Ballinvarosig Investors
-
Posts
886 -
Joined
-
Last visited
Content Type
Profiles
Forums
Events
Posts posted by Ballinvarosig Investors
-
-
Can anyone tell me why BNSF is trading at $100.23?
-
Unusual for the Buffett of the last decade, but not so unusual for the Buffett of the partnership days.Things that are very un-Buffett-like based on what we've heard over the last decade. -
I have followed WR Berkley for a couple of years now, but have never purchased. They just released results today. BV = US$22.97. Stock is trading at US$24.25. Price to BV = 1.05 which is multi-year low (ingoring how low all stocks went in March 09 which in my mind is an anomaly).
Did you strip out goodwill when calculating book value? That should raise the ratio to 1.11, still cheap.
-
True, but when was the last time that Buffett bought a Dollar for 50 cents?The concept of buying a dollar for 50 cents seems too hard to grasp for a statistician.
To me at least, Buffett has been using two approaches in his investment career. The first is the pure Ben Graham approach of buying unloved stocks that are selling below book value. If Taleb refutes this approach, he clearly doesn't know what he's talking about as we have actual (Graham-Newman, Buffett Partnership, Schloss Partnership) long-term outperformance.
The later approach that Buffett uses (the buying and holding of great businesses) is impossible to evaluate considering Buffett is really the only investor who has a record of long-term performance. Therefore, Taleb does actually have a point that Buffett may actually be lucky (post-Pertnership days anyway).
Buffett once said he was 15% Phil Fisher and 85% Ben Graham. If you ask me, he's the other way around now. If you look at the BNSF deal, the only Ben Graham characteristic there is the margin of safety. It's certainly not cheap, not unloved, not depressed, and not a cigar butt by Graham standards.
I think it's kind of funny. So many people cite Ben Graham and the demonstrable proven performance his methods bring, but yet so few actually use his method as intended. Even with you guys, from what I can see of your portfolios and the stocks you talk about, the majority of you do not invest like Ben Graham. That's not a criticism of anyone by the way, obviously Ben Graham isn't the only investment philosophy around! From what I can see though, it is wrongly cited.
-
http://2010.therussiaforum.com/news/video/
Taleb, Milken, Faber and quite a few others talk shop.
What I find remarkable, is that a few of those chaps have no idea what they're talking about. But hey, when did being a hedge fund manager require knowing anything about investing ;D
-
Bought General Growth Properties at the bottom of the market, just as they were about to declare bankruptcy (not my own idea, read a Bill Ackman presentation). After they went up three times, I sold up despite still agreeing with Ackman that the company was trading well below instrinsic value. Should have been a 30-bagger >:(
Bought Allied Irish Bank at just over €3 in late 2008 on the fact they hadn't been so low in 15 years and were still profitable. Share price continued to tank and ended up reaching a low of something like €0.30. Stupidly didn't do my homework (bank is probably the most insolvent bank in the Western World now). I don't feel too bad because even Warren Buffett got caught out trying to catch a falling knife with the Irish banks.
Lost the most money on my Penn Traffic position, but strangely I wouldn't consider this an awful pick. When you're buying the garbage that no one wants, you're always going to get a few zero's.
-
I think the AXP/Salad-Oil Scandal analogy is definitely appropriate here.
The financial cost of the recall to Toyota will be $2 billion - give or take a couple of hundred million. The stock on the otherhand has been cut by tens of billions. It seems the assumption of the market is that the Toyota brand has been quite severely damaged by the incident. The question here is that assumption valid?
-
It's funny, you guys are usually so rational when it comes to investing, but yet when Warren Buffett is mentioned, that rationality just goes straight out the door and you go into "Hero-Worship" mode. What's even worse, is that when there is criticism, it's shouted down, after all, who knows better than the "Greatest Investor of All-Time"?
If you ask me, there's a lot of great material on her blog, and you guys would be for the worst if you didn't read it. For example, if you look at the NetJets posts, there's a huge amount of information and analysis that's never been written before. I know Buffett is a long-term investor, but even on that scale, NetJets has been an awful investment and all the warning signs were there from the outset. If it was so clear, why did he do it then? It has to be ego.
