PlanMaestro

Indeed, swimming in liquidity. If officials do not let them charge for those deposits at least pay down expensive liabilities.

When facts change ... it still confuses me that the latest Q revenues were down across all segments not just consumer.

I still don't think DELL is really cheap. It's fair to slightly undervalued in my mind based on its ability to grow its cash flows, and the lack of competitive advantages. Cheers! « Last Edit: May 22, 2012, 03:19:03 PM by Parsad » ???

Uri Geller http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9w7jHYriFo&feature=player_embedded#!

Europe, USA, the world. http://video.ft.com/v/1680563472001/Brookfield-sees-value-in-Europe

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3b9e6de-b1b1-11e1-bbf9-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1xFObSYow On Monday, Berkshire filed a petition calling for an impartial examiner to investigate transactions before ResCap’s bankruptcy filing, whose net effect, Berkshire said, “was to transfer a substantial share of ResCap’s operating assets to [Ally]”. In the next two days, Berkshire sold some of its bonds, according to a filing on Friday. Ted Weschsler, a Berkshire investment manager who had filed a petition in support of the call for the independent examiner on Monday, wrote in a filing on Thursday: “I have been informed that on June 5 and 6 2012, Berkshire executed trades and sold its holdings of unsecured bonds issued by Residential Capital.” Berkshire continues to hold more than 40 per cent of ResCap’s junior secured bonds, the latest filing stated. Berkshire did not immediately reply to requests for comment. Mr Weschsler could not be contacted. It was not clear from the latest filing whether Mr Weschsler was party to the decision to dispose of the bonds.

The Financial Times interviews Philip Hampton, chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland. http://video.ft.com/v/1680563473001/RBS-chairman-most-troubled-by-Ireland

That is the holdco site, check instead all these local links: http://lee.net/newspapers/

Watching it at the moment... thanks!

This was known already, I think he got the shares in the reestructuring. LEE is a very interesting company and has managed to defend revenues and increase their internet business better that their peers in big cities. Lots of debt though, that is why I think Buffett bought higher in the capital structure. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577338070658967732.html

This bankruptcy proceeding is interesting in several dimensions (monoline insurers, Buffett, BAC, ..) Buffett spars with DC over $1B+ ResCap debt http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/the_chill_is_on_hCgOX8XvhChBwuu962NEhJ Exhibit A is the unusually hostile tack Buffett took with the Obama administration this week when he asked a judge to allow an independent probe of the deals worked out between the government-owned Ally Financial and its bankrupt ResCap unit. The deals had been OK’d by Obama’s Treasury Department. But Buffett’s request was tossed aside yesterday when Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn ruled in favor of a competing request — from ResCap’s creditors’ committee. The committee wants to look at the deals. Buffett presumably believes that fellow unsecured committee members, like monoline insurers who have reached settlements with ResCap, are biased and wanted a second probe. ResCap seeks to release Ally from claims. “The fact [Judge Glenn] approved the committee today was quite bad for Buffett,” a source close to the case said. “I would have to imagine the probability of him getting an independent examiner just fell.” A second source close to the case said, “The judge just basically told Buffett to take a hike.” Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway owns $900 million in ResCap secured debt, of which it will get paid at face value, plus $500 million of unsecured debt that is now likely worth less than 10 cents on the dollar. Buffett likely paid between 20 and 50 cents on the dollar for those bonds, the source said. The Oracle of Omaha’s objection went against his typical style. He makes a point of not buying companies in hostile bids, and is also not known for challenging bankruptcies. “What he was trying to do was get more ammunition for a lawsuit,” the second source said. “I do not think the fight is over.” Buffett, too, in his objection did not complain about the sale of assets to Fortress Investment Group, leading two sources to believe he was not interested in buying ResCap.

Exactly! But we have to say that their opacity made the 2008 uncertainty even worse ... and provided some incredible opportunities (ie: CRE mREIT prefs) that I wish I had noticed sooner.

Any news specific to BAC?

From the comments, Iron Ore cost curve. http://ge.tt/1jsMYcI/v/0?c

Good primer on the coal industry from another thread http://www.scribd.com/doc/76707721/Coal-Industry-Primer

This primer on the Life Insurance industry posted on another thread is very good. http://www.scribd.com/doc/85940042/JPM-Insurance-Primer

If the politics weren't so damaging ... this arbitrage is so obvious.

