shhughes1116

Don’t forget the USS Ranger.

We produced about 2400 M39 ATACMS, and used about 600 across the various gulf wars and war in Afghanistan. Some were converted to unitary warheads. The remainder are past their “expiration date” and can not be used because of our policy against using cluster munitions. I’ll bet there are >1,000 of these left, maybe 2/3 with the shorter range. Disposal is expensive, unless you shove it down an Orc’s throat - that is gratis. I struggle to understand why we did not give these to Ukraine last year. They don’t fit into the fighting doctrine that would be employed in a war with China. Giving them to Ukraine earlier this year would have wrecked Russia’s ability to deploy their KA-52s as a CAS firefighting brigade.

I can think of two reasons for moving a carrier group or two into the vicinity. First, the Israeli Air Force is flying a pretty high tempo operation right now. If things get hairy with Hezbollah in the North, I think they will be overwhelmed. Cue up the carrier air wing. second, if things get hairy with Syria or Iran, Israeli air strikes will necessitate electronic warfare support. each air wing embarks with ~6 Growlers that fill this role. Easier to operate these off the coast where they can maximize time airborne given the short legs of a Growler. the carrier group provides options in case things go south. And if we decide that Putin deserves a punch in the face, easy enough to do that in Syria with his “these soldiers that speak Russian and carry Russian guns aren’t really Russians” mercenary group.

This is going to be an interesting court case, and likely a series of court cases as everyone sues everyone. Lahaina exists within the rain shadow of the West Maui mountains, so it is a fairly dry place in a normal year. Dora added high winds to the mix. You have to ask why the fire department or emergency management agency didn’t have a fire watch going, or if it was, how they could have missed the fire. This is negligent. You have to ask why the Maui Emergency Management Agency didn’t sound the sirens. Bullsh*t people would have been confused. Bullsh*t people wouldn’t have been able to hear them. This is negligent. You have to ask why water was not diverted by the through irrigation ditches at the request of the municipal water authority. You have to ask why the water resource commission thought the most pressing matter was “understanding impact on downstream users” by diverting water to reservoirs that serve Lahaina. This is negligent. I’m sure they will find a way to blame HE. But this tragedy could have been prevented or at least mitigated if they had competent people at the helm of the Emergency Management Agency and the water resource commission.

If you have a hill or a sled, these are two very solid ideas for improving overall work capacity and elevating your metabolic rate.

I do a 15-min circuit that includes pull-ups, dips, hip thrusts (or lunges), inverted rows, and some core work. Every now and again, when I have a few extra min, I’ll throw in some isometric work at the beginning or speed ladder work at the end.

That’s a good question and one that I think is unanswerable at the moment with any level of confidence. I’m sure there are still some pro-Ukrainian people in Crimea, along with some people that support an independent state for Crimean Tatars. Heck, there are probably people that were pro-Russian that have now become pro-Ukrainian. But the consequences of speaking freely and publicly in areas occupied by Russia mean that we will never really know what the current “residents” of Crimea think.

The Russians have a long line of fortifications protected by minefields. But the mobik units have little or no ATGM capability, little or no organic armor or IFVs, and the Russian's mobile reserves and artillery are inadequate to support multiple parts of the line at the same time. So the Alligators are used like a fire-fighting brigade - they are deploying the Alligators to compensate for lack of ATGMs along the line, and a lack of an armored reserve. Drones spot Ukrainian armor columns and the Alligators show up in an effort to slow down or stop the column before it reaches the fortification line. The Alligators mainly use guided munitions, so they can stand-off 5-10km and do this. The older Russian helicopters use unguided rockets which are not suited for this application. Here are the problem that the Russians will have. 1. The Alligator is a pretty good helicopter, but they have a limited number of Alligators. Many have been shot down over the last year, and the remainder have been poorly maintained. They will not be able to sustain this level of operations for a long period of time. 2. They consume a lot of fuel which comes via rail. Lots of rail lines have been blown up recently. Lack of fuel will make it hard to sustain this level of operations. 3. Ukraine will adapt, either with Western 4th-gen fighters (future),or sending SOF into the Russian rear with MANPADS to start shooting down helicopters. By poking at multiple parts of the line in Southern Ukraine, Ukraine is forcing Russia to bring its maneuver units and aviation lose to the front line. This exposes them to MANPADS, drone strikes and artillery fire, and starts to attrit them. If and when the line cracks, the units that would have been deployed to stem the breach, or that would have been deployed to facilitate a fighting withdrawal, will be of little value. Once the Ukrainians are into the rear, Mobiks along the line of fortifications will be stuck in place, and will likely die in place or surrender.

