sculpin

I find it simply amazing that Canopy Growth (WEED -TSX) has a $7.7 billion market cap today. Incredible what an old Hershey chocolate factory in Smith Falls Ontario could be worth when re-purposed. I bet even Willie Wonka would be in disbelief. Estimated 2018 revenue (GMP Capital) -- $75mm Canadian. That's one hell of a P/S ratio. Buyers at these levels better have some good strong Indica on hand if the hockey stick estimates don't come to fruition when this mania ends.... https://www.canopygrowth.com/

Intrigued by what the Pakiya undisclosed position could be. Anyone that track insider buying in micro caps have an idea what Company this is? https://pakiyafunds.wordpress.com/ 2017 Performance January 4, 2018 2017 was a crazy year. The S&P500 index has been on a tear the last 8 years. And 2017 wasn’t any different. The market ended the year up 19.41%. For the last 9 years, the index has been averaging 14.13% annual. Historically the index has returned approximately 10% annual since 1928 to 2014. So the last 9 years have been extremely bullish. We don’t expect the index to give this type of return going forward but with the low interest rates and herd mentality, I don’t expect things to correct anytime soon. My portfolio returned 139.91% in 2017. The year was largely impacted by 5 very large returns. The knew these companies were cheap but we didn’t expect this type of return in a short time period. The big winners were HemaCare (215% return), Bewhere Holdings (300%), Petro River Oil (268%), Total Telcom (110%), and Valeura Energy (253%). Out of these 5 holdings, we sold out of all except Valeura. We ended the year with 3 position on our portfolio. We sold out of all other positions as I believe these 3 positions have huge upside potential in 2017. It was hard selling some of our holdings (HemaCare and Schmitt) but I think the current positions have huge short-term catalyst. Current holdings: Valeura Energy (VLE): This is our biggest position. The company’s first test well with the Statoil partnership has been a success. The results from the well are much better than management had expected. The market rewarded the stock price by moving it up more than 7x in the last 2 months. But I think this is just the beginning. The main reason is institutions still haven’t started buying up the shares. Also even after the 7x run-up, the company is still valued very cheaply. The company will have a resource update in late January, which should be a major catalyst to get other aware of the company and the asset they own. I think the most likely outcome for this company is a buyout and it is likely to happen in 2018. Unidentified company #1: This is a company that we became aware of by looking at insider buys. It is very rare that I see the type of buying from the CEO that I saw for this company. After digging around on the company, I initially didn’t find much that would shed a light on why the CEO is buying. But then following the press releases the company put out it started to become clear the company has some special assets that is making the insider buy. Digging around online it is easy to see which asset it is. This is a sub-$6M market cap company with an asset that is likely worth in the billions. From the press releases it seems clear the company is likely to sell these assets. Again we see this as a short-term catalyst that should have great rewards for shareholders. Grande West Transportation (BUS): This company I’ve followed for the last 2 years. I knew the story but never got that excited by the valuation. But in late 2017, I noticed couple of things that lined up perfectly and made me build an initial position. The insider buying on this one is huge. Over a year ago, insiders had buying when it was selling at fraction of the current price. Even after going up multiples, insiders didn’t stop buying. The constant insider buying and that too multiple different directors, made it very appealing. The company also has been a huge success in Canada and has recently entered US market. The upside from the US market is huge and they have the right product to win this market. If successful, the company can easily be worth multiples. Also I expect the orders from US to start coming in early 2018. Finally, in late 2017 the stock dropped from $3.45 to $2. This created a great opportunity to start a position. (Recently I sold out of BUS. I wanted the capital to allocate to VLE due to the recent pull back in VLE). Although I’m concentrated in 2 plays (VLE and Unidentified #1), I feel that the risk is extremely low that I can lose. I think both of these companies are extremely cheap and once the market becomes aware of what is happening, the stock will be worth multiples. Also, I think the catalyst is in place for the market to wake up in early 2018. I feel like the biggest risk is me doing something stupid, like selling too early. Although 2017 has been good, I think 2018 is likely to be even better.

Very interesting. Could have wide ranging impact on economies, industry, energy usage etc if they could identify what these technologies & materials are.

I am interested to hear your thesis on VVI, as I work in an industry related to one of its businesses. TIA Here you go: https://minesafetydisclosures.com/blog/viad Would love to hear your thoughts/feedback since you're in the industry and some of my assumptions may be wrong The White Pass & Yukon Railway in Skagway would be the perfect asset for the Viad Pursuit business unit. Held be TWC Corp in Canada it is for sale.... White Pass & Yukon Route Railway | Scenic Railway of the World https://wpyr.com/ Built in 1898 during the Klondike Gold Rush, the White Pass & Yukon Route is a marvel of engineering despite the harsh weather and challenging geography faced by thousands of railroad construction workers. Join us 119 years later as we take you on a journey to see our splendid panorama of mountains, glaciers and ... TWC hires Brookfield to review holding in White Pass 2017-06-16 07:45 ET - News Release TWC ENTERPRISES LIMITED ANNOUNCES STRATEGIC REVIEW TWC Enterprises Ltd. intends to undertake a strategic review of its investment in White Pass & Yukon Route. The board of directors has appointed Brookfield Financial Securities LP as a financial adviser to assist in the process. The objective of the strategic review is to evaluate the operations of the business and may include a sale of all or a portion of the business, as well as consideration of a separate public entity vehicle for White Pass. Consideration will also be given to any potential impact on TWC's golf course operations. Chief financial officer Andrew Tamlin stated, "We are seeking the best path forward for White Pass and believe it is prudent to analyze the business and its strategic opportunities at this time." TWC does not intend to disclose further developments or updates with respect to this process unless and until its board of directors approves a specific transaction or otherwise concludes the review of strategic opportunities. There can be no assurance that TWC will enter into any transaction at this time or in the future.

