villainx

Are you talking about Fairfax shares? I was going to ask about that, whether folks are coming back around to the company, or for folks who hadn't left, if there was renewed confidence.

Thanks. I meant more as being so specific about 1.2 book value. Wouldn't it make more sense to say something along the lines of "Berkshire will repurchase when shares are significant discount to intrinsic value." I think a lot of companies have policies where they repurchase when shares are at extreme discount to value (I assume), but they never set the repurchase threshold. If it's to make it clear to shareholders, then setting the discount % from intrinsic value that triggers repurchase makes much more sense than 1.2x book, no? From 2011 to 2012, the threshold went from 1.1 to 1.2, yet since 2012 there's no increase? Especially with the view that intrinsic value has increased at a greater rate than book value increase? Unless there are extreme crisis, there's going to be no repurchase, right? So ... that also ties the hand of future management, no? I think future management can fend for themselves, but it just seems so unnecessary. If buyback or dividends are rationale, sensible decisions why leave it to the successor to initiate it.

What is the point of stating the threshold for Berkshire share repurchase? Has it ever been stated? And has other companies done so? Part of my point is that ... wouldn't it be better to say repurchases would be done at % discount from their intrinsic value instead? Whoever is the next CEO, they likely will institute buybacks and dividends in a big way, so ... it seems Buffett is making it tough for eventual management to operate freely. I know Buffett has forecasted that changes will occur, but there's something to be said about the CEO continuing a Buffett policy versus deciding when to abandon the no div/buyback policy.

This is probably not the right place to discuss this, but compared to their funds/strategies, the stock hasn't gained much. I know they are client focused, but is seems like a big disconnect when your partners (unit holders) aren't seeing the manifestation of the success. I know the distributions/dividends have been better than average, but ... I don't know.

Not a lot of comments on the book. Good? Even for someone who is fairly knowledgeable with Buffett's history/approach?

With going 10 years back, there were tons of real estate bargains in the first half of the decade span. Especially as RE market worked through desperate buyers and foreclosures. Making those same gains in RE would be harder now. I discussed with some friends about the NY market. They liked a particular place in Brooklyn, and said it was unique. Except it wasn't, every neighborhood in NY area (including NJ) so rapid recovered to new all time highsin the last five years. What I attribute to luck - which could have been realized in almost any NY neighborhood, they attribute to foresight in seeing potential in a particular neighborhood. If the game is RE, it'll be interesting what kind of returns can happen going forward.

Also was it surveyed what was their down (if any) years like? Interesting thread regardless. Thanks.

Yet to be asked, was the portfolio all long, or there were some shorts in there too? Was there hedging? I am exclusively long. I don't understand shorting. And I otherwise - own personal biases here - would feel weird shorting.

10K?!? In a separate thread, someone advocated your portfolio obliteration! Just kidding, and I hope I didn't overstated the someone's response, which I more or less agreed with. I started small too.

Never mind my question. Google shows it's CGM Focus Fund. And it's based on Morningstar study.

Any idea which fund Joel discusses in the ~18:00 mark? Best performing mutual fund at 18% per year for 10 years, with average investor in that fund losing 11% during same time period?

Same as above. Was out from approx 11am till not sure, but now appears up at ~10pm, all EST. I had a burning question, insight requiring question and was hoping to look through here for some ideas/inspiration. Alas, just went with my gut.

This might be the Chinese version. I can't read it unfortunately. http://liluchineseblog.tumblr.com Yes, that looks like them. Thanks! The introduction to the first post says: "Why is the disparity between China and the West so large? How can China catch up with the West? What will China look like after it catches up and can it reclaim its past glory? Using New History and adding economics, biology and other natural sciences, as well as traditional studies of Chinese history, we can today place the question of China’s modernisation into the context of mankind’s overall development over the past millennia. From this foundation, we can better understand and answer the three questions above and make more reliable forecasts about China’s future." The blog also has Li's foreword to the Chinese edition of Poor Charlie's Almanac. There's already a translation but the link doesn't work for me? http://blog.enochko.com/2010/06/my-teacher-charlie-munger-english.html It's available at archive.org https://web.archive.org/web/20140701184816/http://blog.enochko.com/2010/06/my-teacher-charlie-munger-english.html Thanks!

This is unrelated to any ongoing thread, but an interesting divertissement: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-kraft-heinz-idUSKBN16M2UI. Security guard (or something else if he reviews emails for his boss) did some small inside trades.

Yeah, I would assume at the sub level that Berkshire managers are very 3G or DBS like. Just that the performance or approach aren't focused on nearly as much. I also might be too hung up on the cost cutting at the expense of innovation the press seems to be applying to 3G, plus 3G recent target industries aren't the easiest to innovate/grow.

Just an innocent question. From what I know of 3G, they are adept operators who know how to trim cost but have been less able to grow them. Partly this might be due to them buying companies that have lots of fat to trim and not a lot of room to grow. But when I think of other skilled managers or management philosophies (like Danaher), they cut cost and do things to innovate/grow, why aren't those types more attractive to Buffett? Or is PCP or BHE those type of companies?

I'm almost half way through, and really dig it so far. There's a wide range of things to get from the book. I think it's better than Liar's Poker - Chaos Monkeys speaks also to the drive to succeed and useful industry information, in addition to the name dropping, tell-all aspect.

I'm hoping to get some idea what you folks think Trump will do that will impact stocks.

From my understanding of copying the greats, unless you are investing in their vehicles, Berkshire, DJCO, etc., it's hard to gain the same benefits from following their picks. You might not have the same investing timeline, investing criteria, portfolio, and while the purchases gardner a lot of headlines, the stock sales usually get less (so difficult to time). With regards to the anxiety of that time period. It was crazy because big institutions were literally going or likely to go down (Lehman, Bear, AIG, Citi, etc). Most disciplined approach would have including adding during those periods, whether it's a boring regular contribution to index investments or focusing on some high quality companies. I'm not sure if it took a lot of courage, but 2008/9 was one of the Fisher hiccup buying opportunities, and the opportunity persisted for awhile after. So if not at the bottom - which is not when Munger or Buffett aims for or purchased at - there was plenty of time even after conditions improved to go in. DJCO positions were more secret because the value wasn't high enough to warrant disclosure (until the value increased to warrant disclosure). Some of Buffett's public moves were before (and after) the bottom. (That said, I don't want to take lightly those that sold out around the bottom, and suffered huge capital loss, or those who were dependent on income and had to bear the brunt of a drastic downturn, or those that just waited around.) Following their process (and discipline) may be of more value. Following the exact purchases of money managers is a tougher call.