How lucky we are to have had Martin Wolf as the Financial Times economics columnist over the last decade. A lonely sane and courageous voice. And now he is trying to be emphatic ... http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4fe89d8c-a8df-11e1-b085-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1wmjFXRZN Now turn to the second issue: how does Germany want the eurozone to be organised? This is how I understand the views of the German government and monetary authorities: no eurozone bonds; no increase in funds available to the European Stability Mechanism (currently €500bn); no common backing for the banking system; no deviation from fiscal austerity, including in Germany itself; no monetary financing of governments; no relaxation of eurozone monetary policy; and no powerful credit boom in Germany. The creditor country, in whose hands power in a crisis lies, is saying “nein” at least seven times. How, I wonder, do Germany’s policy makers imagine they will halt the eurozone’s doom loop? I have two hypotheses. The first is that they believe they will not. They expect that life for some of the vulnerable economies will become so miserable that they will leave voluntarily, thereby reducing the eurozone to a like-minded core, and lowering risks to Germany’s own monetary and fiscal stability from any pressure to rescue the weak economies. The second hypothesis is that the Germans really think these policies could work. One possibility is that the weaker countries would have so big an “internal devaluation” that they would move into large external surpluses with the rest of the world, thereby restoring economic activity. Another possibility is that a combination of radical structural reforms with a fire sale of assets would draw a wave of inward direct investment. That could finance the current-account deficit in the short run, and generate new economic activity in the longer run. Maybe German policy makers believe that it will be either harsh adjustment or swift departure. But “moral hazard” would at least be contained and Germany’s exposure capped, whatever the outcome. Yet the “exit of the weak” option looks very risky and the “painful adjustment and fire-sale” option so implausible as to lead swiftly back to exit. The danger, moreover, is not just to the weaker countries. Germany sends just 5 per cent of its exports to China, compared with 42 per cent to the rest of the eurozone, much of which would be disrupted by a meltdown. What has already happened has weakened its export-dependent economy: German GDP was only 1 per cent higher in the first quarter of 2012 than four years earlier. Beyond these narrowly economic dangers from damage to the “irrevocable” union would surely lie an enduring political disaster for the eurozone’s economic hegemon. In brief, the eurozone is now on a journey towards break-up that Germany shows little will to alter. This is not because alternatives are inconceivable. What is needed is to turn some of the Nos into Yeses: more financing, ideally via some sort of eurozone bond; collective backing of banks; less fiscal contraction; more expansionary monetary policies; and stronger German demand. Such shifts would not guarantee success. But they would give the eurozone at least a chance of avoiding the cost of partial or total break-up. To work in the long run, such shifts would also require greater political integration. In October 1939, Winston Churchill said: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” The key in Europe today is Germany’s perception of its national interest. Once it becomes evident that their conditions will not work, German leaders will have to choose between a shipwreck and a change in course. I do not know which Germany will choose. I do not know whether its leaders know. But on that choice hangs the fate of Europe.

Finished it today, truly amazing. The examples are so good that I will have to watch it again. But now I have a problem ... Mrs wants more hehehe. Any more suggestions Txlaw?

George Soros tries his best to be sympathetic and persuasive. http://www.georgesoros.com/interviews-speeches/entry/remarks_at_the_festival_of_economics_trento_italy/ But the likelihood is that the euro will survive because a breakup would be devastating not only for the periphery but also for Germany. It would leave Germany with large unenforceable claims against the periphery countries. The Bundesbank alone will have over a trillion euros of claims arising out of Target2 by the end of this year, in addition to all the intergovernmental obligations. And a return to the Deutschemark would likely price Germany out of its export markets – not to mention the political consequences. So Germany is likely to do what is necessary to preserve the euro – but nothing more. That would result in a eurozone dominated by Germany in which the divergence between the creditor and debtor countries would continue to widen and the periphery would turn into permanently depressed areas in need of constant transfer of payments. That would turn the European Union into something very different from what it was when it was a “fantastic object” that fired peoples imagination. It would be a German empire with the periphery as the hinterland. I believe most of us would find that objectionable but I have a great deal of sympathy with Germany in its present predicament. The German public cannot understand why a policy of structural reforms and fiscal austerity that worked for Germany a decade ago will not work Europe today. Germany then could enjoy an export led recovery but the eurozone today is caught in a deflationary debt trap. The German public does not see any deflation at home; on the contrary, wages are rising and there are vacancies for skilled jobs which are eagerly snapped up by immigrants from other European countries. Reluctance to invest abroad and the influx of flight capital are fueling a real estate boom. Exports may be slowing but employment is still rising. In these circumstances it would require an extraordinary effort by the German government to convince the German public to embrace the extraordinary measures that would be necessary to reverse the current trend. And they have only a three months’ window in which to do it. We need to do whatever we can to convince Germany to show leadership and preserve the European Union as the fantastic object that it used to be. The future of Europe depends on it.

You guys are fantastic. Hat tip.

Just watched the first two episodes with Mrs and we both loved it. That does not happen too often. Thanks!

Just a reminder of all the recent purchases, that never were really integrated. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409004577156881098606546.html#project%3DBOFA011312%26articleTabs%3Dinteractive NationsBank 43B 1998 FleetBoston 47B 2004 MBNA 35B 2005 LaSalle 21B 2007 US Trust 3B 2007 Countrywide 4B 2008 Merril Lynch 19B 2009

Vinod, have you seen any report on this?

Mundell's impossible trinity: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_trinity