots of 152mm shells and 122mm rockets - mountains of them. And given how military logistics work, you need to stockpile those shells and rockets about 15km - 30km behind your lines, and for Russia, close to a rail head. And to move those munitions to your forward firing positions, you need lots and lots of trucks. Lots and lots of trucks are hard to hide - makes it easy to find munition dumps. Have you noticed a number of videos recently of explosions at munitions dumps behind the Russian lines? Easy to identify given the secondary explosions - you can literally see the 122mm Grad rockets firing off like fireworks. An artillery tube without shells is worthless. Infantry attacking fixed fortifications without artillery support are either dead, or soon to be dead. You know the other problem with being an artillery heavy army? You need lots of replacement barrels. Each barrel can fire a certain number of shells before it degrades. As it degrades, it looses accuracy. Eventually, it will likely cause a shell to detonate in the tube, killing the crew. Specialized industrial machinery is needed to build replacement barrels. You need lots of trucks to move these barrels to the front. You need specialized equipment at the front to replace these barrels. And these barrels are shipped with the munitions. So when the munitions dump goes boom-boom-boom, what do you think happens to the replacement barrels? But don’t take my word for it on this. Why do you think Russia is rolling out T-62s from long-term storage and using them for indirect fire? Could it be because they are running out of everything but 1960’s era 105mm barrels and shells? Why do you think Russia is mobilizing stocks of Soviet-era 152mm shells and 122mm rockets from Belarus? Could it be because they have less than expected in storage and a lack of industrial capacity to produce enough? While this is going on in the background, Ukraine is using the new M142s and M270/ to hit Russian C&C locations. Don’t get me wrong. There is plenty more dying to happen on both sides. And there is plenty of propaganda BS on both sides. But the Ukrainians are hitting the exponential curve upwards on mobilization. This will go even faster now that the UK has agreed to train two brigades of troops per quarter. Every strike on civilians creates a new father or mother that has nothing to live for but death and destruction to the Russian invader. Every kidnapping and torture in Russian-occupied Ukraine creates a new partisan willing to slaughter Russian soldiers in the rear areas and collaborators. Before this is done, I suspect we are going to see the Russian army fall apart.

if we were serious about ending this, we would send ~500 M109A6 Palladins. An upgraded version of the M109s that Norway recently sent and the M109s that the British are about to send. We bought almost 1000 back in the 90’s before the production line closed. Great weapon for shoot and scoot, very accurate, and when combined with the counter-battery radars that we’ve given to Ukraine, the Russian artillery would be toast in about a week.

A bunch of sources, yes. At the beginning of the war when they started conscription, they were moving guys through the system in a couple of days. They had equipment on-hand, and clearly a need for numbers. Now I am hearing that it is taking more than a month - they are waiting around for equipment and the need for numbers is not as desperate. People get really focused on the heavy equipment like HIMARS and tanks and IFVs. Clearly those are important, especially in the South. But people forget about the small stuff - body armor, helmets, secure radios, small-arms and NVGs. The NVGs are pretty crucial. In some areas of the front, can’t go toe-to-toe in a conventional fight with Russians right now given the disparity in artillery. But the Ukrainians have a lot of NVG gear compared to the Russians, and some really incredible NVG stuff for their relatively large force of SOF guys. So from what I am hearing, the Ukrainians are doing a lot of fighting at night. The Russians don’t have a lot of working NVG equipment, don’t have much working thermal optics, and so they are basically blind (and sometimes drunk) at night.

Read my earlier post about mobilization. Ukraine is just now hitting the exponential curve upwards for mobilization, while Russia is struggling to fill frontline units with fresh meat. Ukraine’s problem isn’t numbers - they have more combat-experienced troops than any country in the world given the 8 year conflict in the Donbas and their 1-year rotation for conscripts. Ukraine’s problem is that they are struggling to outfit units with all the stuff needed for the front lines - helmets, boots, NVGs, etc. By the end of the Summer, Ukraine will likely have 750k mobilized troops, most of whom will already have combat experience from the Donbas. My prediction - - Ukraine pushes Russia back to the Feb 2022 borders; - Ukraine gives up Crimea during negotiations with Russia, and then promptly cuts the water at Nova Kakhovka, turning Crimea into an uninhabitable wasteland. - Referendum conducted in the Donbas by UN, and turns out people aren’t so interested in living under Russian rule. There are two additional facts which I think are helpful to understand - - Eastern front in WW2 was won on the backs of Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Siberian fighters, not ethnic Russians. The Ukrainians and Belorussians and Siberians know how to fight. - most of the Russian casualties have been among ethnic minorities and PMC soldiers. In other words, the elites and ethnic Russians don’t give a f**k about the human costs of the “special military operation”. If Putin starts a general mobilization by calling this a war, he is going to have a political problem with the elites and ethnic Russians, likely resulting in the end of his reign.