They can’t buyback shares because they need liquidity to pay down the preferreds that are puttable. You may not like it but there is logic to it. As a D class preferred holder, I appreciate that too. Ha! Yeah they're real short on cash or something that can be turned into cash to buyback the common shares. Sell off some of that consistently disappointing position in Dundee Precious Metals... At the head office level, the corporation held cash of $53.0-million and a portfolio of publicly traded securities with a total value of $194.5-million at the end of the third quarter of 2017.

In the grips of ferocious tax loss selling Dumbdee hits an all time low of sub $2.40 - this in striking contrast of DC's estimate of it's value per share of $11.79 in just the latest Q3 report. Yet the masterminds behind this destruction of corporate value and collapse of the share price refuse to buy back any shares to support their estimate of the lofty value of their corporation. The gong show of the Blue Goose shut down of the Tender Choice plant in Q3 underlines the poor decision making and capital allocation still resident in Dundee Corp. Purchased only 1 year ago, the Tender Choice plant was deemed unfit to carry out its processing work and needed significant repairs and modifications. The Blue Goose President was forced to walk the plank. Then the plant burnt down.... TORONTO, ONTARIO--(Marketwired - Oct. 19, 2016) - Blue Goose Capital Corp. ("Blue Goose") ("the Company"), a privately-held, Canadian-based protein and organic food company which is a subsidiary of Dundee Corporation ("Dundee") (TSX:DC.A) today announced the acquisition of Tender Choice Foods Inc. ("Tender Choice"), a leading Burlington, Ontario based processing plant specializing in the processing, packing and distribution of meat products. "Blue Goose is pleased to have Tender Choice as part of the Blue Goose group of companies," said Ben Nikolaevsky, President and CEO of Blue Goose, "With the acquisition of Tender Choice, Blue Goose has acquired a tremendous platform to build on the rapid growth of its poultry operations, and allows us to facilitate our growth in the industry." At this stage it is apparent that Dundee Corp should be placed in liquidation mode over the next few years. No new investments. Sell all assets at the best available price but not in a fire sale. Cut all admin, management & Board costs to the bone to limit the cash drain. Start buying back the preferred shares at prices less than half of par to cut both the ultimate liability & save on the quarterly dividend drain. Is this not the best way to save shareholder value??

Bri-Chem... https://seekingalpha.com/instablog/379412-darren-mccammon/5067564-brichem-refinance-increase-earnings-50-percent

SINGAPORE (Reuters) - Southeast Asia and India are set to pick up the slack and drive global coal demand through 2040 as China cuts use of the fossil fuel to fight pollution, forecasts from the International Energy Agency and Wood Mackenzie show. India and Southeast Asia will account for the bulk of increased coal use in the decades ahead as they rely on one of the cheapest sources of power to supply electricity, although pollution concerns have delayed some projects. "Coal maintains a strong foothold in (Southeast Asia's) projected consumption, not only because it is markedly cheaper than natural gas, but also because coal projects are in many cases easier to pursue as they do not require the capital-intensive infrastructure associated with gas," the International Energy Agency said this week in its outlook for Southeast Asia. Some 100 gigawatts (GW) of new coal-fired capacity is expected to be built in Southeast Asia by 2040, boosting the total installed capacity to 160 GW, the agency said. Forty percent of the new capacity will be in Indonesia, it said. By then, around half of the power plants will use either supercritical or ultra-supercritical technology, raising efficiency to 38 percent from 33 percent now, the IEA said, but still below international standards. Southeast Asia will become a net coal importer by 2040 as production slips to about 375 million tonnes of coal equivalent (mtce), while demand rises 3.7 percent yearly to 387 mtce, the agency said. Vietnam, which recently overtook Thailand as the second-largest coal consumer in Southeast Asia, will become the largest regional importer by 2040, the IEA said. Wood Mackenzie expects Southeast Asia's thermal coal imports to more than double to 226 million tonnes by 2035, up from 85 million tonnes currently. Imports into South Asia, which includes India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, will rise to 284 million tonnes, up 72 percent during the same period, a forecast from the consultancy shows. In contrast, North Asia's imports will drop 14 percent to 274 million tonnes, with China's intake falling about 40 percent to 103 million tonnes, according to Wood Mackenzie. "Coal is still the most affordable technology in power generation, although we are seeing some push back in coal development," Kiah Wei Giam, principal analyst of coal/gas markets at Wood Mackenzie, said at the Singapore International Energy Week. Still, he said coal's demand outlook remains bright until at least 2025, unless renewables and batteries become cost-competitive. Public opposition has delayed coal-fired power projects in Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines.

If I were an investor in his funds (which have been underperforming over both long & short periods) the last thing I would want is to have the primary Portfolio Manager distracted by taking on an additional business (this Stonetrust biz) and thus diverting more of his time away from research & portfolio management of the Chou Funds.

