omagh
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Posts posted by omagh
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When you're being presented with book value growth numbers by Fairfax, always remember that a substantial portion of book value growth is from share issuance. About 8 or 9 years ago, I did a spreadsheet going back to 1985 to look at the approximate returns on book value using 1985 issued shares and returns on new capital to get a sense of how much return Fairfax generates per retained earning dollar. Obviously there are some judgement calls in doing such a spreadsheet, but some fair assumptions can be made. Fairfax's returns on existing 1985 capital and new issues are nothing stellar and are much less than the absolute book value growth that Watsa likes to showcase. That said, I still think that Watsa is an excellent jockey.
-O
I am wondering if anyone has an idea of the effect on the book value of FFH when the purchase of the remaining shares of ORH is completed. Will the fact that the ORH shares are being purchased for a higher price mean an adjustment to book value of FFH to reflect a higher value for the ORH shares already held? Thanks in advance for your comments.
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FT,
Why speculate on a hedge? What special insights do you have into the future of the S&P 500 that make it worth allocating your hard-earned money? Here's a reasoned counter-argument...
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574420811475582956.html#articleTabs=article
Maybe an S&P bet is not such a "fat pitch". H-W made its hedges when there was substantial evidence of massive credit issues and Watsa presented his arguments to shareholders at the annual meetings in 2006 and 2007. Further, if inflation starts, E inflates and why cap your P? If economy recovers, E inflates and why cap your P?
-O
With the recent rise of the market, and the statement from Hamblin-Watsa that they are continuously monitoring the market for hedge purposes, I was asking myself to what level of the S&P500 I should hedge my portfolio.
S&P500 reached a high plateau of about 1500 in 2007. If you buy the future scenario like the one Billl Gross is elaboring (i.e. future growth will be much lower in the years to come) and if you think that the earnings in the 2006-2007 era were inflated by leverage in the banking and real estate sectors, then you should not expect S&P500 to reach 1500 anytime soon on a fundamental basis, because this equates to lower E and lower P/E. This is so subjective, but if in the short term the S&P500 would reach 1200, then I would be tempted to say that the market is priced for perfection, i.e. V shaped recovery.
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Zorro,
Government in the US (Fed) expanded its balance sheet on the order of ~$1T. Further, there has been a stimulus package of ~$780B. In a $15T economy, these are significant, but they're definitely not the whole picture. Unemployment is undoubtedly crappy, confidence is crappy, but tremendous amounts of human and financial capacity sit on the sidelines.
Personally, I've been fully invested since March (maybe 3-5% cash) and keep rolling over companies that are being taken out (3 so far this year - TUN.TO, WEST, ORH with a fourth rejecting a low-ball offer). Companies with strong balance sheets are taking advantage of low market pricing relative to future growth opportunities. The opportunities to re-invest with decent margins of safety are still available, but dwindling.
Perma-bear James Grant has a downright peppy essay in WSJ today which questions the consensus opinion that the recovery will be slow and tepid.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204518504574420811475582956.html
As if they really knew, leading economists predict that recovery from our Great Recession will be plodding, gray and jobless. But they don't know, and can't. The future is unfathomable.
...
Growth snapped back following the depressions of 1893-94, 1907-08, 1920-21 and 1929-33. If ugly downturns made for torpid recoveries, as today's economists suggest, the economic history of this country would have to be rewritten. Amity Shlaes, in her "The Forgotten Man," a history of the Depression, shows what the New Deal failed to achieve in the way of long-term economic stimulus. However, in the first full year of the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt (and the first full year of recovery from the Great Depression), inflation-adjusted gross national product spurted by 17.3%. Many were caught short. Among his first acts in office, Roosevelt had closed the banks. He had excoriated the bankers, devalued the dollar, called in the people's gold and instituted, through the National Industrial Recovery Act, a program of coerced reflation.