I don't agree with everything she's written, but I think it would be foolish to dismiss her as a hysterical woman after she has had the personal access that you guys could only dream of.
-
I really enjoy reading the Chanticleer quarterly reports and find myself in agreement with most of their picks. However, I really don't have the foggiest why they've gotten themselves in with the Winmill's (Winmill Corp, Tuxis Corp, Bexil Corp, Foxby Corp). Gradual erosion of shareholder value (Bexil), lack of reporting (Winmill) and entrenched management (no catalyst for change).
Investment Partners Asset Management have been particularily scathing about Winmill and their affiliates. They had this to say about Bexil Corp.
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/52234/000145078909000310/exhibit.htm
I've seen Matt Miller of Chanticleer posting here a few times. Maybe if he's allowed to, he can explain he's invested here ;DBexil Corporation (“Bexil”, formerly Bull & Bear Government Securities Fund) is approximately 25% owned by Winmill. According to Bexil’s annual reports and SEC filings, Bull & Bear Government Securities Fund, which previously had been a series of Bull & Bear Funds II (an open-end mutual fund), in 1996 converted to a stand-alone closed-end fund organized under Maryland Law. In 1999 Bull & Bear Government Securities Fund changed its name to Bexil Corporation. In December 1999 the board changed the investment objective from purely government-oriented income securities to include equity and other securities of selected growth companies and in companies that invest or deal in natural resources or commodities. In 2000, the board again adopted a new investment policy to own through internal development or acquisition majority stakes in new and small businesses, including privately-owned companies. In 2002 Bexil filed to de-register, and in 2004 Bexil was granted de-registration as a closed-end fund. Bexil purchased a stake in York Insurance Services Group in 2002 and sold that asset in 2006 for $38,864,121. Upon entering the agreement to sell that asset in 2005, $815,625 in bonuses were awarded to employees, and upon consummation of the sale of that asset $1,909,228 in bonuses were paid to Bexil employees. Bexil’s total expenses in 2006 were $3,452,332, with the largest percentage being employee-related costs. In 2007 Bexil’s shares were de-listed from a national exchange (AMEX) and it de-registered with the SEC as a public company. Among the reasons cited for this decision were the ongoing costs and expenses of remaining listed on the AMEX. Bexil’s most current financial information is from September of 2009 when it showed a book value of $38,146,124. Despite Bexil’s stated desire to reduce certain expenses, from fiscal 2007 through the 3rd quarter of 2009 (while Bexil had not yet purchased a stake in an operating business) it incurred $3,339,993 worth of expenses (with the largest percentage being salaries.) During the first quarter of 2009, Bexil provided for a loan for insiders to purchase $2,366,933 worth of Bexil stock under options for which Bexil does not appear to have yet received any cash proceeds. The transaction appears to have given Bexil insiders (who previously only had stock options) actual ownership of more than 100,000 shares at a weighted average price of around $21.95, while book value per share at that time exceeded $38.00. While there is likely a benefit to insiders of Bexil personally, it is not apparent how such a transaction benefits outside minority Bexil shareholders directly or outside minority Winmill shareholders indirectly. Though Bexil’s stated book value at September 30, 2009 was approximately $38.1 million, its market capitalization at its last-sale share price on December 15, 2009 of $22.40 (according to the quote in the pink sheets) is only about $22.5 million - a discount to book value of more than 35%. Since January 6, 2004, when Bexil was granted de-registration as an investment company, its share price is up about 36%, while its stated book value has increased by approximately 151% during the same period. -
BRK up 5% after shares were split today.
-
Can anyone hear a popping sound?
[flash=200,200]
-
It's interesting, the price is probably going up in expectation that investors are going to pile into the B-shares once they're split. I think it might scupper a few plans if the newly split B-shares actually went down on the first few days of trading :DSplit is having some effect ... BRK-B jumped up 4% today, when everything else was down.
Good luck to anyone who thinks they'll make money out of this.