Yes it is totally a bet that Marret will be able to monetize its investment in Cline. At least the future is looking brighter for both met & thermal coal after so many poor years.... Turning to coal, Macquarie said coking coal prices will also remain elevated for longer than it previously anticipated. The bank revised its near-term coking coal price forecasts by 32% and 40% in the first and second quarters of next year, respectively, to $185 and $175 a tonne. It said the upgrades were based on Chinese restocking demand and tight coking coal supply. “With the potential for voluntary supply restraint by major Chinese metallurgical coal producers, ongoing supply issues, Chinese port inventories remaining low, high land-borne logistics costs in China, and the potential for an accelerated rate of capacity closures in calendar year 2018, it is possible that metallurgical coal prices can sustain above long-run marginal costs for some time,” BHP's Balhuizen was quoted in The Australian. http://www.mining.com/macquarie-says-iron-ore-coal-prices-remain-strong-2018/ Coal inventories at Australia’s three largest electricity providers -- AGL Energy Ltd., Origin Energy Ltd. and CLP Holdings Ltd.’s EnergyAustralia -- have shrunk over winter as they use more of the fuel to compensate for natural gas shortages. The closure of the Hazelwood coal-fired power plant in Victoria state also put further pressure on the nation’s remaining generators to produce more power, eating through their stockpiles at a faster pace. Against this backdrop, the power producers have struggled to get sufficient supplies as they compete with overseas buyers for lower-quality coal that was once considered too poor to export. Miners in Australia can command higher prices for coal known as high ash in China, South Korea and India. https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2017-09-27/now-one-of-the-world-s-energy-powerhouses-has-a-coal-squeeze