Omagh, a quick question. Things may not be getting worse but are they really getting that much better? How much of the recovery is due to the government's massive spending programs and how much is natural market cycles? I think that the government intervention has stopped the freefall but when the spending ends what then? I will have a look at John Train's essay. Thanks for the link.
cheers
Zorro
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Zorro,
The 'end of recession' means that things have stopped getting worse and the opposing force for recession is growth. The dramatic stock price drops over the last year have been a result of economic declines and uncertainty. The "quick, dramatic recovery" is repricing to the "economic decline" and removing the "uncertainty", but earnings provide the floor for stock prices. Earnings have stabilized in many industries and have gone up in a few stocks that I own. Companies will start hiring soon enough and employment will start its downward descent. The economic gloom in the US reminds me of Canada in 1991-1994 when we had gobs of foreign debt and were being threatened with credit downgrades. This is the Baby Boom generation's last chance before they all retire, so there will be a lot of pressure on government to get its balance sheet into better shape.
I think that we're moving on from the Early Surge to the Surge Continues in John Train's fictional essay about market cycles.
-O
Employment is a lagging indicator. I wouldn't put too much stock in it other than to suggest that demand will be slow in some corners.
Typically, it is considered a lagging indicator by economists. The point that I think many are missing is that the economy will recover slowly while unemployment recovers. The current market rally is pricing in a quick, dramtic recovery. This is a senario I have trouble believing. Further if you factor in "true" unemployment - i.e. include those who have stopped looking for work or are now working part-time because their hours were reduced - unemployment is much higher than many realize. The next six months should be interesting as the slow pace of the recovery becomes more apparent.
cheers
Zorro
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Zorro,
Employment is a lagging indicator. I wouldn't put too much stock in it other than to suggest that demand will be slow in some corners.
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/03/business-cycle-temporal-order.html (written in March 2009 at the height of the stock market panic)
-O
The jobless rate nationwide is expected to peak above 10 percent next year, from its current 9.7 percent.
"You are seeing the pace of job losses slow a little bit," said Mike Lynch, a regional economist at IHS Global Insight. But states "are not out of the woods yet."
The United States lost 216,000 jobs in August, the department said earlier this month, down from 276,000 in July. Employers have eliminated 6.9 million jobs since the recession began in December 2007.
To me this suggests the current rally is way over done. The next six months should be interesting.......
cheers
Zorro
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For a second there, I thought this was the Yahoo! board... ;)
Poppy Harlow is a hottie ... :-*
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<iv,
Cole would be proud...thanks for the detailed breakout of your case. It's quite compelling and I'm doing some further due diligence. I've had some mixed success with leasing co's.
Cheers,
-O
Hi O,
Here are the Coles Notes …
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http://www.goodwoodfunds.com/investinfo.htm
http://www.goodwoodfunds.com/pics/gwdfund_mo_perf.gif
Has anyone looked at this name. It appears Goodwood is going to provide investment for a 2% mgmt fee. Does Goodwood have a good management record to more than overcome the 2% fee? TIA.
Packer
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The following alarmist article suggests overcapacity. Is this significant to your thesis?
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1212013/Revealed-The-ghost-fleet-recession.html
The biggest and most secretive gathering of ships in maritime history lies at anchor east of Singapore. Never before photographed, it is bigger than the U.S. and British navies combined but has no crew, no cargo and no destination - and is why your Christmas stocking may be on the light side this year
The 'ghost fleet' near Singapore
http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2009/09/08/article-1212013-06435781000005DC-710_634x403.jpg
The 'ghost fleet' near Singapore. The world's ship owners and government economists would prefer you not to see this symbol of the depths of the plague still crippling the world's economies
-O
New SEC Filing out today dated showing more buying right up to September 9th.
Dennis picked up another 600K shares in September thusfar: Now owns 12.81% of the common and upon conversion of the preferred shares he will have substantially more. If you follow the dates, Dennis has bought stock every day the markets have been open since August 11th. The only days no transactions occurred where on Sat/Sun/Labour Day.
