A_Hamilton

Does anybody know what all of the Long Total Return Swap positions are in? I've got the 3 pieces reported in the ORH insurance filing. KFT, USB and WFC at notional values of 150 million, 150 million, and 243 million, however, this only adds up to ~$550 million. The 3rd quarter interim report said that there were $1.13 billion of notional TR swaps on a long basis. What's the other $550 million? Additionally, have there been any indications of what the single name total return swap shorts (not the indices) are ($518 million short; these had to have hurt in the quarter)? Thank you. AHamilton

Why do you all keep referencing a mutual fund? Looks like Ravi is trying to start an unregistered hedge fund. I'd be interested to hear what others think, but a New York firm giving you a relatively standard partnership document would charge $40,000. Though you are also going to have to figure out whether you need an administrator, and you'll need an auditor and tax accountant. If your $1 million is coming from family/friends you may be able to get off the ground with a simple partnership agreement for a few thousand $$$, and forego the auditor, administrator.

One item to think about, in my mind, on V and MA is that the companies are needed by the governments in emerging market countries because electronic transactions create records which stop the underreporting of taxes, sales and otherwise...so many EM governments are actually very happy to allow these guys to run at large margins (likely until penetration rates are extremely high, then they will get whacked like in the U.S.). Very big cash flow generation will come from these markets for these guys going forward and the market is probably overly focused on their U.S. issues...

Thanks for the shout out, Barminov. I love that the government continues to fail to clamp down on large swap transactions that are wholly unnecessary...great for Fairfax (and hedge fund community), but would hate to find out which bank isn't hedging its position properly in these...

I'm really floored at people's reaction to my comment that mid-teens (or 15% returns as I stated originally) return expectations seem "silly" for a large money manager like Longleaf who has $25+ billion under management. Now, I realize the past decade was a tough one, but to put into perspective how difficult this feat has been over the past decade, exactly 1 manager in Morningstar's list of All US Diversified Stock Funds (3325 funds) with a 10 year history has a return greater than 15%- CGM Focus (17.39%). The average return is 2.39%, and as we all know, there is survivorship bias in 10 year fund numbers. I know a lot of people on this board have put up fantastic returns in their PAs, but between market impact in trading, institutionalization of purchase and sell decisions, skid from the delays due to the instiutionalization of idea flow, etc, these types of returns are just fantastical as a return expectation for a large money manager, especially when the market is trading at or above its historical averages as it appears to be today. They come out with this as their Q1 2009 letter, "Ok," but today? Ain't gonna' happen.

Was the RIMM holding previously disclosed?

"We believe mid-teen returns are acheivable based solely on the metrics of the businesses we own." That's where the 15% business comes in. Additionally, when FFH is 91% hedged and Longleaf is claiming "mid-teens" returns are possible from here, someone is going to be wrong. I happen to trust FFH's analysis of the situation, and so just have no idea where they expect 15% returns to come from in a long only portfolio of equities.

This letter is just silly. 15% (mid-teens) returns on their portfolios going forward with a current $25 billion under management?!? Delusions of grandeur.

So per Bloomberg five year FFH debt trades at a 6.4% YTM maturity (when it trades which is a few times a month)...so 2.1% (5 yr canadian treas) + 2.85% seems cheap (even when tax effecting the dividend v. interest payments), especially since FFH has the option to let this remain outstanding. My questions would be 1.) Why do they keep parceling this out rather than doing one big issue?, and 2.) if FFH thinks low rates are here to stay why not just issue prefs at 3month LIBOR (I don't know what the canadian equivalent is) plus a spread (which is what was just called away at ORH)...

Investor is a really bad example, since they are hardly even actively managing their portfolio. Even if you would argue that they do, they are still overpaying their corrupt executives for making the "active" decision of holding on to companies of which they have been the majority shareholder for decades. I'm actually quite disgusted by Investor and the Wallenberg heirs. I don't know that I necessarily agree that it is such a "really bad example," of a company that invests where its sees the best opportunities. The company has to manage its cash flow each year, choose whether it is going to invest in its holding companies, retain capital, etc., and the fact is, even if their execs are overpaid (name 10 execs who aren't today), the returns over time speak for themselves (See the attached chart of preformance versus the S&P 500). I'm not saying invest in any price, but it is a Holding Co. that invests in several different industries and that has beat the market over time.

Groupe Bruxelles Lambert/Pargesa/Power Corp of Canada Investor AB Jardine Matheson Oresund Investment AB Kinnesik I'm sure we can get a larger list going...

I think its a foregone conclusion that all of the ORH preferreds will be called. Odyssey paid $3.5 million to alter their bond indentures so that they don't have to make SEC filings to be in compliance with their bonds, and can instead make their NAIC filings available to bondholders free of charge. Plus, as has been said here, there is cheaper money available. $80 million to call both series of pref's will in no way break the bank given the level of capital at ORH right now. They can call whenever they want, but they need to give 30 days notice...so if they want the call to take effect at the time the next divi is due, they will need to call by Sept. 20th....

Most sell-side research won't give you the long term historicals you are looking for...most models only go back 2 or 3 years as everything they do is forward looking. If you are trying to normalize historical spreads and margins you are much better off with a VL tear sheet or an S&P Outlook tear sheet. Only other quality way to get this info. is through Bloomberg/Capital IQ/Factset...but those are expensive, and still have errors (but at least there is heavy support behind those products to fix any errors that you discover).

Just a note, but if you are going to buy TM, you are better off buying TYIDF, which is TM's parent. You'll pick up their forklift subsidiary for free, on top of your exposure to TM.

I think Berkowitz is looking at C and thinking a few things: 1.) If C earns a 1% ROA going forward, we are talking about $19 billion of net income annually (on current $1.9 trillion b/s), or, ~$0.65 per share...so at today's $3.30 per share you are paying 5x normalized earnings. 2.) The company is overcapitalized and could write down $20 billion tomorrow and you'd still be an owner at below tangible book. 3.) The company is over reserved with reserves to NPA's of 112%. 4.) If the government pushes the banking industry to create more plain vanilla products, the biggest banks will be the biggest beneficiaries as economies of scale will be more important than they've ever been. 5.) The question that I would have for Berkowitz is how much more does he think C will have to shrink the balance sheet? Any thoughts?