From VIC - also MHY.UN moving up as public access was a few days ago... Marret Resource Corp MAR August 08, 2017 - 3:38pm EST by TheSpiceTrade 2017 2018 Price: 0.37 EPS 0 0 Shares Out. (in M): 18 P/E 0 0 Market Cap (in $M): 7 P/FCF 0 0 Net Debt (in $M): -3 EBIT 0 0 TEV ($): 4 TEV/EBIT 0 0 Description / Catalyst Messages (2) Description Marret Resource Corp. (the “Company” or “MAR”, traded on the TSX) is one of the most asymmetric risk/reward investments I have ever seen in my career. It is small, illiquid, which may make it only suitable for personal accounts, but the return profile is so enticing that it is worth picking up some shares for managers of smaller funds. Investors can purchase MAR (at C$0.395/shr) below liquidation value today (C$0.463), with your downside completely protected, and upside potential of over 37x your capital invested. Executive Summary MAR started off as a publicly traded investment company focused on resource companies, but due to a confluence of factors (changes in tax regime, poor performance, and high percentage of portfolio in illiquid securities) became orphaned and suffered from significant redemptions. Throughout its downfall, the manager of MAR refused to write-down the value on Cline Mining, which owns a metallurgical coal asset called New Elk Mine in Colorado. This culminated in threats of litigation from activist shareholders, a nasty annual general meeting with press coverage, and the eventual undertaking by the manager to liquidate the portfolio. Today, MAR is completely orphaned and forgotten with a market cap of just C$7mm. There is approx. C$8.2mm worth of net cash and liquid, publicly traded high yield bonds on the balance sheet. Thus, MAR is currently trading below liquidation value. Furthermore, MAR still owns approx. 22% of Cline Mining, which underwent a CCAA facilitated debt-for-equity swap. Met coal prices have rebounded significantly since late 2016. Based on an NPV10 interpolated from the Company’s NI 43-101 feasibility study, Cline is worth C$142mm near the current benchmark met coal price of US$165/ton. At US$200/ton, Cline is worth C$1.16 billion (translates to MAR share price of C$14.91). The latest disclosure in MAR’s most recent quarterly report suggests that the manager is actively engaged in strategic alternatives for Cline Mining in the current strong met coal environment. In any case, investors are paying less than nothing for Cline Mining, and thus the investment thesis does not hinge upon a commodity call on met coal or steel markets. Business History Marret Resource Corp. is a publicly traded investment company whose primary business is investing in public and private debt securities in a broad range of natural resource sectors. The manager of MAR, the publicly traded investment company, is Marret Asset Management Inc. (“Marret Asset Management”), a Toronto based fixed income money manager who was acquired by CI Financial in Corp. in September 2013. MAR was originally envisioned as a closed-end fund with permanent capital that Marret Asset Management could invest and earn fees from. MAR entered into a management services agreement with Marret Asset Management in Dec. 2010 and raised C$75 million in equity capital in 2011. At the same time, Marret Asset management introduced three other publicly traded investment funds, these being Marret High Yield Strategies Fund (“MHY”), Marret Investment Grade Bond Fund (“MIG”), and Marret Multi Strategy Income Fund (“MMF”). In total, Marret Asset Management raised over a billion dollars for its publicly traded investment vehicles. Over the next few years, each of publicly traded investment companies ended up in trouble due to a combination of: Change in tax regime – on March 21, 2013 the Canadian Minister of Finance announced new anti-avoidance measures on “character conversion transactions” whereby funds converted income into capital gains by using forward purchase derivatives with a counterparty to obtain exposure to an underlying reference portfolio. MHY, MIG, and MMF were engaged in these character conversion transactions and marketing the tax advantageous nature of their income based investments. With this announcement, they were no longer allowed to enter into new contracts after their existing derivatives rolled off. Poor performance – all of the publicly traded Marret investment companies suffered from poor performance to varying degrees in 2011-2012. For example, MHY had a return of 1.4% in 2011 and 3.2% in 2012 (compared to the Merrill Lynch U.S. High Yield Master II Index which had a return of 16.2% in 2012). Cline Mining – unfortunately, the publicly traded Marret investment companies made one of their largest investments ever at exactly the wrong time to a metallurgical coal company called Cline Mining. As performance weakened, the manager refused to mark down their level three assets. I will get into this into the next section of this report. Trading at a discount to NAV – as a result of the street’s skepticism around Cline Mining and NAV calculations, they began to trade at a significant discount to NAV. Significant redemptions – This all culminated in significant redemptions in 2013. MHY received redemptions for 31.2mm units, representing 44% of units outstanding. Cline Mining – the Straw That Broke the Camel’s Back In Q4 2011, several Marret vehicles (those being MAR, MHY, and MMF) participated as a syndicate and provided Cline Mining Corp. (“Cline”) with $50 million of Senior Secured Bonds. Cline is a metallurgical coal exploration and production company, headquartered in Toronto, Ontario with its key asset, the New Elk Mine, located in Colorado. Cline focused on New Elk and brought it to production in December 2010, right at the beginning of a protracted downturn in global met coal markets. For context, met coal prices dropped from almost $330/ton to under $100/ton in 2014. By July 2012, Cline had largely suspended mining operations at New Elk in order to reduce costs. This suspension was intended to be temporary at the time, with the mine put on care-and-maintenance, in anticipation of an eventual recovery in met coal prices. The New Elk coal mine originally opened in 1951 and was operated by a number of owners until 1989, after which it lay dormant until acquisition by Cline. The mine has all necessary permits to mine and produce coal and to transport to nearby rail-loading facilities, as well as all environmental permits. This is important, as this is not a greenfield project, with development and execution risk. This mine has been operating for decades and has developed infrastructure nearby. Furthermore, Cline invested a significant amount of capital into the mine to bring it back to operating status, only to have met coal prices drop just as the mine made its first deliveries. In December 2014, Cline filed for CCAA protection (the Canadian equivalent of Chapter 11). At the time, the Marret group of funds were owed over $110 million in principal and accrued interest. All court materials can be found here: http://cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/cline/ In the Application Record, it was disclosed that Moelis & Co. was hired to run a sales process for Cline in April 2014, which was unsuccessful. The reasons given for the failure of the process was the low met coal price, negative outlook on steel at the time, and glut of met coal assets for sale including Cliffs Natural Resources, Patriot Coal, SunCoke Energy, Mechel OAO, Walter Energy, and James River Coal. Sparks to fly at Marret Shareholder meeting: “I will be there screaming” Despite the distress that Cline Mining faced, Marret Asset Management refused to take significant mark downs on the value of the debt that they held. In Q4 of 2014, after Cline had filed for CCAA protection, MAR, MHY, and MMF took just a ~25% write-down on the value of the Cline bonds it held. As a result of these aggressive manager marks, the street began to significantly doubt the NAV of MAR/MHY/MMF, taking down the trading prices of each of these entities, as shown below: Vehicle NAV/shr Share Price Discount to NAV Cline as % of NAV MMF 9.07 8.36 -8% 7.1% MAR 4.51 3.16 -30% 10.3% MHY 0.99 0.115 -88% 81.0% MHY traded at the biggest discount to NAV, given that 81% of its portfolio consisted of Cline Mining, and the remaining 19% consisted of Mobilicity bonds, a wireless new entrant that also filed for CCAA protection (and interestingly enough ended up with a full recovery upon a sale of the business to Telus). Heading into 2015 Annual General Meeting, shareholders of MAR were not happy: “What puzzles holders is that Cline has been delisted from the TSX for about 18 months, and is now in the process of going through a complicated restructuring. Determining fair value is a challenge. In a recent update, Marret said Cline “has sufficient liquidity to continue for at least two more years and Cline is looking at various avenues, including surplus equipment sales, to extend this period. But given the uncertainty, ‘the entire NAV of Cline should be written off,’ noted one holder, who also wants other changes, including a substantial issuer bid.” Excerpted from an article written in the Financial Post about this annual general meeting, anticipating screaming shareholders: http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/sparks-to-fly-at-marret-shareholder-meeting-i-will-be-there-screaming/wcm/ca55bbe9-7bc1-4414-9a1d-38699f31618a Outcome In April 2015, the Board of MAR announced that it was reviewing various alternatives to deal with the significant trading price discount to NAV and provide liquidity to shareholders. In June 2015, the Company proposed a plan to return capital to shareholders on two redemption dates. The first redemption date in July 2015 received $45mm of redemptions (approx. 