I do think Ukraine is capable of expelling Russia from Eastern Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, and Crimea, provided military support from the West continues. But I question whether they have the political will to tolerate the level of causalities needed to sustain that effort across Southern Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, and Crimea. If they liberate Crimea, what are they really liberating? What is left of Ukraine in Crimea? It is mainly Russian colonizers. Do the Ukrainians really want to die for that when they can just turn off the water supply, drop the bridge, and watch Crimea wither away? Aside from Donetsk, there are large parts of Eastern Ukraine that still have Ukrainians present. There is a reason to liberate those areas. Liberating Southern Ukraine and strangling Crimea puts Ukraine in a good position to make a grand bargain with Russia. Concede Crimea to Russia in return for Russia leaving Eastern Ukraine. Whether or not Russia would entertain this proposal is another question, and it sets a pretty terrible precedent for future "occupations". I still think it is possible that the Russian units in Southern Ukraine crack and rout. If that's the case, I could see a Ukranian thunder-run via the Isthmus to Kerch. If that happens, then I think Ukraine will fight for Eastern Ukraine rather than negotiate.

I think Crimea is a bargaining chip for Ukraine. Crimea is essentially uninhabitable without controlling the Kakhovka dam. This is the dam that enables water diversion through canals to Crimea. Keep the canals dry and drop the Kerch Bridge, and it becomes almost impossible for Russia to maintain their presence in Sevastopol and nearby bases.

In World War II, the Germans built the Atlantic Wall, starting in earnest around 1942. They put over 6.5 million mines in front of the wall, and built almost 15,000 concrete fortifications along the Channel and Atlantic coast. This was in addition to other non-concrete emplacements and other obstacles erected along beaches and in fields that could be used for landing gliders. Fortunately for the Allies, these fortifications were mostly occupied by static divisions comprised of “volunteers”, older troops, and others with wounds that prevented them from serving in maneuver units. The supporting mechanized units were too far removed from the beaches to have an immediate impact, and when mobilized to stem a breakthrough, they were exposed to withering CAS and artillery fire. Once the lines finally cracked with Operation Cobra, the German mobile reserves were expended/wastes in Falaise and it was a race for the Allies to the Seine and beyond. we are seeing something similar play out in Southern Ukraine. Russia has erected numerous field fortifications and protected them with deep minefields. Unfortunately for Russia, these fortifications and trenches are manned by mobiks - static units with almost zero organic transport, and no training to fire and maneuver. When the Russians are forced to bring up their reserves - a handful of VDV units - they are exposed to drone attacks and artillery fire. I think in the next few weeks, we will see cracks in the Russian line. The Russians will be forced to deploy their reserves, at which point the Ukrainians will deploy their remaining brigades for a culminating fight. The outcome of that fight will determine whether the Ukrainians can race to the Sea of Azov and cut the land-bridge, or have to call off the counter-offensive.

this already happened. You just need to move your Russian flag about three inches to the right and rewind about sixty years. We gave a shit about Soviet influence in Cuba because the USSR was moving nuclear missiles into Cuba. These were missiles which had no other purpose than to attack the United States. How many western countries do you see attempting to move nuclear missiles into Ukraine? apples and oranges here.

The Russians will have to choose to defend one and move their reserves accordingly. Will it be Bakmut or Polohy/Tokmak? With short interior lines of communication and supply, Ukraine can pressure in both areas, wait for a breakthrough, and then move their mechanized forces accordingly. I think Ukraine has about 15 brigades in reserve waiting to exploit weak/broken lines. I still think the main focus is Polohy with follow-on thrusts to Mauriopil, Berdyansk, and Melitpol.

Your second point is absolutely correct. But I must quibble with your first point. There seem to be many out there fooled by Putin, even to this day.

