wondering

https://www.ft.com/content/4ced6dd7-aecc-4bb6-a09d-5d4ed713be45?shareType=nongift. A not such great review of Metlen

4th quarter release. Record annual earnings 41M or $0.37/share since HFP was established in 2020. Book value per share $4.22/share, increase of 10% from start of year. https://www.heliosfairfax.com/helios-fairfax-partners/news/q4-2025-press-release

I just bought my ticket. I like supporting Crohn's and Colitis. I always meet great people. Fairfax has made me a boat load of money. But $450 bucks??!!!! Holy jumping!!!! I am value investor for a reason - I am cheapo. Next year, can we go to McDonalds?

Dexterra article https://www.theglobeandmail.com/gift/c87e0f0f35a1821507db493c59625a086c930e49605b3becee04a73939c1c7b4/GLFNYQ3TFNDWLP3VRWWOAUFEZA

@Viking maybe I will push back on point (great post as usual btw). Can you give an example where Fairfax has successfully invested in a turnaround situation

I have got a two part question. The first question I think I know. 1. How does Fairfax manage FX risk. I asked Peter Frlan this question at an AGM, and he said that they also invest in the currency in which the premiums were earned. So for example, Crum earns insurance premiums in US dollars. Fairfax then invests this money in US dollar bonds and equity investments. Brit earns insurance premiums in pounds and euros (I assume) and therefore, all the float stemming from Brit would be invested in pounds and euros (equity and bonds). And based on this, this mitigates the FX risk. Do I understand this correctly. 2. If #1 is more or less true, then where does Fairfax invest the premiums earned in smaller markets such as Colombia, Argentina, Ukraine, etc.. These markets are really small. Do they just invested in government bonds? My thoughts are that they may invested in some public companies in these markets, but we don't about them because the investment is so small.

@SharperDingaan, if oil major companies return to Venezuela again en mass, what does that mean for Canadian oil sands producers? My thinking behind my question is Venezuela and Canada are both heavy oil producers and thus competitors to one other. If Venezuela ramps up their oil production would this have a downward effect on the price of Western Canadian Select? My own thinking is that short term, there would be little to no direct effect, because it will still take years to rebuild the oil infrastructure that years of neglect. Long term, it may affect WCS since I assume the oil from both countries is refined primarily in the refineries in Texas. I am still a beginner when it comes to oil markets. Would appreciate any thoughts.

I don't know. I thought the interaction between the two speakers sounded fake

A good summary of where Fairfax stands at the moment. Although for regular readers of this board, not much new. The podcast sort of summarizes @SafetyinNumbers arguments. In fact I think they mention his holding company. https://youtu.be/ICdgMUKMmas?si=F-iOne-gxa9gFJA2

I just finished reading the book. Here is my take-aways. It's the book you need, but don't want. The need: Even though I have been a shareholder for 20+ years and been a member of this board for 15+ years or so, I still learned a few new things about the company. After reading the book, I have a better appreciation of why Fairfax puts so much emphasis on corporate culture. This is something that don't appear in a stock screener but they are so important to the firm, and a key ingredient to the long term success of the company. It's no wonder that Morningstar hates the stock so much. The book is honest in that it freely admits the mistake Prem has made in the past (re early insurance co purchases, index shorts). But it also shows how he has learned from past mistakes. The company recently purchased a French insurance company. Given their experiences, I fairly confident that this purchase will work out in the long run. The want: I would have like to see a greater biography sketch of Prem, but there wasn't much new stated in the book. I have to admit this is only my curiosity, not actually important for me as shareholder. Also, I would have like to see perhaps a case study of their analysis of a past investment (how did they arrive at IV etc). Overall, the book is well worth the cost for any FFH shareholder or anyone thinking of investing in FFH. The company is a bit of an oddball compared to most public companies, and this book does an excellent job why the company is odd and how management wants to keep it that way.

100%! both on past Liberal governance, and how things may be changing

As always, excellent explanation of Fairfax @Viking. Looking forward 5 years or so, what are the risks to these 5 streams of income. The following is me playing devils advocate or just raising points to consider (both for and against) Underwriting income eventual return of soft market. major cat event. I think it has been mentioned that Fairfax has reduced their exposure to super-cat events. Does anyone know by how much? Interest and dividend income Fairfax has a history of excellent fixed income portfolio management, but lets say they screw it up they go the wrong way on duration credit? (Maybe but not likely, currently they have average maturity of 2-3 years, can't remember specifically) credit risk (maybe but not likely, holding mostly US govt bonds, maybe the the corporate debt, although I doubt it) Share of profit of associates and non insurance (I am lumping these two together) Eurobank - major recession in Greece and/or Europe. Another Euro crises. (this is beyond my brainpower) Poseidon - major world recession. Interest rates on their debt increasing (I would like that they have considered these risks) Recipe, Sleep Country, Peak Performance - major recession in Canada - always possible India - major recession or stock market crash in India. Maybe a temporary hit to earnings, but I would think that Fairfax would be buying opportunistically. Major capital losses realized or unrealized major correction in US stock market. Sure, but again I think Fairfax would be buying opportunistically Most of their portfolio is modestly priced. Maybe Orla would go down significantly. Less subject to mark to market writedowns than in years past.

