PlanMaestro

Eric, you are a character (smile). Not that I do not like paper profits.

American life companies don't do as much or as high in guaranteed rates as Japanese life companies. They are also much better matched. They have been also raising prices.

Fantastic, thanks for posting.

Itau: 97B 2.4x BV Bradesco: 70B 2.2x BV If Banamex were traded publicly, and not as part of Citigroup, it would be probably worth around 30B. The large American banks valuations do not make any sense. They are all cheap and are probably among the safest banks in the world. That was a very good comment and I've been adding too.

* Overseas exposure is a positive (Banamex at least worth 2x book value today) * No mortgage hangover * No mortgage litigation * The stress test assumes consumer loan deterioration when it will not. * And despite that, they have similar capital ratios in stress test with no approval of capital plan * Better capital and credit ratios today

You are referring to the capital ratios txlaw? That is a good point, I was looking more at the loan loss rates. The assumptions for capital numbers seem to be underestimating the PTPP potential of some institutions relative to JPM and WFC.

Or someone wanted to send a signal for his arrogance ... well deserved. Now, Dimon decided to jump start the Fed announcing the dividend increase. Is someone going to send him a signal too? JPM and WFC numbers were not much better than the rest.

And that includes putback payments.

All of them will pass eventually Parsad, all. Looking at the details of the stress and besides this being a doomsday scenario there is some weird stuff going on (consumer loans). Both Citi and Suntrust are more than OK.

Appendix C includes reports by company ... including PTPP. Dancing with some Springsteen in the background.

Drexler reminded him that it's always, in the end, about product. (That was certainly true in the case of Johnson's triumphs at Apple and Target.) http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2012/03/07/jc-penney-ron-johnson/

Some banks complained of NOT being included in the SIFI list. SIFI banks will have a lower cost of capital after being officially declared too big to fail and having a governmental quality seal.

Excellent article about the Meruelo family. The description of MMPI's bankruptcy proceedings is particularly good. I do suffer from schadenfreude every once in a while not that it is any good. http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/045155/features/the-meruelo-boys-plays-songs-of-loss.php

M&M's large ownership plus the controlling stakes of C&H (and maybe Stephen Taylor) is the main reason for the very low liquidity. Have not heard any updates of Meruelo's efforts to fight this outside bankruptcy court or what is going to happen to the Southpark property. Still, it looks very cheap especially after the bids around book value proposed for marginal properties in the bankruptcy process..

From an organization that thinks that the FED has been too lenient but the reporting is good. For example, this is the background of Moynihan's embarrassing rejection on the previous stress test. http://www.propublica.org/article/fed-shrugged-off-warning-let-banks-pay-shareholders-billions

Duty? Insane. For anyone interested in the desperate last few days of AIG must read "Fatal Risk".

Check part 5, 6: BAC, WFC, IBM, JPM

A melting ice cube is a turnaround nightmare. He must move fast. Those unencumbered assets will not last forever.

Ad hominem? Very bad. Very very very bad troll. Please don't feed him.

Comes with the territory ... but we still have to suffer a few political trolls! Glad to see you around Persistentone.

or large foreign operations.

Southern Yankee, have you learned enough to share with us an investment idea?

Are we at a point where Dell is beyond hatred and it is being just ignored? Twitter and Corner silence.

I am not a shareholder and only follow Fairfax because they are smart and to track their equity portfolio. But what about this exchange? Is there truth to it? Daniel Baldini - Oberon Asset Management: When I look at the results of a couple of these insurance companies that folks consider best-in-class like Arch or Markel or White Mountain or W.R. Berkley, their combined ratios over the past couple of years have been lower than Fairfax's and in Arch's and Markel's recent press releases they also talk about his extraordinary cat losses. So, I'm sort of interested to understand a little better how your underwriting strategy might be different from theirs? I mean are you pricing lower than them in expectation or hopes of acquiring more float, which you can vary cleverly invest are you may be intentionally taking more risk with the expectation that when things go well the payoff will be higher, and you get really interesting…? V. Prem Watsa - Chairman and CEO: Daniel, that's a good question. But no, we definitely don't do that. We're pricing lower to get more business so that we can have a higher float so that we have money to invest. We definitely don't do that. But when you look at some of the companies you quoted like Arch, Markel remember Odyssey Re is almost 50% of our business. So, we've got a company that's in the reinsurance business worldwide and it's about 50% of our business. So you have a catastrophe, you compare our results to Everest Re, you compare our results to Transatlantic and we give you results for Odyssey Re, so you can compare Odyssey to any of those companies or PartnerRe or Platinum or any of these other reinsurance company that are Bermuda based, you'll see Odyssey does very well. Then if you look at each of these companies, they are good companies the one's that you mentioned, but you look at them on a five years basis and a 10 year basis and you look at them on a 15, 20 year basis our returns compare very well. In fact, we tend to exceed them over almost any long-term period. But those are good companies, they follow the same approach we do in terms of focusing on underwriting profit and reserving well and that's what we've done for 26 years and we continue to do that. When the market's done as they seem to be doing today, we'll see our expense ratios come down and our loss ratios improve, and have good underwriting profit again. So in the last four years, Daniel, we've dropped our business, if you look at each of our companies Crum & Forster seen it, I mentioned Odyssey, premiums have come down, Northbridge, our premiums have come down, not gone up. So we are definitely not interested in getting float for the sake of getting float. We look at the two sides separately. Our precedence are all focused on underwriting profit, no bonuses compensation for the top-line and no bonuses, compensation for generating float. It's all about underwriting profitability with good reserving.