That is a fair point about differing unemployment rates; that, and similar misallocation of capital, distinguishes Japan from the U.S. Or, I should say, similar types of misallocation of capital. Rather than pushing money to less productive workers, the U.S. will bolster inflated home prices via tax credits, deferral of GSE foreclosures, and various purchase plans for real-estate linked assets. Efforts to reflate real estate seem to be an attempt to maintain a 70% consumer economy. And Japan did lower the discount rate by about a percent a year from '90-'95, until it sat below 1% thereafter. After '95, real GDP increased by more than 1% despite the IMF crisis and the stock bubble. Meanwhile, avg. household disposable income fell by about 3.6% and expenses by 3.9% from '95 to '01. Households also saved less, down from 12% in '95 to a little over 7% in '03. So why did the Japanese watch their savings and incomes shrink without aggressively seeking yields higher than the paltry prevailing interest rates? Discouraged investors?
Japan and the U.S. may be apples and oranges. But it's also possible that tremendous real estate deflation will smooth differences. Of course, I hope that the stimulus works and that the worst case scenario is a high interest rate environment to contain future inflation. I still want to prepare for an economy that goes flat for a while.