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Here's something from the Philadelphia Fed on TRUP and TRUP CDOs. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-22.pdf I'm sure Fabozzi also has descriptions in his books which google probably lets you read parts of.

No sign of such selling activity in the SEC filings or SEDI here: http://www.canadianinsider.com/node/7?ticker=FFH

I personally wouldn't get too excited yet. I haven't followed the RIM story (or the RIM thread on this board) much, but does any of this price-action matter before it becomes clear whether the BB10 will sink or swim? As a distant observer, that seems to be make or break for the company. I guess it also depends on what the patents etc could reasonable be sold for (floor worst-case liquidation situation), which I have no clue. There is actually lots of reasons to get excited it is not just RIMM that has been adding alpha. This has been the best month for FFH since they put on the S&P hedges as far as their equity portfolio is concerned. LVLT RFP RIMM Bank of Ireland. FFH has targeted a 15% return but warned that the returns would be lumpy being dumped from the index created an entry point and a turnaround in many of FFH positions have being like gasoline poured on the fire Insurance stocks in general have caught a bid as of late. Agreed (I doubled my position in Fairfax last quarter). I'm just reserving any mental fist pumps on the specific RIM situation for later.

I personally wouldn't get too excited yet. I haven't followed the RIM story (or the RIM thread on this board) much, but does any of this price-action matter before it becomes clear whether the BB10 will sink or swim? As a distant observer, that seems to be make or break for the company. I guess it also depends on what the patents etc could reasonable be sold for (floor worst-case liquidation situation), which I have no clue.

You've already noted BRK on your list, but I'll put in another plug anyway - I don't think it's too far fetched to think of BRK as an "index fund" that (with a little insurance leverage) has been hand-picked by arguably the greatest investor that ever lived, and moreover is trading near prices that that same investor is a buyer at. Not that it will give specific fund advice, but if your friends/family haven't read it already, they might find Graham's discussion of "defensive investors" in the Intelligent Investor (chapter 5) useful.

This is a pretty good read. A breakup of the Banks could potentially be quite good for shareholders (he sort of implies a breakup, but I guess doesn't say this quite so explicitly). If my memory is right, Rockefeller didn't get really really rich (in the marketable sense) until Standard Oil was broken up by regulators. Maybe the dynamic of the Banking industry would be different though, depending on how many supposed synergies/economies of scale truly exist. It's interesting in my view that even Fisher, who is apparently outspoken, doesn't touch executive compensation. I think adjustments to this could be more effective than, or at least compliment, incentives from "removing" federal support for shadow banking activities.

I've been a little puzzled by Basel 2.5 and 3. It doesn't seem to solve the weakest link problem to me, but has added huge additional costs to the financial system. Based on my understanding, all the calculations focus on first order exposures and say nothing about exposures between counterparties. So an individual Bank's exposure numbers assumes that the rest of the cast of characters behave themselves, and of course the small detail of whether the calculations are up to the task of managing even the first order risks. So to me, it seems a big presumption that if everyone individually manages exposures with these IMM models, then the system as a whole will be okay. I think it's important to note too, that probably all the models are basically the same, and use very similar data - so they may all have the same blindspot(s) that folks are currently unaware of (but will be fixed in Basel 4). The Fed or other regulators must try to amalgamate this data somehow; I’d be interested to know how they use it. It’s easy to knock the method, but of course harder to come up with alternatives. Probably the Fed etc already do this, but I’d be more inclined to run a dozen or so much simpler jump-to-default type scenarios to get the top-of-the-house look.

For sure, branded CPG goods are basically thew same as Coke Might add CHD and CLX to the strong branded products list (though CLX is a little more heavily levered).

I was curious if any one has attended or regularly attends the NYC Junto meetings (http://nycjunto.org/)? The very public nature of this one seems contrary to Franklin's original concept/ambition, and they appear to have a very libertarian bent. But it looks like it could be interesting.

A disappointing +8% this year for me. A fairly concentrated portfolio (4-6 positions this year including cash) that is now mostly BRK-B and FRFHF with a smaller position in ZINC and around 15% cash. All the best for 2013!

I've also found wikinvest.com to be pretty simple and good. It also has a decent ipad app. One minor annoyance (aside from the credentials issue compoundinglife noted) is that it ignores dividends in the benchmark returns it provides (S&P and DJIA). Not a lot of dividends in my portfolio so it's hard to tell, but I think it accounts for dividends in the portfolio return as this matches my own time-weighted return calc pretty closely. Unless they've been making updates, I would steer clear of Mint for investment tracking purposes.

brk has been tracking the s & p ever since the "announcement". if you want this trade to work, better hope the index doesn't go down. what buffett did by buying back a tiny amount of stock was to signal to buyers that the stock is a trading a bit cheaper than it should be. and if you look at a 3mo chart vs. the 500 index you will see that he accomplished his mission. I don't think this should be of concern, unless you have derivatives with nearby expiries or plan to sell shares in the near term.