Thanks for sharing that clip - quite funny. Forgot how much I enjoyed Monty Python.

After 2014, it was a frozen conflict. Ukraine lacked the resources and political will to re-take Donbas, and Crimea’s location makes it challenging to retake. Russia was busy consolidating control over Donbas and Crimea. After the recent invasion and associated indiscriminate killing and shelling, the political will exists to spill blood while fighting Russia. And NATO has provided the resources that previously didn’t exist. I think Ukraine will push Russia back to the pre-2022 borders. At that point, I think the political leadership will take stock of whether the Ukrainian people are willing to die to retake Donbas and Crimea, and what the potential cost might be. If retaken, Crimea is easily defensible. On the other hand, the Donbas is not easily defensible and could become a demilitarized wasteland between Ukraine and Russia. Even Igor Girkin says that the Russians turned Donbas into a dump, so it might not be worth the cost for Ukraine to retake it.

Man, you guys are still prognosticating about the end game in Ukraine? Why is stalemate the most likely outcome? On what basis do you make this claim? Think about this from the perspective of mobilizing and maintaining an army in the field. On Day 1 of the war, Ukraine had about 100k active duty troops, most of them in the Donbas, with combat experience. They had another 650k men, many of them reservists, with combat experience from their 1-yr stints in the Donbas between 2014 and 2022. In this situation, they traded space for time, wearing down the Russians, to give them time for mobilization. It probably takes about 45 days to bring these men in, equip them, form them into units, train them into a functional brigade-level unit, and another week to work them into the front-line. And what do we see now, about 75 days after the war started? New brigade-level units deployed around Krakiv are pushing the Russians back. Same around the Izyum salient. By the end of the Summer, I’ll bet Ukraine has over 500k combat-experienced, NATO-equipped troops fighting in Eastern Ukraine, and another 250k territorial defense troops manning the borders around Kyiv, Krakiv and Odessa. On the other side, the Russians are only able to field about 250k troops at a time, outside of Russia. Even if they declare war and implement a general mobilization, they lack the logistical infrastructure for anything more. And they are equipping some soldiers in front-line units with dated equipment like MosinNagants. Nice rifle, but atrocious for a fire fight in the 21st century. And almost all of the replacements coming from Russia lack combat experience. So they have 250k troops, at most, to hold a long crescent-shaped front stretching from eastern Ukraine down to Kherson. That is not enough front-line troops to defend the land-bridge to Crimea AND hold the Donbas. A few weeks ago, I said to expect the Fourth Battle of Krakiv, which would blow open the Russian flank in the Donbas and lead to an encirclement of Russian troops. That is now happening in Izyum - the Ukrainians are starting to pinch that salient, while at the same time Ukraine troops are threatening Vovchansk. This will suck Russian troops from other areas to protect the railroad lines between Belgorod and Donbas. And they are being sucked into their rear areas to defend against partisans, especially in the South. With the growing manpower advantage and with an unending stream of weapons from the West, I suspect we are going to see Ukraine sever the land-bridge to Crimea this Summer by attacking towards Melitpol. This would expose the flank of Russian troops in Kherson and likely cause them to fall back into Crimea, rather than hold Kherson and die like the Ukrainian soldiers in Mauriopol. That opens up numerous possibles for Ukraine to finish the war on their terms. Plenty more bleeding and death to come, sadly. But I think we are going to see the Russian army routed in the field.

Putin is not going to use a nuclear weapon unless he feels like he is choosing between a war crimes trial at The Hague and Nuclear Annihilation. And in that case, he is not going to stop at a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. Said another way, Putin can lose the “special military operation” in Ukraine and there is a reasonable chance he can still remain in power. But if he uses a tactical nuke, then he will be out of power, either because of world wide nuclear annihilation, or because NATO uses conventional weapons to destroy any and all infrastructure in Russia (I.e. ice-free deep water ports, energy infrastructure, transportation infrastructure) that makes it impossible for Russia to continue existing as a country.