51% of the shares outstanding). MAR underwent a second redemption event in October 2015 received another $18mm of redemptions. Over time, MAR, MHY, and MMF became orphaned stocks, with dwindling Net Asset Values and little to no interest. In July 2015, Cline Mining completed a CCAA plan of compromise and arrangement with a debt-for-equity swap. As a result, MAR, MHY, and MMI ended up owning 100% of the equity of Cline, with a significantly de-levered balance sheet. My estimate of the ownership interest in Cline Mining is as follows (based on their pre-petition ownership of the secured bonds): MMF: 5% MAR: 22% MHY: 73% Opportunity Today Today, MAR’s NAV is C$0.912/shr and it trades for C$0.395. MAR slowly transformed into a micro-cap stock, with very little liquidity and attracting no new investors. There are plenty of reasons not to pay MAR any attention: Lack of liquidity – the entire market cap of MAR is under C$7mm. Boring – the share price has done nothing for years. Negative stigma – MAR was tainted as an investment holding company with questions swirling around the manager’s mark on Cline. There was no compelling reason to get involved and take any accounting risk. (Note: the investment thesis is similar for MHY, which has a NAV of C$0.725/shr and trades for C$0.11, but is even less liquid with a total market cap of ~$2mm) This lack of investor attention and negative stigma, has created a very interesting investment opportunity with one of the most asymmetric return profiles I have ever seen. The lack of investor attention on MAR/MHY is particularly interesting in the context of current met coal prices. Unlike many futures traded commodities, met coal is priced off of contract settlements, mainly into China which is the world’s largest steel producer. These are hard to track unless you have access to Bloomberg data, but one can look at Teck Resource’s May 2017 investor presentation for a chart of historical met coal prices http://www.teck.com/media/20170516_BofAML-Conference.pdf If you look at page 54 of the Teck Resources slide deck, you will see that met coal prices have staged a significant comeback starting in the second half of 2016. In fact, benchmark prices were US$285/ton in Q1 2017. This was due to many factors including Cyclone Debbie which heavily impacted coal production and shipment in the Queensland state of Australia in March 2017. In fact, Chinese purchasers of coal turned to the US and other coal producing regions to fill the shortfall in supply in the aftermath of the cyclone (http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/04/after-cyclone-debbie-china-replaces-australian-coal-with-us-cargoes.html). Met coal prices have retraced from March 2017 levels, but spot prices are still above US$160/ton. NPV Analysis of New Elk Mine The New Elk Mine had a NI 43-101 feasibility study released in 2012, where the coal product was described as low-sulphur, medium-to-high fluidity, high vol B coking coal and deemed suitable for export. The only downside of the mine is that it is landlocked in Colorado, and thus receives a lower net price per ton after adjusting for trucking, rail, and ocean freight costs to reach end customers (typically in Asia). However, the DCF analysis within the NI 43-101 takes all of this into consideration. New Elk’s cost structure on a run-rate basis is as follows: On-site costs (mining, prep & loading, truck+rail) of US$40/ton Off-site costs (royalties, taxes, sales commission) of US$15/ton Ocean-freight differential of US$30/ton This gives a total operating cost of approximately US$85/ton, after which you should add on another US$10/ton for capex, taking breakeven benchmark met coal price to $US$100/ton (before cost of capital + time value of money considerations). Here’s where the math gets interesting: At a benchmark price of US$160/ton – New Elk has a NPV10 of C$0. At a benchmark price of US$165/ton – New Elk has a NPV10 of C$142mm. At a benchmark price of US$170/ton – New Elk has an NPV10 of C$288mm. At a benchmark price of US$200/ton – New Elk has an NPV10 of C$1.16 billion! See the below table for the corresponding share prices of MAR and MHY depending on the benchmark met coal price you pick: Entity US$150/ton $160/ton $165/ton $170/ton $200/ton MAR C$0.46/shr $0.46/shr $2.23/shr $4.04/shr $14.91/shr MHY C$0.01/shr $0.01/shr $2.82/shr $5.71/shr $23.00/shr Note that MAR has a floor price of C$0.46/shr, even if Cline Mining is worth zero because it holds C$0.32/shr in cash and C$0.14/shr in other liquid, publicly traded, high yield bonds. MHY on the other hand, owns significantly more of Cline Mining (estimated 73%), but holds practically nothing else of value which means that your downside is a loss of all capital. Here is the return profile from their current share prices: Entity US$150/ton $160/ton $165/ton $170/ton $200/ton MAR 17% 17% 465% 923% 3674% MHY -91% -91% 2468% 5089% 20811% Investors should note that MAR current trades (albeit very thinly) at C$0.395/shr, which is less than the value of the cash + liquid securities (excluding Cline) that it holds on hand. In other words, you are paying less than nothing for a met coal mine that is fully permitted, fully developed, was recently producing, and could be worth over a billion dollars! Marret is Actively Pursing Strategic Alternatives for Cline Here is an excerpt from MAR’s latest quarterly report: Cline Mining Update Metallurgical coal prices have been stable above $150/tonne and spiked again, well above $200, as Cyclone Debbie disrupted production in Australia for several weeks. There have been a couple of IPO’s of restructured coal companies, which indicates the sector can now attract equity capital. The Manager continues to explore the best long term solution for the Cline assets as the quality of the proposals are improving. There is concern about weak iron ore and steel prices in China, but so far met coal prices are solid. The Manager sees this resurgence in coal prices as a window of opportunity, and is actively pursuing solutions. Marret Asset Management would love more than anything to fetch a “good” price for Cline resulting in a “par recovery” for their initial bond investment, thus saving them face and allowing them to stand tall behind their dubious manager mark over the years. This single asset is preventing the liquidation of MAR and MHY. In the case of MAR, Marret Asset Management has stopped receiving fees on the remaining assets due to the issues around the marked value of Cline, so there is no incentive for them to hold on to this asset. Conclusion MAR and MHY are two stocks with the most interesting and asymmetric risk/reward profiles I have ever seen. The traded price of MAR is below net cash + liquidation value, and you get Cline Mining and the New Elk Mine for free. Based on current met coal prices, Cline could be worth over C$140mm. If the strength in met coal prices continues and it heads towards US$200/ton, Cline could be worth upwards of a billion dollars. The Marret investment vehicles are heading for wind up and are looking to sell their last illiquid investment. A large strategic can purchase Cline for a fraction of its NPV value and significantly add to their reserves/production without much cost. If this were to happen, an investor in Cline could receive many multiples of their invested capital Recently, new evidence of the resurgence of the met coal industry can be seen in an interesting article here: http://canAadafreepress.com/article/for-the-first-time-in-six-years-a-new-american-coal-mine-has-opened A new met coal mine has opened in the US, the first time in the last six years. Why develop a greenfield project, with all of the execution and development risk, when you can get New Elk Mine for free? I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy. I and/or others I advise hold a material investment in the issuer's securities. Catalyst MAR trades below net asset value of cash + liquid securities, plus you get a free option on the New Elk Mine. MAR's latest quarterly report states that there is "a window of opportunity" in pursuing strategic alternatives for the New Elk Mine. Realization of the NAV discount (excluding New Elk) gives a 17% return. Realization of any value for the New Elk Mine could result in multiples of your capital.

