SharperDingaan

Keep in mind that this is an off-shore bank. If Coy A, Sub A made a Euro$ deposit in the bank & Coy A, Sub B simply withdrew it (for use in the US) there would be no loan. But Coy A would be up the capital tax, less a substantial fee for services rendered. At $100M increments this isn't change. What's good for Coy A is also good for money laundry, drug lords, arms dealers, & various sundry. Friends in the right places, a small rake for the house on every transaction, & honest dealing incentive. There is more to this than published

Quick note on margin funding. In the US the fed is the backstop. Mechanically XYZ coy is seized, & the fed makes the legal entity an unsecured short-term loan to keep the accounts on side. Account holders are then given a letter, asked to verify their bonafides, & transfer their accounts elsewhere within X days. Once the days are up accounts that aren't transferred go to the fed for safekeeping, & the loan repaid. Any losses incurred are repaid from the industries 'insurance' account, recoveries, & writeoff. Minor differences in Canada. Suspicious accounts are not unusual, & there are often ties to money laundering/drug proceeds/home country tax evasion/slush funds, etc. Where proof of ownership is problematic, the funds are seized. Discussion between the former beneficaries & the fed, are by neccessity - somewhat delicate.

Good post. - This combo is attractive because it offers a positive spread, over a long period, at supposedly minimal risk; different spin, & different mechanics - but isn't this pretty much the same message that Alt-A mortgagees heard when they rushed to sign up ? - As pointed out this is a variable spread & for now its strongly positive. But look forward; doesn't the P(x1) of the spread widening seem pretty low, & the P(x2) of it narrowing, or even going negative P(x3)seem much bigger ? If we have inflation, wouldn't this spread also get very negative, very quickly ? - To unwind you need to sell the CD for at least what you paid it, & any realized loss will be multiplied by 4. But if you only unwound when the spread was negative, at that time wouldn't the YTM on the CD be higher than when you bought it ? - almost guanteeing a realized loss on this long term CD - To make money on the combo you really need (1) the spread to widen & (2) the CD YTM to fall, plus the sooner it occurrs the better. In effect you need the fed to run out of rabbits, & the stimulus package to fail. Who is more likely to win here ? the buyer of this combo, or the folks who sold you the CD & margin debt ? Lessons ? * Dont be afraid to ask * Look critically. Why is it good today, will it do better/worse going forward, what happens on exit * Who benefits. Is it mostly you, or the guy who sold it to you ? Next time you go past a soup kettle throw some change in. You just saved a fortune SD

If its just strategy as it relates to Portfolio Management, there are all kinds of text books. There are a series of well defined steps, & mechanical execution will get you to a reasonable solution relative to your defined paramaters. If its about application, look at the various academic papers on different topics. But do not expect someone to tell you how to apply the concept, or what to watch out for. These are essentially the value propositions that keep individuals in business. There are very real differences between how public vs private money is managed. Most of it is fiducial, temprement, the relative strengths/weaknesses of the individual vs the institutional Balance Sheet, & estate planning. Strategy & execution are largely the same, just executed from a different POV. As the majority of the more successfull individuals are current & former Portfolio Managers, Treasurers, CFO`s, etc. , much of the ìnvestment`skill set is similar. Most private money is individuals investing for a specific purpose (buy a house, pay for a wedding, go to school, etc.) The majority of the `return` is as practical education, vs actual $. Generally longer term views, as many of those individuals will go on to be those future PM`s, Treasurers, etc. WEB does the MBA students, this is `School of hard knocks`. Be a little more specific. SD

To do CWB successfully you need to take the long view. Loan provisioning will be a lot more volatile, & earnings erratic, but if the province doesn`t goose the industry out of downturns they loose a lot more than CWB does. The `blue eyed sheiks` are effectively implied guarantors. The real value will be the contacts developed out west. Canada is a small place & FFH will be pretty much obliged to make oil & gas investments as the portfolio expands. CWB will be a great place to develop the `circle of competency`.

Were Abitibi in CCA, debtholders would essentially need to do a debt to pref share swap to refinance the company. In practical terms only the better assets would be put into new coys & refinanced. The poorer assets would be discontinued. Pension shortfalls would be dealt with through some kind of pragmatic compromise arrangement. At 15.5%, we can reasonably assume that this new debt is secured against the better assets. Each new coy would likely be regional, have a very strong BS, & would probably include seperate subs in 2-3 LOB`s. Providing it was done quickly the coy`s would also be profitable, as all existing Abitibi contracts could now be met through fewer plants - generating higher thoughputs & minimizing fixed costs per ton. 1st stage rationalization. But to get a piece of these coys you would have to be an existing debt holder, & essentially agree to a `pre-pack`. Where Abitibi leads others will immediately follow, & subs in the industry`s various LOB`s will get traded (same as hockey). Fewer, bigger, & the most efficient plants in specialized sectors - owned by coy`s that become proxy`s for that segment. Pure, & profitable, plays that facilitate investment. 2nd stage rationalization. It looks like the long awaited industry rationalization has begun, & that FFH is essentially positioning itself. Hopefully, we`re more or less correct. SD