The leadership of NATO is shifting. The NATO of past years was led by the United States and Germany and France. The pain of WW2 was recent for leaders and citizens of these countries. The leaders of those countries, and the citizens, had experienced that pain first-hand, and believed that the Soviets were ready to bring a similar level of pain to Western Europe, engendering strong support for NATO. Those citizens and leaders are now dead. They have been replaced by leaders and citizens who lack that direct experience to the pain and destruction of WW2, and the understanding that bullies must be confronted rather than appeased. Without first-hand experience of that pain and destruction, there is little motivation or appetite for the sacrifice necessary to support a military alliance like NATO. But, I believe we are seeing the leadership of NATO transition before our eyes. I believe the torch of NATO will be carried forward by the former Warsaw Bloc countries. For them, the pain of the USSR is recent, and the pain of Ukraine is right on their doorstep. Their leaders and citizens have a direct connection to this pain, and understand that bullies must be confronted rather than appeased. NATO will not disappear into the ether, rather it will be re-invigorated. Leadership will come from a coalition of former Warsaw Bloc countries like Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

Main thrust towards Polohy. Bridgehead over the Dnipro around Kherson keeps Russian troops fixed on the river, and keeps Ukrainian options open for a quick thunder run to the Crimean isthmus if Russian troops along the river head east towards Melitpol. I actually think Ukraine has not made the decision on the location of the counteroffensive. I think an attack through Polohy is Ukraine’s Plan A. And I think a blitz through Bahkmut is Plan B if things look more promising in the East. With short interior supply lines, they can easily make a game time decision and have mechanized units at the contact line in a few hours.

I think that timing aligns with the expected arrival of the Patriot systems and the Samp/t from Italy and France. The long lead time for the Patriot systems and samp/t systems - lots of training i guess - suggests that NATO has been planning for this eventuality for quite some time, so maybe that suggests there is a kernel of truth in the leaked documents. Part of me wonders if the leaked documents are a misdirection from the U.S. A little bit of truth, and a little bit of BS, intended to confuse the Russians in advance of the counter-offensive.

The package of arms announced today by the U.S. for Ukraine includes another 61 heavy fuel tankers. The last package also included heavy fuel tankers, although I don't think they said how many. Assuming we are giving the M969A1 - capacity of 5,000 gallons of fuel - 61 tankers is a field refueling capacity of ~300,000 gallons. An armored brigade combat team - essentially the pointy end of a stick for a U.S Army Division - needs about 80,000 gallons of fuel to go 200 miles, and more if engaged in combat. The 90 Abrams in the ABCT consume just over half the fuel, with the ~150 Bradleys, ~dozen Paladins, and ~50 M113s consuming the rest. I believe the US just provided the field refueling capacity needed to support the Western tanks (Leopards, Challengers) and IFVs (CV90s, Bradleys, Marders, AMXRC-10s) and Strykers during the counter-offensive. . Given the number of heavy fuel tankers and engineering vehicles that have been provided/committed over the last few months, along with the number of Western tanks and IFVs committed/delivered, I think we will see three separate corps-level units in the Ukrainian counter-offensive. My guess is still Polohy for the main thrust/breakthrough, with one corps heading towards the Mauripol-Vuhledar axis, another heading to Berdyansk, and another to Melitpol.

For those of you that still follow this war closely, there have been some interesting actions recently, which lead me to believe the Ukrainian counter-offensive is coming soon, maybe late Spring. 1. A handful of Russian mil-bloggers have been reporting Ukrainian attacks near Polohy. From what is described, the Ukrainians are conducting reconnaissance in force. 2. The most recent aid package from the United States contained fuel trucks designed to support heavy tanks and mechanized infantry in the field. 3. Recent aid packages have included a lot of bridging and engineering equipment. 4. Over the past few months, it looks like the Ukrainians have been reinforcing Bahkmut with Territorial Defense Forces and existing Brigrades (i.e. 80th, 92nd, 93rd). Clearly things are tough in Bahkmut, but it doesn't look like they've been sending new units that have been recently trained by the West. And I don't see any of the new vehicles they've been getting from the West (i.e. AMX-RC10s, Leopard 2s, Marder IFVs, Bradley IFVs). 5. Ukraine is forming 28,000 volunteers into Assault Brigades - that's about 10 brigades. By my estimation, Ukraine has another 5-6 undeployed brigades and support units trained by the West that have not been deployed yet. Add in the Assault Brigades and you get a force of 15-16 Brigades. The Challenger II and Leopard II tanks that they get this Spring, along with the Strykers, Bradleys, and Marders, will enable Ukraine to create from these brigades two armored brigades and a handful of mechanized brigades. This is a pretty formidable force, especially with the Leopard IIs and Challenger IIs in the van. I continue to think the main thrust happens through Polohy, with subsequent thrusts to Berdyansk and Melitpol. I think there will be a Dnipro River crossing - maybe a feint - to keep Russian forces fixed along the river. If the Russians remain fixed to the river, I'll bet we see a thunder run by the ex-French AMX-RC10s towards the Crimean Isthmus to prevent Russian forces from retreating into Crimea, which might cause a rout amongst the Russian forces that are currently along the Dnipro River. I think Ukraine gets one chance at a counter-offensive. If this fails, I think they are pushed by the West to sue for peace.

