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Jeff Matthews elaborated on this approach nearly 20 years ago in his Pilgrimage to Omaha. Looking at Sherwin Williams success, I certainly would prefer that Benjamin Moore had become Sherwin. But I'm not persuaded that is the lack of capital so much as lacking the top 1% CEO that Sherwin found. Benjamin Moore is an especially hard example, since it had so-bad-it-reached-the-news leadership, but I think Marmon illustrates that it isn't so much sketching out the strategy as executing that takes extraordinary talent and perhaps luck. I don't perceive that BRK subsidiaries have been denied capital to grow, but they are held to articulating how the use of capital will result in returns in a more disciplined way than CEOs of publicly traded companies are. This is the animal spirits / institutional imperative diliemia that WEB has long discussed. Looking only at winners in that game doesn't tell us much about the likelihood of having replicated it. Bolt-on acquisitions have long been a favorite way of growing for BRK, but I agree Clayton Homes is one of the few examples I can think of organic growth.

Historically, I don't think there is strong reason to believe that the same factors to sell the laggards didn't exist before. For example, in 1989 WEB wrote about the "The Sainted Seven Plus One"—Borsheim's, Buffalo News, Fechheimer Bros, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer, See's Candies, and World Book. Obviously Borsheim's, NFM and See's are still performing well, but part of BRK's model has always been to let the laggards die in place (water the flowers and starve the weeds). There isn't much benefit to weeding - nature will take its course. Even the flowers from the Sainted Seven are tiny so aren't material contributors to BRK's financial performance in 2025.

Amazing!! Thanks for letting us witness the excitement of the arrival and unpackaging. The online version you linked earlier is gorgeous. I can only imagine the beauty of the print edition.

I have long avoided learning anything about energy trading, so I ask from ignorance, but can someone explain what the point of the energy trading operations were/are for Pilot? Do all these changes signal that BRK is shutting down, or at least scaling back, the petroleum trading desk?

I share your view on Greg. At the high end of range of outcomes, he turns out to be a Tim Cook. WEB extols his operational prowess; who am I to argue? Maybe he can optimize operations on the existing businesses and expand the moats. At the mid-range, perhaps Abel won't be able pull the trigger on elephants, so he shifts to returning cash flow to investors through share buybacks and perhaps dividends. At the low-end, he can't stop firing at over-priced elephants, fails to reinvest in the great businesses, and squanders billions in cash. Nothing we've heard about Abel suggests he will fall prey to taking huge swings at stupid targets. And I'd like to believe that Ajit, Ted and Todd will have the sway to prevent Greg from making huge mistakes if I'm wrong about that. But I can certainly envision a Berkshire where the mid-range is the reality you've portrayed. Indeed, I'm not sure we haven't been living in that world for the past decade, where playing around with small, cheap, borrowed yen on the Japanese stock market is the most exciting transaction pursued. The test will be whether Abel is able to identify the huge opportunities presented in a dislocated market and, much harder, has the courage to bring out the buckets to act on those opportunities aggressively.

Agreed. I have long hoped that the Wrigley financing was a toehold into a Mars acquisition, but I haven't seen much evidence to justify that hope over the past decade.

Thought-provoking questions, although I wonder if you are setting the bar too high. If Abel is as good as Dimon, Cook, Brian M. that's more than you can ask for. But as big a question to me is who is Greg's Charlie? Structurally, I'm not sure Ajit is intended to play that role. And to be fair, I don't think you can structure such a role into being. Abel needs to find one or more talking partners. Perhaps it is Todd or Ted or a combination of the three.

The piece that I appreciated most was the value of his leadership at GEICO. I knew he had worked with Progressive, but I didn't realize that his work their overlapped with GEICO's weaknesses. I am optimistic that even as a part-time CEO, he will be able to provide the direction needed to restore GEICO.

Amazing story. Crazy growth starting from scratch with plenty of room to continue to pursue Lloyd's.

It's an interesting story. Crazy how much more efficient buyers were able to make the operations - I was particularly struck by the slashing in employees. This is one instance where I felt like the handsome return has been merited. It will be interesting to see if it works out for Smucker's. Has a Loser's Curse feel to the fancy price, but Smucker's is well enough run that there may be a workable strategy behind the combination.

And further to AAPL, if AAPL's stock price were cut in half, the power of AAPL's buybacks would become even more fearsome. As a serial buyer of stocks, BRK hopes the price of AAPL is cut in half (so long as the intrinsic value of the business isn't likewise cut in half, which China does not seem to so threaten).

I thought the different clips of questions to WEB about his successor in the kick-off video (which started in 1980s) made the point nicely. It is crazy how different BRK looks from even 10 years ago. My favorite part of Adam Mead's book is how easy it makes comparing BRK over the decades. To the same point was WEB's answer about what BRK will look like in 50 years. Who knows? That's why I love the image of the Berkshire canvas: we do know what some of the essential pieces will be in 50 years. How many other companies can you say that for?

Right. I don't have the source to hand, but I recall Charlie discussing how good a business big oil would be if the big oil companies would just stop with the money-destroying exploration. I have in mind that is the appeal of OXY: CEO Holub just turns on the cash spigot. (I haven't reconciled the Permian Basin play with that view though, as even the discussion at the annual meeting made it sound as if shale is an always-explore venture, as contrasted with Charlie's 50-year-plus monthly royalty check.)

Interesting thesis. To put your explanation in my words, Chevron was a liquid option that turned out to be a modest money market (better than costless!) but that hasn't proven to be a windfall, and WEB is ready to unwind (potentially to shift to Oxy, although with some of the preferreds being called, total exposure in oil is currently being lightened)?

Chevron is the interesting one to me. I am puzzled that BRK is jumping in and out of Chevron and TSMC. Obviously Chevron remains a very, very large holding, but I don't remember BRK churning ideas like this in the past - particularly with little evident change.