Apologies if we came off as a little aggressive. Shortly after KFS had their first 'hiccup' we bought in & did well. We made the gain because we got in at a very low price, & essentially got out at what was the best exit point in many years. Management was why we left. The reserving issues aren't new - ordinary errors/re-assessments occurr in normal course business, but extra-ordinary adjustments are just that; extra-ordinary. Sizeable extra-ordinary adjustments year-after-year is hard evidence that key actuarial & executive controls are weak, & that current income is being systematically overstated by under-reserving. Add in evidence of casino betting, & a senior departure, & it becomes fair assumption that there may well also be an ingrained cultural problem of boosting current earnings. You don't change culture by simply changing one exec. The press release suggest current quarter operational earnings in the $44M range. Given the reserving history, & the cultural assumption, the prudent question is why is the current CR not actually <100 ? - in a quarter when there were clearly a lot of internal strife. ie: shouldn't the current quarter's operational earnings really be negative? Granted extra-ordinary charges create noise, but the prudent action is to give benefit of the doubt only when there is evidence of reasonable credibility. Portions of the business aren't that bad, but there is a strong case that they would be far better served were they in another carrier. The business could be turned around, & there is evidence of an attempt - but doing it in a recession with credit markets seized & workforce morale probably near rock bottom, is no picnic. Hard markets will benefit other carriers as well, & at far less risk to the investor. That said, we wish the management well, & hope to see them turn it around. SD

80M in additional UW provisioning, despite reducing the book 43%. So it would otherwise have been well north of 140M [80/(1-.43)] ? & in what is supposed to be short tail less risky business ? 114M of investment losses ? They knew there were reserving issues requiring greater conservatism, but still chose not to hedge the equity portfolio - despite direct & overwhelming evidence of growing volatility ? We've fired one exec, now please believe us ?

Keep in mind that the convertible component is just an option; the principal stays in either fixed income or senior equity. If the common goes up, great. If the common continues to fall, you swap the debt for equity at a lower conversion rate. The `too early` issue is still there, but hedged. Of real time interest, may well be FFH & its debenture holding in SFK. One of the higher probability outcomes to managements recent comments is a debenture to snr equity conversion; an example of the hedge being used. Disclosure: We hold a long position in SFK common. While there recently seem to be more snr equity than convertible debt issues, its more likely attributable to issuers needing to improve BS ratios vs raise cash. ie: Not a reflection of WEBs macro view. SD

Almost never mentioned is that Graham (of Graham & Dodds) almost went bankrupt while applying the methodology. Arguably, untill the recovery actually began, he survived only because he had more money than he had places to put it. Downside volatility. Graham made his money, primarily because he was overweight the right stocks at the start of the recovery, & then held them pretty much through to the top of the cycle. The methodology got him there, but its not universal - it works only in up-cycles. Were today's hedging instruments available at the time, he might well have actually made more in the down-cycles. Almost all value investors have been experiencing extreme adverse downside volatility, & in most cases they made thier money in the up-cycles - classic Graham. A very few have modernized the methodology, largely by taking the opposit side of market hedges (ie: FFH-CDS's, WEB-S&P option puts). We may well eventually conclude that WEB & coy actually had too much capital, & that it effectively drove them into the market too early. They did not risk bankruptcy because they were able to efficiently hedge, something that Graham wasn't able to do. Its not always a bargain SD

Another option is direct investment in some of the stuff FFH owns. You still have some FFH weighting (via FFH's investment in the coy you've chosen) but end up with more chance of hitting a bigger 'X'-bagger. Different kinds of risk, generally higher volatility, & also the potential for discontinuity (FFH is not obliged to bail out the coy if/when it screws up).

Keep in mind that the law of large numbers has been systematically making the ratio less sensitive, and that the GNPs measurement has changed over time. The 75% cutoff may need to be lower. Over the next 6 months GNP is projected to decline. For the trend to continue, the decline in stock price would actually need to accelerate. The graph suggests a buy point at 50%, or less (35% over WWII). To get there the 'average' stock price needs to fall at least 62% [(50-130)/130] from the average 'peak'. Normal curve tails suggests there were will be some big winners & losers, & a way to quantify how many. Bear Sterns, Lehmans, etc. were losers, the equivalent offseting winners are still something of a mystery. A laymans look would suggest that except for a very few stocks, its still too early to buy. SD