Disclosure: Seaspan is my largest holding.
<IV
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Thanks 653211/JEast. Here's the correction notice from Gurufocus.
Cheers,
-O
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Correction:
Fairfax Financial did not increase its holdings in Odyssey Re since 6/30/2009. The confusion was caused by an Aug. 14 13-F filing of Fairfax, which indicated that Fairfax owns about 37.8 million shares of Odyssey Re. Fairfax filed an amendment on Aug. 17 to correct the errors about Odyssey Re. GuruFocus missed that amendment, which resulted in this confusion.
GuruFocus.com corrected their statement after missing an amendment by Fairfax.
Cheers
JEast
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http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=68897
FFH is buying above their offer of $60. That's a strong indicator of an increased offer.
-O
Right now, the market is discounting a takeout at ~$65-67 rather than the $60 offered by FFH.
After going through a couple of buyouts of 2 Canadian stocks already in this rally since March, I'm biding my time. So far, buyers have either paid more or been rebuffed and the price still stayed at the bid. If another undervaluation comes along in my research, then I may pull the plug sooner.
I'm mostly raising cash from US holdings back into C$ as well.
-O
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Right now, the market is discounting a takeout at ~$65-67 rather than the $60 offered by FFH.
After going through a couple of buyouts of 2 Canadian stocks already in this rally since March, I'm biding my time. So far, buyers have either paid more or been rebuffed and the price still stayed at the bid. If another undervaluation comes along in my research, then I may pull the plug sooner.
I'm mostly raising cash from US holdings back into C$ as well.
-O
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As 70+% shareholder, FFH is only competing with themselves and an 'independent' valuation. Who else competes? Where's the greenmail opportunity? For most ORH shareholders, there is a gain. BUT, every ORH shareholder knew they were in a minority position starting out. The catalytic events for realization of value were twofold: 1) company performance and 2) FFH takeout. Other outcomes were minor such as FFH sale of ORH position or somebody taking a 5% position and 'ruckus'ing about valuation.
The 'independent' valuation is a bit of theatre. There are relationships in play that will not be fully disclosed. These valuations are never high and the acquirer never walks away. FFH is being opportunistic here based on their estimation of ORH's future cashflows, but the valuation will not reflect FFH's real estimate. FFH shareholders will be well served and ORH shareholders will not, but the theatre from here to transaction close will quibble over a few $/share. The ORH board has few choices here other than some public statements. Barnard has been anything but independent in his actions to date.
Minority shareholders are not well-served in these situations, but they do have the choice to enter these positions or look at other 'fat pitches'. Personally, I took a small position recently ~$37/share as a book value growth play with the expectation that FFH would adopt the NB pattern. I am pleased with the transaction timing but, it could have been a longer wait.
-O
I expect part of the reason that FFH has not offered the details of their share sale is that they are expecting to have to raise the offer by a couple of a hundred million when all is said and done.
The share sale at FFH will be an interesting event. The dilution factor for exisiting shareholders could be up to 20%. On the other hand this is offset by the value of the asset received so the price of the shares should not drop. It may bring in other large shareholders. It will certainly prevent FFH from going private in the near future which was looking like a potential concern to me at least.
IF FFH drops temporarily my ORH shares should offset this. If it actually rises which may happen then thats gravy.
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What's the long term strategy when taking a series of minority positions (ICICI, Alltrust)? Most operating companies want to be in charge of their destiny through control positions and by taking control of the underwriting and the investment float. Are there national restrictions on percentage ownership? Wouldn't a control position in a wholly-owned national subsidiary be preferable as a long-term strategy? I understand wanting to participate in the upside of strong growth in maturing economies (e.g. BRIC countries). If this is a taste test to a control position, that's a positive risk control measure that FFH has learned during its seven lean years (hi TIG!).
