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redskin

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Everything posted by redskin

  1. So it looks like it was worth giving up the 6%
  2. Berkshire has received $53.68 billion in dividends from BNSF since its purchase in 2009. Did he pay $34B for it?
  3. The Forbes article gives his performance from 2006 through 2009. He was up 35% over that period. The S&P 500 total return over the same period was -2.6%. I don't understand how they could be critical?
  4. I appreciated the link. There were some articles or information I didn't see. I liked the summary.
  5. I know nothing about Ally, but you mention $150 billion in deposits. I assume those deposits are funding their loans. Berkshire would need to fund the loans if they sell the deposits. If you assume a bank can earn 1% ROA, they could make $1.5 billion on those deposits. Maybe a 10 multiple ($15B)? I would assume a lower multiple as you don't know if you will retain all of the deposits.
  6. BNSF has distributed $50.58 billion to Berkshire since it was purchased in 2009.
  7. What was the price they paid for McClane?
  8. I'm having a tough time finding anything cheaper and safer than WFC..
  9. He bought about 15% of the average daily volume.
  10. I'm calculating BRK repurchased 23,744.4 class A shares equivalent as follows: On Feb 13, 2020, BRK had 700,395 Class A and 1,385,994,959 Class B shares outstanding, adding up to a total of 1,624,393 Class A equivalent shares. See https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2019ar/2019ar.pdf. On July 7, 2020, Buffett owned 248,734 Class A and 10,188 Class B shares, adding up to a total of 248,740.792 Class A equivalent shares. His total economic share in BRK was 15.54%. This puts total Class A equivalent shares of BRK to be 248,740.792/0.1554 = 1,600,648.597. See https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/315090/000119312520189490/d936378dsc13da.htm 1,624,393 - 1,600,648.597 = 23,744.4 class A equivalent shares repurchased There were 1,620,023 class A equivalent according to the 1st quarter 10-Q. About 19,300 this quarter.
  11. He sold $6 billion of equities in April.
  12. I emailed Carol Loomis asking if Warren would be taking questions from shareholders. She responded with the following... Yes, he is--though the number of questions probably will be shorter than in previous years.
  13. Has anyone heard what the format will be for the annual meeting? Will Warren be fielding questions from the journalists or analysts?
  14. https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2020/03/fed-to-delay-implementation-of-revised-bank-control-framework/ The new control regulations are delayed for 6 months. I was thinking we'd start to see BRK increase its bank holdings after this was implemented.
  15. He's talked in past meetings about the potential for very large investments in the utility. He reiterated in the letter that they could take on projects requiring investments for as much as $100b. In 2019, they invested $4.5b in excess of depreciation charges in the utility.
  16. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200130a.htm
  17. Personally, I'll second redskin's question whole-hearted. I can't remember the sources any longer, and I've got no time to dig them up [perhaps it was actually posted by a fellow CoBF on here], but if I remember correctly, Berkshire has asked for permission not to reduce its position in BAC below 10 percent, while it continues to reduce its position in WFC. Please correct me if I'm wrong, and if I'm not wrong [i may be], what do you get out that? I mean, perhaps, with regard to the forced WFC selling at Berkshire, it may be considered at Berkshire's convenience in the situation. [No kick-a** one-liners from Mr. Buffett nor Mr. Munger for years about WFC being a "good bank" - perhaps for a reason.] Looks like they finalized the rule change. It is effective April 30th. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200130a.htm
  18. Has anyone heard any updates on this proposal? https://www.barrons.com/articles/berkshire-could-lift-stakes-in-several-big-banks-under-proposed-fed-rule-change-51556217117
  19. If the buybacks become truly significant, the IV/BV ratio would narrow somewhat, but otherwise (as is likely to persist for some years) I'd imagine that there are still quite a lot of people willing to pay 120% of BV, and probably also 125% of BV in normal circumstances, which acts as something of a backstop. They might adjust last-reported BV down a little in the event of a market crash. Certainly, if markets plummet, Berkshire is likely to fall too, by a somewhat similar amount, such that the perceived risk-adjusted returns are commensurate for all stocks. However, 'somewhat similar' may still be less than the general market, which could be pegged to a few reasons: 1. If it was trading at the bottom of its range before the crash (e.g. P/BV < 1.30) as it is now, it likely to fall a little less . 2. It is seen as more defensive (i.e. lower risk, meaning lower business risk as well as lower 'beta' for those who subscribe to EMH or CAPM), hence on a risk-adjusted basis it ought to fall a little less. Some of the optionality of Berkshire's assumed ability to invest its excess cash profitably when markets are down is then priced in when markets fall markedly, reducing how much it falls compared to the wider market. 3. The stock portfolio of Berkshire might well fall less than the market because it's also relatively defensive. And even if the Berkshire portfolio experiences a 20% pre-tax decline, this $42 billion reduction in market value is only about 10.6% of Berkshire's Book Value, and after applying 21% deferred tax reduction to the unrealized capital loss, BV would only reduce by 8.4%. This would be partially offset by operating earnings too. I would expect most things to decline in market panics, Berkshire included, and for Berkshire to gain IV and increase leverage by spending that float-funded cash hoard at such times if it can deploy capital, even if it that value might be hidden for a few years. I would not expect Berkshire to fall more than the general market, but not an awful lot less than it either (unless it was highly priced going prior to the crash, of course) I don't try to side-step market crashes, aiming to remain fully invested as I would expect the compounding I'd miss out on by predicting the crash too often and too early to exceed the losses I'd avoid by going to cash. If purchases are made above book value and below intrinsic value, the gap between book and intrinsic value will actually widen.
  20. Berkshire Hathaway Energy is the only subsidiary I know of where you can see the valuation that Buffett places on it. Since Walter Scott is a minority shareholder and he periodically sells his shares to Berkshire Hathaway Energy, those transactions are reported in the Berkshire Hathaway Energy filings. Scott's last reported sale was in Q1 2019. He sold 447,712 shares for $293mm ($654 per share). This transaction values BHE at approximately $50 billion. Transactions in previous years suggest the following per share values.... 2018 $602 2017 $542 2015 $480 2013 $350 2010 $225 2009 $210 He purchased MidAmerican for $35/share in 1999. This equates to an annual rate of return of close to 16%.
  21. I think Buffett would be more interested in buying a private European business or a public European company in whole which would avoid the % restrictions.
  22. Berkshire's cost basis in 'Banks, Insurance, Financials' increased by $15 billion in Q3. $5-6 billion can be attributed to the increased stake in BAC. Will be interesting to see the additions he made.
  23. Why do you think he owns WFC in his personal account? I've seen that stated many times. It would probably take some work for me to find any sources as everything I am recalling was some time ago, (5-15 years?). I thought these were Berkshire pension holdings. I remember him addressing this in the past. He said he wasn't sure why it was disclosed that way.
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