For those that are militarily inclined, it looks like the Ukrainians are going to turn Izyum into the “Fourth Battle of Krakiv”. Just like in the Third Battle or Krakiv, the Russians have left their supply lines unprotected and overextended, this time with a mass of BTGs in near/around Izyum. And their Western flank is very exposed. If the Ukrainians are successful in the same manner as Manstein was in 1943, the Russian flank in Donbas will be blown wide-open. Rule #1 of Encirclement Club: when trying to encircle your enemy, don’t create a new salient with your forces that is exposed to encirclement by the very enemy you are trying to encircle.

There won’t be direct military intervention by NATO countries. You are already seeing the effects of those pictures. US is mobilizing former eastern bloc equipment - upgraded T72s and BMPs - for delivery to Ukraine. Ukraine asked for 100 tanks and 400 APVs. Looks like they are going to get that. That’s the mobile units they’ll need to push East. The MANPADS plus AFVs and drones will make the Ukrainian mobile units tough to beat. Mix in some real-time NATO ISR plus fresh Ukrainian infantry, and I think the Ujrianians have better than 50-50 odds of booting the orcs from the eastern portion of Ukraine.

The Russians rear areas are not secure. In order to secure their rear, they have to pull back troops from the various city encirclements. But In order to secure the encircled cities, they must pull troops out of their rear areas. Their multi-axis advance forced them into this poor situation. The Russians have chosen the latter, and the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces are taking a page out of the Robert Rogers’ playbook and wreaking havoc on the Russian’s road-bound traffic in undefended rear areas. Certainly possible that Mauripol falls, and those Russian forces pivot north to cut off the eastern portion of Ukraine. That said, I think it is more likely that this slowly grinds into a stalemate, with the Russians unable to muster additional offensive actions. fortunately for Ukraine, they aren’t relying on this board for strategic military advice because they would most certainly be f**ked of that was the case.

Since the thread is about the endgame, I’ll offer my view. At this point, I see almost no chance that Ukraine agrees to de-militarization and neutrality. With each day that passes, the Russian ability to wage war decreases, and the Ukrainian ability to wage war (and their resolve to do so) increases. Each child that is murdered by indiscriminate rocket fire and artillery fire puts another parent on the battlefield that has nothing to lose in their quest to slaughter Russian soldiers. In the coming week, I think we will see more surrendering of Russian soldiers, more abandoned military equipment, and small areas where the Ukrainians push the Russians back. I also think the Russians will intensify their bombing of civilian areas in an effort to kill civilians and force the Ukrainians to negotiate. Medium-term, I think the Ukrainians push the Russians back to their borders, and turn the Donbas into a demilitarized wasteland, a la the Korean Peninsula. If Poland hands over their 30 Mig29s, I think this happens faster. During all of this, I think there is a greater than 50% chance that Russia bombs their own troops (or potentially a small town in russian) with a dirty bomb in order to justify further aggression against Ukraine.

Agreed. Amazing how many people in the West, sitting in their comfy chairs safe from indiscriminate rockets, believe that Ukraine should give up their ability to defend themselves and give up their rights as a sovereign nation, in response to an invading country that has a 100 year history of murdering Ukrainians. When your house is destroyed and your children have been murdered, there isn’t much left to live for. Lot of people in Ukraine are in this situation right now. Do you think they are going to lay down their arms and roll over for Russia? Or do you think they are going to grab a bunch of javelins and molotovs and slaughter as many Russian soldiers as they possibly can? I would go with the latter. And let’s talk about a practical problem for Putin. The first Tank Guards Army, the elite military ground unit in the Russian army and based in the Western District of Russia, is getting mauled in Ukraine. This happens to be the same unit that would lock down Moscow and the surrounding region if the populace attempted to overthrow the government. Continuing to bleed his army dry in Ukraine will undermine his ability to stay in power if the Russian populace revolts.

Bring on the fat premiums.

I like CLMT for 2022, for the following three high-level reasons: 1. Upcoming deleveraging (and refinancing of remaining debt at better rates), made possible by the recent $300 million Oaktree investment. 2. I think the expected cash flow from the Montana Renewables operation is not reflected in the current unit price. 3. The GP / founding families seem to have finally realized they are incompetent and appointed a CEO who appears competent, well-aligned with unit holders, and conveys a thoughtful strategy for the business. in addition to the above, I suspect some (or all) of the following are likely happen over the next few years, juicing the return further: 1. Expansion or Montana Renewables operation to produce sustainable/renewable aviation fuel. 2. Strategic sale of renewable diesel operation after it is up and running; 2. Conversion from partnership to c-Corp. happy to discuss more on a CLMT-specific thread if desired.

x2. I do the same in Excel.

I highly recommend the 2020 (or newer) Toyota Highlander Hybrid. Happy to answer questions if you have them.