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constructive

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Posts posted by constructive

  1. I am going to go on a limb and disagree with most of you guys as it really depends on the company. (I have to admit, these types of companies are EXTREMELY rare and when you find them to buy as much as you can)  There are some companies that have all the necessary characteristics to buy and hold for life and you will be extremely well compensated.  (Strong moat, pricing power, low capex, strong FCF generation, all cash being returned to shareholders etc...) The company in my portfolio that does not only meet but exceeds all those characteristics is Philip Morris International.  This was spun-off from Altria (Mo) and it has been arguably one of the greatest investments to buy and hold forever.  Take a look at their returns for the last 50 years and we should have similar returns for the next 50 years. 

     

    Thanks,

    S

     

    Would you hold PM if it went to 45x earnings?

     

    Nobody thought KO was going to trade at 45x earnings, so they didn't need to worry about valuation, but it did.

  2. If I remember correctly, he later admitted that it was a mistake not to sell KO in the late 90s.

     

    "Nevertheless, I can properly be criticized for merely clucking about nose-bleed valuations during the Bubble rather than acting on my views. Though I said at the time that certain of the stocks we held were priced ahead of themselves, I underestimated just how severe the overvaluation was. I talked when I should have walked."

    2004 Annual Letter

     

    http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=12&ved=0CDAQFjABOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.latrobefinancialmanagement.com%2FResearch%2FIndividuals%2FBuffet%2520Warren%2FThe%2520Waiting%2520Game.pdf&ei=fT2eUb7hDOv_4AOt-4DwAg&usg=AFQjCNGLX390XLI-Hg08b_jD4CxKYoQugg&sig2=WxS1nPyJ_sOieBTPJgYekw

     

    "But Buffett says he erred by not selling them at their late 1990s peaks. Coke, at 45, and Gillette, at 30, are about 50% below their highs. "Coke and Gillette weren't the focal point of the bubble, but they achieved bubble prices," the Berkshire chief observes.

     

    At their highs, Coke and Gillette traded for about 50 times earnings. Buffett said his role as a Coke and Gillette director would have made it nearly impossible for Berkshire to sell its stakes several years ago. As a director, Buffett might have been deemed to be in possession of insider information."

  3. I don't know how accurate this information is, but going from $120m-$500m in 34 years = 4%/annum. Thereby concluding Buffett got offered the right price. Any franchise is for sale at the right price....even Coke..as Buffett alluded to previously...he made a mistake not selling it back in 06/07 I think it was.

    Again, assuming the above info is correct, which is a big if.

     

    I think Moroun's rate of return was much higher than 4%. My impression was $30M was the cost of the entire business, not just Buffett's stake. It was 25 years, since that article was written in 2004. With $1B in annual revenue, the market price of the business was probably north of $500M. And Moroun may have paid himself dividends along the way.

     

    But still, I'd guess the rate of return was significantly lower than Berkshire Hathaway. Hard to beat companies like GEICO and See's.

  4. I will take a little friendly action on the predication of a sovereign default.  I wager a pint to be paid in April of 2015 in Toronto that no sovereign will default.

     

    My thesis is that most will kick the can down the road as interest rates will continue to stay low (or lower) helping the situation.  Call it the anti-Bass theory.

     

     

    Cheers

    JEast

     

    How are you going to decide what constitutes a default? Some people think Greece hasn't defaulted in the last two years, others think there has been one default, others think two.

     

    What countries are you talking about? The odds are against you if you include all 196.

     

    http://static3.businessinsider.com/image/4d30bc1a4bd7c8a073220000/chart-of-the-day-sovereign-debt-default-jan-2011.jpg

  5. I was looking at the holdings for the Valley Forge mutual fund which is managed by Brian Boyle of Boyle Capital.  Look at these -- this has got to be someone who reads this board, right?  Right?

     

    MBIA 14%

    AIG 13%

    SHLD 11%

    BAC-WTA 9%

    SD 5%

    FFH 4%

    LUK 3%

    BRK.B 3%

    JCP 2%

    CHK 2%

    MSFT 2%

    CWGL

     

    It's basically just Fairholme plus a little Fairfax, he doesn't necessarily size his positions by number of COBAF posts.  :)

     

    But I do see a problem.

