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Oakforest, Thanks for sharing. Thought provoking.

Zachmansell: Your table, way of thinking about and tracking the CPI/Deflation investments made by FFH and updates are very helpful. Much appreciated. Wondering where you are getting the data that allows you to track the CPI indices. I found the attached CPI Index data and am having trouble replicating the CPI numbers you are using. Biggest variance is for the UK numbers. What am I missing? Is there a different CPI index that is the correct apples to apples comparison for the Fairfax deflation investments? As you know there are a bunch of variants for each CPI index (ex-energy, ex-pretty much anything you want to ex :) Would love to keep track of the bets independently and would appreciate you directing me to the correct data source that applies to the specific FFH investment bets. Thanks. ycharts_chart.pdf ycharts_chart-2.pdf ycharts_chart-3.pdf ycharts_chart-4.pdf

Great information. Thanks for sharing.

Seems like the market price of Berkshire Hathaway as of end of day 2/3/14 is now somewhere between 1.2x-1.3x book for estimated book value ending 12/31/2013. My guess-estimate is most of BRK subsidiaries are doing fine in 2014 and other than fluctuations in mark to market investments (stocks, puts etc.) the book value of BRK in 2014 YTD is same as or greater than year end 2013. Year end 2013 book value should certainly be nicely greater than reported 9/30/2013 book value. . The WEB is "old and will eventually die discount" continues to hang over BRK stock. I hope WEB is backing up the truck on BRK stock and actually buying back stock. So far previous buy back announcement seems to have used mostly as stock price floor setting and as a stock price marketing tool. I have been disappointed with the level of the buyback given how big the discount is and how long it has been going on. Imho BRK should trade at no less than 1.8x-2.0x book value even with the succession issue. Come on WEB, reward the patient and long term shareholders! I would like to own more BRK without putting up more capital!

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/total-nics-background-checks-1998_2013_monthly_yearly_totals-033113.pdf Thanks for the responses. All responses seem to think demand is in a bubble. Here is the link that is commonly used to give insight into demand trends. Are the expectations built into the stock prices that demand falls to below the 1m level? Demand obviously was way high in late 2012/early 2013 but if current 1m+ monthly levels stay steady is that not good for the stocks?

And this has nothing to do with SHLD ;)

RGR and SWHC seem cheap. What do people think? The primary valuation depression driver is that gun sales are in a bubble and will soon decline to "normal levels." However I bought and sold RGR in the teens a long time ago for a small profit. Was scared away by the same logic and now feel like a complete idiot. The FBI checks level for the recent 12 months show pre checks are lower than the post Sandy Hook run up against concerns about greater gun controls. But the levels are still higher than old normal. Is this a case where the new normal is a higher number? Both stocks are crazy cheap if you believe demand and hence FCF stays flat or slightly increases. But there is the rub. Hoping there are people on the board that know more about gun demand and this industry than I do. Here are my thoughts: RGR: Pros 1. Great management 2. Expanding production 3. Great new product intros 4. Taking share Cons 1. The macro gun sales bubble 2. How much demand has been pulled forward 3. What is the replacement cycle if demand was pulled forward? SWHC: Pros 1. Got rid of money losing lines 2. More efficient operator than it has ever been before 3. Turned around? Cons 1. Macro gun bubble 2. Narrow product line 3. Historically spotty and often poor capital allocation and governance 4. Historically more demand swings from its core customers Overall thesis for both: 1. Gun demand bubble concerns are priced in 2. Great cash generation and ROI 3. Demand and supply well in favor of manufacturers 4. Private competitors are a disaster (Freedom etc.) 5. Seems like a Duopoly 6. Gun demand has a new normal that is lower than post Sandy Hook but higher than history 7. Drug dealers are probably loved more than this industry (not that this is a major factor in decisions)

Thanks Uccmal and Myth465. Uccmal: What is the size of the turnout at the annual meeting? Is it possible to meet and spend some quality time talking to the FFH "these people?" Have not been but would go if it was a venue where one could meet and talk to FFH management members appropriately. Would love your insight since it is a rather long haul for me. Not really interested in going if it is like the brk circus. 3) the conference call: they instituted it at/after the near death experience and imho if one listens to all the conference calls since then, the tone and attitude is not really that enthusiastic on FFH's part. Basically the one or two sell side analysts asking a bunch of detailed short term questions about the quarter. Anything else gets brushed off - it is very polite, professional and smooth. Ok if we disagree here, just responding more thoroughly to your point which is well taken by me. I'll let you decide/figure out if I might have already tried that - starting with the NY analyst day during the darkest days :)