Here it is: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/prices-and-markets/stocks/summary/company-summary.html?fourWayKey=GB00B58GVN47GBGBXASQ1

Very well put Liberty! I'm new here, but would definitely echo that sentiment. It's clear there's a ton of brainpower, experience, and collaboration. It's an amazing board for those and many other reasons. I hope to contribute as much as I gain, but so far it's not even close.

I have a lot of respect for Mayor Bloomberg. Here's a recent clip of him discussing gun control.

Here's Prem's reply when asked the question in one of the Fairfax newsletters posted some time back: Each specific decision can be debated on end, so personally I think it's important to get comfortable with their principles and then look at the track record. There are a lot of folks with good track records that I couldn't understand how they make money (e.g., SAC). On the other hand, I'm sure there are also lots of folks spouting Grahamisms and Buffettisms that haven't proven any good at implementation or remained disciplined enough over a long time horizon. (One should also be careful of affinity schemes.) Hopefully looking at their annual reports/letters gives a good feel of both the principles and the track record. For me, they have check marks in both columns, combined with relatively inexpensive capital, so I have given them a good deal of my money (while being price conscious). As ShahKhezri mentioned, I would also say their style is a more Graham-like, before-he-met-Munger Buffett-like, Klarman-like, or maybe even LUK-like than modern day Buffett-like. Though they certainly sometimes venture up the "quality scale" (e.g., J&J and number of others). Others can probably interject with better specifics, but hope it helps some!

Has anyone heard or read anything about Prem's thoughts on retirement and succession planning? I'm hoping he's in the Buffett camp where since he loves what he's doing he'll be working as long as possible (hopefully a very very long time!). On the investment side it's quite a bit different than BRK in the sense that HWIC seems to work more as a team (though I'm not terribly familiar with their process), whereas Buffett basically works alone. From a succession planning standpoint, this is definitely a plus relative to BRK.

Just an observation, but it's strange, FFH closed at 341.18, FRFHF at 352.02, and FFH.U at 361.52. I never really track the three quotations but would expect them to be a little narrower than that. An unusual end to the day I guess.

Pretty close to where Brian Bradstreet was buying

Well, we don't really know that the memo is exactly the same, so the conclusion does not necessarily apply. There could be some subtles that are in favor of ownership for fairfax. Also, I guess "economic interest" is just part of the consideration of the "benefits and burdens of stock ownership" for tax purposes, and the relative weights of these various considerations is somewhat subjective. In any case, given the audits, I guess this hinges on whether there was "fraud, malfeasance or misrepresentation of a material fact" and the statute of limitations. It's curious this wasn't mentioned in Fairfax's quarterly report given the memo was from June, but it wasn't directed to Fairfax so possibly they didn't know about it (or they thought it unimportant).

From BRK's perspective it would be. But from shareholder's perspective the capital gains (from BRK retaining the dividends) will be taxed again (but potentially deferred). That would take the rate for most shareholders to 27% = 1-(1-14%)*(1-15%) using the long term capital gains rate.

I'm not so sure. Based on her last article (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/business/fairfax-financials-400-million-tax-break-revisited.html?pagewanted=all), the E&Y tax opinion was based on representations made by Fairfax (i.e., they did not independently look at the ownership question). Here's the quote from that article: "Ernst & Young’s clean tax opinion, Mr. Kleinbard wrote, was based solely on representations made by Fairfax. The auditor did not independently analyze whether the insurer obtained share ownership. He cited confidential deposition testimony from an Ernst & Young executive who had worked on the opinion. Ernst & Young declined comment." I'm not quite as familiar, was the second opinion you referred to from PWC as part of their regular audits? From the NYT article: When asked for comment on the opinion, Paul C. Rivett, vice president of operations at Fairfax, made this statement: “The I.R.S. guidance advisory was not issued to, doesn’t mention and has no effect on Fairfax. Two separate I.R.S. audits correctly concluded Fairfax owned these shares; moreover, Fairfax has a binding closing agreement memorializing that correct conclusion, and any statement to the contrary is entirely without basis.” Ah, right, that's clear thanks.

I'm not so sure. Based on her last article (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/business/fairfax-financials-400-million-tax-break-revisited.html?pagewanted=all), the E&Y tax opinion was based on representations made by Fairfax (i.e., they did not independently look at the ownership question). Here's the quote from that article: "Ernst & Young’s clean tax opinion, Mr. Kleinbard wrote, was based solely on representations made by Fairfax. The auditor did not independently analyze whether the insurer obtained share ownership. He cited confidential deposition testimony from an Ernst & Young executive who had worked on the opinion. Ernst & Young declined comment." I'm not quite as familiar, was the second opinion you referred to from PWC as part of their regular audits?

It's been a while, but from what I recall Muddy Waters has been pretty accurate in spotting phony accounting in the past and deserves credibility.

I wonder if Fairfax got a little bit. Still not enough volume to buy back too much. Myself I have to preclear trades through my employer which is frustratingly slow.