Insurance - The Engine That Drives Fairfax

[Viking]

13 hours ago, patterson said:

The 1997 letter has a similar explanation of insurance float, as do the 2007 and 2014 letters among the other years you noted like 1998 discussed by Viking in the part 1 article above. I only know this because I happen to have a document with some highlighted passages.

 

"In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last five, our cost of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding money ... Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had." https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1997.html.

 

Looking over the 1997 letter again, I love the implications of Buffett's simple but profound statement that "[u]nless you understand this subject [insurance float and how to measure its cost], it will be impossible for you to make an informed judgment about Berkshire's intrinsic value." At the time Buffett wrote that, Berkshire's insurance float was something like 7 billion and (very roughly) equivalent to something like 15% of Berkshire's market cap at the time. Contrast that with today, where Fairfax's insurance float exceeds its market cap.

A general question for board members… Given how important float and investment leverage is to the business model of companies following in Buffett’s/Berkshire Hathaway’s footsteps is there a reason Markel doesn’t mention it? I have always found that peculiar.