Philip Morris IV

Bank of Hawaii (BOH) has always stood out to me. They consistently churn out great numbers -- even through the 2007-2010 period -- and trade at a significant book value premium to the sector and Hawaiian comps, at 2-3x BV (3x today). Hawaii is unique for the US in that the Big Four (and all other mainland banks) are absent there. The banking market is almost entirely controlled by BOH, First Hawaiian (FHB), Central Pacific (CPF) and American Savings (a subsidiary of Hawaiian Electric - HE). It would appear this insulates them from mainland/asian competition, but of course their geography naturally limits growth. This is very obvious on their 10yr financials and I believe reflected in their below-market earnings multiples.

FWIW I've had a Leesa for just over 2 years and would strongly recommend them. In my view the company delivered what it promised -- a great mattress at a reasonable price -- and the experience is significantly better than a B&M store purchase. Their generous return policies are worth noting. My only caution with online mattresses is that the sheet industry has yet to catch up with their noticeably shorter heights. Leesa, Casper etc. mattresses are generally around ~10" thick while the vast majority of sheets are made for mattresses 14" and taller. You may have to buy straps to keep your fitted sheets taut.

Just curious, why do you think bank preferreds should be doing shitty?

According to his blog, he owns varying amounts of common (with "an embarrassingly high basis") from pre-2008 and series N preferreds from Aug 2009. All in Fannie, none in Freddie. No information on amount.

Fidelity does have an RIA platform, however they have a minimum AUM requirement. Last I recall several years ago it was in the $10 million neighborhood.

I hear you, but don't those VC returns include a majority of companies that would never reach the point of going public anyway? The report more or less presumes that the unicorns would go public around the time their success was fairly certain, adding to public returns thereafter. On another note, the report didn't touch on the effect of valuation which is worth exploring. Given that many of the unicorns aren't GAAP-profitable, the same weighted impact these companies would have on market returns would appear to put downward pressure on market earnings. The return would be greater but the broad valuation would also move higher.

A few dozen pages ago in this thread, someone speculated that Carney may have source(s) in the Treasury and so to keep them, he reflects their interests. We'll never know but seems like the most likely explanation for his incentives. It could just be me, but I've noticed the character of his articles has changed over the past several months too: his pieces are more brief now, and contain less analysis/interpretation, more facts. He could see the writing on the wall as well.

Not that I've checked, but it's not likely they appear in any of his filings as they are not 13-F securities. It is for this reason they also do not show on Fairholme's 13F.

While I agree, is anyone concerned about a potential trade-off between more opportunities and the time it takes for intrinsic value to be realized from them? Finding opportunities is only half the battle. My understanding is this becomes a double edged sword. I agree with the notion that capital should flow where return is greatest, but as indexing continues unabated, that big capital is increasingly precluded from flowing back and raising multiples. It's like we can't have it both ways. (Unless of course indexing loses favor and sentiment shifts back to active management.) To the extent that value investing is about finding cheap companies and waiting for them to no longer be cheap, doesn't vast indexing remove a powerful catalyst?

I have an RIA and highly recommend hiring a compliance consultant for the $2-5k to guide you through registration. Usually the fee also includes a years-worth of consulting, which is valuable come renewal time or when the state regulators want to audit you. The Form ADV (esp. Part 2A) is difficult enough for someone not trained in compliance, but you also need other contracts (for example your advisory agreement) that one should definitely not write themselves or blindly copy someone else's. States differ in how they like their documents prepared -- when I moved from New York to Texas last year, the Texas regulators required several detailed changes to my advisory contract, and later came to my office to perform an audit. My compliance guy helped me through this. Sionnach, feel free to PM if you would like a referral. Otherwise good info here.

There's an AIQ thread in the ideas forum that is quite thorough and provides a very clear thesis. The GAAP earnings figure is rather fictitious with this one. http://www.cornerofberkshireandfairfax.ca/forum/investment-ideas/aiq-alliance-healthcare/ I am with tombgrt and have been buying more here. If it weren't for the illiquidity this would be in my top 3 holdings (am concentrated).

Thanks again merkhet for all your work here and the updates. Seems there is big volume on several of the preferreds today. Looks like someone picked up 3.9M shares of FNMAP.

This is a good point in favor of having a management fee. Another is that without one, it incentivizes the manager to really crank up the risk. With 0/6/25, the manager has to break 10% (and possibly HWM) to make just 1%. With 1/6/25 there isn't the constant pressure to swing so hard or act hastily when downward volatility strikes. WRT lockups, something I don't see mentioned yet is a 'soft' lockup. In other words, a 2-3% redemption fee that expires and/or scales down to 0% over time. This I believe accomplishes the best of both worlds in a way -- discourages early withdrawals yet mitigates their impact anyhow, and still allows LPs the option, for a price. When payable to the fund, it also rewards the more patient LPs, as the exiter's loss is their gain.

I can recall in 2010-11 several times waiting in that exact line for up to an hour. It was worth it. When they opened a closer one to me in Westport CT, that one always had a long wait as well. Their whole menu and execution of quasi-upscale fast-casual is very good. Props to BG2008 for pointing out the shady proceeds purposes. It'll be funny to see how little that will probably be mentioned in the eve and wake of the offering.

So, are there legal tools aside from a pre-nup that can be effective at protecting pre-marital assets in the event of divorce? Do posters have insights into perhaps: Trusts? Irrevocable/DAPT/other? Corps? _____? Or do we just accept that we either bear the full risk or none at all.