-
That's funny, I actually enjoyed the first 2/3's and felt the last 1/3 was a little rushed. Anyway, I don't think I would go so far as to say that she's "milking" her Buffett connection. Most of the time I read anything she writes or watch her; I learn something new. Also, I see an awful lot of comments accusing her of being "bitter" in that article. Personally, I think the Buffett-worship is going a little too far.
-
Absolutely.I am a US Investor. If I buy shares of Fairfax through FRFHF, I will still be eligible to receive any future dividend distributions from Fairfax, still be able to vote on proxies, etc? Correct?
-
Hugh Hendry is another hedge fund manager who says the same thing. His November 2009 commentary is available here. I highly recommend reading it.
When you think about it, what the likes of Hendry and Hoisington are suggesting is incredible. Treasury markets are already at generational lows, but yet these guys have come along and suggested that they're going to go even lower.
-
I'm only going by his mutual fund performance as linked to above, but that to me shows that he had no divinity what was coming in 2008/2009. Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying he's a bad investor. But I sure as hell wouldn't be writing a book about a crash that I didn't see coming!tanked in 2009? sure about that?
-
I don't know what his hedge fund returned, but his mutual fund didn't perform well.Anyone know what his returns are like?
One of you say his returns are good since inception, another says that it tanked during 2009 ... ??? ???
-
Three things annoy me about Whitney Tilson.
1. He seems to have repositioned himself as one of these people that foresaw the housing/credit market crash. Considering his two mutual funds tanked in 2009, I don't think he's in any position to be lecturing others about the subject.
2. He strikes me as another one of these people (and there are many) that think that Warren Buffett is simply infallible. Right before the construction market collapsed, he was touting USG (http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=3752). Now I don't have a problem with someone making a bad call, but I do have a problem with people who simply tout stocks because Warren bought them.
3. He seems to be under the misapprehension that he's a value investor. There's a few stocks in his portfolio that definitely are value stocks (dELiAs*, etc.), but most of his stuff is anything but (nothing wrong with non-value stocks, I just don't think you should be talking about yourself as a value investor unless you have most of your investments in true value stocks).
I actually like Whitney Tilson anyway. Right or wrong, he puts himself out there and shares his ideas at least!
-
I'm intending on doing some research into Japanese stocks, however Google isn't being too helpful. Have any of you clever folks dabbled in the Japanese stock market, and if so, what resources do you use to drum up ideas? I'd be particularly interested in getting new lows lists, some sort of filter screens and any other goodies that can help you dig out bargains. Other than cursory glances at the likes of Sony, Nintendo and Toyota; I don't have the first clue about Japanese stocks, so any thoughts/tips/advice would be great.
Thanks!
-
Up another 30% on a takeover. I love it when a stock surpasses your wildest dreams :DFortunet - FNET (this stock was a great pick, it just kept giving and giving) -
Surprised that this one has been missed.We interviewed Bruce Greenwald, the Director of the Heilbrunn Center for Graham & Dodd Investing at Columbia University in November. He was less than impressed with Berkshire Hathaway’s decision to buy the balance of Burlington Northern they do not already own. You own a good deal ofBerkshire Hathaway, what is the value investor’s case for using Berkshire
Hathaway stock to buy this company?
Last year I sold all my Berkshire and then I bought back what we now own.
Last year I said that you have to take Warren Buffett at his word that he will
do a couple of points better than the S&P going forward. And he did. That’s
not bad at all. But I believe that we are still of the size where we could do a
bit better. But that is absent some type of cataclysmic event – and then we
faced this cataclysmic event, which allowed Berkshire to put tens of billions of
money that was earning less than 1% to work, to earn 10%.
I can’t see how Burlington Northern was a great deal. The greatness of
Berkshire is its deployment of float and profit. They are deploying other
people’s money in terms of float - premiums on insurance policies that don’t
have to be paid out for years and years. If you are going to use part of that
float to pay for an investment, you have to make sure the investment is going
to make good money. With Burlington Northern, if you adjust for a buyer with
cash and don’t think much more about it, then it was not a great deal. But if
you bought it using cheap debt and good chunk of other people’s money and
you were highly confident that the company would give you a cost-plus return
over a decade, then it’s a good investment.
