RunPacoRun

I have uninvested cash sitting in a tax-advantaged retirement account that earns interest in a government money market fund. Right now, it's roughly 4%. Hence, any premiums earned on cash-covered puts are a bonus on top of that. My brokerage liquidates the money market fund automatically when purchases are made. On March 18th, I sold a put, with strike price of $500, expiring 28-March, for $1.21. Nothing impressive, but a little something to do while waiting for the price to fall. Yes, my calculated IV for BRK-B is $500. But that's me.

It just broke $530. Although there's one more trading day left before the options expire, it did go to show that the stock moved 3%-5% up. Let us know what you ended up doing. I never risk being forced to sell my shares. BTW, I write cash-covered puts for BRKB with the goal of purchasing and getting a premium. I'm in that mode now given the high price.

.95% expense ratio "HLPR" for the symbol would've been more appropriate.

I bought my first B shares on 22 February 2007 at $71.98 per share post-split, roughly $3599 pre-split. The lowest I ever paid per share was $47.70, roughly $2385 pre-split in 2009. Back then, I re-read the shareholder letters and the Intelligent Investor on my commutes to and from work over and over. It took me more than a decade to understand and internalize the principles. When buying shares, I was extremely nervous clicking the execute button, given the high per-share price at the time, and that I was new to investing. I've sure come a long way.

Combining your thoughts here, LearningMachine's, and others on this thread, the Berkshire's underlying motives really go back to the basics: * The discount to intrinsic value for equities in the portfolio has been reached or exceeded. * Treasuries at today's quoted risk-free rates than what's out there for equities and large wholly-owned companies. * They're going to make a big purchase, such as CB. Looking back to pre-2008 and pre-2000, they were just acting on points 1 and 2. Again, these are just inferences from other people's ideas and what has been written in the annual reports.

. . . with the target date being infinity.

Fact: In past shareholder letters, WEB wrote that it's easier to buy a reinsurance company than to start one from scratch. Fact: Looking at the balance sheet, the vast majority of its investment assets are in fixed maturities, $106B out of $136B. There is only $14B invested in private equities. Fact: CB's market cap is $106B. Conjecture: Berkshire could be interested in CB's insurance operation. If Berkshire acquired CB at its market cap with cash, Berkshire could liquidate its fixed income portfolio and then invest it in more equities and/or buy other businesses in full.

Hi Dajidali. It's no problem if you don't receive the meeting credential via mail. You can get one at the CHI Health Center lobby on Friday 11am-5pm or on Saturday 7am-4pm. Bring your photo ID and proof of ownership. https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/meet01/2022geninfo.pdf

That's my conclusion too. Warren stated regularly in the annual letters how much he admired Singleton as a capital allocator, particularly with regards to repurchasing 90% of Teledyne shares at a bargain. Charlie stated in an annual meeting that he and Warren were "avuncular" when compared to Singleton. Hence, I suspect Warren wanted to give a fair warning to all shareholders regarding the strategy behind the share repurchases without explicitly saying they're engaging in a Teledyne 2.0. Based on what I read about Singleton, he just did what was in the best interests of the shareholders who didn't sell, although he didn't communicate what he was doing and why, which meant "too bad" for Teledyne shareholders who sold too early.