We can get a good sense from the battlefield. What markings do we see on the cases? How many fires do we see on FIRMS? What types of artillery do we see on the battlefield? Reported shelling. And so on. You are painting the munitions industry with a broad stroke, instead of acknowledging that different munitions have different lead times and different complexities of production. It is easy to produce small arms ammunition. It is not easy to produce artillery shells. The Soviet Union produced VAST quantities of 152 and 122 artillery munitions in the Cold War. After the Cold War, most of those munition operations were shut down - they couldn’t justify producing more when they had huge stockpiles. To paint a picture, they had so much that they literally had to store rows and rows of 155 and 122 artillery shells outside, exposed to the elements, for years. This is a big part of why they’ve had multiple catastrophic explosions at munition depots in the last decade. When they closed those munition operations, they lost the skillset also. Making artillery shells is not menial labor - it actually requires some skill, in addition to the infrastructure and machinery. We are having a similar problem in the United States with ramping up 155mm production. But we have more existing facilities that do this work, and other Western countries also have similar facilities.

you are suggesting that Russia is out-producing conventional munitions? As in, they are producing more than the West? Please provide a source for that statement, because it contradicts what is and has been widely known about the Russian munitions industry. At this point, most Russian munition production is “re-processing” of existing munitions that have reached the end of their usable life. Their ability to produce new munitions is pretty limited, especially 152mm and 122mm shells. Producing artillery shells is deceivingly hard.

You hit the nail on the head. The deep drone attacks force Russia to re-deploy scarce air defense assets away from Ukraine, or acknowledge to their people that they are vulnerable to attack.

set aside radars and detection range for a moment. You essentially have four types of air defense. 1. close-in shorad. Something like the Gephard or dudes with an HMG on a truck. 2. Shorad. Something like the NASAMS or Hawk or Aspide. Range is maybe 15-20 miles. 3. medium range air defense. Something like the patriot with a range of 15-100 miles. 4. Long range / theater air defense. Something like the THADD, with a range of maybe 150 miles. the Russians use different equipment but the concept is essentially the same. With that in mind, think about the large landmass of Russia. In order to create an impenetrable air defense curtain, you’d need a huge number of medium range and long-range air defense systems. Russia doesn’t have this. Neither does the West or China. This equipment is expensive, hard to maintain, and hard to operate. So you make a best guess about possible targets and attack vectors and place your equipment accordingly. Ukraine’s attacks deep in Russia are an important strategic move. It is causing Russia to devote air defense assets towards the protection of targets in Russia. This leaves Russian troops in Ukraine more exposed to drone attacks, missile attacks, and attacks by rotary and fixed wing aircraft. same concept was used by the British in 1941. Bombing Germany caused a massive reallocation of resources (planes, AA, and personnel) from the front-lines to the inner parts of Germany. In the long-run, this exposed/weakened German troops at the front.

North Korea does not have 500k well-trained troops. Not even close.

I think it is a toss-up between Gripens and F-16s. The Gripens were designed to operate in austere conditions by conscripted support staff, similar to the current conditions in Ukraine. But there is a large bolus of F-16s about to be retired in the US, and sending these to Ukraine would enable sourcing munitions from a larger group of countries that operate the f-16. Both planes are vulnerable to shorad. I disagree with your point about getting longer-range weapons than HIMARs. To make this happen, the US or NATO would have to give Ukraine tomahawk missiles, or storm shadow missiles. Even if the tomahawk is a fairly old weapon, I don’t think we are likely to give Ukraine a 1000+ mile range weapon, and certainly not newer cruise missiles. The quickest way to end the war in Ukraine would be to hand over the soon-to-be-retired bolus or f-16s and ~250 M1A1s sitting in the boneyards. Hell, give them the M-60s from the Gulf War also - they worked quite well for the Marines in the first gulf war. We don’t need the old M-60s and we have more than enough old M1A1s sitting in storage for future conversion to M1A2 if needed. This equipment helps Ukraine fight, and limits the impact of western weapons to the occupied areas of Ukraine.