The lack of moat for market makers is partially because it is a secondary business for most of their competitors which provides benefits for their primary business and is not forced to stand alone.
In the case of the large investment banks (Citi, Morgan Stanley, Goldman, BAC, etc.), there are multiple benefits:
1. For firms that they have a prime broker relationship with (hedge funds, buy side, prop, etc) they will often stipulate that as part of their prime brokerage agreement the firm is obligated to send their firm through the investment banks infrastructure / market maker and if they chose to route to a different firm they will have to pay additional fees.
2. All of these firms have a substantial amount of "captive" order flow that originates from their retail broker and wealth management arms. Their market maker division gets exclusive rights to this.
3. They view it as a service they are expected to offer as part of an overall relationship with large customers. Not having this capability could be viewed as a negative when pitching large potential clients.
The second set of firms that often end up with market making firms are HFT/Prop firms (Wolverine, Two Sigma, Getco before Knight merger). In this case, these firms are already active on the major exchanges running their own HFT algos and trading their own accounts. At some point, they realize that by virtue of being a successful HFT they have created the vast majority of the infrastructure required to be a market maker for client flow and since the majority of the infrastructure can be shared any additional revenue they generate from attracting client order flow will offset the increasingly large costs of maintaining an up to date infrastructure. Furthermore, the idea of having some diversification from prop trading which is heavily dependent on volatility and volumes is extremely attractive. The interesting thing is that most firms don't move in this direction until their HFT profits have peaked because retail market making is far, far less profitable than successful prop trading.
The final problem these firms face is that all of their clients have relationships and connections with multiple of their competitors so in the case where a firm does get into trouble, their clients completely abandon them w/in hours. This is what happened with Knight during their blowup. In the couple days between the event and the announcement of the new investor buy-in, the majority of their clients had ceased to send _any_ orders to them. Why would they take even a modicum of risk when they can receive the exact same product at multiple other firms who did not have that same level of risk?
Thanks a lot for the explanation. Really great insight. I will keep it in mind. Sorry I am a little uninformed, but isn't the Volcker rule going to force the big banks out of this business?