Hi folks. Longtime lurker, first-time poster here. Just wanted to chime in with a few comments, some general, some related to the topic of this thread.
First, I want to echo those who have highlighted @gfp's contributions to this board over the years. Thank you for your thoughtful posts—I hang on every word. (I'm grateful to all the members of this forum, I should add!)
Re: the topic of this thread, a comment that Seth Klarman made in an old issue of Outstanding Investors Digest (at least, I think that's where I found it) comes to mind. An interviewer asked Klarman about his hurdle rate, clearly expecting his answer to be some crazy nominal figure like 20%/yr. Klarman emphatically replied that he never targets nominal returns, only risk-adjusted returns. I agree that that's the metric to target.
I would hazard that Berkshire has pretty much always (and maybe literally always, but I won't go that far) offered at least plausible risk-adjusted returns, including over the past two decades. As gfp mentioned, the key is not to interrupt quality compounding, and the easiest way to avoid interruption is to own low-risk assets that you know intimately.
The stock's decent risk-adjusted prospects hold even today. Compare owning (an admittedly slightly pricey) Berkshire now with owning the S&P 500 at a Shiller P/E of 34 and with after-tax corporate profits/GDP near all-time highs, not to mention a degree of concentration that Ben Inker of GMO argues all but ensures underperformance in megacap stocks.
So, has Berkshire "killed it" since 2000? On a risk-adjusted basis, yes, and it has a good shot of continuing to do so for the next ten+ years, especially if its dividend policy holds.
My 1991 shares have done 14.46% p.a. for 33 years, my 2011 shares have done 15.04% for 12 years, and my 2020 shares have done 25% for four years. If you bought conservatively over the past three decades, you probably killed it in non-risk-adjusted terms, too.
Anyway! Nice to meet all of you. Looking forward to many exchanges on this forum.