    VAFGX            1.64%

    FAIRX              1.00%

  6. I didn't start learning investing before 2009, so could anyone please tell me if we had a lot of fairly valued stocks in 2007, or everything was quite over valued at that time?

     

    2007-2008 was a fascinating time in the market. There was huge, very fast sectoral rotation. Financials were hammered from capital losses and raising equity. Speculative commodity prices and producer valuations collapsed. Retailers and consumer goods posted operating losses from declines in discretionary spending.

     

    The market P/E was only around 17 in 2007. There were certainly opportunities, if you understood what types of companies had a risk of permanent loss, as opposed to temporary loss.

  7. I don't think those stocks offer favorable risk/reward profiles. All three are unprofitable, PLUG has negative gross margins and APP has negative tangible book value.

     

    http://schwert.ssb.rochester.edu/f532/rnm_value_2012.pdf (On average, profitable companies outperform unprofitable companies.)

     

    http://www.bengrahaminvesting.ca/Research/Papers/Griffin/Does_Book-to-Market_Equity_Proxy_for_Distress_Risk.pdf (Cheap stocks outperform on average, and distressed stocks underperform on average. You can't just buy distressed stocks and assume they are cheap.)

     

    http://www.russell.com/indexes/documents/research/defensive-equity-is-the-market-mispricing-risk.pdf (High beta stocks are systematically overpriced, since some investors seek out lottery tickets indiscriminately.)

     

    If you are interested in distressed companies, I'd suggest debt and hybrid securities as a more attractive area to concentrate on.

     

  8. I'm talking about cost of capital, not discount rate. Judging by the large car loans and home loan do you think this family will have an average cost of capital less than 4% over the next 30 years?

     

    It's nowhere close to being as safe as Treasuries. What if you need to make unexpected repairs? What if you sell the house and don't recoup the cost of your solar addition?

     

    True, energy inflation works for you, but regular inflation works against you in this calculation.

  9. On a high level it seems hard to lose money at this game with current economics (including incentives).

     

    Why do the short sellers believe SolarCity can't buy/install systems that pays themselves off and then generate a profit long term?  That's what seems crazy to me. 

     

    If the typical homeowner can have a system built that pays for itself, SolarCity somehow can't be at least as capable of doing so?

     

    Good question. As far as I can tell, distributed solar panels have single digit ROIs, whether SolarCity owns and operates them or homeowners. Take away tax breaks and they would go negative. In contrast, solar farms and solar hot water have double digit ROIs.

     

    The reason I think SCTY will have worse economics than homeowners is that they will give up margins for growth. But the moat they are trying to build with their growth is illusory.

     

    Not short, but I think the business model is weak, and the valuation is terrible.

  10. There is a point where you have a large enough install base throwing off cash that it overwhelms the expenses associated with having the guys running around town installing new systems.

     

    Yes, time will overwhelm installation expenses, but if they have the wrong model it will never overwhelm the operating expenses. And in the meantime they are going to need billions more dollars.

     

    Also, compare revenues to operating assets. On that basis they're a third as efficient as centralized utilities. That metric isn't going to improve very much unless they increase prices.

  11. Well with -50% profit margins so far, SCTY is looking like a non-economic actor too.

     

    It sounds like SCTY gets repaid over 5 years if they are selling you electricity.  Then they get paid a second time if you buy the equipment from them at that point, or else they just continue to milk you for cash flow as you continue to buy only the electricity.

     

    This sort of model would create a lot of depreciation expenses in the beginning even though they would be hugely cash flow positive (given enough scale and high installed base of customers).

     

    Similarly, if you build a hydro dam I doubt you look like an economic actor until it is built and operating.

     

    OK. Throw out depreciation, cut SG&A in half, still negative.

  12. Also, you have to think about how recently the terms of the preferred were amended (mid 2012), and how extreme the terms are.

     

    Treasury and FHFA specifically amended the terms to eliminate any possibility of Fannie and Freddie's viability. This wasn't an accident, this was the clear intent.

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