Kraven

I just don't understand at all why this is the case. He said they have a bid but that it is non-binding and subject to financing. It's as serious as it is. Should he say "we received a bid today from some jokers who almost certainly don't have the money to actually close the deal, but I'm disclosing it for laughs"?

Kraven, I am with you on this. However, the fact that Sellers deemed this disclosure worthy to shareholders led me to believe that the bid was a bit more solid than it turned out to be. Best, Ragu I don't understand your point. Are you saying that the fact that Sellers disclosed it at all led you to believe the bid was more solid or that he thought what he actually disclosed led you to believe it? If the former, he had an obligation to disclose it as a material fact and if the latter, as I said, the disclosure was good and not misleading in my view.

In what way is it "legalese" and "deceptive"? I read it and it's very clear and written in plain English. They say they have a non binding agreement and that financing isn't in place. It isn't misleading in the least. This is good disclosure.

I've read this thread and I am struggling to see where you have been bashed. Perhaps I am not the sensitive guy I thought I was.

I would draw your attention to Ben Graham and Walter Schloss. Perhaps you've heard of them?

I'm pretty surprised. Normally by now the response "hookers and blow" to a question like this would have appeared.

The Blind Side. It was a movie as well. Both the book and movie were good. Entertaining and interesting.

Along the same lines as the ones you mentioned is "Trading Bases" by Joe Peta.

[amazonsearch]King of Capital[/amazonsearch] I recently read this and enjoyed it. It's billed as a history of Steve Schwarzman and that always turned me off a bit, but I'm glad I read it. It's really just a history of private equity with a focus on Blackstone and of course Schwarzman, although there's actually relatively very little discussion of him individually. There's lots of good deal data and many individual transactions are discussed, both good and bad. I would recommend it to anyone interested in a history of private equity (and, more specifically, Blackstone) and anyone who enjoys reading about the details of specific transactions.

You consider a chair, desk and bed as expensive things you don't need? Yes. A desk alone can run over a hundred dollars, and beds can run quite a bit more depending on which style you buy. The floor is included in my lease, at no extra charge. I'm all about saving money but that strikes me as extreme. But more power to you.

You consider a chair, desk and bed as expensive things you don't need?

Nicely done on the "whoot" chant. That made me laugh. Now just need to figure out how to reference Morton Downey, Jr. and we will be all set. "Mort! Mort! Mort!" just doesn't seem to cut it. I think the differences between Schloss and TB are more a difference in degree rather than a difference in kind. That is, I think in many cases Schloss and TB would have been looking at the same things, but I think there was a difference in implementation. Schloss had many smaller positions, but also some larger ones as well. Although I think he claimed to go up to 20% I doubt that happened very often if ever. But 3-5% positions were certainly routine and the top 20 or so was probably 50-60% of the portfolio. TB on the other hand, at that time, had 1000+ positions. They would buy anything in whatever size was available. I think too that Schloss was more concerned about liquidity than TB was. TB would buy many dark stocks and those that truly traded by appointment. There are other things too, but the main point is just that they implemented a similar approach differently. In terms of what TB was doing and whether it was different from buying from a screen, I would say back in the day their net net purchases probably were pretty equivalent to buying from a screen. But that was only about 1/3 of their portfolio. They also bought unlisted and illiquid stocks, stocks with "hidden" assets, some controlling positions, etc. But they had parameters for things that they would use. Overall though I think there is generally a view that investors in low p/b stocks are just the functional equivalent of buying from a screen. That's not what Schloss did. It's really more of a way of deciding which pool to fish from and then within that pool choosing your fish.

No, it's the one just called The Money Masters. It's kind of like the Jack Schwager books in which he came out with a bunch with similar sounding names.

Yeah, Money Masters is great. I love the way it was written. None of the fawning over "celebrity" business and investing types that exists today. It's just very matter of fact. The section on Buffett is good too. Buffett before he was Buffett - not larger than life. He was just a wealthy investor who seemed like a regular guy. But for me, the Tweedy Browne subsection is the best part of that book.