Borrowing money is a sure way to die. But if you are buying toll booths and
roads and regulated industries – pipelines or railroads or electric utilities,
where you know you are going to end up with some type of cost-plus pricing –
you are going to do very well, given that the actual equity you have in it is low.
It’s like buying a house with a low down payment. If you judge the return after
expenses, after taxes, and on the profits on shareholder equity, the return can
be two to three times what it looks like to an all-cash buyer.
-
Talk about taking your toys and going home :DCheck out this filing of Sharper Image Corporation's Settlement Agreement with its departing CEO:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/811696/000119312506261766/dex101.htm
You want to focus on Section 7 therein...
HT: footnoted, of course
-
I don't have a problem with corporate art as long as there isn't a conflict of interest. In this case however, there's a conflict of interest so large, you could drive a bus through it! A cash strapped CEO selling his own useless maps to the company without an independent valuation is most certainly that.I actually dont think that is that bad. Most large companies have "art" and other interior design features that would cost just as much. If you put an antique map on the wall, then you don't have to put a painting.
Further, the art/painting isn't "necessary" shareholder spending, but for a company that size that can benefit from having a corporate headquarters that isn't just walls and paint. A better looking atmosphere will increase employee attitudes and not turn of clients/outsiders when they come for meetings. Plus, they will probably be used for 50+ years. $12 million/50 years $240k/year, which is a rounding error to a company with 647 shares outstanding.
In addition, CHK probably didn't get a bad deal; I know their CEO had huge financial problems (I think he margined his stock & was forced to sell during crisis). He was probably in a position where he had to sell.
-
I've never actually laughed at an SEC filing until I read this. What's even crazier is that this guy seems to be a darling of CNBC (he's been interviewed several times and Cramer thinks he's wonderful). I suppose this only serves to highlight just how important good management is!Voting for the worst footnote of 2009 ended last night and footnoted readers have chosen the disclosure by Chesapeake Energy (CHK) that it had spent $12.1 million to purchase Chairman and CEO Aubrey McClendon’s antique map collection. Here’s the disclosure in all of its glory from the April 30 proxy statement:In December 2008, the Company purchased an extensive collection of historical maps of the American Southwest from Mr. McClendon for $12.1 million, which represented his cost. A dealer who had assisted Mr. McClendon in acquiring this collection over a period of six years advised the Company that the replacement value of the collection in December 2008 exceeded the purchase price by more than $8 million. The maps have been displayed at the Company’s Oklahoma City headquarters for a number of years, during which the Company has been insuring the maps in exchange for their display. Our corporate headquarters in Oklahoma City is comprised of numerous buildings in a campus-type setting. These maps have been displayed throughout the Company’s headquarters for a number of years, complementing the interior design features of our campus buildings and contributing to our workplace culture. Our employees and visitors appreciate the maps’ depiction of the early years of the nation’s energy industry and the discovery and expansion of Indian Territory (now, Oklahoma) and the surrounding territories of the early United States. In addition, the collection connects to our Company’s everyday use of mapping in our business of exploring for and developing natural gas and oil. The Company was interested in continuing to have use of the map collection and believed it was not appropriate to continue to rely on cost-free loans of artwork from Mr. McClendon. The Board of Directors authorized the purchase of Mr. McClendon’s collection following review and approval by the Audit Committee and required that the Company’s purchase price be applied as a credit to Mr. McClendon’s future FWPP costs. Future purchases, if any, of historical maps or artwork for the Company’s headquarters will be made directly by the Company.
Now just imagine for a moment being the person responsible for writing this sort of bulls-it. Sounds like a fun job, eh? This particular disclosure got a lot of exposure this year after we wrote about it and even prompted Chesapeake to issue a amended proxy a few days later to provide additional details on the maps and other goodies the McClendon received. Toward the end of the year, it was also mentioned in this profile of footnoted friend Nell Minow in The New Yorker.
Has anyone come accross any other filing goodies?
BRK's 2009 Annual Report/Chairman Letter to Owners
in Berkshire Hathaway
Posted