Having gone through the entire filing, having trouble telling what the maximum amount FFH could lose on the hedge/swaps/derivatives is. Any insight from board members would be welcome. Basically a related concern to Partner24's question: What is the amount they could lose in a 1/50 type opposite events from their hedged event scenario 1. See the notional amounts but that cannot be the max loss because that would have been a very poor (hopefully non-starter) investment decision 2. See the cost of each derivate/hedge investment line item and see the change in value to reconcile to current market value but that does not give you the total amount they could lose 3. Nothing in the MD&A that outlines scenarios or any verbage scenarios that says if the Russell goes to x we would lose y on a mark to market basis. 4. Nothing in the MD&A or filing numbers that outlines whether they can cap the loss by closing out the hedges/swaps/derivatives at certain points in time or for a certain price or at a certain level of each index. 5. Nothing in the MD&A to give comfort on how much upside there is in the offsetting income from the hedge/swap/derivates that might mitigate the total loss Own a largish amount of FFH and have bought in chunks all the way from $85 (during the they are going under days) to $300 with an average cost of $220ish. Never really considered selling and honestly hope never to sell but the following things are making me wonder/annoyed: 1. The NYSE delisting which I viewed as a bit arrogant and peevish and unnecessarily limiting. The savings 2. Very disappointed with their MD&A and numerical presentation here in this filing. After all FFH and Prem has been through, thought they would be over detailed when you have a really bad quarter even if it is only bad "looking/short-term" mark to market/ short term etc. 3. The way too early time of the conference call imho has been making for too few questions especially quality ones 4. The decision to hedge 80%+ of your portfolio. Why not then just be 20% long invested and in cash? Long term oriented shareholders should be ok with having dry powder and waiting for FFH to pull the trigger. Feel like they are being overly cute and complex with the hedge/swap/derivate maneuver and mathematically don't think it makes sense at such a large percentage? Again, if I am wrong would love to hear a detailed explanation on how you can invest $100 and then hedge $80 and then still make money if the s 5. Unnecessary high bar jump investments like Abiti, canadian retailer turnaround, messy regional airline situation, Level 3, Overstock, usg, dell etc. They were liquid when lots of higher quality companies/business models were cheap, why stretch for these higher bars to jump over. Is there something in the DNA that says we like to buy messy insurance companies and fix them so they are attracted to messy equity investments. fyi, i see and hear their JNJ in the portfolio response but dont consider the price they bought it at to be that great. JNJ is going to have issues if the stent business has issues as that was masking the growth and margin problems in the rest of the business and with their recent consumer product issues and medical device issues that I see could occur, I don't think that JNJ is at a sufficient margin of safety. Almost impossible now for JNJ to find a small Neutrogena for a great price and grow it into a large business to make up for medical device revenue/margin issues. 6. CDS gains caused inflated head syndrome at FFH with respect to investment process? 6. Agree with Myth465 on underwriting so not expecting some miracle there. Again, don't really want to sell so would love for the board members to refute/assuage my concerns with their knowledge and opinions. Hate to pay lots of taxes and its hard to find "replacement" good companies at good prices. Parsad: Hope you take no offense at my rather pointed concerns and vexation. Really like the board and have been a long time FFH fan but am definitely frustrated with some of the recent decisions and this filing's disclosure quality has me a bit more frustrated. Realize this may not pass the worth your time test: but if Prem does care to hear from shareholders that think they have legitimate issue(s) to raise, feel free to pass it along if it is appropriate or worth your time.

;) Title is an attempt at some BH humor given the volume of BH related posts. No offense to anyone. $375/sh US FFH pinks book value at 3/31/2010. Stock at $360=0.96x Book Year end book should be in the $350s at worst even if the stock and put portfolio is more negative. Stock market decline should help with insurance hard market emergence as capacity is constrained and paper gains for other insurers investment portfolio disappear? Who is selling at these prices? Volume has spiked today. Cannot imagine the big 3-4 shareholders needing to liquidate so it has to be the marginal but still not insignificant holders. Pabrai types (just using an example not casting any opinion on Pabrai's abilities or situation) getting or planning for redemption calls given that their portfolios as reported on 3/31/10 have dropped a lot in the 2Q? The FFH and BRK share price drops make no sense to me. Differing opinions are welcomed. Just trying to start a meaty non-BH related discussion !!!

;) Title is an attempt at some BH humor given the volume of BH related posts. No offense to anyone. $59/sh BRK-B book value at 3/31/2010. Stock at $69=1.17x Book Year end book should be in the $50s at worst even if the stock and put portfolio is more negative. Who is selling at these prices? Same exact question for FFH.

Does anyone have an estimate of the dollar amount of Fairfax's hedge/short indices position and a sense for the level at which they are short? Wondering what the positive impact of that is going to be and what % of Q2 portfolio losses are likely to be offset? Thanks.

Curious: Does Canadian/US securities law-reg FD etc. not require them to make a filing/disclose the 2010 presentation at the same time as or before the annual meeting so that all shareholders can see it? Ericopoly - thanks for the old presentations. Agree that they "keep them well hidden." Not sure why the AGM presentations cannot be widely available and as easy to access and archived via their website like the other documents?

AGM 2010 Presentation? I see the link for 2009 on www.fairfax.ca but not one for 2010. Would appreciate if someone can point me to the 2010 presentation. Thanks.

Thx Nodnub the info and clarification and Oldeye I totally appreciate the humor. However, it was a ? not a declaration of intent ;)