Thanks for this info sculpin. I like that GMP is using ~$200M for the Parq value. I had been optimistic it would be worth $120M. For an opening a week away looks like quite alot of outdoor work still going on. Hopefully they are ready to go on the 29th... http://skyscraperpage.com/forum/showthread.php?t=213941&page=33

And Parq opens next Friday... http://parqvancouver.com/ GMP's take... Parq Casino could be portfolio ace In our view, DC.A’s medium term performance largely depends on three core items: opening the Parq Casino, completing the sale of United Hydrocarbon (UHIC) assets and managing liquidity at the corporate level. In this report, we are taking a deeper dive into each of these three items. Parq Casino set for fall 2017 open The Parq Casino project in Vancouver remains on track for a fall 2017 open. Management projects Parq may generate $75-$100 million annual EBITDA with an estimated 12-month ramp up to full operations. We have performed a sensitivity analysis for the project using the EBITDA range, possible debt refinancing, and valuation multiples based on gaming peer comparables. Although our range is wide, we calculate DC.A’s 40% equity stake in the project may be worth ~$196 million at our midpoint assumptions. With ~$102 million carrying value, we see potential for a material win here, and the addition of a lasting, cash generating property to the investment portfolio. UHIC sale a positive outcome DC.A recently announced the sale of UHIC assets (DC.A ownership 85%) to Delonex Energy Ltd. for US$35 million cash on closing, US$50 million cash on first oil, and a royalty stream. The deal is subject to a number of conditions with uncertain timing including approval from the government of Chad. GMP is advising UHIC on the transaction. We see this announcement as positive for DC.A. Although our NAV was reduced, we believe the market may have been assigning near nil value to UHIC. Closing the deal would remove monthly cash requirements to maintain the property and add long run royalty potential. For now, our NAV conservatively reflects only the initial payment on closing. Maintain BUY – DREAM sale eases any liquidity concerns We continue to pay close attention to DC.A’s liquidity position. On May 19th, DC.A sold all remaining shares in DREAM Unlimited Corp. for net proceeds of $106 million. We calculate this brings DC.A’s net cash position at the corporate level to ~$57 million and offers management significant flexibility. We anticipate selective cash injections into existing investments, with an eye towards funding those most likely to reach profitability in the medium term. Our updated NAV is now $9.79 (previously $9.77). We apply a 20% discount to yield our price target of $8.00 (unchanged). We maintain our BUY rating.

Good to see this finally. From GMP....We see this announcement as positive for DC.A. Although our NAV was reduced, we believe the market may have been assigning near nil value to UHIC. Closing the deal would remove monthly cash requirements to maintain the property and add long run royalty potential. Dundee Corporation and United Hydrocarbon International Corp. Announce Closing of Transaction With Delonex Energy Limited TORONTO, ONTARIO--(Marketwired - Sept. 22, 2017) - Dundee Corporation ("Dundee") (TSX:DC.A) and its subsidiary, United Hydrocarbon International Corp. (the "Company" or "United"), are pleased to announce that United has closed its previously announced transaction (the "Transaction") with Delonex Energy Limited ("Delonex"). The Company and Delonex have satisfied or waived all the conditions precedent under the Share Purchase Agreement dated May 10, 2017, as amended (the "SPA"), including all board, shareholder and regulatory approvals. The Transaction is for Delonex to acquire United's indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary, United Hydrocarbon Chad Ltd. ("UHCL"), which holds the Company's May 2, 2012 Production Sharing Contract, as amended (the "PSC"). Delonex paid US$35 million on the closing of the Transaction (subject to applicable escrow and holdback requirements), and will pay an additional US$50 million if first oil is achieved, including US$20 million for first oil at Doba and US$30 million for first oil at Block H. United will retain a royalty of 10 per cent on Doba production and a 5 per cent royalty on Block H production, payable unless the average price of Brent Crude oil is less than US$45 for a quarter. Delonex has committed US$65 million in funding within two years of the closing date for a comprehensive exploration program for the assets in Chad, and, subject to commerciality being achieved, a further US$35 million for development in Doba. The exploration program will include 2D and 3D seismic programs and three exploration wells, representing a significant increase in activity when compared to UHCL's current obligations. United estimates that following closing of the Transaction and payment of all outstanding debts, expenses and other obligations of the Company, including repayment to Dundee of CAD$5.1 million, United will retain approximately CAD$14 million for working capital purposes, not including escrow amounts. United's President and Chief Executive Officer, Gabriel Ollivier, commented as follows: "The Transaction is very encouraging for United's shareholders as it grants us sustained material exposure to the potential of our blocks without having to raise additional capital." David Goodman, Chairman of the board of directors of the Company, added: "We are very pleased with the Transaction as it gives shareholders the opportunity to realize a significant return on their investment once commerciality is achieved." GMP FirstEnergy acted as financial advisor to United. ABOUT DUNDEE CORPORATION Dundee Corporation is a public Canadian independent holding company, listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol "DC.A". Through its operating subsidiaries, Dundee is engaged in diverse business activities in the areas of investment advisory, corporate finance, energy, resources, agriculture, real estate and infrastructure. Dundee also holds, directly and indirectly, a portfolio of investments mostly in these key areas, as well as other select investments in both publicly listed and private enterprises. ABOUT DELONEX ENERGY LIMITED Delonex Energy Limited is a Sub-Saharan oil and gas company focused on exploration, development and production. Delonex is currently active in Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique and the Transaction in Chad is part of the company's strategy for expanding its portfolio in Central & West Africa. Delonex is led by a management team with a proven track record in discovering, developing and operating world-class onshore basins and building and operating pipeline infrastructure. Their core leadership team previously worked together at Cairn India, where they established a recoverable resource base of 1.2 billion barrels of oil onshore in Rajasthan, India, with plateau production of c. 200,000 barrels of oil per day. They also managed the successful financing and execution of integrated upstream and midstream development projects with a combined capital spend of over US$4 billion. The projects included development wells, processing facilities and the world's longest (c. 700 km) continuously heated and insulated oil pipeline with an export terminal. Delonex is backed by a group of global investors with extensive oil & gas experience, led by global private equity firm Warburg Pincus and the International Finance Corporation (a part of the World Bank group).