I am not sure those years are truly representative of his fully body of work. I would say a couple things about it. One, Schloss was already getting up there in age at that point and Edwin was doing more and more of the investing. On those lists of stocks Schloss owned people are always surprised at some of the names, like McDonald's, that he owned. Anything that makes you go "hmmm" (a little Arsenio humor) is almost certainly an Edwin selection. So the style had shifted a bit. Second, the style had shifted already from a net net type strategy to a low p/b strategy and then to simply trying to get around 1x p/b as opportunities dried up (the frothy 80s market) and their AUM had grown fairly substantially over those years, relatively speaking.

I think Oddball answered the same way I would have. TB did very well until they had to adjust their strategy. Whether that was solely as a result of AUM that was too high, I am not sure, but that was certainly at least a part of the decision process. I would disagree completely with Grantham's contention. Outperformance buying these sorts of things is still very possible. Based on my understanding of what most board members do (at least those who post most often), I would say that I probably follow the TB approach from a portfolio construction standpoint more than anyone. I will buy at least a small position in anything and everything that meets my parameters (once in a while some things that don't, but I try not to stray). It's a very satisfactory way to invest.

There's a section on Tweedy in The Money Masters that states that for a while in the 1960s and 1970s Tweedy only purchased net-nets at 2/3 of NCAV and sold at 1x NCAV. They purchased anything and everything that met their criteria and their returns were great. The problem was they eventually outgrew this strategy and adapted as they took on more money. I would be happy with Schloss/Tweedy type returns. Me too! That is one of my favorite all time pieces. They would buy anything that met their criteria on a purely quantitative basis. They would buy in any size. They would have holdings that were $50 or $100. I think they had about 1000+ positions at the time and were doing about 15% a year at the time. Of course AUM grew and as you said they had to adapt which led to them becoming run of the mill value investors buying the same stocks as everyone else. The interesting thing to me is that many people will talk about being contrarian and attempting to succeed unconventially, but very few recognize that investing in a Schloss/"old" Tweedy Browne manner is about as unconventianal as you can get. It is equated with buying from a screen when it is very far from that. As I have said before, I have dozens of positions and most are fairly small. Definitely small by the standards of the board. I follow a Schloss approach, but in terms of portfolio construction it's probably more like old Tweedy Browne than anything.

I'm not a fiction reader but I may make the exception in this case. Good for him. As a former pitcher (I'm from Hamilton BTW) I can relate to the realization that your career (at least the aspiration of a pro) are nearing the end. Some days I would give anything to throw a fastball like I used to. That book looks good. I will read that. It's not fiction, but Pat Jordan's "A False Spring" is very good and details a former phenom's fall from grace and the sudden disappearance of ability to throw strikes.

That was very good. I enjoyed it very much. I like post apocalyptic novels. Stirling is prolific to say the least. The Dies the Fire trilogy then had another trilogy tacked on to it. I think I read 4 of them. They get progressively worse and Die the Fire is by far the best.

The Lifetime Member award is worth much more to young people. I see a whole new generation of Cialis type commercials with young board members discussing Buffett in side by side bathtubs while looking at the sunset. On second thought, that's a fairly disturbing image.

I always thought Fisher was riding on Daddy's coat-tails. Not sure why people pay attention to him. No different than any other large fund company. Cheers! My recollection is that after a relatively brief time working with his dad, he chafed under his watchful eye and went his own way. I think there was a time when he could have been considered an innovator. He wrote Super Stocks, I think it was called, probably 30 years ago and tied valuation to p/s rather than other metrics. Whether that was good or bad, at least it was considered new at the time and I think he did well and his shop grew. Then like many, he became an asset grabber. So while he is certainly a perma bull, I think it's more about asset gathering than anything else. Someone who is a purveyor of mutual funds, etc isn't going to ring the bell by telling people to be careful. I have to say that when I saw he is a billionaire it was one of the more shocking of those on that list I've seen.

Good post.

For fund administrators in the Caymans, I would recommend Maples. Very easy to work with.

Are you trying to seduce him, Mrs. Robinson?

Retail as well. Friends involved in the business inform me that their clients have yet to participate in the market, but calls are starting to come in asking "if there's anything they should be doing now".