New Ben Watsa video https://youtu.be/_KO4TyAVHAY?si=jRCGDrLFpnBDs4RJ

3rd quarter release. Helios is slowing turning the corner. Book value is now 4.05/share. (vs 3.84/share at Dec 2024). Nine months earnings 0.20/share (vs loss of 0.16/share first nine months of 2024) https://www.heliosinvestment.com/uploads/files/HFP-2025-Q3-Press-Release-Final.pdf

I read the piece in the Globe and Mail. I can't wait for my copy to come. It seems like @Viking ghost wrote this book. Everything the author mentioned, Viking already talked about it a year ago. Haha

Very disappointed with the budget. No major tax cuts to speak of. The opposition is weak - now was the Liberals time to do it. Maybe next year. Our country has so much potential

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/cleveland-cliffs-stock-soars-after-company-touts-plans-to-re-focus-its-rare-earth-mining-efforts-154808356.html

Orla Mining's stock price has gone up like a rocket the past year (up 190%). When does Fairfax exit this stock? I don't know if because Orla mines gold and gold is not a mineral with many industrial uses, and it's traditionally held a hedge against the dollar/inflation, how does an investor determine when the stock is overvalued or has reached intrinsic value?

To return to the recent news of the August share buybacks.... Obviously Fairfax are value investors with the concept of margin of safety built in their DNA. One can probably suppose that they vary their margin of safety depending on the quality etc of the investment (example: investments with a high ROE will need less margin of safety than those investments with a few warts on them). It also stands to reason that Fairfax also applies the margin of safety when buying their own stock. I guess my question is how much of a margin of safety does Fairfax apply when buying its own stock? 20% discount? 30% discount? 50% discount? I doubt they will be explicit in terms of their estimation of FMV of FFH, so we will never know for sure. One thing I am confident of this that Fairfax knows its own company better than anyone else. They are probably the premier evaluators of insurance companies. In terms of their portfolio investments, the last 5 years they have clean up a lot of the crappy investments, and what crappy investments remain are a small percentage of the portfolio. Currently, the equity portfolio is dominated quality names. All to say is that I think they can truthfully evaluate their current portfolio. In sum, the fact that they are buying back shares so aggressively, without risk of diminishing the capital structure of the company (they make this qualification each quarterly conference call), makes me sleep well at night even though my percentage of FFH in my portfolio is crazy-high.

as a point of comparison, as of June 30 2024, cash position in his funds were as follows Associates 32.4% Asia 26.6% Europe 22.3% Bond 42.6% RRPS 43.3% Your point is taken. Seems like Francis has been bearish for a while.

Chou Funds is out with their mid year report again hold https://choufunds.com/pdf/SEMI-AR 2025 EN.pdf At the moment, the returns are nothing to write home about, however what stands out for me is the large percentage of cash that Francis is holding in each of his funds Associates (US et al) 21.9% cash RRSP (mostly Canadian) 23.8% cash Bond 55.4% cash Europe 40.9% cash Asia 33.3% cash I guess he isn't finding too many bargains.

Second quarter earnings. https://www.heliosinvestment.com/uploads/files/HFP-2025-Q2-Press-Release_1.pdf book value per share increased to 3.95/share from 3.85 Q1. Net income for 1st 6 months $12.4M vs net loss of 21.2M in first 6 months of 2024. Perhaps too early to say they are turning the corner. Currently selling at 50% to book value

I am going to risk having eggs thrown at me, and play devils advocate for the moment. Here are some thoughts to consider I remember Prem saying in an AGM a few years back, that the insurance business, taken by itself, is a very so-so business, with crummy rates of return. It is only when management is super-sharp to invest the float wisely does the business begin to look better. Morningstar (I am not sure if it was Brett Horn specifically) gave bad ratings to Intact and Definity (Cdn P&C companies) as well. all one star investments. The models that Morningstart runs appears to not like all P&C insurance companies, not just FFH. @SafetyinNumbers mentioned that the danger of Morningstar is that they are hooked into various brokerage accounts as research (they appears in my RBC direct account), and thus have an influence on naive investors. However, @Viking mentioned by in the last 4.5 years FFH has compounded 44% annually. If Fairfax has compounded annually by 44% with a crap Morningstar rating, I will take it.

Is Fairfax too complex to be valued at the same metrics as its insurance peers? I raise this question because I have read this criticism twice from analysts. Once from the RBC analyst mentioned above (see attached full report) and another from an analyst on Seeking Alpha https://seekingalpha.com/article/4790903-fairfax-holdings-misunderstood-conglomerate-with-some-upside What is the complex part of Fairfax? TRS investment private equity holdings other I can understand how the TRS might be view as complex (I have to admit re-read the explanation of the TRS 5 times before I begin to understand it). Are the private holdings too difficult to model for income projections? I know Safetybynumbers has argued that Fairfax has the low value metrics because it doesn't screen well for the quants. Maybe screening well and complexity is the same thing? Could this problem be fixed by greater disclosure or explanation in the annual report? 1654 (1).pdf

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd ( FFH-T -0.29%decrease Scotiabank raises price target to C$2,900 from C$2,500 with a “sector outperform” rating. Scotia said Fairfax displays an attractive combination of value and low risk growth. “We think stocks such as Fairfax are particularly well-positioned for the current environment and market conditions given its combination of relatively low valuation and macro sensitivity and healthy underlying growth profile. We believe the stock has earned a sustainable valuation re-rate on the back of the organic expansion of its insurance operations and significantly higher operating net investment income driven by enhanced interest and dividend yields and investment float. We expect these levels of earnings contribution to be sustainable over the next few years and have enhanced the company’s ROE and growth rate potential of its book value while also adding greater consistency to both of these metrics. Further, given its value investing approach, we think it has the potential to continue to generate outsized investment returns – even against a backdrop of more modest equity market returns. The company has demonstrated resilience through the business cycle and turbulent financial markets, but we view it as a less defensive play than more traditional publicly listed insurers. At this stage of the market cycle, this provides an attractive balance: downside protection thanks to the relative resilience of insurance operations through a potential recession and upside potential when markets recover.”