Parq articles... http://vegasseven.com/2017/08/17/parq-to-the-future/ https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-07/parq-vancouver-preview-bringing-vegas-flair-to-a-business-hotel

Bought more Dundee common @ $2.64

Any investment whether public or private is not seen as cash or fully liquid until it is sold. This was case with DC & Dream. Now its sale has allowed them to repay all bank debt, fund some needed liquidity into Parq completion and given them about $40mm cash liquidity on the balance sheet to fund operations for the next year or so.

Blue Goose has significant land position that is most likely not fully reflected in the value of this asset. Especially now that it is growing and becoming operationally profitable.... Blue Goose owns over 45,000 acres of farm land in British Columbia, and is a recognized consumer brand with beef, chicken, and fish products distributed to over 640 retail locations across Canada, making Blue Goose well-positioned to capitalize on the high-growth organic food market. From the conference call... Well our land is appreciated nicely in value so we've been very happy with the investment. And it's used primarily to graze the cattle up and house the cattle operations in BC. We've had appraisal done of it which value at approximately $100 million. In the future, I mean we're looking actively at all of our businesses to evaluate what they're worth and what our best strategic opportunity is in accessing liquidity and maximizing the value of the underlying investments. So we would absolutely look at anything in that regard.

From GMP this morning.... Dundee Corporation1 BUY DC.A-TSX Last: C$2.76 August 14, 2017 Target: C$8.00 Q2/17 - UHIC sale progressing Undiscounted NAV $9.39 Dundee Corp. (DC.A-TSX) reported Q2/17 results on August 10th after the market close. Our NAV of $9.39 versus $9.79 previously, was slightly lower q/q largely due to a decline in the publicly traded investment portfolio. The discount to NAV remains wide at ~70%. We believe that some investors may be applying deep discounts to the private investments. UHIC sale may close in Q3 The sale of UHIC assets continues to progress. In July, regulatory approvals for the transaction were approved from the Republic of Chad and UHIC shareholders. Certain other conditions are still required, including an extension from the Republic of Chad to the exploration period. Management now expects the transaction to close in the third quarter with an outside date by year end. GMP is advising on the UHIC transaction. In our view, this possibility of earlier closing than originally expected is positive for DC.A from a liquidity perspective. We assume the deal will close, but conservatively include only the initial US$35 million payment in our NAV (US$9.5mm to be held in escrow for three years). Payment on achievement of first oil (US$50 million) could add ~$1 to our NAV, plus an ongoing royalty. Maintain BUY – liquidity position much improved In our view, the DREAM sale has left the liquidity situation much improved. Net cash at the corporate level was ~$46 million exiting the quarter. With the debt paid down, annual corporate level cash needs (interest, dividends, op. expenses) are now ~$33 million. We believe this may be reduced in the coming quarters. Subsequent to the end of the quarter, DC advanced $5 million (along with $5 million from partners and $27.5 million additional debt) to fund any cost overruns and initial working capital requirements for the Parq Casino, which remains on track for a fall 2017 opening. Blue Goose also delivered a strengthened quarter of operating results. Exiting the quarter, our NAV is now $9.39 (previously $9.79). The only material change to our NAV was the decline in public investments. The discount to NAV remains wide at ~70%. We apply a 20% discount to yield our price target of $8.00 (unchanged). We maintain our BUY rating. Please see Figure 1 for our NAV sensitivity analysis.

http://www.intrepidcapitalfunds.com/media/pdfs/fsb0.nschmidt.xf00.193745.endurance_fund_commentary.pdf "In our Dundee mea culpa in last quarter’s letter, we wrote: “We have urged management to sell Dundee’s public investments to pay off bank debt and preferred stock, which would reduce cash burn by half. If the company then catches a break on one of its major private investments, it could mark a turning point for the company’s fortunes.” On May 10th, Dundee announced that Delonex Energy will acquire United Hydrocarbon (UHIC), Dundee’s Chad energy venture/money pit. Delonex offered $35 million at close, another $50 million when first oil is achieved, and ongoing royalties ranging from 5%-10% of production unless Brent prices fall below $45 per barrel. Dundee has been spending $12 million per year to maintain UHIC while seeking an investor, and this cash drain will disappear upon a sale. It’s not a done deal, as Dundee is currently in negotiations with the Government of Chad to renew its Production Sharing Contract. On May 19th, Dundee sold its entire remaining stake in DREAM Unlimited for CAD $106 million. The proceeds will likely be used to pay down bank debt. The sales of UHIC and the DREAM shares were exactly the type of positive catalysts we were seeking. The market has clearly shrugged, since Dundee’s shares are back down to all-time lows. Canadian small caps have traded weak this year, which could be a factor, but we think investors will need confirmation that the Delonex transaction closes before they bid up Dundee’s shares."