-O
I infinitely prefer this mode of growth to the purchases of huge existing insurers with decades of liability of their balance sheet. This way FFH gets to really know the operations and participate in their growth with future capital infusions such as is being done with ICICI, Advent.
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Sanj,
Every time my portfolio hits new highs, I start looking around at what to trim. Now is one of those times.
I wouldn't be too worried about the casino players. There are speculators in all markets. We're probably going to start hitting some rougher waters in the fall as major players start coming back into the market after the summer hiatus. The Dow has risen mightily on weakening volume. The market is ripe for some short-selling on speculative run-ups.
The nice thing about value investing is that the ups and downs of the market are the opportunities presented by Mr Market who is currently in a manic summer phase. Who knows what the fall brings?
-O
I'm having a very, very hard time with what is happening in the markets these days. AIG at $50/share! Wow! You're kidding right?
This weekend I was at a wedding, and a family friend of mine was telling me how his uncle has nearly doubled his stock market investment for him in a few months. The process...a little of this, a little of that, some of this and some of that. No discussion of valuation, intrinisic value, growth, balance sheet strength or economics.
We expected the markets to rebound considerably from the March lows in our 1st Quarter letter, but me thinks speculation is beginning to run rampant again and the stupid fast money is flowing swiftly. Beware the rising tide! Cheers!
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Hi Sanj,
This is the first year of Francis' new US$/C$ currency hedging policy. Apparently, he had some clients who were uncomfortable with the currency shifts. If you're talking to Francis, I would be curious to know what his thoughts are on the US$/C$ going forward. He previously was of the opinion that the US$/C$ was a long cycle that didn't have significance since the swings were roughly cyclical around a mean. Has his view changed now that the US (deficit $2T on $15T GDP ~ 13%) is in a significant recession while Canada (deficit $0.05T on $1.5T GDP ~ 3%) is in a milder recession? Buffett seems to think that the US$ vs world currency basket is going to decline.
BTW: good luck on the burger quest!
-O
I always wait to see what Francis writes, because it gives me some idea of what the guys at Hamblin-Watsa may also be thinking about. Francis' 2009 Semi-Annual report is out, and in there he discusses interest rate swaps to protect against inflation. He's also the only mutual fund manager I know of that refunds management fees if he's unhappy with his performance. Cheers!
http://www.choufunds.com/pdf/SeAR%2009%20printing.pdf
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k,
A return of capital to shareholders (an extraordinary dividend) is pretty uncommon, but I did have a stock do that a few years ago. Essentially, the company was generating 20% RoIC, but since revenues were not expanding, RoIC was declining as capital accumulated. So, management which owned a substantial amount of shares determined that the best use of capital was to return money to shareholders via a special dividend. The stock dropped by approximately the same amount. Strangely, there was a run-up in price between the announcement and the dividend cutoff date, but some new shareholders may have been angling to arrange their income by taxation.
-O
I'm assuming the market will correct the stock price for this extraordinary dividend payment:
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/iPass-declares-20-mln-apf-352495178.html?x=0&.v=1
This 20 million payment is good for shareholders of the stock as of Aug 31st. Hmmm... at today's price of 94 million market cap, that's nearly a 21% gain from dividends alone. Has anyone seen something like this before? I've seen this once a long time ago, but I wasn't a shareholder in the period this payment was met, and I didn't track the stock price to see if the market adjusted for this distribution. I'm inclined to believe it will. At the time of announcement from the board of directors, the price was 1.80. It's now trading at 1.50. It will need to go to $1.45 for the distribution to be fairly valued into the stock price. IPass has over 70 million in cash and cash equivalents, and is trading near book. Any thoughts?
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It's interesting to contrast Buffett's patience to Bill Miller's haste. Miller fully expected that the government would assist the marketplace with backstops when he dug deep on FRE and others. Yes, Buffett is benefiting from TARP indirectly through BRK's holdings, but that's while following rule number one "Don't lose money".
-O
Here's another guy trying to make a name for himself. They're coming out of the woodworks!
