prevalou

The question is : where are the bad loans ? Since the last crisis banks are very careful on their exposure. Even bad loans at italian banks are overcollateralized.

I think there is a bit of truth this, the problem is psychological. There no confidence in anything anymore? China, no. Europe, was there ever. Oil, look at a chart. Real Estate/Housing, look at where the GSEs are. Ive heard 3-4 guys say we are heading for Japan (Munger, Summners, Marks), Pick a US State... its in budget crisis....Simple things is you cant count on the old things any more and when you do that you stop making out lays of capital and start.....and thats just the financial side of things. Forget the rest of the worries that have always existed in a similar form or another. From what gather and the musings online and such....I dont know why Yellen keeps doing the same shit quarter in and quarter out....pull your reliever he got you out of the jam already. The Brexit thing by itself seems trivial....compounded with the rest its no wonder investors flee to bonds and bond like investments......I have no proof but I suspect that never normalizing policy(in any country) after risk of true collapse receded harmed confidence a great deal....Yellen is fighting the last war. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-06-15/deutsche-bank-if-one-wanted-simple-indicator-broken-financial-system-then-it That chart makes teh Third Reich look like a better investment enviornment than Germany today....just saying. Edit: assuming bond yeads are and indicator investor sentiment and during these hard times, Buffett accumulates PSX and maybe other investments...

Funny is the story of the 90 years old grand mother invested at 85 % in equities ! Yes 85% ! What would he say about old grand father Munger invested at 95% in equities !

interesting because when social media stocks tank, it is just the beginning and when its hedges tank, it is the end of the move and Prem will soon be proven right...

Fabulous... annual report 2013: "...these losses are significant but we consider them unrealized and expect both of them to reverse when the grand disconnect disappears-perhaps sooner than you think..." annual report 2014: :"...these losses are significant but we consider them unrealized and expect both of them to reverse when the grand disconnect disappears-perhaps sooner than you think..." annual report 2015: "...these losses are significant but we consider them unrealized and expect both of them to reverse when the grand disconnect disappears-perhaps sooner than you think..." annual report 2016: "...we have warned you many times in our annual reports of the many risks that we see and the great disconnect between the markets and the economic fundamentals. These risks may be coming to a head in early 2016..."

Maybe there is a tendency to give up on value investing after 10 years of underperformance and embrace macro investing because there are big down moves in the market. Macro gains favor in a bear market (most of it at the bottom) while stock picking doen't interest anymore. At the top, it is the contrary : Nobody has interest in Fairfax.

No date ?

Yeah, I didn't say I don't believe you. But it doesn't really matter in which European bank they are. Btw. I wouldn't like to own any of those "certain eurozone countries'" sovereign bonds listed on this very page. I agree with that. However, the ECB ending up with all the problematic European sovereign bonds can't be qualified as a (long-term) solution – at least not in my mind :) Euro banks sovereign Greece debt exposure is minimal, it is my point

https://www.db.com/ir/en/download/DB_Interim_Report_3Q2015.pdf page 40

for instance DB Greece sovereign gross debt exposure is $ 0

Interesting because even in this thread negativity abounds...

I agree with that. There was a time when conventional wisdom said: "it is important to have a lot of debt in a private company because management can't rest on its laurels and has to seek growth to refund the debt". If I Invert: "in our societies with massive lending, people are being lazy and growth will be low for years."

anyway, if the 1950/1970 period doesn't explain the increase in M2% GDP, it seems "lending from fractional reserves doesn't explain the massive increase in lending. Why is it important to know who is lending: in a borowing contract there are two concerned parts: the borrower and the lender. Why is there an obsession with the borrower ? Maybe the lender has a strong hand and can withstand a a bad credit or a recession. Nobody seems to care. Is it conventional wisdom applied ?

An increase in the money supply multiplied by fractional reserve banking, operating over 60 years. from 1980 to 2013, us M2%gdp went from 69.4 % to 88 % (in M2 are the deposits you are mentioning). Source Worldbank. I don't see the massive increasing lending in these figures. Maybe the increase was before in the 50s, 60s ans 70s ?

the problem with japan is that all this lending by japanese goes to an improductive borrower (the government).