Significant selling pressure over the last year has seen DC.A recently hit a new low of $2.58 in the last week. Looks like much of the selling has come out of the outspoken Murray Stahl from Horizon Kinetics who had sold a whopping 2mm shares up until the end of January 2017. I am sure it is their continued sales from the remaining 3 million that is in part responsible to have pounded the share price down to below $3. Net Increase or decrease in the number or principal amount of securities, and in the eligible institutional investor’s securityholding percentage in the class of securities, since the last report filed by the eligible institutional investor under Part 4 of the early warning requirements: There has been a net decrease of 2,078,845shares or -3.75% in the security holding percentage of Horizon Kinetics LLC (“Horizon Kinetics”) with respect to the Class A shares of Dundee Corporation (“Dundee Class A Shares”) since the last report filed under Part 4 of National Instrument 62-103. 5. Designation and number or principal amount of securities and the eligible institutional investor’s securityholding percentage in the class of securities at the end of the month for which the report is made: Horizon Kinetics, through mutual funds, pooled funds and private client managed accounts for which its subsidiary asset managers, Kinetics Asset Management LLC and Horizon Asset Management LLC (together, the “Firms”), provide portfolio management services, exercises control or direction over 3,132,703 Dundee Class A Shares (or approximately 5.64% of the outstanding Dundee Class A Shares), as of January 31, 2017.

Liquidity.... DUNDEE CORPORATION SELLS SHARES IN DREAM UNLIMITED CORP. Dundee Corp. has sold 15,536,288 Class A subordinate voting shares of Dream Unlimited Corp. at a price of $6.85 per share for aggregate proceeds, net of associated costs, of approximately $106.1-million.

GMP on..... Dundee Corporation1 BUY DC.A-TSX Last: C$3.83 May 15, 2017 ▼ Target: C$8.00 UHIC sale provides cash, royalty potential Dundee Corp. (DC.A-TSX) reported Q1/17 results on May 11 th after the market close. Prior to the quarter, DC.A also announced the sale of UHIC assets to Delonex Energy Ltd. in exchange for US$35 million cash on closing, US$50 million cash on first oil, and a royalty stream. DC.A owns 85% of UHIC’s equity. Delonex is a Sub-Saharan oil and gas company focused on exploration, development and production and is currently active in Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique. The deal is subject to a number of conditions including approval from the government of Chad. DC.A management believes the timeline for this approval is uncertain. In our view, this announcement is positive for DC.A. Although our NAV is reduced, we believe the market may have been assigning near nil value to the UHIC investment. We believe the cash payable on closing would help ease any liquidity concerns for DC.A. Our UHIC NAV contribution (previously based on management’s carrying value) is reduced by ~$2.60. We assume the deal will close, but conservatively include only the initial US$35 million payment in our NAV. Payment on achievement of first oil (US$50 million) would add ~$1.00 to our NAV, plus an ongoing royalty. Liquidity remains tight We believe DC.A continues to manage a tight liquidity situation. The existing $80 million credit facility has been replaced by a 365-day revolving term credit facility with a Canadian Schedule I Chartered Bank for up to $80 million, which offers some near term certainty on the corporate debt. Corporate debt ended Q1/17 at $61 million and currently stands at $49 million after certain asset sales post quarter. We believe further asset sales of the liquid public investments remain possible for annual corporate level cash needs (interest, dividends, op. expenses) of ~$36 million. Maintain BUY – Parq casino remains on track Exiting the quarter, our NAV is now $9.77 (previously $12.49). There were no material changes in our NAV other than UHIC. The Parq Casino Resort project in Vancouver (Paragon Holdings) remains on track to be completed and operational by the fall of 2017. Despite the decline, the discount to NAV remains wide at ~61%. We apply a 20% discount to yield our price target of $8.00 (previously $10.00). We maintain our BUY rating. Please see Figure 1 for our NAV sensitivity analysis.

Surprised these knuckleheads don't own preferred like I assume rest of us do. much better risk/reward than common imo. Actually have bought large amount of the common between $2.85 and $4. Believe valuation here is now very compelling with caveats of a gradual upturn in resource markets & successful completion of real estate projects over the next year.

Commentary from the Intrepid Endurance Fund Q1... The top detractors from Q1 performance were Dundee Corp. (ticker: DC/A CN), Syntel (ticker: SYNT), and Primero Mining’s 5.75% Convertible Notes (CUSIP: 74164WAB2). Dundee’s performance has been abysmal, and that comment doesn’t just apply to the stock. The company is involved in many different ventures, but almost nothing has worked out. We attribute at least half of the unfavorable outcomes to poor decisions by management and the rest to bad luck. Hindsight is 20/20, and our involvement in Dundee came from trying too hard to find value in an over-picked market. Our fair value for the stock is based on asset value, in contrast to our typical discounted free cash flow valuation. We felt comfortable with this approach because the assets were originally anchored by publicly-traded equities that seemed reasonably valued to us on inspection. Dundee’s cash flow has been negative as the team attempted to nurture a basket of various nascent businesses into self-sustaining enterprises. It hasn’t worked. We had chances to revisit the investment as the situation changed and decent investments were exchanged for speculative ones. The mistake is on me, your Portfolio Manager. We have not added to the holding in over a year and reduced our position last summer at better prices—a small victory in an otherwise dreadful investment. So where do we go from here? Dundee is a $3.50 stock with $12.25 of book value. That book value continues to decline as the company’s portfolio is not generating cash flow but Dundee is incurring corporate overhead and financing costs. Right now the market is implying that every single private company Dundee manages is worth nothing, plus that the business burns cash at the current rate for another three years. We have urged management to sell Dundee’s public investments to pay off bank debt and preferred stock, which would reduce cash burn by half. If the company then catches a break on one of its major private investments, it could mark a turning point for the company’s fortunes. We’re not holding our breath but aren’t yet inclined to sell Dundee at today’s prices. The Fund’s weight in Dundee is approximately 1%, so its impact on performance going forward should be more limited. http://www.intrepidcapitalfunds.com/media/pdfs/1q17-intrepid-endurance-commentary-final-approved.PDF