There are some very valid points in the article. Although the criticism of Buffet is somewhat off target. It is true that all of corporate America has been a beneficiary of TARP and other bailouts. And yes it is probably true that without them both Berkshire's (and this is the key point, everybody else's holdings) might have ended up being depressed for a very long time. So yes, Berkshire benefited, but so did you and I. Do I really believe my other stock holdings would be where they are today without these actions? No way, they'd be in the dumps at the March lows maybe for several more YEARS.
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http://www.fairfax.ca/Assets/.../2009_AGM_Slide_Presentation.pdf - slide 12
In 23 years under current management, float has been obtained 230 basis point cheaper than borrowing, including some periods where borrowing was impossible for FFH. FFH also maintains a high cash component on its balance sheet to deal with some inevitable short term risks, including the ass-biting. As a 10-year shareholder, there have been some bumps and lumpy returns, but the track record has been good and I've continued to invest new capital along the way.
-O
The CR issue has always bugged me as well. If you are proponents of disciplined underwriting, then no matter how long tail your business might be, the results should show, year after year. We haven't seen that, yet. I still hold out hope.
If we see that FFH can't underwrite business profitably, then is there really any reason to be an insurance company? Why not be a hedge fund? If you are paying for float, why not just borrow money and invest? It's much safer than underwriting risks that can bite you in the ass every so often, possibly in a big way. Buffett always talks about being paid for float, and what a great deal that is. He's right. If investments are the only source of income, then just invest. Investment results could get even better without insurance regulations limiting the possibilities.
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The Fed should hire Dennis Gibbs. He's shown his mettle in operating run-off. He's run out of things to do at Fairfax.
The poor US taxpayer is not done paying for AIG...$160BB and counting. With Buffett and others withdrawing from the marketplace for pricing, it's inevitable that AIG will consume more capital destroy more wealth. Unfortunately, the public purse may not know when it should exit because it's play way outside of its circle of competence.
-O
Lot of red flags:
Despite the fed takeover, they're still keeping reinsurance risk within the group (from one sub to another) ? Either the risk was so toxic for the price, that industry refused it (so they had to do it amongst themselves) - or no-one is looking at the consildated group risk (its only individuals within each sub looking at only their sub).
The fed invests 130BB+ and isn't aware they its behind, & not ahead of policy holders ? Or is it more likely that at the operating level AIG's UWs haven't been told that the fed has an override - so they believe they have to write, because they need the premium ?
AIGs UW risk has to be rising dramatically - as they're writing for additional premium, and don't seem to be able to reinsure much of it. Assume reinsurance where-ever practical, & their book can only contain a material & growing slug of really low quality business. The securitiation issue again, but this time with insurance vs Alt-A & liar loans ?
A super-cat loss doesn't have to be weather related, it could also be the collapse of significant UW capacity - & arguably the risk that AIG is increasingly representing. We know that WEB has been withdrawing from super-cat because the premium doesn't warrant the risk - perhaps this is part of the reason?
It cant be easy running AIG, so lapses is corporate wide risk management & communication are to be expected.
Hopefully they can fix it before it blows up.
SD
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Q2 2009 Earnings Call Transcript
July 31, 2009 8:30 am ET
Executives
Bradley Martin - VP, COO and Corporate Secretary
Prem Watsa - Chairman and CEO
Greg Taylor - VP and CFO
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Key points...
During the first six months of 2009, shareholders’ equity at June 30, 2009 increased by
$644.4 to $5,613.2 from $4,968.8 at December 31, 2008. Common shareholders’ equity at June 30, 2009 was $5,510.7 or $315.91 per basic share (excluding the unrecorded $340.1 excess of fair value over the carrying value of investments carried at equity) compared to $278.28 per basic share (excluding the unrecorded $356.0 excess of fair value over the carrying value of investments carried at equity) at the end of 2008, representing an increase per basic share in the first six months of 2009 of 13.5% (without adjustment for the $8.00 per common share dividend paid in the first quarter of 2009, or 16.4% adjusted to include that dividend). During the first six months of 2009, the number of basic shares decreased primarily as a result of the company’s repurchase of 28,700 subordinate voting shares. At June 30, 2009 there were 17,443,784 common shares effectively outstanding.
Major changes to portfolio investments in the first six months of 2009 included a net increase of $1.6 billion in bonds, a net decrease in cash and short term investments (principally U.S. Treasury securities) of $2.2 billion and a net increase of $0.8 billion in common stocks. The unrecorded excess of fair value over the carrying value of investments carried at equity was $340.1 at June 30, 2009 ($356.0 at December 31, 2008).
Holding company cash, short term investments and marketable securities at June 30, 2009 totalled $880.1
During the first six months of 2009 OdysseyRe purchased on the open market approximately 1.2 million of its common shares pursuant to its
previously announced common share repurchase programme, increasing the company’s ownership of OdysseyRe to 71.9% as at June 30, 2009.
As of June 30, 2009, the company owned $5.81 billion notional amount of credit default swaps with an average term to maturity of 2.9 years,an original cost of $114.8 and a fair value of $158.4.
During the second quarter of 2009, the company sold $140.3 (2008 – $855.0) notional amount of credit default swaps for proceeds of $8.6
(2008 – $190.0) and recorded net losses on sale of $0.3 (2008 – net gains of $22.8) and net mark-to-market losses of $81.7 (2008 – $7.0). During the
first six months of 2009, the company sold $3.04 billion (2008 – $4.69 billion) notional amount of credit default swaps for proceeds of $231.6
(2008 – $1,075.0) and recorded net gains on sale of $46.2 (2009 – $317.0) and net mark-to-market losses of $71.8 (2008 – gains of $384.0). Sales of credit default swap contracts during the first six months of 2009 and 2008 caused the company to reverse any previously recorded unrealized market value changes since the inception of the contract and to record the actual amount of the final cash settlement through net gains (losses) on investments in the consolidated statements of net earnings.
June 30, December 31,
2009 2008
Holding company cash, short term investments and marketable securities, net of short sale and
derivative obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 862.7 1,555.0
Holding company debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858.3 869.6
Subsidiary debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899.9 910.2
Other long term obligations – holding company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176.1 187.7
Total debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,934.3 1,967.5
Net debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,071.6 412.5
Common shareholders’ equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,510.7 4,866.3
Preferred equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102.5 102.5
Non-controlling interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,026.1 1,382.8
Total equity and non-controlling interests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,639.3 6,351.6
16.1% 6.5%
Net debt/total equity and non-controlling interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Net debt/net total capital(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.9% 6.1%
Total debt/total capital(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.6% 23.7%
Interest coverage(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9x 16.4 x
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(letter only, full report isn't posted yet)
http://www.longleafpartners.com/pdfs/09q2letter.pdf
We use the depressed 2009 numbers as the base for going forward rather than assuming
normalized levels of cash flow from an average of the last several years. A stock’s price
must be significantly discounted from what current business levels justify for us to buy.
We have greater confidence in our appraisals because in addition to using conservative
assumptions, some macroeconomic tailwinds could make our valuations too
low. Credit remains tight, but its wider availability should help increase business
activity. Stimulus spending across the world is in early stages and should show more
impact going forward. Production levels dropped significantly more than GDP
declined, thereby depleting inventories over the last six months. Industrial production
will rise above current rates without demand growth.
Effect on Book Value of FFH when ORH purchase is completed
in Fairfax Financial
Posted
Hi frog, It's probably on one of the old computers in storage, so I'll have a look for it in the next couple of weeks and post if I can find it. If it was on a work laptop, it may not have survived. For someone with some free evening time, it's easy enough to do but tedious now that there are about 25 years of annuals to wade through.
-O